SH227 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Prime Minister Rabin
2/5/76; 3:27 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
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R: I understand that you said when it comes to the question of the treaty program you don't have your answer yet.

K: It is not negative but I did not get a positive answer.

R: Then how to you propose to deal with it?

K: I will tell Simcha Dinitz about it. I have marked it. That could not be done as rapidly as the other.

R: What?

K: What I would like to do on long-term programs. . . . The way this gets confused is they discuss maximum programs each time. There are certain fundamental items we know we are going to do.

R: If you can distribute, say tanks, artillery, these are the items you have given us and there is no real program except the planned numbers, to decide about the numbers and then to decide about a time of deliveries.

K: That is what I think. We could have two categories. We could have a certain basic minimum, say, agree to on a long-term addition and some basic annual additions but that will take me a number of weeks to sell but this is not impossible.

R: All right.

K: You have to remember I had my only meeting with the President this morning since we came back.

R: I understand. What we have in terms of priorities is basically about 4 items.

K: Which are they?

R: Tanks, ABC's, missiles . .

K: Where is that?

R: In the page, the third page.

K: Yes, I have got it.

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R: We had, there are, for example, the Aim 9 H which is supposed to be 49, I think. It is the process of being delivered to Kuwait. This is the most advanced, which would mean they will have it before we will have it. If my information is correct, I would, like I did not get it officially.

K: I don't know that.

R: The fourth item is the German lugil (?) weapons.

K: I knew you were going to raise tanks so I raised it this morning and I was told this is an especially difficult one, but why don't we leave it, Mr. Prime Minister. You can be sure we will do better in several of the categories you gave me than what you have and I will let Dinitz know how much better we can do.

R: All right. I hope really that it will be better.

K: I gave you my philosophy on this. I am not saying we are not going to have troubles in the years ahead but they will not arise this way. As long as I am here we will press you if we want to press you.

R: The third items we mentioned certain needs from third countries in Europe.

K: I will get Haig to do it. He promised me to do it.

R: I believe it was raised in the last 9 months.

K: I told Haig to do it and I don't know why he has not done it. That has to do with bridging.

R: There are three items there and Dinitz will be able to give it to you. Therefore, I think the question of long-term, if not, I would find items that anyway you are going to give us . . .

K: What I would like to do on the long-term. If they want to say that call to it to your financial capabilities there are joint minimum financial capabilities we can assume. Let us get those you can use and if more become available we can go to an annual increment on top of a basic program.

R: The second point of course is I hope you will succeed in advancing certain dates of delivery on those things.

K: I have not talked to Defense but to Scowcroft and the President and my impression was we could do that.

R: The third country issue. . .

K: I have never talked to the third country myself but if this situation is the way Dinitz described it to me all they need is word from us.

R: That is what I was told because I did not talk with them.

K: If that is the case, you can count on it in the next few weeks in that we will talk to them.

R: Okay.

K: I read your press is screaming about that Sadat comment and I don't know what clarification we can do except I was on my trip.

R: The way I sense it is Asad said you gave him a commitment.

K: I, Henry Kissinger?

R: I can't recall. In his speech either that you or the United States.

K: To do what?

R: I think, I believe it would be better if some of your people will give you the paper because it was a public statement. According to what we had it was published in the Israeli paper that you gave him a commitment or something of this kind that you will do better on the question of the PLO.

K: (laughs) I don't know what I can do, except what I have said 100 times publicly. I have explained to you my theory.

R: I am not questioning it. It came from Sadat himself.

K: I would not have urged the strategy we were discussing, if this were not our intention. I will get the paper.

R: No one practically raised this issue in Israel lately except when three days ago when Sadat started with it.

K: We cannot have constantly these demands for clarification. Well, it doesn't come from you; I have no complaints from you.

R: I am quite sure when I arrived to Los Angeles the first question I had in a press conference was what do I have to say about it.

K: And what you said was fine.

R: I said I don't have the text of Sadat's statement and second, that I would to the best of my knowledge America's policy is as it was declared by so and so . .

K: And you can say you talked to me and you were told that this is my position.

R: Can I say ~~anyk~~ without denying anything after Sadat's statement I talked to you and you restated your position.

K: You can say this. I would not want to tackle Sadat head-on.

R: I understand.

K: You can certainly say I restated our position and that this is the American position.

R: Fine. It is all right. Thank you.

K: I think your trip was a very great success.

R: I believe so too even though we have got all the problems back home. Not such a good deal for them; they cannot accept that things can be good.

K: What is so wierd about this is on one hand they accuse us of the worst treason and on the other they want reassurance from us.

R: Don't seek logic in the papers.

K: Everybody here feels and I certainly feel that you have conducted yourself in a very statesmanlike way. I talked to a number of our mutual friends on the West coast after the meeting you had there. They were all very impressed.

R: I am glad to hear it. I had an interesting lunch at which I had professors, one [redacted] is very strange. B6

K: They did not tell me what went on.

R: That is lunch here in New York.

K: What did he want?

R: Why doesn't Israel recognize Chile. The Jewish communitiy is for strong defense budget. We are accused on both sides. By Israel on one hand by some people that we don't encourage and we do encourage people here to be for strong defense. And why we supported the American intended action in Angola.

K: (laughs) Well.

R: I asked him what does he expect Israel to do. Not to talk to Chile and if we talked to Chile, would he propose not to talk to Russia because they are the same regime. I am leaving tonight.

K: Have a good trip back.

R: Israel would like to thank you very much for what we have discussed and what has been exchanged.

K: I think it has been a good visit. We will no doubt have difficult times but we have worked together on them before and we will do it again.

R: I really thank you very much.

K: And give my best to (Rabin's wife).

R: And give our best to Nancy.

END