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INFO

14 MAR 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO

SECT 1420F2

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

1. PRELIMINARY STATION INTERPRETATION OF ELECTION


RESULTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE \_\_\_\_\_ FORWARDED IN \_\_\_\_\_

A MORE COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS CANNOT BE MADE UNTIL DETAILED RESULTS ARE AVAILABLE IN APPROX THREE WEEKS. TO WHAT EXTENT THE ELECTORATE DIVIDED ALONG SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS LINES CANNOT BE ANSWERED PRECISELY WITHOUT FURTHER ANALYSIS.

VARIABLES SUCH AS THE NEW VOTERS, ILLITERATES, AND THE EFFECT OF POSSIBLE GOVT PRESSURE AND INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS ALSO REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. NEVERTHELESS MOST OBSERVERS INTERPRET THE OVERALL RESULTS AS AN INDICATION THAT U.P. PROGRAM STILL APPEALS TO SIZEABLE PORTION OF THE CHILEAN ELECTORATE, ESPECIALLY TO LOW INCOME GROUPS. APPARENTLY THE MATTER OF ISSUE OR PROGRAM IDENTIFICATION SEEMED TO INFLUENCE THE VOTERS MORE THAN THE VOTERS' PERCEPTIONS OF CANDIDATES OR PARTIES.

Declassified and  
Approved for Release  
July 2000

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PAGE 2 SANTIAGO

2. WHILE THE PDC APPARENTLY USED THE PRE-CAMPAIGN [REDACTED] FUNDS TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES AND THE PN DID NOT, BOTH MADE OVERALL ELECTORAL GAINS WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT [REDACTED] FUNDS. THE FUNDS ALLOWED THE PARTIES TO RUN WHAT WAS CLEARLY A MAXIMUM EFFORT. MOREOVER, LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND SHIFTS IN STANCE IN THE PN ARE NOW IN THE OFFING AND THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE BENEFICIAL IN THE LONG HAUL. THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN CHILE GIVE A DEFINITE ADVANTAGE TO THE LARGER PARTIES AND THIS PRINCIPLE OBVIOUSLY WORKED AGAINST THE PIR AND THE PDR (AS WELL AS THE SMALLER PARTIES IN THE U.P.) THE PDC IS STILL BY FAR THE LARGEST PARTY IN CHILE. THE PN MOVED FROM FOURTH INTO SECOND PLACE, AND WHILE CODE'S REPRESENTATION IN BOTH HOUSES HAS DECLINED BY ABOUT 4 PER CENT IN COMPARISON TO THE LINE-UP BEFORE THE ELECTION, CODE MAINTAINS A CLEAR MAJORITY IN BOTH HOUSES.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR ASSESSMENT AS OUTLINED IN OPTION THREE OF SANTIAGO [REDACTED] IS STILL GENERALLY VALID. ALL POLITICIANS ARE STILL VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF EVALUATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ELECTION AND EXCHANGING

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ACTION UNIT

INFO

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 SANTIAGO

VIEWS, SO THE LINEUP FOR THE FUTURE IS STILL QUITE FLUID. HOWEVER, MOST OF THE ACTORS SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD THE CENTER OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. MANY GREMIALISTAS HAVE ADOPTED THE VIEW THAT ANOTHER NATIONAL STRIKE WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE UNLESS IT IS PLANNED CAREFULLY IN ADVANCE WITH THE FULL COOPERATION OF CODE AND AT LEAST TACIT SUPPORT OF ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE WATCHWORD OF THE PN NOW IS COORDINATION WITH THE PDC WITHIN CODE AND WITH THE GREMIALISTAS. ALLENDE APPEARS TO BE INTERESTED IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH HIS PROGRAMS BUT IN A WAY CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO CARRY THE PDC ALONG WITH HIM. PRATS IS REPORTEDLY CONTENT WITH THE ELECTORAL RESULTS AND IS SEEKING RESOLUTION OF SOME OF THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF A MODUS VIVENDI BETWEEN THE U.P. AND THE PDC. PRINCIPAL UNKNOWNNS ARE (A) WHETHER THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WILL DECIDE TO STAY IN THE GOVT, AND IF SO UNDER WHAT TERMS, OR RETIRE; AND (B) TO WHAT EXTENT THE PDC WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO ACCEPT SOME OF U.P.'S PROGRAMS AND REPRESENTATIONS IN THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO GAIN ELECTORAL GROUND; PUT ANOTHER WAY, IT IS NOT CLEAR YET TO WHAT EXTENT THE PDC CAN AND WILL

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 SANTIAGO

MAINTAIN A POSTURE OF ACROSS-THE-BOARD OPPOSITION TO THE U.P.  
AND THUS LEADERSHIP OF CODE.

4. WE FEEL THAT DURING FORESEEABLE FUTURE, STATION SHOULD  
GIVE PRIMARY EMPHASIS TO [REDACTED] ACTIVITY, TO WIDEN OUR  
CONTACTS, KNOWLEDGE, AND CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT  
ONE OF FOLLOWING SITUATIONS:

A. CONSENSUS BY LEADERS OF ARMED FORCES (WHETHER THEY  
REMAIN IN GOVT OR NOT) OF NEED TO MOVE AGAINST THE REGIME.  
STATION BELIEVES WE SHOULD ATTEMPT INDUCE AS MUCH OF THE  
MILITARY AS POSSIBLE, IF NOT ALL, TO TAKE OVER AND DISPLACE  
THE ALLENDE GOVT. OBVIOUSLY THIS WILL NOT BE EASY TO DO. THE  
CHILEAN MILITARY TENDS TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS ESTABLISHED  
CHAIN OF COMMAND AND ONLY WHEN A CONSENSUS IS EVIDENT.  
MOREOVER, GENERAL PRATS DOES NOT SEEM DISPOSED TO GO ALONG  
WITH THIS OBJECTIVE.

B. A SECURE AND MEANINGFUL STATION RELATIONSHIP WITH  
A SERIOUS MILITARY PLOTTING GROUP. SHOULD OUR RE-STUDY OF THE ARMED  
FORCES GROUPS INDICATE THAT WOULD-BE PLOTTERS ARE IN FACT  
SERIOUS ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS AND THAT THEY HAVE THE NECESSARY  
CAPABILITIES, STATION WOULD WISH TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE, SECURE

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 5 SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

CHANNEL WITH SUCH ELEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF DIALOGUING AND, ONCE BASIC DATA ON THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPABILITIES IS OBTAINED, TO SEEK FROM HQS AUTHORIZATION TO ENTER INTO AN EXPANDED [REDACTED] ROLE.

5. SHOULD THE MILITARY DECIDE TO REMAIN IN THE GOVT INDEFINITELY AND TO PARTICIPATE IN GOVT PROGRAMS AT ALL LEVELS, STATION WOULD VIEW AS A MINIMUM OBJECTIVE THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY TO ACT CUMULATIVELY AS A BREAK ON GOVT PROGRAMS. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MILITARY ROLE WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO MERELY BLOCKING AND SLOWING DOWN THE PROGRAM OF THE U.P. REGIME.

6. WHILE THE STATION ANTICIPATES GIVING ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO OUR [REDACTED] PROGRAM, OTHER POLITICAL POWER CENTERS (POLITICAL PARTIES, BUSINESS COMMUNITY, MEDIA) WILL PLAY AN ESSENTIAL SUPPORT ROLE IN CREATING THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES (A) OR (B) ABOVE. GIVEN THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION RESULTS, STATION FEELS THAT CREATION OF A RENEWED ATMOSPHERE OF POLITICAL UNREST AND CONTROLLED CRISIS MUST BE ACHIEVED IN ORDER TO STIMULATE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION FOR INTERVENTION ON PART

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PAGE 6 SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

OF THE MILITARY.

7. AT THIS STAGE IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE FINANCIAL NEEDS OF THE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT TIME FRAME. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FUNDS TO THE CODE PARTIES TO KEEP THEIR ORGANIZATIONS ALIVE, GROWING AND FIGHTING. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THE ENTIRE MEDIA FIELD AGAIN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WE ARE NOT YET ABLE TO GIVE AN ESTIMATE OF THE FINANCIAL NEEDS OF THE OPPOSITION TO COVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS OR SO, BUT SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO IN NEAR FUTURE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]