

# **12 FAH-7 H-220 PROGRAM DESIGN AND APPROVAL**

*(TL:LGP-01; 08-10-2001)*

## **12 FAH-7 H-221 GENERAL**

*(TL:LGP-01; 08-10-2001)*

The RSO designs and adapts LGPs to address post threat levels, taking into account the security provided by the host government. The design of the program is determined by the facilities and residences the U.S. Government must protect and what protective measures will be used. A major design issue for many LGPs is whether or not the LGF should carry firearms and under what circumstances they should be used. The program design should also consider the need for security enhancements installed in residences and/or using mobile patrols in residential areas. Static residential guards may be authorized for certain categories of residences according to the threat level at post.

## **12 FAH-7 H-222 IDENTIFYING GUARD SERVICE NEEDS**

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a. After identifying the facilities and personnel the post must protect, the RSO is responsible for determining the extent of guard services required. Principally, the threat and the type of scope of other security measures already in place will influence this determination. Within policy guidelines, the RSO identifies guard posts, specifies hours of coverage per day and days per week, and the function of each guard on post.

b. LGF personnel should be the initial barriers against harm to U.S. Government personnel and facilities. The LGF provides an early alert of possible attacks against U.S. Government assets. Guards are expected to resist attacks, thereby providing a first line of defense from such violence.

c. Demand for guard services is dependent on how well the host government protects U.S. Government personnel and facilities and on how well it is able to respond to and deter criminal incidents in general.

d. The types of guard services provided are:

(1) **Access control for visitors and their packages**—The examination and inspection of all non-U.S. Government employees entering an official facility, on foot or in a vehicle, to ensure that they and any packages or other material in their possession do not contain weapons, explosives, or other items prohibited from entry into the mission;

(2) **Control of visitors within official facilities**—The maintenance of order and the control of any disturbances created by visitors who have been permitted entry into the mission. For example, visa applicants who refuse to accept in an orderly manner rejection of a visa application;

(3) **Examination of vehicles for contraband and explosives**—The check of all vehicles, official and non-official, including cars, vans and trucks before allowing entry into official facilities in order to ensure that the vehicles do not contain weapons, explosives, or other items prohibited from entry into the mission;

(4) **Foot patrol of secure perimeters**—The patrol by a guard or guards either inside or outside of the exterior of the mission and its outer perimeter;

(5) **Protection of employees at work and at home**—Ensuring the security of employees while working in official facilities and at certain posts providing security to employees and dependents at their residences through mobile patrols or static posts;

(6) **Mobile patrols**—One or two guards, with a vehicle, who may conduct security checks at official facilities or residences on an irregular basis and/or be responsive to alarms and calls for assistance in the event of criminal or terrorist attack;

(7) **Reaction forces**—In countries with a high threat level, an armed mobile force that is prepared to respond to alarms and calls for assistance in the event of criminal or terrorist attack;

(8) **Bodyguard and/or armed escort for the chief of mission (COM) and others**—Guards employed by the U.S. Government, solely or in concert with host government security personnel, assigned to protect the COM or any other member of the mission, determined by the Emergency Action Committee (EAC), to be under extreme risk of personal violence or assassination;

(9) **Surveillance detection**—Often accomplished by LGF observations, but the objective of surveillance detection is considered so important that it has been assigned its own staff and program management (See 12 FAH-7 H-222, paragraph g); and

(10) **Such other security functions as determined by the RSO—** Depending on the local security situation, threat level and intelligence reporting, local guard forces may be assigned to tasks above and beyond those described above.

e. Where the host government provides security guards or patrols, or participates in the LGF mobile patrols, the post will be responsible for determining whether or not these services are adequate to meet the post's needs. In instances where a unit of the host government's security force is detailed to the post, the RSO or PSO will usually exercise professional oversight of this unit. Custom or circumstances may require the provision of a stipend and/or food, shelter or other forms of support for services rendered. Such costs are authorized if they are restricted to the LGF program and approved by DS/CIS/PSP/FPD. They should be accounted for under the RSO's input to the post's annual International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) budget submission.

f. A major element in the post's LGP is the SDP. Surveillance detection (SD) is the identification of planned terrorist activities targeted at a mission through the use of personnel specially trained to detect and report on surveillance or other suspicious activity directed against the mission. This program requires a significant commitment in personnel and financial resources. U.S. Government surveillance detection requirements will normally not be met by host government forces, but the nature of the program requires host government concurrence before implementation.

g. An optimum and appropriate amount of host government protective services should be sought and its performance monitored by the RSO. In addition, where a LGP is required, it should be managed by the RSO. It is U.S. policy that missions should contract commercially with a suitable and qualified local firm for the provision of all guard services to meet the mission's needs. This contract should provide coverage of specific posts for the required hours per year by trained guard personnel, transportation equipment, communications equipment, weapons, expendable supplies, and such operational costs as can be anticipated at the time of signing of the contract. Where this is not feasible or can be shown to be more costly and less effective, the mission may contract for guard services directly, using a personal services agreement (PSA). The mission then selects, trains, supervises, and disciplines guard personnel. The mission must also maintain proper records concerning the management and operation of the force. The administrative overhead costs to support the LGF personal service agreements must be borne by the mission and are not chargeable to the LGP.

## 12 FAH-7 H-223 NEED FOR ARMED GUARDS

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a. Several factors must be taken into account by the RSO when making a determination that armed guards and/or bodyguards are needed to protect mission personnel and assets. The RSO must obtain Department approval for arming SD personnel. Should the RSO consider the use of firearms necessary for any security personnel the Department requires the following items to be taken into consideration:

(1) Mission policy, as developed by the EAC, supported by the RSO and approved by the COM concerning the need for armed guards;

(2) The 12 FAH-6, *Security Standards*, as related to special protective equipment (SPE);

(3) The host government laws, regulations and policy concerning weapons in the hands of a local guard force. **NOTE:** In those rare cases where an armed SD force is needed, particular attention must be paid to host government regulations on carrying and use of concealed weapons;

(4) Other local laws which may restrict the type and/or caliber or weapons that can be used (i.e., weapons exclusively for military forces use);

(5) Host government and U. S. Government policies on use of deadly force.

(6) Establishment of a clear line of responsibility for personal injury, loss of life or property damage (liability). Particular attention must be paid to differences in responsibility between a non-personal services (NPS) contract guard forces and PSA guard forces as well as local liability law.

(7) DS policy with regard to types and capabilities of weapons requested by the RSO to accomplish the mission. Heavy caliber or high rates of firepower (semi-automatic and automatic) weapons are usually restricted to bodyguards and certain high-threat situations;

(8) Procurement sources for weapons and ammunition, i.e., contractor, U.S. Government. See 12 FAH-7 H-626;

(9) The host government licensing and firearms training requirements for armed guards; and

(10) Training program for NPS contract or PSA guard forces, in the absence or unacceptability of host government standards. (i.e., Who will provide training, what are qualifying standards?).

## **12 FAH-7 H-224 HOST-COUNTRY CONSIDERATIONS**

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a. Due to the size of the mission and the number of personnel, dependents and official facilities that require protection, the LGF in many countries can constitute a substantial force. Posts and RSO and/or PSOs should make every effort to ensure that appropriate host government agencies and officials are fully aware of the size and function of the LGF. They should also ensure that a post's LGF is fully in compliance with any host government laws, regulations or policies governing the establishment and operation of a "private" guard force.

b. Many countries are also very sensitive about weapons and ammunition in the hands of any other entity other than their own police or military forces. Restrictive requirements or outright prohibitions may preclude the use of armed guards. Where the use of an armed LGF is contemplated, information relating to the above considerations must be fully researched and documented. This information must be maintained in the post's LGP files and records. A copy of this information should be provided to DS/CIS/PSP/FPD. Post specific, in contrast to nation-wide information, concerning host government regulations on weapons and ammunition should also be included in the post records.

## **12 FAH-7 H-225 PROGRAM APPROVAL**

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DS/CIS/PSP/FPD reviews each post's LGP submission to ensure that the program request is in accordance with established standards. Adjustments may have to be made if the program submissions for all posts exceed the funding available to DS/CIS/PSP/FPD for the worldwide local guard program. If an adjustment is needed, DS/CIS/PSP/FPD will notify the posts effected.

## **12 FAH-7 H-226 THROUGH H-229 UNASSIGNED**