

RELEASE IN FULL

THE UNITED STATES, THE NEW WORLD ORDER, AND NATO: A DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE



December 15, 1993
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

CONTENTS

Opening Address <i>Captain Donald P. Loren, US</i>	2
NATO's New Direction: Can You Get There from Here? <i>Commander Kurt W. Tidd, US Navy</i>	4
NATO in the New World Order <i>Kori Schake</i>	8
Comparing the Roles of NATO, NACC, and the CSCE <i>Celeste A. Wallander</i>	14
Keynote Address <i>Thomas G. Weston</i>	33
NATO and the United Nations <i>Alan K. Henrikson</i>	40
The Alliance and Post Cold War: US Interest in Europe <i>Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.</i>	52
The Implications of Russia's Response to East European Hopes of Inclusion in NATO <i>Uri Ra'anan</i>	63
NATO: A SACEUR Perspective <i>Col. Richard H. Witherspoon, US Army</i>	70
Closing Remarks <i>Robert D. Putnam</i>	74
Contributors	76
List of Participants	79
About the Fellows Program	83

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS: TOWARD A NON-ALLERGIC RELATIONSHIP

Professor Alan K. Henrikson
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

The United Nations traditionally has been allergic to NATO. I use this unusual word—from the Greek allos + ergon, or "other" and "work"—because it suggests exactly that odd reaction, a disagreeable sensitivity to or even actual antipathy toward another, different kind of body, that has characterized so much of the United Nations community's response over the years to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Perhaps revealingly, there is not a single reference to the North Atlantic Alliance or NATO in the most recent annual Report to the membership of the United Nations by the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.³⁵ This gold-covered document, of some 182 pages (the longest ever), does actually mention the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and even the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). But the name of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does not appear in the volume.

In fairness, of course, it should be noted that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, both in this large document of September 1993 and in his Agenda for Peace report of 1992 to the UN Security Council, has in a general way supported a larger role even in the peace and security field for "regional understandings." A brief Chapter VII in that slim blue booklet deals with "Cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations." But that earlier, shorter report does not mention NATO either.³⁶

The comment made late in 1992 by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner implicitly speaks volumes about the difficult NATO-UN relationship. "Mr. Boutros-Ghali, in his 'Agenda for Peace' and letter to the CSCE, has welcomed the role of regional organizations in upholding UN decisions," as the Secretary-General wrote in the NATO Review. "At the same time, the habit of cooperation and looking to each

ALAN K. HENRIKSON is Director of The Fletcher Roundtable on a New World Order at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts 02155. He is also an Associate at The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, where he has served as Counselor on Canadian Affairs.

³⁵Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-seventh to the Forty-eighth Session of the General Assembly, September 1993 (New York: United Nations, 1993).

³⁶Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992). This report does mention, with regard to Africa, the OAU, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). With reference to Asia it mentions the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN). Regarding Central America, it refers to the OAS and a further unique arrangement, "The Friends of the Secretary-General." The reference to Europe is noteworthy: "Efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have been of central importance in dealing with the crisis in the Balkans and neighbouring areas" (p. 36).

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS

other for guidance has yet to be established at the working level."³⁷ Indeed, such actual practice of inter-organizational collaboration had by then scarcely begun.

The omission of the name of NATO from major UN institutional reports, like NATO's coolness toward the United Nations, contrasts strikingly with what I believe to be the actual reality: that the North Atlantic Alliance, the legal commitment along with the military forces and political infrastructure, constitutes the firmest foundation the United Nations system has in the world. Arguably, NATO has done more in its 44-year history to contribute to world order, and not merely stability in its own defensive or treaty area, than has the United Nations Organization itself, operating worldwide. NATO has been the bedrock of international peace, even globally. This, I might point out, was part of the original intention. When President Harry Truman attended the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949, he stated: "To protect this area against war will be a long step toward permanent peace in the whole world."³⁸ I draw attention, for later reference, to the fact that President Truman said the treaty would protect the North Atlantic area against "war"—a systemic goal—rather than against any particular country such as Germany or Soviet Russia—an alliance objective.

Why, if the world's dependence on NATO has been so heavy, has there been such an aversion to that body on behalf of the United Nations community and among multilateralists? The basic reason presumably is that the North Atlantic Treaty, though it purports to be UN Charter-consistent, often has been considered by theoretically (not historically) minded internationalists to be fundamentally at odds with the very concept of the United Nations. The opposition between NATO and the United Nations, to put it too succinctly, is between **collective self-defense, or alliance, and collective security, or system.**

Article 51 of the UN Charter, on which NATO hangs its hat, is considered by some to be a throwback to the old, prewar, unenlightened international order, conceived as a state of anarchy. "Nothing in the present Charter," this article begins, "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . ." In other words, the right of self-defense is thought to be pre-existing, primordial, fundamental, and not as anything that derives from the new world order of the Charter itself—that is, the notion of collective security.

These two basic ideas, collective self-defense and collective security, are classically and well contrasted by the political theorists Arnold Wolfers and Inis Claude. They therefore need not be elaborated upon here. The basic difference is that Professor Wolfers, who was skeptical of the idea of collective security, imagined that it might lead to an obligation to take punitive action against one's own allies, if the United Nations should so decide. "Soon after the Korean War had rekindled the hope that collective security under the United Nations would of necessity be directed against nondemocratic countries belonging to the Soviet bloc—the same countries, therefore, against which all Western collective defense arrangements

³⁷Manfred Wörner, "A Vigorous Alliance—a Motor for Peaceful Change in Europe," *NATO Review*, vol. 40, no. 6 (December 1992), p. 4.

³⁸Address of the President of the United States, Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. 20, no. 511 (April 17, 1949), pp. 481-82, quoted in Alan K. Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance," in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, eds., *American Defense Policy* (5th ed., Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 296-322, quotation on p. 297.

Alan K. Henrikson

were directed—the Suez crisis brought a rude awakening,” as Wolfers wrote.³⁹ The somewhat more idealistic, or less realistic, Professor Claude is inclined to credit the wisdom of collective security. But he, too, was emphatic that NATO is not an embodiment of the collective security concept.⁴⁰

The best expression of the essential difference between these two ideas is, I believe, that of President Woodrow Wilson. He said in January 1917: “There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.”⁴¹ A comprehensively organized international security arrangement, paradoxically, could actually disentangle countries from dangerous military alliances and alignments, Wilson was convinced. What is not perhaps sufficiently noted is the importance of disarmament in the Wilsonian model of world order. His chief insight was that international relations should and would eventually approximate domestic civil society, with fortified barriers between nations broken down and national arsenals considerably reduced—to the level of police forces. As Wilson stipulated in the fourth of his Fourteen Points, adequate guarantees should be “given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.” In our own time, in the 1990s, that would imply a critical link between the success of collective security and weapons nonproliferation, as well as nuclear management. Without serious arms reduction and control, collective security cannot really be expected to work. It is unfair to Wilson’s memory to think that it could.

Even more directly relevant to the issue before us—the NATO-UN relationship—is an early theoretical argument that at one time raged, as between the jurists Sir Eric Beckett and Hans Kelsen, over whether NATO is truly a “regional” organization or not. If it is, then its actions might come under the control of the UN Security Council, for Chapter VIII of the Charter expressly gives that body authority over “regional arrangements or agencies.” Article 53, paragraph 1, states: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” Sir Eric Beckett took the view that NATO, as a collective defense organization, cannot be a regional arrangement in the sense of the Charter. Hans Kelsen replied that matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security appropriate for regional action must not and do not exclude self-defense. His interpretation would seem to indicate that NATO could be both a collective-security entity and collective-defense body.⁴² The Beckett-Kelsen debate, whichever side one prefers, tends to place form before function. What is vitally important, in my view, is not so much what organizations like NATO are as what they do, and can do, over time.

³⁹Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), chapter 12, “Collective Defense Versus Collective Security,” quotation on p. 186.

⁴⁰Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 120-21. For a brief application of this distinction to some recent events, see, e.g., Alan K. Henrikson, “Collective Security, the Balance of Power, and American Leadership,” in *Mapping the Unknown: Towards a New World Order*, The Yearbook of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1992-1993, ed. Lidija Babic and Bo Huldt (London: Hurst and Company, 1993), pp. 77-87.

⁴¹Quoted in Alan K. Henrikson, “The North Atlantic Alliance as a Form of World Order,” in *Negotiating World Order: The Artisanry and Architecture of Global Diplomacy*, ed. Alan K. Henrikson (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), p. 112.

⁴²A somewhat more extended summary is given in R. A. Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace: A Study of Universal-Regional Relationships* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 11-13.

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The origins of NATO, in this context, are important to know. The U.S. negotiators of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948 and 1949—principally, John Hickerson and Theodore Achilles of the State Department—introduced to the ongoing European discussions a new formula from the 1947 Inter-American Treaty, or Rio de Janeiro Pact. The text of the Rio Treaty was so drafted as to include the possibility of action against aggression from within the alliance itself, as well as from an extrahemispheric source. The historical example on every Latin American mind was the chronic Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia (1932-1935). In 1947, when the Inter-American Treaty was signed, the possibility of aggression from outside the Western Hemisphere seemed quite remote. The twenty-one American republic partners thus stated inclusively, without specifying the direction from which aggression might come, that "an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all." This very familiar-sounding language is Article 5—the heart—of the North Atlantic Treaty! As Hickerson pointed out at the time: "Conceived in these terms *it would be possible for the Soviet Union to join the arrangement* without detracting from the protection which it would give to its other members."⁴³ That theoretical possibility deserves to be remembered.

NATO is and has always been, I believe, both an alliance and a system, intraregional but also extraregional. It is a "hybrid creature," as one of my students recently remarked. It also has a "changeling" quality. It is not at all static—as the examination of institutions in terms of such categories as "collective self-defense" and "collective security" can mislead one into thinking. An organization, conceived as a historically evolving entity, can turn from one thing into another, and may even seem to replace itself. Consider, for example, how the Quadruple Alliance against Napoleonic France turned into the larger, ostensibly impartial Quintuple Alliance, which in turn eventually became the basis of the systemic Concert of Europe. Consider, similarly, how the Triple Entente plus the United States of America, then an "associated" power, became at the end of the First World War the Big Four, and (though without the United States) the League of Nations Council, the nucleus of the League system. Consider, further, how Churchill's "Grand Alliance," or Roosevelt's "United Nations," of the Second World War became the United Nations Organization, with the Security Council of war victors as its inner directorate.⁴⁴

NATO is quite similar—a Cold War alliance that has, latently within it, the possibility of becoming a wider systemic entity. Think, in retrospect, how the very existence of the North Atlantic Alliance worked to reconcile France and Germany, to control Greece and Turkey, and to chasten Great Britain and Iceland when they came to blows in their "Cod War." I would even contend, much more broadly, that the relationship today between Europe, as a whole, and the United States of America is being profoundly and subtly "managed" by the structure of the continuing, but evolving North Atlantic Alliance relationship. To make the point again, to put complex organizations such as NATO into strict analytical categories "essentializes" them, depriving them and their operators of flexibility and a capacity for fundamental change.

Having sought to establish the reality that NATO is both an alliance and system-like, I offer for consideration the following proposition: If NATO is to maintain its inherently systemic as well as its alliance characteristics in current circumstances, it must expand to the east progressively and rapidly,

⁴³The reference is given in Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance," p. 300.

⁴⁴Henrikson, "NATO as a Form of World Order," pp. 111-12.

Alan K. Henrikson

including at least the largest countries of the former "Eastern Europe." With the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the boundaries of Europe, always the focus of NATO, have suddenly shifted. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland are, so to speak, "where" the Federal Republic of Germany was in 1954-1955, when it was brought into NATO. These countries are important; they have asked to join. And if they are not included, there could be trouble--trouble that could be prevented. The further issue of possibly including Russia as Boris Yeltsin and, in the mid-1950s, Georgi Malenkov, also asked for, is much more problematical.⁴⁵ Russia usually has been on the margins of the European state system, half in or half out. Russians may not, in fact, unequivocally desire such a close, integrated security relationship with the West. The idea that Zbigniew Brzezinski has of "a far-reaching NATO proposal for a formal treaty of alliance with Russia and a simultaneous initiative to establish a NATO-linked 'coalition for regional security' with three or four Central European states qualifying for eventual NATO membership" reflects his background in and understanding of the region.⁴⁶

The very viability of NATO today, I submit, depends on its preserving its systemic character. This could be at stake if the alliance/system does not expand. The eastern part of Europe is now an a-systemic void, a danger to itself and others. NATO is an international security organization. It makes no sense, as someone recently said, for it to admit only those countries that are already secure. Its very mission is to "project stability," as Secretary-General Wörner untiringly has stated.

If NATO is now to extend a securing influence outside its own existing alliance area, as defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it must do either of two things: take aboard new members or seek authorization for its action from elsewhere--that is, from the United Nations or the CSCE. The failure of NATO to react and to transform itself even more rapidly than it has done, starting in 1989 as the Cold War clearly was coming to a quick end, has meant that it now has to seek a "mandate" outside itself, or above itself. This partial loss of opportunity is unfortunate.

During the Cold War years, when the "Free World" determinedly ^{was} the Free World, the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance had a strong conception of international order of their own--a "NATO ideology." The Preamble of the Treaty, which speaks of "freedom," "common heritage," and "civilization," was taken quite seriously. As one Cold Warrior, the veteran Paul Nitze, wrote at the time: "It is my suggestion that a concept of world order is necessary both to hold the alliance system together and as a basis for harmonizing the relations between the alliance system as the 'coalition of free nations.'⁴⁷ The same expansive logic applies today.

⁴⁵Malenkov's request in 1954 was aimed at defeating the European Defense Community (EDC)--hence, German rearmament. Though intriguing, his overture was essentially a propaganda ploy, and was treated as such by the American and other Western governments.

⁴⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Bigger--and Safer--Europe," The New York Times, December 1, 1993. Brzezinski's idea of a formal treaty with Russia (presumably a NATO treaty with Russia) in present circumstances is reminiscent of some of the purpose of the 1887 German-Russian "Reinsurance Treaty."

⁴⁷Paul H. Nitze, "Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order," in Alliance Policy in the Cold War, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976; originally published in 1959 by John Hopkins Press, Baltimore), pp. 15-30, quotation on pp. 26-27; quoted in Henrikson, "The North Atlantic Alliance as a Form of World Order," pp. 121-22.

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS

What has happened, in effect, is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in now turning to the United Nations or the CSCE for its moral charge, has become somewhat ideologically decapitated. More gently stated, it has lost its halo, its idealism—as important as its military mission. The current NATO doctrine of "interlocking institutions," according to which NATO, the UN, the CSCE, the WEU, and the EU each has "a distinct role within a framework of complementary, mutually reinforcing organizations with responsibilities in the field of international peace and security" might turn out to be debilitating rather than innervating, synergistic.⁴⁸ This is likely to prove the case especially if the idea of "layering"—the United Nations necessarily always on top, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe just beneath it, and NATO somewhere further below them as a "subcontractor"—ever takes hold. Manfred Wörner, for one, has emphatically rejected the notion of NATO as filling merely a "subcontracting" role. He is right to do so. The North Atlantic Alliance must be able to propose its own contracts.

This critique of the "interlocking" or "layering" idea might seem to imply that all international organizations are on the same level. In theoretical terms, a case can be made for this view. In the Westphalian international system that we still live in, all states are sovereign, and remain sovereign even when they pool a bit of their sovereignty, as members of the European Union have done. After all, virtually the same powerful states are involved whether they choose to act through the United Nations, European Union, NATO, or other organization. I once heard a former SACEUR, General John Galvin, reflecting on NATO's de facto involvement in the Persian Gulf operation (Desert Shield and Desert Storm), refer to NATO and the United Nations as "fellow" organizations. This is quite apt. There is much to be said for such a nonhierarchical and, also, informal idea of the NATO-United Nations relationship or, perhaps more accurately, non-relationship.

The United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe naturally look to their own members or signatories, some of whom happen to be parties to the NATO alliance, rather than to NATO itself for assistance with the making and implementation of decisions and policies. It is not that they don't notice the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (and thus mention it in their reports) but, rather, that they ignore it. NATO itself, admittedly—especially as the release of Cold War tensions has reduced political coherence within the Alliance—has tended to favor "selective ally participation" in important tasks. One of the risks of this new practice of discontinuing emphasis on NATO as a solidary thing is that the United Nations Organization and even the CSCE will attempt to develop their own separate capacities, when they can ill afford to. To an extent, some of this expenditure is desirable, for any successful organization must be functionally competent. But, at a time when material resources and moral resources are in such short supply, it makes no sense at all to ignore what NATO can do, and maybe do best.

What might be done about this awkward double institutional aversion, this mutual allergy? An important key, I suggest, is Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. This relatively unknown passage provides for the conclusion of "special agreements" between UN members or groups of members—North Atlantic Alliance members or even NATO itself—and the Security Council. This is a possible bridge between the world, its regions, and their nations. The article reads, in its entirety:

⁴⁸"'Interlocking Institutions': The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)," Basic Fact Sheet No. 6 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, September 1993).

Alan K. Henrikson

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

No Article 43 special agreement ever was concluded, owing largely to the Cold War. Today, however, the negotiation of these connective links should be possible. As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali himself commented in Agenda for Peace: "Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail."⁴⁹ I believe he is absolutely correct in this assessment.⁵⁰

Who, then, should enter into these agreements? The logical "first" individual UN member state that should do so might be Canada, a country that has long done international military duty under various guises under UN auspices and has just withdrawn its forces from NATO's military structure.⁵¹ Beyond these singular arrangements, which are somewhat analogous to NATO status of forces agreements (SOFAs), there should be an overarching "framework" agreement, with guidelines laid out for all North Atlantic Treaty signatories (even those not part of the integrated military structure); between NATO as an organization and the UN Security Council. I, of course, do recognize the probable lawyer's objection that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not a legal personality (in supposed contrast to the European Union, which has majority voting) and cannot therefore sign treaties or make comparable binding legal commitments.

What I am suggesting, however, need not necessarily be in "treaty" form, although the language of Article 43 noting that special agreements would be "subject to ratification" would seem to require use of a treaty-related process. Should this "constitutional" obstacle to a commitment by NATO as such prove insuperable, a NATO negotiation with the Security Council could erect instead a kind of scaffolding for

⁴⁹Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 25.

⁵⁰The subject is discussed more comprehensively in Alan K. Henrikson, Defining a New World Order: Toward a Practical Vision of Collective Action for International Peace and Security (Medford, Massachusetts: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1991).

⁵¹This recommendation, to a Canadian audience, was developed in somewhat more detail in Alan K. Henrikson, "The Canadian Contribution: From Word to Concept to Model," text of presentation to the concluding session of the 65th Foreign Policy Conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), "Does History Repeat Itself?" Ottawa, December 4-5, 1993.

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS

more binding bilateral agreements between individual NATO members and the Council. The result would be much the same. Function, in life, usually takes precedence over form.

What this mutual approach might mean, in operational terms, was articulated in a historically learned and also far-sighted way by Thomas R. Pickering, when he was serving during the Gulf War period as U.S. Permanent Representative at the United Nations. Speaking personally, Ambassador Pickering made the following "relevant points" regarding Article 43. These merit recounting today, two years later. They are:

First, the conclusion of such an agreement need not confer an automatic, mandatory obligation to provide troops to the Security Council, but could instead simply state their availability subject to certain terms or procedures.

Second, Article 43 is silent on command arrangements: the phrase "on its call" does not necessarily mean "at its direction."

Third, by specifying "assistance and facilities" the language permits members to satisfy their obligations by means other than provision of combat troops--a useful flexibility.

Fourth, Paragraph 3 specifies that agreements shall be at the initiative of the Security Council, a helpful limiting factor that ensures selectivity.

Finally, Paragraph 3 also states that agreements may be between the Council and individual members or groups of members, offering a potential basis for associations between the Security Council and regionally based alliances. Since alliances offer a more functional basis for concerted military action than a chance grouping of UN member states, this too could be a useful feature.⁵²

Indeed it could. Such a conception of a possible "allied" relationship between the United Nations and the "regionally based" North Atlantic Treaty Organization suggests another -- "long step," like the one of which President Truman spoke in 1949 when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. Many other, variant conceptions of global-regional cooperation might today be considered.⁵³ But this one employing Article 43, aimed as forming a cooperative bond between the world's central international collective security organization and its most powerful collective self-defense arrangement, really might amount to something.

NATO and the United Nations, though not exactly Siamese twins, depend on each other. As Manfred Wörner recently has said,

⁵²Thomas R. Pickering, "The UN Contribution to Future International Security," personal remarks at Conference on Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection, "Into the 21st Century," sponsored by The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the United States Marine Corps University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 20-21, 1991.

⁵³See, for example, the imaginative yet perhaps practicable ideas in Colonel J. D. Harries, "Peacekeeping Futures," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 2 (October 1991), pp. 25-31, and Gwyn Prins, "The United Nations and Peace-Keeping in the Post-Cold-War World: The Case of Naval Power," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 22, no. 2 (1991), pp. 135-55.

Alan K. Henrikson

It is because of NATO's capabilities, particularly in the field of crisis management, that the United Nations has increasingly looked to the Alliance as a partner in peacekeeping in recent years. The UN is fulfilling an extremely important and indispensable role, but it is overburdened and underfunded, today handling no less than 17 missions worldwide with over 80,000 troops at a price tag of over \$3.6 billion. Under the able leadership of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who enjoys my admiration, the UN has set the stage for the development of an emerging international consensus toward a broader notion of security that includes the concept of intervention for humanitarian purposes.

But even the most extraordinary dedication cannot solve the basic problem that the UN lacks the infrastructure, the logistics, and the command and control facilities for major military operations. Only NATO can offer these assets, at least in the European theatre. For NATO, in turn, cooperation with the UN facilitates the Alliance's new role in crisis management; it places our efforts in a broad, internationally accepted context. Moreover, it also increases public awareness and acceptance of crisis management. So the future may well see frequent and close cooperation between the UN and NATO.⁵⁴

This cannot happen, however, without political will—such as President Truman manifested in the 1940s. The 1990s are another time of possible international "creation." This is also a postwar decade. In it, as I have attempted to show, old political bodies, even seemingly antagonistic ones, can be "de-sensitized," and made to cohabit in the house of a new world order.

DISCUSSION WITH ALAN K. HENRIKSON

SCHAKE: What did we do when the Soviets asked for NATO membership?

HENRIKSON: Well, one idea was put forward by Zbigniew Brzezinski; you probably all saw it,

SCHAKE: In 1954?

HENRIKSON: No, very recently in the Times, and his answer to that question is, and it bears on my legal-theoretical point: his answer is an alliance between NATO and the Russian federation in conjunction with what he calls a coalition of Central European states and a kind of expanded Partnership for Peace. I think he is trying to differentiate his idea of a coalition with a focus on Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia where he and his family are from. When he writes about that subject, Eastern Europe, he really knows it. He has that sensitivity I think that many of us born in the USA just do not have. But he proposes this coalition of central European states, an expanded Partnership for Peace which would go even beyond that, plus this alliance, not between the US and the Russian federation—it would not be another Yalta, it would not be a condominium arrangement—but between NATO, between Luxembourg and Iceland, and the Russian federation and everything that is part of it. It occurred to me that it is something like the 1887 Reinsurance treaty that replaced the Dreikaiserbund. And therefore that can be done in conjunction with the enlargement of NATO to the east.

⁵⁴Manfred Wörner, "A New NATO for a New Era," speech by the Secretary-General of NATO at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1993.

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS

SCHAKE: O.K. What would this relationship between NATO and Russia encompass? What would it do? It is clear what our relationship with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would be. They would be members of NATO. What would that relationship that you are suggesting between Russia and NATO entail?

HENRIKSON: Essentially it would be a classic nonaggression pact. Whatever political and psychological overtones that would have. It **would** have implications, just as the Reinsurance treaty did. That had secret clauses that provided for the status quo in the Balkans and essentially it reserved for Russia the right to intervene. And I think that would be an implication of such an arrangement. It would indirectly and not explicitly give Moscow an assurance that the US and NATO would not interfere with what the Russians might feel they have to do in Tadjikistan, or Kazhakstan, or someplace else. Remember there are also parts of the CSCE which bind them to a certain set of principles, and that has not been a weak reed on which to lean politically, and also there is the NACC relationship, so there are various ways which a commitment like this could be prevented from degenerating into an insurance of Russia's reexpanded sphere of influence. It is Brzezinski's idea, not mine, and I am really trying to think it out.

SCHAKE: No, I understand. I think though that that does in fact sound like another Yalta except with a different boundary, namely, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are on this side, but we tell them that we are not going to bother with Tadjikistan and other places, so the effect is the same but the area is different. It is not clear that NATO would not want to manage Russia calmly and respectfully the way the Germans did the withdrawal of Russian forces from German territory in a way that makes them more of a partner than that, namely, that keeps them from trampling Tadjikistan and Georgia and stuff like that, by empowering them in Europe—in a sense treating them as partners in a European context.

HENRIKSON: It could not and would not "tell" them that. As I emphasized, there is the Helsinki Final Act and so on, and the UN Charter for that matter which preclude their doing things like intervening in sovereign states elsewhere. One would have to do these things simultaneously. Russia is both in and out of the European state system. There are times when the Russians do not want to be included. I think Brzezinski's idea fits the logic of the situation quite well. If only he did not try so hard to differentiate what he has proposed from what I think the administration is evolving toward. The administration is a little vague right now because, as was pointed out, you want to keep the consensus together until January; but that is no reason why an academic cannot be a little bolder in circumstances like this.

SCHAKE: But the vagaries of it. . . .

HENRIKSON: Why not be Harry Truman. I mean think of the uncertainties; think of the sensitivities, including Russian sensitivities. When the North Atlantic Treaty was revealed in late 1948, actually Stalin knew about it already because of Donald Maclean who was First Secretary at the British Embassy, so he was not too surprised. There was a great cry of outrage from the east, and there were other countries clamoring to get in. Yugoslavia wanted to join. And the idea of associate membership was actually considered at that time, and rejected. As Robert Lovett said, that would mean as in a country club you have members, you would have non-resident members, and you would have those that had summer privileges. I think that is essentially what we are talking about in some of these more or lesser charmed circles.

Alan K. Henrikson

SCHAKE: The difference the administration is facing now is that in 1948, you had the Berlin blockade. It was clear the Soviets were the bad guys by then, whereas now I think the administration is buying time because it is not clear the Russians are going to be bad guys. We want to give them every incentive not to be a negative force in Europe.

HENRIKSON: Yes, it is very important to be attentive to chronology. Things happen so fast. Ernest Bevin had the idea for what became NATO at the foreign ministers' meeting in December 1947. It was not until February and March 1948 that it was clear the Russians were the bad guys. The basic idea for NATO was actually that of Bevin who put it to Marshall, who was actually not very interested in it for a while, until some of these events did create public opinion and Congressional support such that an agreement like this could be negotiated. But statesmanship can, knowing what its objectives are and its interests are, exploit events provided that you know what you want to do. And it is not clear, to me as one US citizen, that those who are proposing the Partnership for Peace, including you and some of our other colleagues here today, really know what objective you have in mind. And I think that ought to be made clear. And I think it ought to include membership of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in NATO, and that this should be expedited and done very, very directly with provisional periods for those who might engage in a Partnership for Peace to see whether they are up to it, to engender a certain habit of cooperation, common standards, and so on. But if just one group of countries is included, think what that would mean to the countries all around. Basically, what happened when the Rome declaration which created NACC came out, I remember a British journalist saying--I happened to be in England at the time--he said what that means is that Europe will once again be whole and free, and that Eastern Europe will be included within NATO. That was self-evident to a lot of very knowledgeable observers in 1990. Why can't we see the implications of that now?

SCHAKE: We can see the implications of it, but it is not a question of whether you want Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. I think there is a pretty strong consensus throughout the alliance that you do. It is a question of managing change such that Russia does not become a greater threat to them, so that you attempt to pull out Russia into the system while it is clear that they are in such a period of flux that you may not be able to. If it is clear that Russia is a threat to them, then there is no question about our reaction--you pull them into NATO, and build the wall a little more eastward. But while that is not clear, it strikes me that it is not an unworthy objective for the administration to buy time to see where they are going, to give the East Europeans some reassurance but not creating a Russia that is going to be harder for everyone to deal with.

HENRIKSON: Well, one of the foundations, if not the most important foundation, of security is certainty. Anybody familiar with European history cannot help but think of the creative vagueness about Belgium, and the vagueness about Poland in 1939. I mean who is to say that a Russian general will not encroach upon Polish territory. And what will we do then? Why not respond to this Polish foreign minister who is asking for something from his point of view--and our point of view too because we lived through this history or learned about it? Why not respond to that in a way that is indicative of the long-term situation?

SCHAKE: You think the sixteen NATO members would ratify membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic now?

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS

HENRIKSON: That is where political will and courage come in. Why not make more evident and predictable in a certain way what the Partnership for Peace really means in terms of the inclusion of the eastern part of Europe in not only Europe itself, but the larger Euro-Atlantic community. With Russia being partly included to the extent they wish to be. One has to respect the fact that Russia is Russia, and let them work out whatever type of agreement they might want.

TIDD: I am just curious of the logic for an expedited admission of the Visegrad countries. What is behind that logic? If it is to bring them in because they feel the most threatened, what makes the Baltic states any less threatened and yet we do not seem to be putting them on a fast track? If it is because they make the most convincing case for themselves, I have heard very convincing cases from Bulgarian and Romanian representatives that they too should become members. Bulgaria sells themselves as the best member because they are the only state that has good relations with both Greece and Turkey.

HENRIKSON: And Germany. The German-Bulgarian relationship is of very long standing. You ask what the logic is: because those countries are the big ones. You get Poland into it, and Lithuania will worry a lot less about being part of the so-called near abroad. Actually, if something happened, even though President Bush, remember, was very reluctant to recognize the real independence of the Baltic states, it was very clear that if something really happened, not only the Nordic countries and Germany, but the US would be involved if only because of the ethnic component of American society. It would be provocative to bring the Baltic states in by themselves. But if you do Poland, that is because that issue has really emerged now. The Baltic states are not really in a position to demand that sort of help right now. Those are the big three countries. They are organized. They are asking for it. And we do not know what is going to happen. It would have been easier to do this six months ago than it might be six months from now, depending on what happens in Russia. It might have had an effect on the Russian election. These are hard issues—I fully recognize that.

LOREN: How interesting. The conversations have gone through the point of trying to pull the thread of creating a sense of security—whether you call it Partnership for Peace or whatever—in the midst of the uncertainties of not granting actual security guarantees.

CONTRIBUTORS

Alan K. Henrikson is the Director of The Fletcher Roundtable on a New World Order. He currently teaches at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and is also an Associate at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, where he has served as Counselor on Canadian Affairs. He has participated in the Distinguished Visitors Program of The Policy Study Group in Tokyo and was United Nations Development Programme-sponsored Visiting Professor of Diplomatic History at the Foreign Affairs College, affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in Beijing. Additionally, he was Lloyd I. Miller Visiting Professor of Diplomatic History and Scholar-in-Residence at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State. Professor Henrikson has written widely on the history and current problems of U.S. foreign policy, the North Atlantic Alliance and European Community, U.S. relations with Canada and Latin America, international cooperation in the Nordic/Arctic area, political geography, and multilateral organization and peacemaking. His publications include Defining a New World Order: Toward a Practical Vision of Collective Action for International Peace and Security (1991) and Negotiating World Order: The Artisanry and Architecture of Global Diplomacy (1986), which he edited. Alan Henrikson received his A.B., A.M., and Ph.D. in History from Harvard University. He also holds B.A. and M.A. (Oxon.) degrees from Oxford University, where he read Philosophy-Politics-and Economics (P.-P.-E.) as a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College. He studied as well in Norway at the International Summer School of the University of Oslo.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., is Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is also president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. Dr. Pfaltzgraff has served as a consultant to the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Information Agency. He has taught at the University of Pennsylvania, the College of Europe in Belgium, the Foreign Service Institute, and the National Defense College in Japan. His most recent publications include: Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy (1993) (co-editor); The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (1992) (co-editor); and Transatlantic Relations in the 1990s: The Emergence of New Security Architectures (1993) (co-author).

Robert D. Putnam, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Director of the Center for International Affairs, and Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University, is a specialist in comparative government and international relations. He has previously served as Dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and as chairman of Harvard's Department of Government. He is the author or co-author of more than thirty scholarly articles and seven books published in seven languages, including The Comparative Study of Political Elites (1976); Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (1981); Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits (1984; published in English, German, Japanese, and Italian); Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993; published in English and Italian); and Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (1993). Professor Putnam graduated from Swarthmore College with Highest Honors in 1963, attended Balliol College, Oxford, and in 1970 received his Ph.D. with distinction from Yale University. He has received honorary degrees from Swarthmore College (1990) and Stockholm University (1993). He taught at the University of Michigan for more than a decade, and served on the staff of the U.S. National Security Council at the White House before coming to Harvard as professor of government in 1979. A recipient of numerous awards and scholarly honors and a consultant to various governments and international organizations, he is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts

CONTRIBUTORS

and Sciences, where he directs a major interdisciplinary investigation of "Social Capital and Public Affairs." The Economist has described his widely-discussed book, Making Democracy Work, as "a great work of social science, worthy to rank alongside de Tocqueville, Pareto and Weber." His current research focuses on the revitalization of Western democracy.

Uri Ra'anan is a University Professor in the University Professors Program, and Director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, of Boston University. He is also a Fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. Author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of 23 books, and contributor to 19 others, as well as 21 monographs and Congressional publications, his latest publications include Russian Pluralism--Now Irreversible?; State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Breakup of Multinational States; Inside The Apparatus; Gorbachev's USSR: A System in Crisis; and The Soviet Empire: The Challenge of National and Democratic Movements. His current research focuses on factional struggles and ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union. Prior to his current appointments, he was Professor of International Politics and Director of the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he taught for two decades. Before joining the Fletcher School, he taught briefly at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and, previous to that, at Columbia University and the City University of New York. He obtained his undergraduate and graduate education and degrees at Oxford University (Wadham College, 1945-1950).

Kori Schake has been the NATO desk officer on the Joint Staff for the past three years. She is responsible for preparing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NATO meetings and participating in interagency working groups on NATO issues. She specializes in command and control arrangements, military implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept, and European architecture issues. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from Stanford University, where she studied with, and later worked for, Condoleezza Rice. She did her graduate work with Catherine Kelleher and George Quester at the University of Maryland, receiving an MPM from the School of Public Affairs and MA from Government and Politics. She continues to work on her dissertation, "NATO In Crisis: the Allied Politics of Berlin Planning, 1958-1962."

Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Navy, The Atlantic Council of the United States, is a Surface Warfare Officer whose operational assignments include shipboard tours in USS SEMMES (DDG 18), USS AMERICA (CV 66), USS DEYO (DD989), and USS LEITCH (DD 984). Additionally, he served as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group EIGHT. His staff assignments include serving as Aide de Camp to the U.S. Representative, NATO Military Committee, Brussels, Belgium, and in the Pentagon in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Strategy and Policy division. Commander Tidd earned a Master's in Political Science from the University of Bordeaux, France, as an Olmsted Foundation Scholar. He is a 1989 graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, is qualified as a Joint Specialist, and is a designated Political/Military affairs subspecialist in European/Russian area studies.

Celeste A. Wallander is Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University, and Faculty Associate of the Center for International Affairs and the Russian Research Center. She received a B.A. (1983, political science) from Northwestern University and her Ph.D. (1990, political science) from Yale University. Her dissertation was a study of the effects of crisis bargaining and escalation incentives on Soviet use of military force in ten Cold War era cases. Her current research is on the role of international institutions in German and Russian security strategies in the current period after the Cold War. She is

CONTRIBUTORS

now editing a book on the sources of Russian foreign policy. She has received fellowships and research support from the Social Science Research Council, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the National Council for Soviet and East European research. She teaches courses on international relations theory, security, crisis behavior, and Soviet and post-Soviet security policy.

Thomas G. Weston is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. Mr. Weston has been a U.S. Foreign Service Officer since 1969, serving in Europe, Africa and the United States. He has spent much of his career serving in and focusing on Central Europe. Mr. Weston was Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Mission to the European Communities from 1990 to 1993. This fall he assumed his current position, with primary responsibility in the European Bureau for multilateral matters, including NATO, arms control and the EC. Mr. Weston was educated at Michigan State University.

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon as Chief of the SHAPE Liaison Office, coordinates a broad range of issues in the Washington area for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the SHAPE staff, and subordinate headquarters in Allied Command Europe. Graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1968, he received a commission in the Field Artillery. He subsequently completed studies in the Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the United States Army Command and General Staff College and, most recently, the United States Army War College. He holds a Master's Degree in International Relations from the University of California. Additionally, Colonel Witherspoon served with the 8th Battalion, 4th Field Artillery as a battery commander and assistant operations officer. He commanded a battery and served as Adjutant in the 2d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery in Germany, and commanded 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Other staff assignments have included Executive Officer, 6th Battalion, 14th Field Artillery and Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, 1st Armored Division in Germany; government and International Relations Institute at West Point; Executive Assistant (Speechwriter) to SACEUR; Staff Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army; and Army Member of the Chairman's Staff Group, Joint Staff.