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# CONTENTS

## Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft (Lawrence S. Eagleburger, J. Lynn Helms, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Charles M. Lichenstein, President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, Diplomatic Notes, Letters, Proclamation, Resolutions)

### The President

- ✓ 22 Visit to Mexico (Statements, Toast, Joint Communique, Summary of Agreement)
- 27 Building Peace Through Strength
- 30 International Trade
- 31 Central America and Chad
- 32 Situation in Central America
- 33 The Middle East

### The Secretary

- 34 Japan and America: International Partnership for the 1980s
- 37 News Conference of August 31

### Africa

- 40 Visit of Zaire's President (Mobutu Sese Seko, President Reagan)
- 41 Visit of Senegal's President (Abdou Diouf, President Reagan)

### Arms Control

- 41 INF Negotiations (Paul H. Nitze)

### Economics

- 42 Bankers and the Debt Crisis: An International Melodrama? (W. Allen Wallis)
- 44 International Monetary Fund (President Reagan)

### Energy

- 45 International Energy Security (Richard T. Kennedy, E. Allan Wendt)

### Europe

- ✓ 50 CSCE Followup Meeting Concludes in Madrid (Secretary Shultz, Concluding Document)

- 52 Anniversary of Gdansk Agreement in Poland (President Reagan)
- 60 Soviet Active Measures
- 67 U.S.-European Relations (Richard R. Burt)
- 68 U.S.-Soviet Grain Agreement (White House Statement)
- 69 15th Report on Cyprus (Message to the Congress)

### International Law

- 70 Deportation of Nazi War Criminals to Israel (Justice Department Statement)

### Middle East

- 71 The Libyan Problem
- 79 Situation in Lebanon (White House and Department Statements, Letter to the Congress)

### Treaties

- 80 Current Actions

### Chronology

- 83 August 1983


### Press Releases

- 85 Department of State

### Publications

- 85 Department of State
- 86 Foreign Relations Volume Released

### Index



03 15 1983

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
SEPT. 4, 1983<sup>10</sup>**

A U.S. RC-135 aircraft was in the vicinity of the Korean airliner on August 31 when the airliner was initially detected by Soviet radar. Both aircraft were then in international airspace, and the U.S. aircraft never entered Soviet airspace. The United States routinely conducts unarmed RC-135 flights in international airspace off the Kamchatka Peninsula to monitor, by technical means, Soviet compliance with the SALT treaties. The Soviets conduct similar monitoring activities near U.S. missile-testing areas. The Soviets are aware of our flights and track them routinely. They know that our aircraft do not enter their airspace. The Korean aircraft's inadvertent entry into Soviet territory should have been an early and strong indication to them that the flight was not a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.

The Soviets traced the Korean aircraft and the U.S. aircraft separately and knew there were two aircraft in the area, so we do not think this was a case of mistaken identity. The closest point of approach was approximately 75 nautical miles, while the U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit. Later the U.S. aircraft crossed the path taken by the Korean airliner, but by then the airliner was almost 300 miles away. Still later, as the Korean airliner strayed off course and overflew Kamchatka Peninsula, it was initially identified by the Soviets as an RC-135 and then as an unidentified aircraft. Approximately 2½ hours after the U.S. and Korean aircraft were near each other in international space, the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner as it was exiting—or had exited—their territory west of Sakhalin Island, some 1,000 miles from the operating area of the U.S. aircraft.

During the 2½ hours of Soviet surveillance of the Korean aircraft, the Soviets had radar images—both ground and air—of the Korean 747. The two aircraft are distinctly different in shape and size. Their fighter aircraft also had visual contact with the Korean aircraft. The SU-15 and MiG-23 aircraft pilots, whose voices are on the tape obtained by the United States and played for the congressional leadership, never refer to the Korean aircraft as an RC-135, only as the "target." They made no serious effort to identify the aircraft or to warn it. They did not appear to care what it was. Instead, they were intent on killing it. If the Soviets made a mistake in identification, which stretches the imagina-

tion, they have not said so to date. In fact, they have not to date admitted shooting down the Korean commercial aircraft, with 269 people aboard. We continue to ask the Soviets for their full accounting of this incident.

The presence of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on a routine monitoring mission to assure Soviet compliance with treaty obligations some 1,000 miles and 2½ hours flight time from the scene of the shootdown in no way excuses or explains this act, which speaks for itself. In fact, the RC-135 in question, at the time KAL #007 was shot down, had been on the ground at its home base in Alaska for more than 1 hour.

**PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS  
TO THE NATION,  
SEPT. 5, 1983<sup>9</sup>**

My fellow Americans, I am coming before you tonight about the Korean airline massacre—the attack by the Soviet Union against 269 innocent men, women, and children aboard an unarmed Korean passenger plane. This crime against humanity must never be forgotten, here or throughout the world.

Our prayers tonight are with the victims and their families in their time of terrible grief. Our hearts go out to them—to brave people like Kathryn McDonald, the wife of a Congressman, whose composure and eloquence on the day of her husband's death moved us all. He will be sorely missed by all of us here in government.

The parents of one slain couple wired me: "Our daughter and her husband died on Korean Air Lines Flight 007. Their deaths were the result of the Soviet Union violating every concept of human rights." The emotions of these parents—grief, shock, anger—are shared by civilized people everywhere. From around the world press accounts reflect an explosion of condemnation by people everywhere.

Let me state as plainly as I can: There was absolutely no justification, either legal or moral, for what the Soviets did. One newspaper in India said: "If every passenger plane is fair game for home air forces, it will be the end to civil aviation as we know it."

This is not the first time the Soviet Union has shot at and hit a civilian airliner when it overflew its territory. In another tragic incident in 1978, the Soviets also shot down an unarmed civilian airliner after having positively identified it as such. In that instance the Soviet interceptor pilot clearly identified

the civilian markings on the side of the aircraft, repeatedly questioned the order to fire on a civilian airliner, and was ordered to shoot it down anyway. The aircraft was hit with a missile and made a crash landing. Several innocent people lost their lives in this attack—killed by shrapnel from the blast of a Soviet missile.

Is this a practice of other countries in the world? The answer is no. Commercial aircraft from the Soviet Union and Cuba on a number of occasions have overflown sensitive U.S. military facilities. They weren't shot down. We and other civilized countries believe in the tradition of offering help to mariners and pilots who are lost or in distress, on the sea or in the air. We believe in following procedures to prevent a tragedy, not to provoke one.

But despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it, and the evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the truth. They have persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. Indeed, they have not even told their own people that a plane was shot down.

They have spun a confused tale of tracking the plane by radar until it just mysteriously disappeared from their radar screens; that no one fired a shot of any kind. But, then, they coupled this with charges that it was a spy plane sent by us and that their planes fired tracer bullets past the plane as a warning that it was in Soviet airspace.

Let me recap for a moment and present the incontrovertible evidence that we have. The Korean airliner, a Boeing 747, left Anchorage, Alaska, bound for Seoul, Korea, on a course south and west which would take it across Japan. Out over the Pacific, in international waters, it was for a brief time in the vicinity of one of our reconnaissance planes, an RC-135, on a routine mission. At no time was the RC-135 in Soviet airspace. The Korean airliner flew on, and the two planes were soon widely separated.

A 747 is equipped with the most modern computerized navigation facilities, but a computer must respond to input provided by human hands. No one will ever know whether a mistake was made in giving the computer the course or whether there was a malfunction. Whichever, the 747 was flying a course further to the west than it was supposed to fly—a course which took it into Soviet airspace.

The Soviets tracked this plane for 2½ hours while it flew a straight line course at 30,000-35,000 feet. Only

civilian airliners fly in such a manner. At one point, the Korean pilot gave Japanese air control his position as east of Hokkaido, Japan, showing that he was unaware they were off course by as much as or more than 100 miles.

The Soviets scrambled jet interceptors from a base in Sakhalin Island.

Japanese ground sites recorded the interceptor plane's radio transmissions—their conversations with their own ground control. We only have the voices from the pilots; the Soviet ground-to-air transmissions were not recorded. It is plain, however, from the pilot's words that he is responding to orders and queries from his own ground control.

Here is a brief segment of the tape which we're going to play in its entirety for the UN Security Council tomorrow.

[Translations of taped radio transmissions from two Soviet pilots to "DEPUTAT," the Soviet ground station call sign:

Soviet SU-15 (805) at 1818:34 GMT: The A.N.O. [air navigation lights] are burning. The strobe light is flashing.

MIg-23 (163) at 1818:56 GMT: Roger, I'm at 7500, course 230.

SU-15 (805) at 1819:02 GMT: I am closing on the target.

SU-15 (805) at 1826:20 GMT: I have executed the launch.

SU-15 (805) at 1826:22 GMT: The target is destroyed.

SU-15 (805) at 1826:27 GMT: I am breaking off attack.

White House Note: The missile was fired by the SU-15, and the MIg-23 was an observer.]

Those are the voices of the Soviet pilots. In this tape the pilot who fired the missile describes his search for what he calls the target. He reports he has it in sight; indeed, he pulls up to within about a mile of the Korean plane, mentions its flashing strobe light and that its navigation lights are on. He then reports he's reducing speed to get behind the airliner, gives his distance from the plane at various points in this maneuver, and finally announces what can only be called the Korean airline massacre. He says he has locked on the radar, which aims his missiles, has launched those missiles, the target has been destroyed, and he is breaking off the attack.

Let me point out something here having to do with his close-up view of the airliner on what we know was a clear night with a half moon. The 747 has a unique and distinctive silhouette

unlike any other plane in the world. There is no way a pilot could mistake this for anything other than a civilian airliner. And if that isn't enough, let me point out our RC-135 I mentioned earlier had been back at its base in Alaska, on the ground, for an hour, when the murderous attack took place over the Sea of Japan.

And make no mistake about it, this attack was not just against ourselves or the Republic of Korea. This was the Soviet Union against the world and the moral precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere. It was an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations.

They deny the deed, but in their conflicting and misleading protestations, the Soviets reveal that, yes, shooting down a plane—even one with hundreds of innocent men, women, children, and babies—is a part of their normal procedure if that plane is in what they claim as their airspace.

They owe the world an apology and an offer to join the rest of the world in working out a system to protect against this ever happening again. Among the rest of us there is one protective measure: an international radio wave length on which pilots can communicate with planes of other nations if they are in trouble or lost. Soviet military planes are not so equipped because that would make it easier for pilots who might want to defect.

Our request to send vessels into Soviet waters to search for wreckage and bodies has received no satisfactory answer. Bereaved families of the Japanese victims were harassed by Soviet patrol boats when they tried to get near where the plane is believed to have gone down in order to hold a ceremony for their dead. But we shouldn't be surprised by such inhuman brutality. Memories come back of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the gassing of villages in Afghanistan. If the massacre and their subsequent conduct is intended to intimidate, they have failed in their purpose. From every corner of the globe, the word is defiance in the face of this unspeakable act and defiance of the system which excuses it and tries to cover it up. With our horror and our sorrow, there is a righteous and terrible anger. It would be easy to think in terms of vengeance, but that is not a proper answer. We want justice and action to see that this never happens again.

Our immediate challenge to this atrocity is to ensure that we make the skies safer and that we seek just compensation for the families of those who were killed.

Since my return to Washington, we have held long meetings, the most recent yesterday with the congressional leadership. There was a feeling of unity in the room, and I received a number of constructive suggestions. We will continue to work with the Congress regarding our response to this massacre.

As you know, we immediately made known to the world the shocking facts as honestly and completely as they came to us.

We have notified the Soviets that we will not renew our bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation so long as they threaten the security of civil aviation.

Since 1981 the Soviet airline Aeroflot has been denied the right to fly to the United States. We have reaffirmed that order and are examining additional steps we can take with regard to Aeroflot facilities in this country. We are cooperating with other countries to find better means to ensure the safety of civil aviation and to join us in not accepting Aeroflot as a normal member of the international civil air community unless, and until, the Soviets satisfy the cries of humanity for justice. I am pleased to report that Canada today suspended Aeroflot's landing and refueling privileges for 60 days.

We have joined with other countries to press the International Civil Aviation Organization to investigate this crime at an urgent special session of the council. At the same time, we are listening most carefully to private groups, both American and international, airline pilots, passenger associations, and others, who have a special interest in civil air safety.

I am asking the Congress to pass a joint resolution of condemnation of this Soviet crime.

We have informed the Soviets that we're suspending negotiations on several bilateral arrangements we had under consideration.

Along with Korea and Japan, we called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council which began on Friday. On that first day, Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, France, China, the United Kingdom, Zaire, New Zealand, and West Germany all joined us in denouncing the Soviet action and expressing our horror. We expect to hear from additional countries as debate resumes tomorrow.

We intend to work with the 33 countries which had citizens aboard the Korean airliner to seek reparations for the families of all those who were killed. The United States will be making a claim against the Soviet Union within the next week to obtain compensation for the benefit of the victims' survivors. Such compensation is an absolute moral duty which the Soviets must assume.

In the economic area in general, we are redoubling our efforts with our allies to end the flow of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union.

Secretary Shultz is going to Madrid to meet with representatives of 35 countries who, for 3 years, have been negotiating an agreement having to do with, among other things, human rights. Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Soviet Union is scheduled to attend that meeting. If he does come to the meeting, Secretary Shultz is going to present him with our demands for disclosure of the facts, corrective action, and concrete assurances that such a thing will not happen again and that restitution be made.

As we work with other countries to see that justice is done, the real test of our resolve is whether we have the will to remain strong, steady, and united. I believe more than ever, as evidenced by your thousands and thousands of wires and phone calls in these last few days, that we do.

I have outlined some of the steps we're taking in response to the tragic massacre. There is something I've always believed in, but which now seems more important than ever. The Congress will be facing key defense issues when it returns from recess. There has been legitimate difference of opinion on this subject, I know, but I urge the members of that distinguished body to ponder long and hard the Soviets' aggression as they consider the security and safety of our people, indeed all people who believe in freedom.

Senator Henry Jackson, a wise and revered statesman, and one who probably understood the Soviets as well as any American in history, warned us, "the greatest threat the United States now faces is posed by the Soviet Union." But, Senator Jackson said: "If America maintains a strong deterrent—and only if it does—this nation will continue to be a leader in the crucial quest for enduring peace among nations."

The late Senator made those statements in July, on the Senate floor, speaking in behalf of the MX missile

program he considered vital to restore America's strategic parity with the Soviets. When John F. Kennedy was President, defense spending as a share of the Federal budget was 70% greater than it is today. Since then, the Soviet Union has carried on the most massive military buildup the world has ever seen. Until they are willing to join the rest of the world community, we must maintain the strength to deter their aggression.

But while we do so, we must not give up our effort to bring them into the world community of nations: peace through strength as long as necessary but never giving up our effort to bring peace closer through mutual, verifiable reduction in the weapons of war.

I've told you of negotiations we've suspended as a result of the Korean airline massacre, but we cannot, we must not, give up our effort to reduce the arsenals of destructive weapons threatening the world. Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations] has returned to Geneva to resume the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Equally, we will continue to press for arms reductions in the START [strategic arms reduction talks] talks that resume in October. We are more determined than ever to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the threat hanging over mankind.

We know it will be hard to make a nation that rules its own people through force to cease using force against the rest of the world. But we must try.

This is not a role we sought—we preach no manifest destiny. But like Americans who began this country and brought forth this last, best hope of mankind, history has asked much of the Americans of our own time. Much we have already given. Much more we must be prepared to give.

Let us have faith, in Abraham Lincoln's words, "... that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it." If we do, if we stand together and move forward with courage, then history will record that some good did come from this monstrous wrong that we will carry with us and remember for the rest of our lives.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S STATEMENT, UN SECURITY COUNCIL, SEPT. 6, 1983<sup>11</sup>

Most of the world outside the Soviet Union has heard by now of the Korean flight #007 carrying 269 persons between New York and Seoul which strayed off course into Soviet airspace, was tracked by Soviet radar, was targeted by a Soviet SU-15 whose pilot cooled, and after careful consultation, fired two air-launched missiles which destroyed the plane and, apparently, its 269 passengers and crew.

This calculated attack on a civilian airliner—unarmed, undefended, as civilian airliners always are—has shocked the world.

Only the Soviet people have still not heard about this attack on Korean Air Lines #007 and death of the passengers because the Soviet Government has not acknowledged firing on the Korean airliner. Indeed, not until September 5 did Soviet officials acknowledge that KAL #007 had disappeared in its icy waters.

The Soviet Government has not been silent about the plane; it has merely lied. On September 1, Foreign Minister Gromyko announced that:

An unidentified plane coming from the direction of the Pacific Ocean, entered the air space of the Soviet Union over the Kamchatka Peninsula and then for the second time violated the Soviet airspace over the Sakhalin Island. The plane did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries, and did not enter into contact with the radio control service.

Fighters of the anti-aircraft defense, which were sent aloft toward the intruder plane, tried to give it assistance in directing it to the nearest airfield. But the intruder plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan.

The next day, September 2, TASS repeated Gromyko's charge that Soviet airspace had been rudely violated by "an unidentified plane" which "in violation of international regulations ... flew without navigation lights." TASS referred to efforts to establish contacts with the plane "... using generally accepted signals and to take it to the nearest airfield in the territory of the Soviet Union. Over the Sakhalin Island, a Soviet aircraft fired warning shots and tracer shells along the flying route of the plane. Soon after this the intruder plane left the limits of Soviet airspace and continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan. For about 10 minutes, it was within the observation zone of radio

location means, after which it could be observed no more."

Yesterday, when Soviet General Romanov finally admitted that the Korean plane had crashed killing "numerous" people, he also asserted, "the jetliner was flying with its lights out. . . ."

This is what TASS said, but we do not have to wonder about what really happened to the airliner or when it happened or what Soviet officials knew about its fate. We know, because we know what the Soviet pilots who intercepted the Korean airliners over the Sakhalin Island said to their ground controllers during the 50-minute period from 1756 hours to 1846 hours on August 31 while they tracked, discussed, and destroyed the Korean airliner and its passengers.

The U.S. Government, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, has decided to spread the evidence before this Council and the world. It is available on the video tape I am about to play. On this tape you will hear the voices of the pilots of Soviet interceptors—which included three SU-15 Flagons and one MiG-23 Flogger, including the SU-15 pilot who pulled the trigger which released the missiles that destroyed Korean Air Lines #007. While it is obvious that the pilots are acknowledging instructions from ground controllers, those instructions are not audible. What I am about to play back for you is the intercepted tape of the actual air-to-ground reports; it is, of course, in Russian; on the monitor screens you will see, simultaneously, the

original Russian and the English translation; through your audio system you will listen to these voices in translation into all the working languages of the United Nations. Immediately following my presentation, the Russian-to-English transcript will be made available to all who may wish to study it. After this session of the Security Council, an audio cassette on which voices are still clearer will be provided to any interested mission.

Nothing was cut from this tape. The recording was made on a voice-actuated recorder and, therefore, it covers only those periods of time when conversation was heard.

[The video tape was played.]

Ambassador Kirkpatrick (right) used the TV monitors in the UN Security Council meeting September 6 to show members the transcripts (in English and Russian) of the Soviet interceptor pilots' conversations with their ground station. Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Oleg A. Troyanovskiy is on the left.

(Wide World photo)



The transcript we have just heard needs little explanation. Quite simply, it establishes that the Soviets decided to shoot down this civilian airliner, shot it down, murdering the 269 persons aboard, and lied about it.

The transcript of the pilot's cockpit conversations illuminates several key points.

- The interceptor which shot KAL #007 down had the airliner in sight for over 20 minutes before firing his missiles.
- Contrary to what the Soviets have repeatedly stated, the interceptor pilot saw the airliner's navigation lights and reported that fact to the ground on three occasions.
- Contrary to Soviet statements, the pilot makes no mention of firing any warning shots, only the firing of the missiles which he said struck the "target."
- Contrary to Soviet statements, there is no indication whatsoever that the interceptor pilot made any attempt either to communicate with the airliner or to signal for it to land in accordance with accepted international practice. Indeed, the Soviet interceptor planes may be technically incapable of communicating by radio with civilian aircraft, presumably out of fear of Soviet pilot defections.
- Perhaps the most shocking fact learned from the transcript is that at no point did the pilots raise the question of the identity of the target aircraft nor at any time did the interceptor pilots refer to it as anything other than the "target." The only activity bearing on the identity of the aircraft was a statement by the pilot of the attacking interceptor that "the target isn't responding to IFF." This means the aircraft did not respond to the electronic interrogation by which military aircraft identify friends or foes (IFF). But, of course, the Korean airliner could not have responded to IFF because commercial aircraft are not equipped to do so.

We know the interceptor which shot down KAL #007 flew behind, alongside, and in front of the airliner—coming at least as close as 2 kilometers—before dropping back behind the plane and firing his missiles. At a distance of 2 kilometers under the conditions prevailing at that time, it was easily possible to identify a 747 passenger airliner. Either the Soviet pilot knew the Korean plane was a commercial airliner, or he did not know his target was a civilian passenger airliner. If the latter, then he fired his

deadly missiles without knowing or caring what they would hit. Though he could easily have pulled up to within some hundred meters of the airliner to assure its identity, he did not bother to do so. In either case, there was shocking disregard for human life and international norms.

In the days following the destruction of KAL #007, Soviet leaders and the Soviet press have said they do not understand what all the fuss is about. They began by accusing the United States of creating a "hulabaloo" about nothing, and more recently they have accused us of a "provocation"—implying, though never quite saying, that we "provoked" them into shooting down an airliner that strayed into their space, "provoked" them into violating the internationally agreed upon standards and practices of behavior. They have spoken as though a plane's straying off course is a crime punishable by death. They have suggested that "like any self-respecting state, [they] are doing no more than looking after [their] sovereignty which [they] shall permit no one to violate." (From a newscast, September 4, 1983, Moscow Domestic Television Series.)

They have claimed, still without acknowledging that they shot down the Korean airliner, that "our antiaircraft defense has fulfilled its duty for the defense of the security of our motherland." They have suggested that they may have mistaken the Korean airliner for an American reconnaissance plane, but still do not admit that they attacked and destroyed it.

But none of these lies, half lies, and excuses can withstand examination. Straying off course is not recognized as a capital crime by civilized nations. And no nation has the sovereign right to shoot down any person or vehicle that may stray across its border in peacetime. There are internationally agreed upon standards for intercepting unwelcome aircraft. They call for serious efforts at identification, verification, warning, and, if the case is serious, for intercepting the intruder and forcing it to land or to leave one's airspace. Sovereignty neither requires nor permits shooting down airliners in peacetime.

Recently the Soviets have implied that the KAL #007 may have been mistaken for a U.S. aerial reconnaissance flight. But that is no more persuasive. The Korean Boeing 747 was on a routine scheduled flight. At the time it was shot down, the U.S. reconnaissance plane referred to by the Soviets had been on the ground 1,500 miles away for more than an hour.

Moreover, the United States does not fly reconnaissance missions in Soviet airspace. We do regularly operate aircraft in international airspace to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT and other arms control agreements. The Soviets know what our usual flight patterns are and can readily identify these missions.

Finally, neither the United States nor any other country upset about the slaughter of the 269 passengers of KAL #007 is creating a "hulabaloo" by exaggerating the importance of the events. We are protesting very important violations of the norms of civilized conduct on which international aviation rests, without which it will not be possible for any of us to board airliners, fly across continents and oceans without fear of being the object of a murderous attack. To a degree we rarely consider, international air travel depends on networks of mutual trust that we will not shoot down one another's airliners, kidnap, jail, or poison passengers and crews.

Why did the Soviet Union violate these norms; why have they lied about it? Two reasons are most often advanced to explain why the Soviet pilot shot down the airliner. One is that it was a mistake—the mistake of a trigger-happy pilot who, with his ground controller, followed a philosophy of shoot now, identify later.

But if pilot error was responsible for this tragic mistake, why has the Soviet Government not said so? Why has it lied, and why is it complementing the murderous attack on KAL #007 with a lying attack on the United States for provocation and aggression?

As I considered this question, my mind returned to a debate that took place in this Security Council 21 years ago when my distinguished predecessor, Adlai Stevenson, called the attention of the Council to the "unmistakable" evidence that a series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles was being installed in the Western Hemisphere. Soviet representative Zorin flatly denied the charges and, as Soviet representatives so often do, coupled his lying denial with a vicious attack on the United States. Our calling attention to threatening Soviet behavior, Zorin asserted, only masked the United States' own aggression and piracy. But Adlai Stevenson, too, had the photographic evidence to back up his charge—as irrefutable as the audio tapes we have today.

The fact is that violence and lies are regular instruments of Soviet policy.

Soviet officials regularly behave as though truth were only a function of force and will—as if the truth were only what they said it is; as if violence were an instrument of first resort in foreign affairs. They occupy Afghanistan and accuse the United States of interference in internal affairs. They create massive new European vulnerabilities with their SS-20s and accuse NATO of seeking to upset the balance of power.

We think otherwise. We believe that truth is as vital to cooperation and peace among nations as among people.

It is depressing to consider seriously our global prospects if they must be built on relations devoid of truth, devoid of trust. It is depressing to consider a world in which a major nation equipped with the most powerful modern weapons believes it has a sovereign right to fire on a commercial airliner lost over its territory. These Soviet actions and claims illuminate the Soviet conception of appropriate relations among nations in peacetime. They illuminate the world in which we live and work and make policy.

Of course, some sophisticated observers believe that the destruction of KAL #007 was not the work of an isolated Strangelove, unconcerned about human life but was, instead, a deliberate stroke designed to intimidate—a brutal, decisive act meant to instill fear and hesitation in all who observed its ruthless violence much as the destruction of Afghan villagers or the imprisonment of the Helsinki monitors are intended to secure compliance through terror.

Whichever the case—whether the destruction of KAL #007 and its passengers reflects only utter indifference to human life or whether it was designed to intimidate—we are dealing here not with pilot error but with decisions and priorities characteristic of a system. Not only did Soviet officials shoot down a stray commercial airliner and lie about it, they have callously refused offers of international participation in search-and-rescue efforts in spite of clearly stated "International Standards and Recommended Practices" of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which call on states to "grant any necessary permission for the entry of such aircraft, vessels, personnel or equipment into its territory and make necessary arrangements . . . with a view to expediting such entry."

We are reminded once again that the Soviet Union is a state based on the dual principles of callousness and mendacity. It is dedicated to the rule of

force. Here is how Lenin described the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in 1920: "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more than unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by law or regulations and resting directly on force" (the fifth Russian edition of Lenin's collected works, Vol. 41, p. 383).

It is this principle of force—this mentality of force—that lies at the root of the Korean airline tragedy. This is the reality revealed to the world by this horrible tragedy. It is a reality that we all must ponder as we consider the threats to peace and human rights that face all of us today.

The United States deeply believes that immediate steps should be taken here in the United Nations to decrease the likelihood of any repetition of the tragedy of KAL #007. We ask our colleagues to join with us in the coming days in the effort to wrest from the tragedy of KAL #007 new clarity about the character of our world and new constructive efforts to render us all more secure in the air and on the ground.

#### ACTING SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 6, 1983<sup>12</sup>

Today the Soviet Government at last admitted that its forces shot down KAL #007. Their confession comes only after the truth was known everywhere, that the U.S.S.R., without any justification, shot down an unarmed civilian airliner with 269 people aboard. And their admission was made only after the entire civilized world had condemned the Soviet action. Yet the Soviet Union has still not apologized, nor has it accepted responsibility for this atrocity. On the contrary, the Soviet Government states flatly that it will take the same action in the future in similar circumstances.

The international community is thus being asked to accept that the Soviet Union is not bound by the norms of international behavior and human decency to which virtually all other nations subscribe.

The Soviet Government statement claims that the Soviet air defense forces concluded that the Korean airliner was a reconnaissance plane on a spying mission. It strains credulity to accept the argument that the Soviets, after more than 2½ hours of tracking, and after the SU-16 that later shot down KAL #007 had moved to approximately 1 mile from the Korean aircraft, failed to identify the KAL airliner for what it was—a distinctively shaped Boeing 747 commer-

cial aircraft. Despite statements by the Soviet Government to the contrary, it is clear from the recording of the Soviet intercepter pilots' conversations with ground control that the Korean airliner's navigation lights were, in fact, illuminated. The recording reveals no warnings given to the doomed KAL flight.

The statement that attempts were made on the international distress frequency—121.5 megacycles—is not borne out by the facts. Even if the Soviet aircraft had that capability—which we do not believe—there is no evidence on the tapes of the Soviet pilots making any such transmission. The Korean airliner's radios were working prior to the shoot-down—as evidenced by the position reports made by the pilot to Japanese ground radio stations up to the time he was blasted out of the sky by a Soviet fighter. These transmissions were remarkable only by the routine nature of the conversations.

Just as there is no indication that the Soviet fighters attempted to contact the innocent airliner using the established international procedures, there is no indication that the airliner was either aware of or trying to evade the Soviet fighters or even that it was aware of the presence of those aircraft. Tragically, there is no indication that the Korean airliner even thought it was off course.

Previous Soviet accounts have been demonstrated by this most recent statement to be, at a minimum, grossly misleading. Today's release continues to lie to the world but also raises the most serious questions about the competence of the Soviet air defense system, with all the danger that implies.

The world community still needs straight answers. We are tired of lies and half-truths. Decent respect for the opinion of mankind requires that:

- The Soviet Union must provide a full accounting of what transpired;
- It must make an unequivocal apology for its actions;
- It must make restitution for the victims' families; and
- It must cooperate with international efforts to investigate this tragedy and to recover its victims.

The Soviet Union must accept the norms of civilized society in respecting the lives of innocent travelers. The world demands that the Soviet Union give assurances and take specific steps to ensure that the events of August 31 cannot occur again.



nying they shot down the plane even as his own government was finally admitting they did.

Accurate news like this is about as welcome as the plague among the Soviet elite. Censorship is as natural and necessary to the survival of their dictatorship as free speech is to our democracy. That's why they devote such enormous resources to block our broadcast inside Soviet-controlled countries. The Soviets spend more to block Western broadcasts coming into those countries than the entire worldwide budget of the Voice of America.

To get the news across to the Russian people about the Korean Air Lines massacre, the Voice of America added new frequencies and new broadcast times. But within minutes of those changes, new Soviet jamming began. Luckily, jamming is more like a sieve than a wall. International radio broadcasts can still get through to many people with the news. But we still face enormous difficulties.

One of the Voice of America's listeners in the Middle East wrote: "If you do not strengthen your broadcasting frequencies, no one can get anything from your program." Our radio equipment is just plain old, some of it World War II vintage. I don't mind people getting older; it's just not so good for machines.

More than 35% of the Voice of America's transmitters are over 30 years old. We have a similar problem at Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. We have 6 antiquated 500-kilowatt shortwave transmitters. The Soviets have 37, and theirs are neither old nor outdated. We regularly receive complaints that Soviet broadcasts are clearer than ours. One person wrote and asked why it's not possible for a nation that can send ships into space to have its own voice heard here on Earth.

The answer is simple. We are as far behind the Soviets and their allies in international broadcasting today as we were in space when they launched Sputnik in 1957.

We have repeatedly urged the Congress to support our long-term modernization program and our proposal for a new radio station, Radio Marti, for broadcasting to Cuba. The sums involved are modest, but for whatever reason this critical program has not been enacted.

Today I am appealing to the Congress, help us get the truth through—help us strengthen our international broadcasting effort by supporting in-

creased funding for the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and by authorizing the establishment of Radio Marti.

And I appeal to you, especially those of you who came from Eastern Europe, Russian, and Soviet-dominated countries who understand how crucial this issue is, let your representatives hear from you. Tell them you want Soviet rulers held accountable for their actions even by their own people. The truth is still our strongest weapon. We just have to use it.

Finally, let us come together as a nation tomorrow in a National Day of Mourning to share the sorrow of the families, and let us resolve that this crime against humanity will never be forgotten anywhere in the world.

#### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPT. 11, 1983<sup>17</sup>

As part of the policy of the U.S. Government to develop full information on the tragic shootdown of KAL #007 by Soviet forces on August 31, U.S. Government experts have continued to review the poor quality transmission on the tape which was played at the UN Security Council September 6. That review has now been completed. After efforts at electronic enhancement and hundreds of replays of the tape, U.S. Government linguists were able to interpret three passages more clearly as indicated below.

The first segment at 1819:08 which originally was translated "I have enough time," now is translated as "They do not see me." The second segment was a previously unintelligible phrase at 1820:49, which has now been translated as "I am firing cannon bursts." Because of the Soviet pilot's reference at 1828:05 to launching "both" rockets, the linguists also rechecked the reference at 1823:37 which was previously translated as "rocket." They were able to clarify that the plural was used; thus the translations should be "... now I will try rockets."

The transcript does not indicate whether the cannon shots were aimed at the KAL plane or were tracer rounds. We do note that, according to information made available by the Government of Japan to the United Nations, KAL #007, in its routine radio transmissions to Tokyo at 1823:15 (over 2 minutes after the cannons were fired) gave no indication it was aware of Soviet aircraft in the vicinity of that cannon had been fired. The evidence indicates that the

pilot was totally unaware of the fact that he was off course, that he was intercepted by Soviet fighters, or that any warnings—visual, radio, gunfire—were given.

This additional analysis of the tapes reinforces our belief that the totality of the events remains exactly as stated by the United States and Japan. The Korean airliner was not aware of the Soviet fighters, nor was it aware that any warning was given. The Soviets consciously made the decision to shoot down the aircraft. The fact is that it was an unarmed, civilian airliner, and it cost the lives of 269 innocent people.

#### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPT. 12, 1983<sup>16</sup>

At 10:30 a.m. today, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John H. Kelly presented the Soviet Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Sokolov with a diplomatic note demanding compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives of U.S. nationals aboard Korean Air Lines #007. The note indicated that the United States considers the Soviet Union's destruction of that aircraft as a "flagrant and unjustifiable breach of applicable principles of international law and as a direct violation of internationally agreed procedures to be followed when an aircraft inadvertently intrudes on a state's territorial airspace." The note further characterized the Soviet Union's action as "wrongful" and as giving rise to "responsibility under international law to make reparation." The U.S. diplomatic note did not specify an amount of compensation but indicated that the United States will supplement its claim with specifics at a later date.

Soviet DCM Sokolov refused to accept the note. Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly refused to accept Mr. Sokolov's rejection of the U.S. note.

At the same time the U.S. note was presented to DCM Sokolov, Mr. Kelly presented a similar diplomatic note on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea demanding compensation for its losses as well. DCM Sokolov also rejected that note.

We shall continue to press the Soviets to meet their clear obligation under international law to pay compensation to both the United States and

Korea.

**DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
SEPT. 16, 1983<sup>23</sup>**

This morning Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt called in Soviet Minister Sokolov and presented him with a second diplomatic note demanding that the Soviet Union accept diplomatic notes which the United States has attempted to present the Soviet Union on its behalf and on behalf of the Republic of Korea.

These notes demand compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives and property of U.S. and Korean nationals lost as a result of the wrongful shoot-down of Korean Air Lines #007 on September 1.

The presentation of claims of this nature by one state against another through diplomatic communications and the consequent payment of appropriately substantiated claims is an established international practice with hundreds of precedents going back several centuries.

**DIPLOMATIC NOTE,  
SEPT. 16, 1983<sup>4</sup>**

The United States refers to two diplomatic notes presented by Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John H. Kelly to Deputy Chief of Mission Oleg Sokolov at the Department of State on September 12, 1983 and to the oral representations of Mr. Kelly to Mr. Sokolov on that occasion. Copies of the two notes are attached hereto. [For texts, see p. 15.]

The first note states the position of the United States that the Soviet Union's actions in firing upon and destroying Korean Airlines Flight No. 007 in the vicinity of Sakhalin Island on September 1, 1983 was wrongful under international law and gives rise to a responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union to make reparation. That note further demands compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives and property of United States nationals lost as a result of the Soviet Union's wrongful actions.

The second diplomatic note was presented by the United States on behalf of the Republic of Korea. That note indicates that the Government of the Republic of Korea also considers the Soviet Union's actions with respect to Korean Airlines Flight No. 007 to have been wrongful under international law and to create an obligation to make reparation. The second note demands compensation for Korean lives and property lost as a result of the Soviet Union's wrongful actions.

The Soviet Union has now admitted that it deliberately destroyed Korean Airlines Flight No. 007 and thereby directly caused the deaths of 269 innocent persons and the destruction of attendant property interests. The United States submits that the Soviet Union's responsibility under international law

for these actions and its concomitant obligation to make reparation are beyond dispute. The only issue that may be properly considered as open to discussion is the calculation of the amount of compensation owing. The United States notes that its position and that of Korea are consistent with the position of six other states that have now presented the Soviet Union with similar claims, and that the right of all of these states to reparation has been publicly affirmed by dozens of other states that do not themselves have claims.

The presentation of claims of this nature by one state against another through diplomatic communications and the consequent payment of appropriately substantiated claims is an established international practice with hundreds of precedents going back several centuries. The United States submits that the Soviet Embassy's refusal to accept the attached notes is contrary to this established diplomatic practice. The United States demands that the Soviet Union accept the attached notes and will regard its failure to do so as an additional delict giving rise to additional redress under international law.

<sup>19</sup>Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

<sup>20</sup>The resolution was rejected: the vote was 2 against (U.S.S.R. and Poland), 9 for (France, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Pakistan, Togo, U.K., U.S., and Zaire), with 4 abstentions (China, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe). The resolution received the requisite votes necessary for adoption. However, because the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, cast a veto, the resolution was not adopted.

<sup>21</sup>USUN press release 71.

<sup>22</sup>Adopted by a vote of 26 for (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Spain, Uganda, U.K., U.S., and Venezuela), 2 against (Czechoslovakia and U.S.S.R.), with 3 abstentions (Algeria, China, and India) and 2 absent (Iraq and Lebanon).

<sup>23</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■

<sup>1</sup>Press release 327.

<sup>2</sup>Read to reporters by principal deputy press secretary to the President Larry Speakes in Santa Barbara (text from White House press release).

<sup>3</sup>Read to reporters by principal deputy press secretary to the President Larry Speakes in Santa Barbara (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 5, 1983).

<sup>4</sup>Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Hughes.

<sup>5</sup>USUN press release 67.

<sup>6</sup>Made to reporters at Point Mugu Naval Air Station, Calif., prior to departure for Washington, D.C. (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 5).

<sup>7</sup>USUN press release 68.

<sup>8</sup>Press release 331 of Sept. 6.

<sup>9</sup>Broadcast from the Oval Office (text from White House press release).

<sup>10</sup>Made available by the White House press office.

<sup>11</sup>USUN press release 70/1. V

<sup>12</sup>Read to news correspondents.

<sup>13</sup>Read to reporters by principal deputy press secretary to the President Larry Speakes (text from White House press release).

<sup>14</sup>Made to print journalists following Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech to the CSCE conference (press release 336 of Sept. 9).

<sup>15</sup>Made following his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko (press release 339 of Sept. 9).

<sup>16</sup>Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

<sup>17</sup>Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Brian Garison.

<sup>18</sup>8:23 GMT (8:23 EST) - KA-007 Tokyo Radio Korea Airline level 350 altitude 38,000 feet.

RJA: Korean Air 007 Tokyo Roger. From the Sept. 7, 1983 statement by the Director General of the Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.