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AN ALTERNATIVE TO CHINESE EXPANSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by

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S E C R E T

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I. Preface. The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of creating or stimulating disturbances in mainland China to weaken the control of the Communist regime over e southeast littoral. The purpose of this would be, on the one hand, to curtail the capability of mainland China for territorial or ideological expansion in southeast Asia, and, on the other hand, to facilitate and encourage seaward and western-oriented tendencies in the coastal area; on the one hand, to create a social barrage against aggression, and on the other, to "open the door" of the littoral to an inward flow of free world influences: cultural, political and economic.

A basic premise of this paper lies in the author's conviction that the influence of the West, western ideas, and western methodology, and the evidence of well-being accompanying the western systems have been absorbed during a long time and in depth along the coastal area of China, and that if the reins of communist control could be lightened on this area, it would once again function as a beachhead for the further absorption of these ideas. The author's conviction in this sense derives from a residence of ten years as a boy in the south central Yangtze plain and from subsequent visits to China in 1937 and during the war in 1945. The latter period, assignment with the Army, included a trip by jeep over the portion of the auto road from Kunming to Kweiyang. After most of the war-time period, spent in Kunming and Chungking, the author had a chance to observe, as

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United States troops moved into Nanking and Shanghai, how firmly engrained were western methods and ideas, and even religious practices, following eight years of occupation under the then anti-western Japanese East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

Another basic premise is the author's conviction that any totalitarian regime - be it Communist or otherwise - which succeeds in organizing the considerable resources of China to an efficient degree will, by its development and from historical precedent, be a serious menace to the safety of the southeast Asia and to the peace of the world. It follows that any regime in China will be totalitarian unitl such time as internal checks and balances are achieved to assure only a regime of the broadest consensus.

II. The Problem. The central policy problem dealt with in this paper springs from the foregoing premises. A China organized along totalitarian lines and developing a tremendous industrial potential, despite current set-backs, can become a serious contender for world power independently of Soviet aid or assistance.

Since much of the security that exists in Southeast Asia today derives from the preponderant United States naval power in the Pacific area, it can be expected that this balance will be seriously affected on a broad scale apart from the present Chinese land incursions at such time as the Chinese develop naval power. Chinese naval development would be relatively less successful in the North China Sea because of the strategic capability of the Japanese to dominate the northern waters. The South China Seas can

be less easily controlled from without in view of the relative openness of the Sea to the south.

At the present time the very intractableness of the terrain in Southwest China, the lack of roads and communications, have contributed to the sluggishness of Chinese advance and Chinese support of the Communist advance over the land of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Once the organization and domination of these interior areas within regular Chinese frontiers if fully accomplished by the Chinese communist government, and this is evidently not the case at present, there can be nothing other than a military defense line of western troops (probably principally United States) to stop China from moving at will throughout Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma.

Although the danger on land is imminent, the danger by sea can be a far more serious development in the long run. Both, however, are related. Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, has pointed out that the Southeast Asia area is important to the United States and that the peninsulas must be treated as a whole. He pointed out that the Japanese [a naval power] had assessed the importance of the area in the pursuit of their Co-properity Sphere.

Succinctly, the first aspect of the problem is to maintain the current degree of terrain and social difficulties for the Chinese in southwestern China or accentuate them so that the southward Communist probes cannot turn into a massive offensive and, subsequently, to weaken the control of the Communist regime over China's southern littoral so that its industrial strength cannot achieve the degree of development required to support

a modern naval power.

The second part of the problem is to train upon the southern littoral a barrage of moral and material resources which will keep an initial and defensive effort from stagnating, and will turn this effort into a positive influence favoring the posture of the free world and gaining for it additional support within the area now included in Communist China.

III. Summary of Paper. An analysis is made of the geographic factors affecting the problem, including a brief note on communications, agricultural and mineral resources in the area of interest. A review is then given of ethnic resources with particular emphasis on the tribal Nosu (Lolo or Yi), the Wa, and the Miao, as well as the Hakka, a Han Chinese group with a peculiar dialect and close social organization. The review illustrates the independent tendencies of these groups, outlines their habitats and their relative numerical strength. The tribal groups covered represent a population of about six million in all, and the Hakka are about twenty million. These groups cover the main areas of the Southern China mountain arc from Yunnan to Fukien.

A brief review follows of those aspects of Chinese history which have a bearing on the conclusions of the paper. These include the North-South struggle, the background of China's relationship with the West, and the function of the South as a staging area for revolution. There follows a brief analysis of some of the major weaknesses of the Chinese Communist Regime which have a bearing on the conclusions of the paper: the "Middle Kingdom" viewpoint, the lack of broad consensus of the present government, a brief survey of the "nationalities" policies of the communists and their tendency to "kill with Kindness" the individual ethnic groups.

The paper then covers the policy conclusions that can be derived against this background. First there is a mention of the old U. S. policy and the significance of the "Open Door" today. Then current U. S. policies toward the Southeast Asia Area are discussed and a review of recently proposed alternative lines of policy follows with a critique of each alternative. This concludes with a special reference to Taiwan and the "Two-Chinas" policy. At this point the paper offers another alternative approach which hinges upon the problem of halting an aggressive China in the making and upon a suggestion for actions inside China. Since the latter is the critical point, the paper reviews relevant factors of escalation and concludes that the decision for action into China is feasible and desirable.

The paper ends with an outline of a suggested program for carrying out the policy proposals. This program is broken down into four principal segments with a review of the feasibility of each element: insurgency among the tribes of Southwest China, a movement for a Free and Independent Kwantung - a proposal to be executed in two states, a development through economic means of a de facto autonomous Hakka area, and a proposal for a limited program for return of the Chinese nationalists (Chiang) to the mainland. These suggested elements are then tied together in a proposed schedule of timing.

IV. Statement of Background and Analysis of Pertinent Environmental Factors

a. Geography. The dominant geographical feature in the area treated in this paper is a mountain arc stretching from the Tibetan highlands behind

the Yunnan plateau through Kweichow along the saddle between Hunan and Kwantung and Kiangsi, and along the ridge behind Fukien province to Chekiang. This chain in its western limit forms a natural bar, along with the Salween and Mekong Rivers, between Central China and Burma, Thailand, and Laos, but in the eastern limit is also a bar against the easy access from Central China to the coastal strip running from Kwangsi up to Shanghai.

Although Yunnan has at its heart the tableland of Kunming area, this tableland is surrounded by canyons half a mile deep and mountains of up to three miles high. On the west it is drained by the Salween and the Mekong. The latter river becomes the Thailand-Laos border. The Kunming plateau area is drained by the Red River which flows down to Haiphong. The northern part of the province is cut up by the deeply gorged Yangtze (Chin Sha Chiang at this stage - the River of Golden Sand). It is significant that the Chinese people (Han people) who crowd all the good level land occupy only 22 per cent of the land area, leaving 78 percent, the rugged mountains, to the numerous separate tribal "nationalities".

"Although Kweichow (the next province in line) is spoken of as a plateau, sloping downward from Yunnan, very little of a plateau topography remains, as the table-land has been carved into a sea of mountains or broken by faulting. The Kweichow hills have some of the most spectacular limestone scenery on earth. Less than 5 per cent of level land is left, and rugged mountains and deep gorges dominate the landscape". [1] This situation is dramatized by the famous new road built during the war between Kunming and Kweiyang where at a certain point the road must climb the face

of a bluff and to do so zigzags back and forth in the giant twenty-one steps.

As the mountains dwindle into the hills of the arc along the coast they become less formidable. "The coastal region, divided politically into the four provinces Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, is separated from the basin of the Yangtze by barriers of hills, most of them averaging from three to six thousand feet in height...The region is transversed by numerous streams, most of them comparatively short and punctuated by rapids, and, accordingly, divided into many little valleys. These valleys favor the development of clans and of local dialects."[2]

(1) Communications. As can be expected from such geography, communications and roads are difficult if not tenuous. Without discussing the surfaces of the roads which are a special problem, suffice it to say that the famed Burma and Ledo Roads of the wartime periods which form the backbone of communications in Yunnan were known to be punishing for even the ruggedest vehicle. Although roads have been or are being built in Kweichow, navigation by small boats still is the best way to reach parts of the province. In the coastal strip good passes through the hills to the interior are infrequent and difficult. The most easily negotiated is, of course, the main pass through which goes the Hankow-Canton Railway. Another pass goes from Kweilin to Hengyang. The other passes are not important. Coastwise shipping has long been the preferred communication between areas along the coast; the Yangtze was the main communication from the interior.

(2) Minerals. The same mountain arc of which we have been speaking is also one of the richest reserves of non-ferrous metals in the world. In fact, a continuation of the same mountains provide a backbone for Thailand and Malaya and the source of their principal mineral commodity, tin. China also has some rich tin deposits which have been most actively worked in the past near Mengtzu on the Red River valley in Yunnan just before the river flows into North Vietnam. In Hunan are the world's richest antimony mines; while the richest one is off the mountain ridge other rich antimony deposits are on the ridge. In a pocket along the ridge between Kiangsi, Kwantung, and Fukien are China's richest tungsten mines - some of the richest tungsten mines in the world.

(3) Agriculture. The mountain ridge also acts as a dividing factor in agriculture. North of the mountains are the rich rice basins of the Yangtse and the Tungting and Poyang Lakes, below the ridge is a more diverse agriculture, multiple crops, and smaller cultivated areas. Nevertheless, although this southern area has not been known to be as prosperous as the rice plains, it is rich in variety and normally quite self-sufficient in terms of quantity. As is to be expected, south of the mountains the climate and crops are sub-tropical.

This brief sketch of principal geographic factors significant for the purposes of the paper serves to illustrate the diversity and character of the specific area of interest, but it should be supplemented by some general observations. Geographic "isolation probably contributed toward the formation of a number of the familiar characteristics of the Chinese.

To it partly may be ascribed their national pride. All other civilizations with which the Chinese had close contacts were derived from themselves and, they thought, were inferior to theirs . . . .Theirs was the Middle Kingdom and all other peoples were barbarous. . . .Lack of intimate relations with other great civilized states, too, helped to breed in the Chinese a reluctance to regard themselves as one of a family of nations or to treat with occidental powers on the basis of equality. . . .The Chinese were not greatly tempted to become a seafaring people. . . .The south supplied with much better harbors was not fully incorporated into the Empire until the seventh and eithth centuries of the Christian era and even then remained on the periphery of national consciousness. . . .China faced north and west, and not south and east. . . ." 3 "The hills and mountains along the south coast and in the southwest have made these regions somewhat hard to hold and have favored rebellions. Even yet the Chinese have not fully occupied the hills to the southwest, but for the most part have pushed their non-Chinese neighbors only out of the valleys." 4

b. "You-group" Chinese. "'All Chinese are alike' is but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European tenderfoot that 'all Chinese look alike.'" 5 A Chinese scholar has put it differently: "Physically [the Chinese] are in no way as homogeneous as they may appear at first glance, and their ethnography is full of ups and downs. . . .From the beginning of Chinese history there are two distinct ethnographical concepts in their mind. The one, to borrow Mr. Sumner's apt phrase here, may be described as the "We-group," the group which the Chinese historians consider

as their kind, the civilizers. What they have called the barbarians may be described for our purposes as the "You-group." [6]

For the purposes of this paper it is important to understand the extent, strength, and nature of the "You-group" in southern China. At the risk of being accused of overemphasizing the differences at the expense of the similarities, the discussion is also to cover Han groups along the coastal plane. Essentially, the purpose is to highlight a number of important ethnic minorities in the southern sector and indicate that "self-determination" may be a valid instrument for U.S. policy here.

As implied above, there will be considerable difficulty in specifying ethnic groups, because early Chinese accounts dealt with them generically as "barbarians" or "savages" without distinctions of ethnic nature and often not even noting linguistic differences. Although a recent ethnic study of China by the Russian National Institute of Ethnography [7] cites 52 distinct "nationalities" in China with a total population of 35,320,360 (based on the 1953 Chinese census), ten of these have a total population of 28.56 million. Of these ten principal groups, four of them are in the area which is under study in this paper, the Chuangs, the Yi, the Miao, (though also to a certain extent the Puyi) are being extensively discussed here, because they are in the mountain belt with which we are dealing. Notwithstanding the ostensible precision of the Russian analysis, its group designations are inadequately specific, and the Soviet study has failed even to mention two tribal groups in Fukien, the Santak (or Tan Chia) and the She min (or Sha ka) who number in the vicinity of 200,000. [8]

The main difficulty in studying the minority groups lies in the terms used to describe them. There are three principal recurrent terms in Chinese history used to describe the southern "You-group," Miao, Man, and Yi. The term Miao was originally used by the Chinese to refer to the indigenous racial groups they were displacing as they filled into the area known today as central China. It was only much later that this term became generally associated with a specific ethnic and linguistic group who refer to themselves as Hmo, Hma, Hmong, Hmoong, or Hmung with the "H" aspirated rather than sounded.

The term Man meant "barbarians" (or rather, "vermin") and seems to have been applied to all barbarians along the periphery of the Chinese Empire during its period of expansion; the designation included the Miao during certain periods. Apparently the designation Man was used for barbarians who might be troublesome but might be expected to be contained within the borders of Chinese law and order. It is interesting to note here that Marco Polo in the account of his travels refers to southern China (the Sung Empire) as Manzi which is apparently Man tze, sons of the barbarians.

The terms Yi (also given an I or E) was apparently a term generally used for barbarians along the periphery of the empire but more outside than inside the sphere of Chinese order. Although this term has more recently come to refer specifically to barbarian groups in the south, in the past it was also used to refer to the Mongols and other steppe-borne invaders in the north. Only most recently has the term Yi, as in the Russian paper cited above and now generally among the Chinese, come to refer to the groups related to the Lolo (another derogatory name) in Yunnan and Kweichow.

To make the essentially derogatory term Yi palatable, a new character has been created for the designation. Such a measure was necessary for purposes of simplicity, because the often used term Lolo is insulting, and the people grouped under the general heading, call themselves variously as Nosu, Ngo-su, Nesu, Nei-su, No, Na, Lei-su, Mo-su, Mon-su. As differences occur, these groups can be further filtered out and differentiated.[8]

The above is a somewhat simplified outline, and many scholars would modify the generalizations and add a number of qualifying statements. Nonetheless, the above viewpoint is a useful one because it demonstrates the majority of terms indicate "We-groups" attitudes rather than specific ethnic designations; it also shows the arbitrariness of almost any designation. The two main groups to be dealt with below are the Miao and the Nosu. The former is included linguistically in the Miao-Yao group of the Sino-Tibetan language family, and the latter is included in the Tibeto-Burman group of the same family.

(1) The Nosu are the largest ethnic minority group of the Yunnan. Their center is in the Ta Liang Shan mountain fastness in Szechwan, often in the past referred to as Independent Nosuland, which has been declared an autonomous chou (district) in Szechwan, but the Nosu spread out over a large area. The Russian study already cited describes the Nosu as the largest group of the Yi and states that the Yi spread north to 30° latitude and south to 20° or farther south, crossing into Vietnam and Laos. In the east they have spread as far as 105° longitude into Kweichow. Since the census gives the total population of the Yi as 3.25 million and they spread

over such a large area, it is obvious that they are not thickly settled. In fact, the Yi are generally a mountain people and leave the plains to the Han Chinese. The Nosu themselves are dominated by the "Black" Nosu or closely interbred aristocracy which controls the "White" Nosu - both a freeman class of serfs and a slave class of captured neighbors. The former are clearly an invading element into China and are warlike, horse-riding, given to feuds with other tribes, and in general recalcitrant. For years the Chinese have sought to dominate them and failed. The Nosu proper do not spread much further south than the Kunming area--the last nationalist governor of Yunnan under Chiang was a Nosu. They spread east into Kweichow. Some of them have been converted to Christianity, and there was a Nosu church up to the time the Communists took over China. Christianity, where it has been propagated, has "civilized" the Nosu but not destroyed their proud independent spirit. The southern tier of Yi who go as far south as Vietnam and Laos is provided by the Lisu, largely Christian, who spread into Burma and Thailand and silt in between the Salween and Mekong south of Tali; the Minchia (or Pai) in the Tali plain; the Nasi (Nakhi and Moso) to the north of this group; the Hani along the Red River; the Lahu between the Black River and the Mekong and down into Thailand, Laos, and Burma; and the Chingpo (or Kachins) who are along the Yunnan border next to the Kawa and Thai peoples. More simply "to describe their distribution, an isosceles triangle may be imagined with its base joining Tali and Ch'u-ching and its apex at the town of Ya-an on the Hsikiang-Szechwan border. Black barbarians [black Nosu or Yi] would then occupy the two sides of the triangle which

would be prolonged southwards to the town of Menghua, south of Tali Lake, in the west, and about two thirds of the way to the Vietnamese border in the east. White Barbarians [White Nosu or Pai] would be along the base of the triangle to both its extremes including the Tali plain and the Kunming area. A perpendicular dropped from the apex to the base of the triangle (following the Chien-Ch'ang or An-ning valley) would have both White and Black tribes scattered along it." [10]

In summary, the Yi group as a whole, dominated by the Nosu, both with respect to character and independence, has a population of roughly 1.852 million in Yunnan and together with the remaining 8 million of the minorities of Yunnan occupy roughly 78 percent of the land of the province. The Yi have another quarter million in Kweichow. Another 1.123 million are in Szechwan. The principal autonomous regions within Yunnan are the Te-hung Thai and Chingpo (Kachin) autonomous area with 1.625 million; Chi Sung Yi of 1.6 million; the Hung - ho (Red River) Hani of 1.48 million; the Tali Pai of 1.5 million; the Wei-Shan Chung Miao of 1.4 million; and the Hsi-Shung-Pan-Na-Thai group at the bottom of Yunnan. It should be noted here that the Miao group flows into Yunnan as the Nosu do in Kweichow.

(2) The Miao. In the 1953 census, the Miao (in the ethnic sense) numbered about 2.5 million. Of these about two million live in Kweichow province. "Though the designations for the different Miao within Kweichow run into several tens, based on locality or peculiarities of custom or costume, the Chinese division into five main groups - Black, White, Blue, Red, and Flowery - can be maintained. It covers in fact the principal tribes nowadays often widely separated but linked by common traditions,

similarity of customs and speech. The present distribution of the Miao throughout the province (Kweichow) is roughly as follows; the Red, who settled mainly in northwest Hunan, reached into the northeastern part of Kweichow; the Black concentrated in the eastern and southeastern region, interspersed by remnants of the White and the Flowery, the main body of whom has spread to the west and northwest. The Blue are represented in central Kweichow, extending somewhat to the south . . . . Beyond Kweichow, and west Hunan the Miao are found in the southern parts of Szechwan, in Kwangsi and Yunnan. From these provinces they migrated, during the last century, into Indochina and Laos and today are also represented in small numbers within Burma and Thailand. Here on their march southward they have reached 17° latitude." [11]

Perhaps the best way to understand the present fragmentation of the Miao is to imagine the entire area of central China south of Honan originally inhabited largely by the Miao tribes. They engaged over the years in a slash-and-burn type of agriculture which would spread each of the tribal groups across a tribal area which permitted them a generous 20-year cycle for their livelihood. These areas would be contiguous but mutually independent, much as the American Indian hunting preserves. As the Han peoples spread into the Miao areas, they would not spread along an even front but like fingers down valleys and into preferred land. The Miao groups in turn would originally not be exterminated or removed, but the area in which they lived would be reduced. This would serve to speed up the cycle and in turn denude the land with the Miao gradually restricted to more mountainous area.

They would not necessarily migrate unless the area in which they lived became completely exhausted and they were then forced to move. [12] On this basis it can be seen why the Miao spread over such a large area and why they are simultaneously restricted to such small districts. Indeed, it might well be asked whether we are even sure that these many Miao groups are even ethnically related. Research conducted so far indicates this is the case, and that while there is some difficulty linguistically from group to group the languages are similar and are often mutually inter-intelligible. [13] This has been verified in the case of Meo groups in Thailand to those in Laos with tape recorders. [14] Although the Miao are peaceable generally, they are quite independent and have retained this independence despite strong Chinese influences in social customs, language, and dress for centuries. As in the case of Nosu, the "Black Miao [15] (or the "raw" - uncivilized - as opposed to "cooked" Miao) have been a decidedly independent people, and through strong resistance by its members and the inaccessibility of their territory they have preserved the designation "raw" to this day. The actual level of civilization between these groups varies a great deal from place to place, but the "long-skirted" Black Miao consider themselves to be the aristocrats among the Miao. [16]

"The fact that the Miao have survived centuries, perhaps millennia, of continuous fights and attempts to annihilate them, is in itself the best proof for their vigor and vitality. Their warlike spirit, which in recent times documented itself when they entered Indochina, found expression

in their war songs celebrating their heroes--among them women--keeping alive the memory of their campaigns. Savina (1924) and Roux (1954) remark that among the tribes of Laos and Tonking only the Miao have war songs. In Kweichow, the Black Miao of the Hunang-p'ing hsien, the present writer observed that it was customary for the men on festive occasions to recite the story of the '18 years' War,' commemorating their fights during the periods Hsien-Feng and T'ung-Chik, 1851-1875. Not only did the Miao understand [how] to prepare weapons, they had armour and shields as well--they also mastered the tactics of warfare and their campaigns were well organized. The Miao's love of freedom is stressed by all observers . . . Henri Roux (1954) who has lived many years in close contact with the Miao in Indochina, characterizes them as being proud, loving adventures, imbued by a warlike spirit and possessing the instinct of hunters. He found the Miao's tents filled with guns of all sizes, as even the small boys were taught to use the, and the guns 'grow with the children.'" [17]

Within the province of Kweichow the Miao, together with other minorities, form about 40 percent of the population and occupy about 40 percent of the land. Some have estimated the population and percentage of land tenancy considerably higher. [18] At the present time there are the following autonomous areas which include Miao within Kweichow: the Ch'ien-nan chou of Puy's and Miao with 1.86 million, the Ch'ien-tung-nan chou with Miao and Tung of 1.8 million. There are also three autonomous Hsien for the Miao: the Lushan, the Taipiang, and one other. In Hunan there is the Tsiang-hsi chou of Maio and T'uchia with 1.75 million. The presence of autonomous

Miao groups in Yunnan has already been mentioned.

Although the Chuang and related groups of the Thai family (Chung or Puyi and Tung) have a collective population of about 10 million, they are not reviewed here because they tend to be more of a lowland population. The mountain area with which this paper is largely concerned, is dominated, on the other hand, by the Nosu and the Miao up to the Canton-Hankow Railway. This would be completely accurate should we include the Yao group who are linguistically grouped with the Miao but are apparently quite distinct culturally. [19]

(3) The Hakka. This review so-far leaves the population of the mountains or hills to the east of the Canton Railway uncovered. It happens that the area of mountains from the railway east through the back of Kwantung and southern Fukien is dominated by a group of Han Chinese who are known as the Hakka (this is a cantonese version of Ch'e Chia--guest family). Despite the fact that this group is a Han Chinese group, it could probably be accurately classed with the "You-group" because it is a late-arrival Han group in the Kwantung area and has settled in the mountains where Kwantung, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Fukien join. The Hakka, however, reach down to the Kwantung coast just west of Swatow and crowd into the back of Chao Chou Hsien and its port of Swatow which some Hakka even consider as their port. Most experts will carry the Hakka as at least a predominant element in the population as far west as the Kuelin-Henyang Railroad where they mingle into the Yao and Chuang and eastward into the western fourth of Fukien. In the latest census the Hakka were listed as approximately

20 million in this area.

The Hakka are mainly distinguished from the surrounding Pun ti or original natives by their dialect which is evolutionally between Cantonese and Fukienese on the one hand and modern Mandarin on the other. The Hakka are a highly individualistic people who tend to retain doggedly their ancient family traditions, customs, diet, architecture and social structure. They have retained their fearless qualities and are ardent lovers of liberty. They are a physically strong race and the women have never bound their feet.[20] This point is particularly worthy of mention. Since all Chinese surrounding the Hakka bound their feet, this exception must have had firm and old roots. Most Hakka explain that it is because they inhabited poor lands and the women have traditionally done manual work while the men have been sent off to study or make a cash living, but this alone would not seem to account for the individuality of the women because all Chinese women work hard even if not in the fields. It is the author's considered opinion that the explanation must be sought in something associated with the deep individualistic traditionalism of the Hakka and may stem from an age-old association of women with agriculture dating from neolithic times. It is probably subconscious, but it would nevertheless undoubtedly be considered a natural calamity if the men were to work the soil because the soil would not produce![21]

The account in the Encyclopaedia Britannica prepared by a scholar who was a long-time resident of Hongkong describes the Hakka as the highlanders of China. "They would not submit to foreign rule and were considered

rebels . . . . Many of the most courageous and sturdy politicos and generals of south China are Hakkas. They are strong individualists: the men are courageous fighters and the women vigorous workers."

Another expert has described the Hakka as a strong, hardy, energetic, fearless race with simple habits but of very contentious and litigious disposition. Self-reliant and active, their rapid expansion and fondness of property have often brought them into conflict with their neighbors . . . . [22] The Hakka "are a type of Chinese distinctly apart from the remainder [of the Chinese] and with a reputation for impatience of authority and independent views." [23] There are differences enough between the Hakka and the neighboring Cantonese and Hokkien, Hoklo, and Teuchia to prove that the Hakka are now an altogether separate branch of Chinese differing in character and manners. The Hakka dialect is not of mere local growth nor a patois of some one or the other dialects but an independent branch of the common Chinese language. [24] This point is brought home in another way by the following quotation from an anthropologist. "In so far as my material permits conclusions, [the Hakka] also differ physically from the groups among and with whom they live, but they are beyond any doubt closer to the population of Kwantung than any other [Chinese] provincial group dealt with in this study." [25]

Historically, it should be noted that the Hakka provided the backbone of the Taiping rebellion. They also furnished leadership in the rebellion of Sun Yat Tsen. General Chiang Fa-k'wei was reportedly a Hakka. A single member of the Chinese Communist Central Committee--characteristically an

Army man, Marshal Yeh Chien-Ying--is a Hakka. In southeast China a great many Hakka have emigrated, and as a whole the various emigre Hakka communities have furnished prominent leaders among the overseas Chinese out of proportion to their numbers. [26] This is particularly the case in Thailand, but it is also true of Malaya where many Hakka are prominent in ownership of tin mines and where the Hakka also provide the bulk of the laborers in these mines. In the areas of Borneo and Formosa the Hakka provide the majority of agricultural labor.

Finally, it should be pointed out in this stage of the paper that the Hakka area covers virtually the entire area of the richest tungsten reserves in China and three of the principal antimony moning areas.

c. Historical Background. Some historical factors have been brushed in roughly in both the geographic and the ethnic portions of this paper, but a brief review will be made here of three principal historical factors that play an important part in the conclusions of this paper:

(1) The conflict between North and South in Chinese history.

(2) The historical development of the relationship of China with the west.

(3) South China as a staging area for revolution.

(1) The Conflict between North and South in Chinese History. The very existence of two cities, Peking and Nanking, northern and southern capitals, characterizes the historical struggle between North and South in China. The line of demarkation in these struggles is usually in the vicinity of the Yangtze River or its water shed with the Huang Ho. The northern

power has usually represented a new invading force either impelled from the Mongolian steppe or from the Manchurian plain. Peking has usually been associated with conquerors and an empire of foreign origin, while Nanking has usually been associated with purely Chinese regimes as in the Wu, Eastern Chin, Liu Sung, Southern Ch'i, Liang, the Ch'en, Sung, and Ming dynasties. The difference between North and South is not just a difference of political geography. It is a difference of climate, agriculture, and most particularly of people. "The Chinese of the north tend to be conservative, well balanced, and reliable. Southerners are more emotional and tend to be radical and restless; they quickly adjust themselves to new conditions." [27]

This contrast between North and South is summarized by Cressey. "For two thousand years the north and south have had such pronounced differences in culture and ideals that the resulting difficulties have frequently exceeded the possibility of political adjustment." This difference has a more recent sequel. "One of the most significant geographic facts in China's modern history is her new relation to the ocean. Formerly China faced to the north and west, and the Pacific was the back door. The Jade Gate, not far from the end of the Great Wall in Kansu, was the front entrance . . . .Today [1934] all this has changed. China has turned about face and now fronts on the Pacific. Shanghai, Canton, and Tientsin have replaced Sianfu and Peiping. The ocean is now a great highway over which have come trade and knowledge . . . .Even more important than the <u>things</u> which China imports and exports are the ideas which have come across the ocean." [28] In the light of this statement it needs little imagination to

to assess the change under communism, as Maritime China has been virtually closed to the West.

(2) The Historical Development of the Relationship of China with the West. "Until the nineteenth century their own vast land engrossed. . . . almost all [the Chinese] energies. North of the Yangtze, where were long the chief centers of civilization, the proportion of coastline to area is small. . . .The south, supplied with much better harbors, was not fully incorporated into the Empire until the seventh and eighth centuries. . . . and even then remained on the periphery of the national consciousness. From the south, to be sure, merchants ventured abroad, sometimes to fairly distant parts, and, later, partly because of limited arable land, overseas emigration from that region began." [29] Early in the sixteenth century began the first contacts of the modern West with the Chinese through the Portuguese. With a policy of keeping western mariners at arms' length and restricting them to southern ports, south of the mountain area, the Chinese Empire virtually succeeded in ignoring the westerner until about 1839. Nevertheless, western influence was already seeping into the southern littoral. As the wars with the westerners were initiated, in the First Opium War, the door of China was forced open, but the resulting agreements only opened more of the southern coastal ports. It was not until 1859 that entry was forced into China proper. The attenuation of force and the evolution of more reasonable western approaches to China can probably best be dated with the assertion of the Open Door Policy by the United States in 1899. Although the statement may have been an effort in part to rationalize the existing situation in China,

there was enough idealism in it to provide the basis of growing, closer friendly relationship between the United States and an emerging modern China, ruptured suddenly at a later date by the communist regime.

Communist China today, where all contacts with the West have been heavily curtailed or at least closely supervised and foreign diplomats of countries who have recognized China are treated like the tribute bearers to the Imperial Court, distinctly echoes an older isolationism.[31] Many elements make this sealing off of China analagous to the sealing off of Japan under the Takugawa Shogunate after the initial contacts with the western world - the sealing off which was successful and endured until the visit of Commodore Perry and his fleet.

(3) South China as a Staging Area for Revolution. "The Chinese have a saying that 'Everything new originates in Canton.' It was in this southern city that the agitation developed for the revolutions of 1911 and 1927. Here, too, communism early made headway."[32] If we add the Tai P'ing Rebellion led by the Hakka Hung Hsiu-Ch'uon who got his start in Canton, it can be said that the four serious revolutions of recent Chinese history have begun in Canton. "The progressiveness of Canton is doubtless related to [the] inflow of ideology from overseas Chinese."[32] The bulk of overseas Chinese who have gone to the United States, particularly Hawaii, to the Philippines, Borneo, Indonesia, Malaya, and Singapore, Thailand, and Burma, have come from the Kwantung area. Many overseas Chinese have become relatively wealthy and have sent back large remittances to China. "Even more important than this money is ideas."[32]

In fact, the entire Sun Yat-Sen revolutionary movement was staffed and financed through these overseas Chinese. Mention has often been made of the potential fifth column nature of the overseas Chinese community. The facts certainly do not support such a contention, which has been fanned up in countries where Chinese immigrants are in great numbers and tend to dominate the economic if not the political power of these countries. Certainly the suppression of the Chinese community in Communist-tending Indonesia does not indicate that the Chinese there were front runners for communism. As a sequel of talks with a number of American officers serving in Thailand, Malaya, and Singapore as well as with members of the Chinese leadership, and after digesting Purcell and Skinner, I am disposed to think that with good economic and political conditions in these countries and a corresponding degree of relative well-being of the Chinese within them, the Southeast Asian area will once again be a strong center of influence upon China in a pro-western anti-communist sense.[33]

For this paper, the picture of the South as a staging area would be incomplete without some mention of the "Kiangsi Soviet" of Mao Tse-tung. During the period of the Kiangsi Soviet, Mao had succeeded in grouping his resources and defending himself against unusual odds in an area which roughly corresponds to the northern half of the Hakka area. The fact of the use of this area for defense was not related to the character of the people. In fact, there is a signal lack of Hakka leadership in the Communist ranks. The use of this area does, however, point to the importance of the natural physical defenses of this area.

In this brief historical summary some reference should be made to the philosophical historians. In Toynbee's view, China is a Universal State of the Far Eastern Civilization which is in its last stages of decline. The Communistic development is a re-establishment of the universal state under an alien ideology, which may or may not give it a new lease on life. A universal state in decline, in Toynbee's thesis, is subject to the incursion of barbarian war bands from its borders. The T'aip'ing Rebellion, despite the Han Chinese character of its participants, had many of the characteristics of such an incursion with syncretic religious basis and war band tactics. The Sun and the Chiang revolutions are interpreted as efforts to modernize China, not as an avatar of the former universal state, but as a modern western national state within the community of nations. The Communistic revolution started as such a movement but has since espoused the "Middle Kingdom" philosophy and the xenophobic attitudes of the old Imperial regime. "The Chinese, like the Western and the non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples, felt themselves to be superior to the Russians in civilization, and the motive that led them to accept a communist regime was not a wish to gain entry into the modern world through a Russian door. The Chinese peoples' objective was to recover for China her historical, cultural, and political primacy at the eastern end of the Old World Oikoumene." (Toynbee, Study of History, Vol. XII, p. 543)

In the southwestern portion of China are numerous groups of tribes barbarian to the Chinese. The similarity of the possible role of that of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the last stages of the Ottoman

empire has already been suggested by Toynbee,[34] and as the author of this paper has looked into these groups, he is struck by the strength of the analogy. The same analogy may hold with regard to the revolt of the Tibetan groups which maintain their resistance. The critical question is whether the Communist Chinese regime can bring these groups as successfully under domination as the Soviets have done with their ethnic minorities, or whether enough of them can escape domination and batter against the Communist regime during its periods of weakness.

Another philosopher of history, Carroll Quigley, in The Evolution of Civilizations, MacMillan 1961, believes that there is a new Chinese civilization in the process of gestation at the present time. He anticipates the next stage of Chinese civilization will be a stage of expansion during which it may present "greater threats to both /the/ Western and Russian civilizations than either of these will present to the other." This anticipation of a new expansionist China is at least worth keeping in mind during the discussion of policy conclusions below.

d. The Communist Regime and Essential Weaknesses. The following is a brief resume of certain aspects of the Chinese Communist regime which have a direct bearing on the conclusions of this paper. The observations are not designed to be either all-inclusive nor a complete, balanced statement of strengths and weaknesses. Since they are selective they will inevitably reflect attitudes of the author, but in each case pains will be taken to cite authorities in support of each point.

(1) The "Middle Kingdom" Viewpoint. The most fundamental observation that one can make about the current Communist Regime in China is that it is basically an effort "to set the clock back." It is in effect a re-establishment of the Chinese Empire in modern garb.[35] "The theory that China's career since 1949 represents only a temproary straying from the path of her manifest destiny is quite implausible."[36] How precisely the empire has been re-established can be illustrated by certain external manifestations: the return of the capital to Peking, the regional control system with control going down to cell leaders under Communism as to block leaders under the Empire, the retirement behind the xenophobic shelter of the natural environment of the Middle Kingdom, and the assertion of the superiority of Chinese Communism and ergo, the superiority of the Chinese way.[37] In connection with the organization of rural China under the Communists, the following statement was made in a detailed study by Hsiao [redacted]g-ch'uan. "Facts indeed suggest the conclusion that the Chinese Communist movement, with the exception of its imported ideology, has repeated some of the salient features of the political process prevailing in the imperial past."[38] Even the system of the communes which has been considered the Mao Tze-tung ultimate addition to Communism has its older precedent. "The celebrated neo-Confucianist K'ang Ya-wei, who tried to save the Manchu dynasty by introducing constitutional reforms in 1898, who took an important part in the attempted Manchu restoration of 1918 and who, to the end of his life, wore a pigtail, did in fact, sixty years ago, advocate a social structure very much like Mao's communes."[39]

It appears that the one tie--that of the Chinese communists to the Soviets--which makes Chinese Communism as alien modern ideology is now undergoing severe strain. Should the tie be broken, as certainly appears possible in the context of present Chinese developments, the one thing which gives Chinese Communism its essential modern character will be removed, and it can be anticipated that an "improved Chinese philosophy" will come to the fore. It is in fact the intellectual problem of the European origin of Marxism which would seem to be the principal stumbling-block in the massive self-deception being practiced by Chinese Communist ideologists. Yet even this has had a plausible recent explanation. "The collapse of the old Chinese state, served by a bureaucracy of scholars, had not only deprived the intellectuals of their traditional role in society, but had also, for most of them, destroyed their faith in the Confucian doctrines of their forefathers. At first it was to the liberal West that the new generation turned for enlightenment. . . .It was not until 1906 that a passing reference was made in a Chinese book to the Communist Manifesto, and a full translation did not appear until 1920. . . .There were, indeed, many reasons why this particular creed should appeal to the Chinese intellectual, who above all felt the lack of some system of thought to replace the Confucian view of life, which had so comfortably explained the whole duty of man without reference to the supernatural; and had confirmed the privileges of an educated elite."[39] For "elite" read "cadre" to fit the apposite context.

The regime can scarcely evade a fundamental Chinese reaction to power and control. "In Chinese civilization, the rule of a dynasty depends on its possession of a specific virtue, the teh. Like all things under the heavens, the teh is exhaustible, and when it has weakened to the point of causing suffering to the people and revolutionary unrest, a new possessor of the teh with his family will succeed in overthrowing the declining dynasty."[40]

(2) The Problem of Consensus or the Popular Base of Government. A recent review of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party[41] and worked out down through the Central Committee shows the following leadership representation by provinces of origin:

Hunan province (from which Mao himself comes) - 30 members

Szechwan (an early stronghold of the party) - 12 members

Hupeh and Shansi - 6 members each

Shantung, Shensi, Kiangsu, Hopei, and Fukien - 5 members each

Anwhei, Kiangsi, and Kwantung - 4 members each

Honan - 2 members

Kwangsi, Leaoning, Heilungkiang, and Inner Mongolia - 1 member each

Chekiang, Kansu, Kirin, Kweichow, Tsinghai, Sinkiang, Tibet, and Yunnan - no members

The tabulation indicates that the Chinese Communist Party, far from enjoying a national consensus is based heavily upon a Hunan power group. The breakdown also serves to emphasize the Central isolationist as opposed to an outward and maritime viewpoint. Particularly significant appears

the number of provinces which have no representation. The lack of representation from both Kweichow and Yunnan seems symptomatic of the problems in control presented by these areas. And there is only one representative from the Hakka area - a military man (Marshal Yeh Chien-ying), out of a possible 13 provincial representatives around this area. From what the author has been able to gather about the Hakka member, he has gone out of his way to prove that he is not a Hakka, but a national leader, during the period of his governorship of Kwantung.

A great deal has been made of the fact that Communism achieved its victory in China by basing its strength on the peasants. It this were indeed the case, it is quite evident that the regime has lost a lot of hold in this area by design. Mao stated in 1948, "In the past, because we have had to fight a guerrilla war in rural areas, we permitted the party organizations and army leaders in various areas to remain largely autonomous. The conditions. . . .at the same time. . . .also produced undisciplined and anarchic conditions, as well as regionalism and guerrillaism, which are detrimental to our revolutionary work. The present situation demands that we do our utmost to overcome these undisciplined, anarchic conditions, to overcome regionalism and the guerrilla mentality. . . .so that the party may gradually shift its emphasis from the rural areas to the cities."[42] This certainly points to an element of eroding consensus. It would be superfluous to attempt here to enumerate other examples of the erosion of consensus where revealed. Many such examples have been listed and commented upon in "Tensions in Communist China," an analysis of internal pressures

generated since 1949, prepared at the request of Senator Alexander Wiley by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress in 1960. Other illustrations can be derived from CIA FDD Confidential Summary no. 3251 of 8 November 1961 on "Popular Disaffection in South China Provincial Press." The important suggestion these facts provide is that the Chinese Communist Regime has not made much progress in broadening the base of consensus it enjoys, if in fact it even tried to. This is a useful angle from which to review the Chinese policy toward minority nationalities.

(3) The Policy toward the Nationalities and its Results. Since the Communist jargon tends to call ethnic minorities nationalities when there is any coherence at all to these groups, the word nationality will be used in this paper to refer to ethnically identifiable groups. A historical analysis of the treatment given the nationalities in the Soviet Union has shown that there is a three-phase process. The first phase was from the formation of the Soviet Union until 1924 when the nationalities were recognized. The second period was from 1924 until 1930 when the nationalities question was played down. The third phase, from 1934 to 1954, found the Soviets working up and replaying the nationalities as a sort of exploitation of apparent consensus. As might be expected, there is a rough similarity of development in China.[43]

Under the Chinese Constitution of 1954, Article 2, "All the nationalities are equal," and there is a prohibition against any "discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality." In a sense this was an official confirmation of the Program for Implementation of Regional autonomy for

Nationalities laid down on 9 August 1952. What this really consists of is that "the voice of authority shall speak in the language of the local minority group, but that the words shall be the words of the man at the top."[44] Where under the Nationalist Government of Chiang the tendency was a "homogenization" of the ethnic minorities into complete sinification and therefore a suppression of differences, the Communist Regime has adopted a policy of "killing them with kindness." Assimilation is still the aim, but an appearance of consensus is the means.

Based upon the census of 1953, a number of "autonomous" governmental units has been proclaimed. To restrict the discussion to the southern tier: the largest autonomous government has resulted from changing the name of Kwangsi Province to the Kwangsi Chuang Peoples' Autonomous Area on 15 July 1957. There was already a large autonomous area for the Chuang peoples (a Thai-related group) known as the "Kwei hsi Chuang people autonomous chou." The new formation in effect combined an ostensibly uniform ethnic area comprising about 6 million Chuang together with about 13 million Han Chinese. The Chuang occupy the central and western parts of the old Kwangsi province and the Chinese are mostly in the eastern third. The question might well be asked as to why such an apparent contradiction to the nationalities program occurred. An official explanation was given by Chou En-lai as follows at an official meeting in March, 1957. "We may say in general that the future of the industry, agriculture, mines, and electric power of China lies chiefly in minority lands. This applies to Kwangsi. . . . It is true the Chinese outnumber the rest in Kwangsi; this

will make the Chuang people understand that we really want to help." In short, the early "pure" autonomous region did not work, so the original province organization was restored under a face-saving name, but with a clear implication that the Chinese would be running things. Such an example might appear to be isolated but a similar development has occurred in other areas, although less dramatically.

"The case of the Miao people is another interesting example. . . .The Miao have three qualities which immediately bear on our subject: they are fiercely independent, and so were overjoyed at the thought of autonomy. They accept no rulers but their own tribal chiefs and therefore look autonomy at its face value and put it into practice. (Naturally this brought trouble.) Thirdly, they raise in their grass-covered mountains cattle far superior to any in the plain. They were ordered to come down--with their beautiful beasts--and try rice planting. They resisted. Now their autonomy is being remodelled. Wherever possible, they are united with another people in a joint autonomy. For example, the new T'u-Miao People's Autonomous Chou. The population is 19 percent Miao, 22 percent T'u,[45] and 59 percent Chinese. There are now four autonomous chou and three counties in which the Miao share a joint autonomy.[46]

A review by the author of one year and a half of propaganda put out by the Chinese Government shows that a great deal of emphasis was placed upon "cultural achievements" of the nationalities program. A great deal was made of folk festivals, recordings of folk music, songs, and poetry of nationalities. Emphasis was put upon achievements in alphabetical recording

of minorities' language and making the languages uniform -- which in substance appears to reduce peculiarities of language in a procrustian bed of uniformity so as to afford an easy means of introducing Chinese words and communist jargon into the local idiom. Another emphasis emerged in the insistence upon the "unity of the nationalities," a treatment of the nationalities as a "uniformly ununiform" group, a great "you-group." Thus, the distinctions among the various levels of culture and character of the various nationalities are completely ignored. The failure to make these distinctions in dealing with the ethnic groups is only a degree less unenlightened than the tendency on the part of the Han Chinese to treat all minorities as barbarians. Mao Tze-tung in the early days of the nationalities program made much of the necessity to avoid the error of "great Han Chauvinism" or the Middle Kingdom attitude, and in a report on developments in the field of nationalities given out in January 1962, a statement emphasizes that an important condition for success in the nationalities work is to "guard against and overcome the 'Great Hanism' and local nationalism." The problem is clearly still there.[47]

Finally, there is much implied by the absence of boasting by the Chinese Communist Party about success with minorities. It is a reasonable assumption that where a mass of reporting fails to mention a success in one given area, that a failure is being passed over. Such seems to be the case with the Nosu (Lolo or Yi): there is practically no mention of these people despite their widespread presence. In a document on ethnic minorities in China prepared by the Ethnological Institute of Moscow in

1959, it was stated that "up to a few years ago" the Yi had preserved in the Ta Liang Shan a sort of feudal society. What has happened since was not mentioned and there is little published material to show. Alan Winnington, in his Slaves of the Cool Mountain, has drawn a detailed picture of the release of the slaves under Communism and of the subsidy of the Black Nosu (Norsu he calls them) landlords. Winnington is apparently convinced that the reform measures are permanent and effective. He has indicated that a rapid reform was under way among the Nosu and that among the Wa, a long-term but slower-paced reform is also taking place. Winnington wrote before 1959 and the above observations refer to later materials.

In the course of his field trip, the author was informed by a missionary that recent local broadcasts in China, heard outside, indicated that the Communists had undertaken a personal campaign against missionaries who had worked among the Lisu. Since this group was largely a Christian group until a short time ago, there is an implication that Christianity is giving the Communists some problems with their nationalities.

If "national in form, socialist in content" is indeed the by-word of the Communists on the nationality problem, it can be expected that there would be a much show of autonomy with far less substance. This is exactly what the propaganda out of China indicates.

V. Policy Conclusions. The turning point of China's relationship with the western world might be set at the declaration of the Open Door Policy by Secretary of State John Hay on September 6, 1899. Before this date, arbitrary force was the basis upon which Western powers dealt with

China. After that date the necessity at least to do lip service to less predatory principles began to take precedence. Notwithstanding the origin of the "Open Door" policy in the effort to preserve commercial opportunity against the background of the Opium Wars and other high-handed measures, the United States need not be ashamed of its policy toward China.

There were two main elements of the Open Door policy: The first concerned access and equal opportunity for all nations and the second the territorial integrity of China. The former element, despite its origins, might with a new and different emphasis be accorded a place alongside such later projects toward an open society as the Cultural Exchange programs, the People-to-People program, and the "Open Skies" as well as other mutual inspection proposals. In view of the isolationist character of the Chinese Communist Regime with its "Bamboo Curtain," our aim must be to open China again - through the interchange of ideas and trade - to Western influences, particularly American. But until genuine democratic institutions come into being and are sufficiently developed to constitute real checks and balances of Chinese power, it would be desirable if an element could somehow be fostered which could serve as a brake upon, or to attenuate, central Chinese power.

There is an already declared policy of the United States in favor of the self-determination and freedom for all peoples, and this may be thought of as a conceptual basis for such a safeguard as I adumbrate. Although the United States had in the past recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, in reaction to the recent revolt in Tibet the United States might now well

consider that self-determination should apply there. If applied also in the case of other ethnic minorities in China a "Great Wall" of independent human loyalties might eventuate across the southern arc of mountains of China, to act as a barrier to Chinese expansionist moves toward southeast Asia.

"The recent United States policy toward South and Southeast Asia has been directed at achieving the maximum security of the area with a minimum of American commitments."[48] In China, "in practice, the United States Government has consistently and consciously avoided moving toward any 'liberation' policy of all-out pressure, recognizing that such a policy would be both dangerous and impracticable. Ever since 1950, however, the United States has actually followed a policy which has involved steady and persistent, even if limited, pressure against Peking. Officially, the policy was described by the head of the China Desk in the State Department in 1954 as one of 'pressure and diplomatic isolation.' It might best be labeled in fact as a policy of 'limited pressure.'"[49]

Against this backdrop the alternatives for United States policy in China have been described as follows:[51]

1. A basically military response, bolstered by economic efforts, invoking SEATO and backed up by unilateral action with the possibility it might evolve into a Korean-type operation.

2. Complete disengagement. It would involve a steady retreat and the development of an offshore line of defense.

3. An alternate line of defense. This would require the redrawing in Southeast Asia of a new defense line to hold the area deemed essential.

4. Mutuation of disengagement. This would provide for other alternatives, such as a neutralized belt.

The policy of disengagement (alternative 2 above) is obviously the least acceptable of the alternatives advanced. If such a policy were to be adopted it would lead to the total loss of Southeast Asia and possibly the consequential loss of India to communism. Even if the Southeast Asian allies left to themselves might be able to offer resistance to Communism, their resolve to do so would probably collapse if the United States should disengage. A corollary of the disengagement policy would seem to be at least partial resumption of isolation on the part of the United States, and this would reduce the thrust of the United States in all sectors of world leadership. Some doubt might arise whether Japan would continue to serve an active part in Western defenses by permitting bases in its territor Certainly the policy of disengagement would place a tremendous burden of defense on the United States Navy. Strong though it would be relatively, its problems would be enormously increased. In the long run it is difficult to doubt that Communist China, left unharassed, would be able to organize itself effectively as a modern industrial state with a large navy. In the long run the United States would be faced in the Pacific by a formidable threat.

Since the alternatives of another line of defense (alternative 3) and a mutation of disengagement (alternative 4) resemble each other in effect

however different the degree of our resolve in either alternative - they can be discussed together here as a spectrum of choices shading from a position of firmness to one resembling withdrawal. The selection of either of these alternatives would be based upon similar reasoning:

a. Military unwillingness to accept arbitrarily the line of defense as offered by the circumstances;

b. Lack of confidence in our Southeast Asian allies;

c. A political and/or military unwillingness to commit American troops to an action which might eventuate in "another Korea;"

d. A Micawber-like hope that some slightly more favorable situation will turn up after a little delay.

Without condemning any of these (and admittedly each may be valid in given circumstances), I submit that the policy of the fall-back postulates that an adequate defense can be achieved by limited measures. Rational defense should indeed be effected with the greatest economy possible. The risk of this range of policy-choices is, however, that of "too little and too late." There would be much to recommend this range of alternatives if our Southeast Asian allies are strong and resolved and if the United States is merely required to provide assurance that there will be a line from which it will not withdraw. This contingency is, however, contradicted by our feeling a lack of confidence in our allies, which is part of the reason for this spectrum of choices. It is difficult to see how such a policy really avoids the Korean-type situation; rather it would seem likely to lead to that eventuality. Moreover, this range of choices would allow the

creation of a powerful China. A long range advantage could accrue to the West in such a circumstance if the countries of Southeast Asia should of themselves develop an equivalent power in time to serve as counterweight to the Chinese development. In sum, this alternative probably leans more heavily upon our Southeast Asia allies than we have a right to think realistic.

The first alternative of the firm line may be given a more complete statement. The United States policy would be to stand firm on the southern border of China, or alternatively on the northern border of Laos and the southern border of North Vietnam, and if necessary move in United States troops to sustain this position itself should the SEATO commitment be not strong enough.[51] While maintaining this firm line, endeavor to instill in the Chinese a stake in the peace. On the Free World side of this firm line there would be every effort to build up the economic and political strength of the countries in Southeast Asia. The line-holding policy

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inevitably brings to mind the limnes of the Roman Empire. It would be like raising a dam against a steadily rising water course. It implies an obligation of direct defense by United States troops throughout the world. The commitment implicit would exhaust human as well as material resources; but even if the resolve for such a policy were present, it is questionable whether a society such as ours could persevere in it. As opposed to the policy of a qualified line, this policy alternative tends, I submit, to underrate the usefulness of our Southeast Asian allies and to undercommit them. The invocation of SEATO is treated as somewhat pro forma because of

inherent weaknesses in that organization, and there is an assumption implied that we should do everything ourselves.

In a sense this alternative is an application of containment for Southeast Asia. The corollary of the policy is the encouragement of the Chinese to have a stake in the peace. This is theoretically achievable in terms of the "theory of games" and would consist in determining a suitable "payoff" for the Chinese. Such a theoretical approach, however, fails in some basic premises. The "payoff" we would insist upon, and the theory untenably assumes a rationality on the part of the Chinese consonant with our own. As long as China is Communistic and pursues a program consistent with its current declarations and actions, it is unlikely to become interested in the development of good relations with existing governments and people. "Their objective is revolution and they promote it where and as it is possible without excessive risk, adapting their methods to local conditions. Their goal is to lead Asia to Communism. . . .We must deal, . . . with a group of men in power who are dedicated to extending revolution beyond their own borders, by force where necessary and feasible."[50] Consider also the history of the Chinese Empire, before Communism. Whenever the Chinese state achieved a degree of effective organization, it always became expansionist. The precedents are therefore against China's sensing a stake in peace if peace should not subsume China's right to unhindered expansion.

Fundamental to the United States power position in Southeast Asia is the existence of Taiwan (Formosa) as the seat of the Government of the Republic of China. First and foremost is its function in defense as a base,

or in terms of naval requirements a fixed aircraft carrier, off the coast of China. Even if this potential were not to be actively exploited, there is the factor of denial to be reckoned. It could constitute an excellent base from which the Communists might try to break up coordinated naval operations of our fleet in the Pacific. This kind of possibility, mutatis mutandis, was appreciated by the Japanese in the past with regards to this island. The Japanese also thought in terms of controlling the Kukien coast together with Formosa as a primary element in their Greater Asian sphere. Historically, it is useful to recall the strategic position enjoyed by the Ming rebel Koxinga in possessing the island as well as the efforts of the Dutch to control it.

The existence of the non-Communist Chinese Republican Government on Taiwan also represents an important repository of good will in American relations to the Chinese people. The record of Taiwan, whatever recriminations may be raised, is a testimony to the good will of the United States toward the Chinese people. It is in the straight tradition which stems from the liberalizing influence of the United States in foreign policy affecting China beginning with the Open Door Policy and the return of the Boxer Indemnity funds, and culminating in the long period of American aid to China. Taiwan, furthermore, is the base for a strong infusion of Western ideas and ideals into the Chinese people through Educational Exchange, military training, and in the example of freedom in the relative terms of Oriental society.

Another helpful activity carried out by Taiwan is its regulatory relation with the overseas Chinese communities of the Nan Yang (Southern

Ocean). From a proportion of over 90 percent of the total population of Singapore, 37 percent of Malaya, and about the same of Thailand, it runs to lesser but still substantial percentages elsewhere. The Chinese community, furthermore, has an influence greater than even its numbers suggest, an influence largely based on economic power. Where possible, the local regimes have tended to penalize the Chinese population in hope of capturing the economic power. The Chinese community is often spoken of as a potential fifth column, but this appraisal of its misunderstands both the historical function of the Chinese in the area and the nature of a fifth column. These Chinese are not only in the area but will be there for the foreseeable future. If they are not made a means of disseminating Chinese Communism, they may become a channel for transmitting Western ideas and ideals into China. Instead of being a spearhead of aggresseion, the Chinese community could well become a base on which the Free World could expand at the expense of Communism. Taiwan appears fortunately suited for a regulatory relation with these overseas Chinese. It is neither large nor powerful enough to be overbearing and its influence upon the Southeast Asian countries has to be exerted through persuasion; Taiwan must function as a conciliator between the overseas Chinese and their hosts. Yet the island is strong enough to offer a ponderable pressure toward solutions: Taiwan can raise the voice of conscience in the world arena in case of grave abuse of the overseas Chinese by their hosts. Together with the other Southeast Asian areas where the Chinese constitute a substantial element, through its

example Taiwan can reflect the economic achievement of the Free World. I had the privilege of hearing the Chairman of the Overseas Commission of the Chinese Government speak on the policy of Taiwan toward the overseas Chinese community. He showed a thorough comprehension that the overseas groups must exercise patience and be good citizens in the host countries. Unquestionably, in his mind Malaya provides the best example to date of the mutual adjustment of checks and balances between the overseas Chinese and their hosts. Although weaknesses are admitted, the results on the whole are notably favorable.

There is, finally, a certain value in the existence of the potential threat of invasion of the mainland by Taiwan. Though it may never be possible to assess the actual deterrent value of the threat, the fact that the mainland Chinese have not yet marched south of their borders en masse can arguably be attributed in part to the posture of Taiwan.

The "two-Chinas" proposal may be briefly stated as entailing (1) recognition of the Peking Government, and (2) the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. From it little of value would seem likely to come. British recognition of Peking has won the British Ambassador a status not unlike that of western representatives to the Imperial Court prior to the last half of the 19th century. Nor can it be expected that the Chinese Communists would make a useful contribution in the United Nations. Taiwan, from the evidence available to date, reprehends the "two-Chinas" proposal. The adoption of the "two-Chinas" policy as presently

understood would in large measure annul the good will of the Taiwan Chinese and deprive us of the advantage of Taiwan's influence upon the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. It would seriously affect the availability of Taiwan as a base. A new weakening factor would also be added. "In such countries as the Philippines and Thailand, and even more so in Korea, Vietnam, and the Republic of China, under the immediate threat of Communist armed might, United States China policy is a vital issue. We cannot adopt the "two-Chinas" concept without causing the most serious and far-reaching repercussions in these countries."[52]

It would seem inadvisable for the United States to adopt the "two-Chinas" policy unless this could be shown convincingly to serve the long-term interest of the United States. This is not to say a situation can not be envisioned where a "two-Chinas" policy may directly serve the interest of the United States. At the root of such a consideration, however, is the problem of "territorial integrity." Just as the proponents of the "two-Chinas" put aside the old concept of territorial integrity, so also they supplant it with a new one assigning territorial integrity to each of the two states of segmented China. Yet daily all are forced to live with the uneasy situation of a divided Germany where neither side is prepared to accept a permanent ratification of the division. Now if to Taiwan could be added at least a firm beachhead on mainland China, the concept of "two-Chinas" might offer an advantage (provided the policy did not permanently sanction the lines of division): such a situation might be turned to the advantage of the United States in providing a mainland bridgehead for a

novel evolution of the "Open Door" and a real counter for bargaining with the Soviet Union as well as with mainland China.

VI. An Alternative Proposal. The element of defensiveness in current American policy on China seems to me to lead towards a position in which, in thenext 15 to 25 years, the United States will have to confront two instead of one major world antagonist and with no foreseeable new assets outside the European area. But instead, pursuant to its general objective of freedom and self-determination for all peoples, the United States should, I submit, stimulate self-consciousness and independence and economic self-sufficiency among the ethnic minorities of the southern arc of mountains stemming from the Tibetan border through Yunnan, Kweichow, and behind Kwantung and Fukien. It would have the immediate aim of disrupting the southward access and control of Communist China and the long-range aim of providing an intractable human wall against any future expansionist efforts of China in that direction. This concept need not imply the formation of independent states. Rather what is desired would be an autonomous belt even though under the Chinese suzerainty.

A second purpose of this proposal is to loosen the hold over the southern China littoral through the above development and to encourage an independent maritime outlook for the Kwantung area with the object of opening up China pursuant to a new "Open Door" approach. My proposal can be linked with one of the other defensive alternatives described above. It is my contention that the alternative which provides for a qualitative line of defense could be adapted to it, since that alternative places

greater weight on the Southeast Asian allies, demands fewer United States resources, and the weakness of retreat implicit in the alternative as a posture for defense is offset by a positive across-the-line approach into China in my proposal. The Southeast Asian allies are of course important in themselves, but a weakening of the Chinese thrust against them which is the aim of my proposal would provide a more positive challenge to them and foster a constructive build-up of their economic and political strength so as to make headway without the risk of ruin.

The most serious objection to any proposal to cross over into China lies in the threat of escalation. In his speech of 6 January 1961, Khrushchev provided what is in effect a scale of escalation. Obviously his statement should not be accepted at face value but rather as a firm indicator. The Khrushchev statement might be tabulated as follows:

Category of War	Soviet Reaction
1. World wars	Communists most determined opponents. Threat of total retaliation
2. Local wars (Egyptian campaign of British and French)	Threat of nuclear retaliation, but an even stronger threat of direct intervention with conventional arms. "Communists will combat both world and local wars, although existence of local wars is not excluded."
3. Liberation wars (Algerian war; Castro in Cuba)	Soviets in favor, recognize, will help.
4. Popular uprisings	"These uprisings must not be identified with wars among states, with local wars, since these people are fighting. . . . their right for self-determination."

Now, even if we doubt that Khrushchev's tolerance in terms of escalation would apply to liberation wars against his interest, in fact what is proposed in this paper is much less than an open liberation war. What is proposed is limited indeed and in execution possibly not clearly attributable to agencies external to China. As long as across-the-frontier moves are kept down in the scale, it would appear there would be no threat of nuclear escalation and probably no threat of Soviet intervention.[53] Nevertheless, there are contingent factors which would affect any possible escalation, contingent factors in this case which are favorable to my proposals are:

(1) Distance: The proposal advanced in this paper affects the farthest point in China from the Soviet Union.

(2) None of the proposed actions would individually "appear" to affect the integrity of mainland China seriously.

(3) There will be no threat or potential threat to the Soviet Union involved.

(4) The terrain where actions are contemplated is naturally intractable. The best communication is uncertain and the problem confronted by the Chinese will, ideally, never be clear cut to them.

(5) There are more real, imagined, or threatened dangers nearer the heart of Communist China and the borders of the Soviet Union. Kept aware of them, the Soviets are likely always to have a clear preferred choice remote from the area affected by proposal in this paper.

There is another set of relevant factors to the proposal of this paper; they concern the reactions of countries contiguous to the area of proposed operations and in which the operations must be based -- specifically, I refer to Burma and Thailand. The proposals advanced in this paper ideally should be brought to fruition so slowly and inconspicuously that neither protests from China nor reactions in Burma and Thailand could be expected to be serious. Undoubtedly a period of strain will occur especially if the proposed measures are effective. The very effectiveness of the measures at that point should bring on a shift in the balance of power along the frontier against China and in favor of the bordering countries. At that time the strain, however substantial, would be necessarily more apparent than real. To discuss this aspect of the problem, due note should be taken of the fact the Communists have already made moves to "develop" the tribes in Burma, and the essential decision may well be who achieves the first and most effective development of those groups, and not whether they should be developed.

VII. Suggested Program for Carrying out Policy Proposals. My proposal for an alternative policy towards Communist China has been formed with a number of resources in mind. Each element of the program is a separate entity and can be used independently; therefore each element will be treated individually below. It is the suggestion of this paper, however, that all of these elements be woven into a single fabric. Each should be developed separately with interrelated aspects undetectable by the Chinese Communists. Since timing is essential in the coordination of the individual

elements, a timetable follows:

a. The creation of disturbances in Southwest China - This element of the proposed program conceptually derives from a general objective of policy: the freedom and self-determination of all peoples. The aim is to create the same sorts of difficulty on the Chinese side of the southwestern border area of China as the Communists have succeeded in creating south of that border. There is, however, a major difference. The northward efforts rest upon fragmented ethnic groupings as opposed to the "Greater Han" allied groups working the other way. It is therefore not suggested that a massive resistance force be formed across the Chinese border but that, slowly, by carefully working through key areas, the tempo of restlessness be increased with overt actions not initially against personnel but mainly against material objectives. It is not suggested here that any firm nationality patterns be created; the object is rather to establish a sufficiently pervasive identity of individual groups so that an esprit de corps of each group can carry forward the action. The attacks and actions should be varied enough so that even a careful follow-up by the Chinese will not establish a clear pattern.

The aim is to destroy the pattern of order which the Chinese have been striving to lay down. Specific targets include permanent structures, e.g., railroads, bridges, roads, important buildings, industrial works, mines, etc. It is contemplated that the targets would not be hit by large but by small, carefully chosen groups whose tasks will not be associated with tribal groups in the immediate area of operations but at the greatest

possible distance. I venture to suggest that there should be some gradual arming of war-like bands by the United States. The eventual object in view is to bring about major shifts in the Chinese Communist order of battle -- ideally, the draining off of regular troops from the coastal area between Canton and Amoy, as this is related to another part of the program discussed below.

During the course of the field trip taken by the author, an officer of the intelligence staff of Admiral Felt (CINCPAC) suggested that an important contribution toward achieving a tempo of disorder could be the use of militia groups by means of direct bribery. The feasibility of this effort has not been reviewed by me; the officer felt it could be done.

The most important tribal group in Yunnan, in my opinion, is the Nosu. Little stimulus to action is needed with this group, but they are so remotely situated in Yunnan province that access might present a problem. During the last war a Chinese expert said of the Nosu that "If they could be organized into one fighting unit against the Japanese, they would make some of the world's best guerrilla fighters. . . . The southwestern frontier of China, politically speaking, is the weakest spot of the Chinese front against the Japanese."[54] The same expert pointed out that [illegible] northern part of Burma, culturally speaking, forms a unit with [illegible] Nosu are wide-spread, and since they belong in part to the aristo[illegible]re are some members of this group, notably the family of ex-governor Lung of Yunnan province, who are affluent and are at present outside China. Direct access to the Nosu must be developed across the Burma border above the level

of Myitkyina. Indirect access, however, could be developed from as far south as Thailand through the Lisu, a related group which has been largely converted to Christianity in China and which borders on the Nosu area. Indirect approaches might also be made through the Lahu. In view of the stront feudal traditions of the Nosu, it might be much better to arrange a catalytic role only for this group and to base the broader long-range effort on the Miao. To stir up action there would be little need for much more than the furnishing of weapons to the Nosu. If this is done, it should serve as a framework for the selection of certain particularly able individuals for carrying out demolition tasks.

Further down along the Yunnan-Burma border are the Wa peoples, who extend from the eastern shore of the Salween into China. There is a small group of these people up near Tali, but they range largely along the border itself. Gordon Young, who has spent the better part of a life time living near and working with tribal groups and who now is working with USOM in Chengmai, Thailand, told me during my lengthy interview with him that he feels the Wa people are the most accessible, reliable, and war-like group among the tribes, and that furnished with suitable arms they would be able to cause ponderable disorder in China. To heighten the tempo of disorder in China such an action would seem useful, but there are two things against too great an initial reliance on this group: first of all, the depth of their normal penetration into China is not as great as would be desirable for the proposal contained in this paper, and their linguistic grouping among speakers of the Mon Khmer Family of languages makes it unlikely that

the group could penetrate affectively much farther into China than their normal habitat; secondly their degree of culture is generally rated lower than that of other tribal groups. Nevertheless, the heartening assurance of feasibility with this group should keep the Wa among the principal elements to be considered.

The Miao (Meo in Laos, Vietnam and Thailand) are a most important group to work on. This is because they spread over the area of primary concern to this paper and there are groups of them accessible in Laos and Thailand. Since the Thailand groups came through Laos, access to the Miao would have to be developed back in this direction. There are also Miao in contact with Nosu groups in Yunnan. The Miao are a particularly attractive group to work on in connection with the proposal made in this paper because of their age-old tradition of independence and individuality and the egalitarian integrity of their social organization. The main difficulty with the Miao is the dispersed nature of their groups and the highly complex problem of intercommunication. Perhaps this might be overcome with tape recording devices?

In addition to their spread over the mountain arc of interest in the context of this paper, the Miao have a fairly tight community in the vicinity of Mengtzu and near the Nosu and Hani groups located around the principal tin mines of China at Kuchiu. Since tin is a major non-ferrous metal export form China, perhaps seeking for a Malayan to conduct demolitions in this key communications area would provide a plausible - to Chinese Communists - "capitalist plot" to explain damage in the Mengtzu area as an

action conducted by the Malayan tin industry to reduce the competition and take advange of a disordered world. Under the cover of such ostensibly "capitalistic" efforts, some real progress in developing resistance might be accomplished. Although there are certain serious difficulties about developing the Miao, it has been generally agreed by knowledgeable officers with whom it was possible to discuss this aspect of my paper that the Miao development would be feasible. In this connection it is worth mentioning the favorable evaluation given by Bernard B. Fall in Street Without Joy when he speaks of French efforts with the Meo tribal groups, "but like much else good during the Indo-China war, [the arming of the tribes] was begun too late, and almost until the end of the war, was fought with too little of everything."

b. A Free and Independent Kwantung Movement. Although an independent Kwantung is one of the ideal aims of my proposal, I do not believe that such a movement could seriously be created within the present environment. If it should be possible to reduce the strength of Communist control over the Kwantung area, I venture to suppose natural historical tendencies would reach towards independence or at least autonomy. Furthermore, since Canton is the major city of the South China coast, the Communist controls in this city may be expected to be tighter than in outlying areas. Finally, the independence of Kwantung is of such evident danger to Communist China that active efforts towards it would probably call down harsh retaliation. In short, it would not be desirable to work seriously on an independent Kwantung until conditions alter.

The very fact that an independent Kwantung would be a manifest danger to the Chinese Communists gives the clue to another element of the program I propose. As a method of focusing Chinese Communist attention on the wrong thing and to heighten in Chinese Communists a sense of crisis and the feeling that things are going wrong, an elaborately papered campaign for a Free and Independent Kwantung should be launched in the Canton area. Care should be taken to avoid real instigation to action, so as to preclude false starts. Desirable leaders for such a movement should be ignored in this initial effort, but the papering should do the utmost to create mutual suspicions among Communist leaders in order to increase alarm, uneasiness, and other conditions which could facilitate a genuine Free Kwantung movement on a reprise at a later date.

c. Hakka Autonomy. The important section of the mountain arc to the East of Canton is dominated by the Hakka. Although these people are independent and strong, they are Han people, considered to be at a slightly lower cultural level by the surrounding Han groups. Therefore, after talking with numerous Hakka and experts on the Hakka during the field trip, I am disposed to doubt that an independent Hakka movement, unrelated to that of Kwantung as a whole, could be realistically advanced. There is, however, an object of similar import which might be feasible. Since the Hakka area embraces the richest Tungsten mines in China and one of the richest antimony areas, my attention was drawn to the possibility that something could be done of an economic nature for the purposes outlined above.

Tungsten is a metal often in demand in the West and particularly in Germany and Japan. Germany's supply comes largely through Czechoslovakia, which obtains tungsten from China. The Japanese supply is from Thailand and Korea. Both Germany and Japan could benefit from a new supply by sea, going in their own bottoms. The cost of tungsten is sufficiently high and the quality of the ores in China sufficiently rich to warrant their being handled in small quantities. It is proposed that German and Japanese purchasers be induced separately to approach Hakka businessmen to procure the metal for export at Swatow. The economy of the metal is such that it could be profitably smuggled if need be. The insistence upon Swatow could be rationalized on the basis of the nearness of the supply and the ostensible need to avoid the highly charged situation in Canton and Hong Kong and the problematic invasion threats on the Amoy-Fuchow coast. Actually the purpose would be to train the supply from source to port through Hakka territory.

A similar but different operation could be developed in antimony. China is not producing it at pre-war levels because of the loss of a market, and antimony is one of the items which can be bought through barter in P.L. 480 commodities. Almost any suitable third country could develop this operation by seeking out Hakka intermediaries again and stipulating Swatow as the port. The intermediaries need not be the same Hakka as above.

The Hakka business groups in Southeast Asia are exceedingly closely organized and have contact from country to country as well as with mainland China -- in their hometown communities. They "keep their own council" even

in the Chinese community and the produce dealt with in this case is sufficiently lucrative and sufficiently rich that it might well attract their interest. Once the trade was established, it would be only a matter of time before they would be controlling transport to the source and dominating the economy of the area. If only one half of China's production in these commodities were diverted in this manner, it would involve an annual turnover of roughly 25 million dollars on the basis of pre-war production. If the major fruits of these transactions could be kept within the Hakka area, the economic benefits would be considerable.

The question has been raised as to how it would be possible to achieve this effort despite the vigilance of the communists. First of all, the mines in question are under local county government management. The initial diversions would not be expected to be so great as to alarm the regime. By the time the regime became aware of a major and presumably an uncoordinated effort, they would be faced with a dilemma -- either to cut off a lucrative supply of foreign exchange not controlled by Russia, or to permit continuance of the trade. Should they choose the latter, and this is likely, the Hakka intermediaries would be in a position to press for a degree of autonomy for the area. It should be kept in mind that the terrain is not the most attractive. It is not an area necessary to communications except along the coast; and if the other parts of the program were working, the balance of pressures would be, it seems, for the Chinese Communists to leave well enough alone.

d. Chiang's return to the Mainland. Although the prospect of a return of Chiang to the mainland is not an essential element of the proposed program, it could be a useful element. If one were to postulate a successful disruptive effort in Yunnan-Kweichow, a successful development of economic autonomy in the Hakka area, and the initial stages at a real effort to develop a Free and Independent Kwantung, then it is proposed that a modest effort be made to return Chiang to the mainland. It is proposed that this be done at the neck of the Chan-Chiang peninsular north of Hainan. The landing in an area so remote from Taiwan would probably have to be assisted by U.S. shipping. The choice of this point is based upon the fact it possesses a developed port, it has communications to the areas where the greatest disruption would be achieved by that time. It is contiguous to Kwantung which is postulated as developing an independent movement. The seizure of the pennisular would cut off Hainan Island and leave it an easy victim of further conquest. Finally the peninsula would be a beachhead on the mainland. It would be relatively easy to hold and would be insulated from the main Chinese military resources by a belt of disorder. The return of Chiang to the mainland is of course a problem in escalation. It is felt that a landing at the point suggested could appear small enough initially to appear to be a feint. If the landing were covered by a deception plan which would point to a major effort on Fukien, it might be as much as a month before the Chinese were convinced that the southern landing was the real thing. Furthermore, there would be that belt of confusion prohibiting ready access. Projecting ourselves into the Soviet position for a moment,

I submit that they would be unlikely to resort to heavy retaliation if the problem looked remote and looked as if it could be contained. In fact, it would seem feasible to keep the Soviets out of the fight until the invasion eventually succeeded in reaching the Yangtze, if plausible, guaranteed word were conveyed to the Soviets that we were not prepared to support the action beyond the river.

This might disappoint our Chinese allies but would achieve the basis upon which a divided China could be a strong factor in the U.S. policy position. How much stronger would be our position in a divided Germany if at the other end of Russia's worry there were a divided China which could be put in ferment?

Finally, it seems to the author that one of the greatest abberrations in Soviet policy through the years has been the recent development by the Russians of a massive, modern China on the very borders of the Soviet Union. It is such an unusual development in terms of Soviet history that it is at least tempting to see in this phenomenon the culmination of a serious Soviet miscalculation which began with the invasion of South Korea. If indeed this were the case, it would be more compatible with the pattern of traditional Soviet diplomacy if China were made a much smaller state -- at least the portion near the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union could be kept out of China as a returned nationalist regime made its way to the Yangtze, it might very well be that Soviet cooperation could be developed to keep China that way.

The author is not so sanguine as to believe that such an advance by Chiang could be immediately forthcoming, because at the point of landing on the Chan Chiang peninsular Chiang would be confronted with a situation sufficiently matured that he would have to negotiate his way with substantially independent groups before he could proceed, and his success in establishing some form of consensus in these groups would be contingent upon his own abilities. If he did indeed succeed in these measures, he would have developed a breadth of consensus which could provide the basis of an elementary but genuine democracy. Provided that the other aspects of the proposed program were to work out favorably, the successful advance of Chiang out of the beachhead would not be essential, and the United States could still reap the political advantage of having kept faith by returning him to the mainland even though he were to hold the beachhead and no more.

e. Timing. The proposed schedule of timing would run roughly as follows:

(1) Start of false Independent Canton movement.

(2) Development of disturbance in Yunnan about six months later.

(3) Development of Miao insurgency, following above by six months.

(4) Intensification of Tibetan disorders to heighten the effect of the above if necessary or to strike a balance if too heavy reaction sets in within Yunnan and Kweichow.

(5) Development of economic actions in Hakka area. To start about the same time as (2) above.

(6) Bring (2) and (3) -- and as necessary (4) to a peak at about 18 months after beginning (2).

(7) Start genuine free Kwantung movement about 10 months after start of Hakka economic measures.

(8) Bring Hakka development (politically) to full action about 18 months after start.

(9) As Southwest area difficulties reach peak and as Hakka political measures are brought to full action, land Chiang troops on Chan Chiang peninsular ostensibly as feint or minor action.

FOOTNOTES

1. Inez de Beauclair, A Miao Tribe of Southeast Kweichow and its Cultural Configuration, p. 132.

2. Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese, Their History and Culture, p. 10.

3. Latourette, op cit, p. 28.

4. Latourette, op cit, p. 22.

5. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 656.

6. Li, Chi, The Formation of the Chinese People, p. 3, 4, and 5.

7. A map of the Peoples of China, Mongolia, and Korea issued by the Institute of Ethnography, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Moscow, 1959. Editor, P. Ye. Terleskiy. Accompanied by monagraph by Solomon Il'ich Bruk, translated as item 3710 by the JPRS, photoduplicated by the Library of Congress, 16 Aug. 1960.

8. The Santak were described to the author by the Rev. Yeh, Hsüeh Fen in Singapore. He is in the process of writing a book on these people. Other details were furnished personally by Mrs. Inez de Beauclair in Taipei. It is possible that the She listed in the Russian map are meant to cover all these groups. Although the locations given do not match with those of Father Yeh.

9. The purpose of this paper is to simplify rather than complicate the classification of the tribes. Where the ethnic groups can be related, this is done. Many scholars, however, would reject out of hand some of the groupings. For example, Prof. Joseph F. Rock in his beautiful publication, The Nakhi Kingdom has insisted upon differentiating NASHI (NAKHI) and MOSO although few scholars do this. He deliberately fails to relate Nosu (Lolo) with the Nakhi although there are similarities. He rejects Nakhi similarities with the Minchia (PAI) and the Hsi fan, some of the differences are worth noting, but the recent Russian publication groups them all together. It also should be noted that Alan Winnington in Slaves of the Cool Mountain refers to NOSU as NORSU.

10. Michael Blackmore "The Ethnological Problems Connected with Nan-Chao (Ta-li)".

11. de Beauclair op cit, p. 127.

12. I am indebted to Prof. Herold J. Wiens for this interpretation.

13. There is a direct conflict on this point between F. M. Savina and de Beauclaire, the latter feels there is some difficulty in communications between groups. Savina maintains the groups can understand each other. It could be that one scholar is noting similarities and the other differences.

14. I was informed of this experiment by C. G. Edwards of the Christian Witness Press in Hong Kong.

15. The problem of what the "black" and "white" designations mean exactly has not been determined. The following points might be made:

a. The mong and Tartars use the designations Black and White to distinguish between nobles and commers.
b. The designation probably does not refer to dress, although this has been maintained.
c. The overtone of "black" in Chinese can refer to "wicked", "savage", or "wild," White as a color is used for sobriety, i.e., as funeral color.

16. de Beauclaire op cit, p. 132

17. de Beauclaire op cit, p. 168.

18. In the Soviet ethnographic study cited above, 30% of the population is attributed to minorities and they are given as occupying 30% of the land. Micky, in her Cowrie Shell Miao puts the tribal populations at more than 50%.

19. de Beauclaire makes quite a distinction between Yao and Miao, but most scholars do group them.

20. George Babcock Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations, p. 344.

21. Among a group of proverbs in daily use among the Hakka is the following: "of the same father but not of the same mother are brothers. Of the same mother but not of the same father are strangers." One can only speculate on the reasons which made this a relevant proverb, but there is at least the suspicion that the proverb was to correct tendencies toward a matriarchal clan system.

22. Hsieh T'ingyu, "Origin and Migrations of the Hakka." p. 359.

23. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 359.

24. Paraphrased from E. J. Eitel, "Ethnographic Sketches of the Hakka Chinese."

25. S. M. Shirokogoroff, Anthropology of Eastern China and Kwantung Province.

26. G. William Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand, p. 36.

27. George B. Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, p. 13.

28. Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations, p. 7.

29. Latourette, op cit p. 29.

30. Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, p. 213.

31. For detailed treatment of this current closure, see Peter Tang, Communist China Today, p. 455-456, the current discouragement of recognition is described on p. 458.

32. Cressey op cit, p. 217.

33. The overseas Chinese question is immensely complex and this one paragraph hardly does full justice to the problem. Although the author is not an expert on the overseas Chinese, he is prepared to sustain the thesis presented here in some depth, both on his own observations as well as on other authorities.

34. Toynbee, Study of History, vol. VII p. 65.

35. Toynbee, Study of History, VII, 206, 208, VIII, 330.

36. Victor Purcell as quoted in connection with McAleavey article in History Today.

37. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, in addressing the Senior Seminar in 1962 made a specific point of the Chinese outlook in this sense.

38. Hsiao, Kung-Ch'uan, Rural China, University of Washington Press, Seattle 1960.

39. Henry McAleavy, "China Under the Warlords" in History Today part II p. 306.

40. Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Louisiana State University Press, 1956, Vol. I., Israel and Revation, p. 39.

41. Chao, Kuo-Chun, "Leadership in the Chinese Communist Party" - in The Annals January, 1959

42. S. M. Chiu, Chinese Communist Revolutionary Strategy.

43. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Nationality Doctrine in Soviet Political Strategy, in Review of Politics, 1954, p. 283.

44. Peter S. H. Tang, op cit, p. 202.

45. It should be noted that T'u Chia means simply earth people or people of the soil, The Chinese have classified the T'u together with the Yi. This designation illustrates the problem of ethnic terms.

46. China News Analysis no. 232, of June 13, 1958.

47. Liu Ch'un, in National Unity. (Min-tsu T'uan-Chieh) January issue 1962.

48. Myron Weiner in American Diplomacy in a New Era.

49. A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia.

50. Rather than try to synthesize a set of alternatives, I have taken the liberty of presenting the alternative, as given by Ambassador John M. Steeves to the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy in 1962.

51. I am indebted for this formulation to Marshall Green, Consul General in Hong Kong who gave it to the author during his field trip.

52. Ralph N. Clough, "United States China Policy."

53. These conclusions, with the exception of those involving the crossing into China, are similar in substance to those arrived at in the Secret paper "Elements of U. S. Strategy to Deal With Wars of National Liberation." Report prepared by the Counter Guerrilla Warfare Task Force on 8 December 1961.

54. Hu, Hsien-Chin, "Frontier Tribes of Southwest China."

BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR

The author was born in south central China at Changsha, Hunan in 1918 of American missionary parents. With the exception of periods of home leave with his parents, he lived in China until 1932; about half of that time was spent at Kuling, Kiangsi, which became the Chinese summer capital in 1936. The author was then for five years at Kent School in Connecticut. At the end of the course he made a visit to China, primarily Kuling, but had occasion to travel the length of the Hankow-Canton railway which had been recently completed. The next four years were spent at Harvard. Following graduation, the author entered the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps and subsequently served in Morocco and Italy. In 1945 he was re-assigned to China and served about nine months there in Kunming, Kweiyang, Chunking, Nanking, and Shanghai. He then returned to Italy and in 1946 was made Chief of CIC in Trieste.

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A urvey of Its Land and Its People

McGraw-Hill, New York, 1934

An excellent portrayal of Chinese geography. For full understanding, this book should be consulted as well as the later book by the author below if only to illustrate changes

CRESSEY, George B.

Land of the 500 Million, A Geography of China

McGraw-Hill, New York, 1955

An excellent geographical survey of China with good choice of illustrations.

WANG, K. P.

"Mineral Wealth and Industrial Power"

Mining Engineering, August 1960

A current review of China's mineral resources and development. Informed experts have indicated the article is too uncritical of Chinese boasts.

3. Ethnic Groups, General

LI, Chi

The Formation of the Chinese People, an anthropological enquiry, Harvard University Press, 1928.

From fragmentary and incomplete materials, the author cleverly draws some exceedingly useful conclusions.

SHIROKOGOROFF, S. M.

Anthropology of Eastern China and Kwantung Province

Royal Asiatic Society, Shanghai, 1925

A scholarly working over of limited samples providing useful conclusions.

de BEAUCLAIR, Inez

"Ethnic Groups in General Handbook of China, Volume I

Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, 1956

Mrs. de Beauclair is a thorough researcher and although this particular reference has not been reviewed, considerable confidence is felt in the findings.

BRUK, Solomon Il'ech

Peoples of China, Mongolia, and Korea

Academy of Sciences, USSR, Institute of Ethnography, Moscow, 1959.

Translated from Russian by the Joint Press Review Service (JPRS) as item 3710 on 16 August 1960.

This monograph accompanied a detailed and comprehensive linguistic map of China edited by P. Ye TERLESKIY based upon 1953 census of China. It is obvious from internal evidence that some of the figures are approximations and the use of terms is not universally accepted by scholars.

Languages of the Minority Peoples

China News Analysis, Hong Kong, Issue No. 234, June 27, 1958

An excellent critique of the linguistic analysis being undertaken by the Chinese Communists.

WIENS, Herold J.

China's March Toward the Tropics

The Shoe Spring Press, Hamden, Connecticut, 1954

A historical treatment of the isolation and movement of ethnic groups during the Han advance. Considered an excellent scholarly work although WIENS has not traveled extensively through the area.

CLARKE, Samuel R.

Among the Tribes in Southwest China, China Inland Mission, Philadelphia, London, 1911

Although this book is outdated and some designations are no longer accepted, it is a useful reference.

EMBREE, John F. and THOMAS, William L. Jr.

Ethnic Groups of Northern Southeast Asia

Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1950

This is a compilation done for the U.S. State Department.

HASTINGS, James

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethnics, New York, 1955

There are a number of scattered references to the ethnic minority groups in China and Burma. The reference is useful for

thorough research but is difficult to use.

STEVENSON, William H.

Yellow Wind

Houghton, New Yrok, 1959

There are three chapters of this book that deal with the tribal groups in Southwest China, chapters 5 through 8. The treatment is useful but not thorough.

TUNG, Tung-ho

Languages of China

China Culture Publishing Foundation, Taipei, 1953

Useful summaries in a thin monograph by a specialist. Accompanied by a good linguistic map.

a. Yunnan Area and Related Groups

NOSU (Lolo, Yi), Lisu, Nakhi, Pai. Some selection has been made in favor of more recent material and useable material. The bibliography should be fairly complete otherwise.

HENRY, A.

"The Lolos and Other Tribes of Western China" in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Volume XXXIII. Not reviewed by the writer.

ROCK, Joseph F.

The Ancient Nakhi Kingdom of Southwestern China

Harvard University Press, 1947

A most thorough study but tending to fragment the tribal groups so completely that relationships are difficult to understand. Magnificent photographs.

LEGENDRE, Aime, Francois

Far West Chinois, Race aborigene, les Lolos, T'oung Pao 10, Leyden, 1909.

Not reviewed by the writer.

BROOMHALL, Alfred James

- Strong Tower, China Inland Mission, Lutterworth Press, London, 1947.

- Strong Man's Prey, China Inland Mission, 1953.

Although these volumes concern missionary work among the Nosu (Lolos), they give perhaps a finer insight into the people than some of the scholarly studies. The first volume has some useful notes on the origin of the Nosu.

FENG, Hanyi and Shryock, J. K.

"The Historic Origins of the Lolo" in The Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, edited by Serge Elisseff, Charles S. Gardner and James R. Ware, Harvard Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Volume 3, No. 2, July 1938.

This is an adequate analysis of the history and origin of the Lolo which name the authors feel is not an insult, although this fact is generally accepted by other scholars.

HU, Hsien-chin

"Frontier Tribes of Southwestern China" in the Far Eastern Survey, Volume XI, No. 10, May 18, 1942.

This article dealt with the Nosu primarily in connection with the war against the Japanese. The study also discussed Kachins, Pai-i or Minchia.

BLACKMORE, Michael

"The Ethnological Problems Connected with Nan-chou (Ta-li)" Unpublished paper furnished by Herold J. Wien.

This paper has been quoted above in the text. It is an excellent review of the problems of the origin of the rulers of the Nan-chou Kingdom. The study covers the Yi (Lolo or Nosu) and related groups.

SIGURET, J.

Territorires et Population des Confins du Yunnan

Peking, Harry Vetch, 1937. A recommended work not consulted by the writer.

STEVENSON, P.H.

"Notes on the Human Geography of the Chinese-Tibetan Borderland" in Geographical Review, Volume XXII, No. 4 (1932).

The article discusses the stratification of tribes in the Ta Liang-shan region of Southwest Szechwan. Discusses Lolo, Hsifan, and Jarung.

FITZGERALD, Charles P.

Tower of Five Glories

Cresset Press, London 1941

A study of the Minchia or Pai in Yunnan.

WINNINGTON, Alan

Slaves of the Cool Mountains

Lawrence & Wisehart, London 1959.

Discusses the ancient social conditions and changes now in progress on the remote southwestern borders of China. In this book WINNINGTON refers to the Nosu as Norsu. Winnington feels that a radical change has been successfully carried out by the Communist regime among the Norsu and that a slower but adequate development has been started among the Wa.

TAYLOR, Mrs. Howard

Behind the Ranges

China Inland Mission, 1959

This book is a study of the missionary life of J.O. Fraser among the Lisu, and it provides some insights into the people. To be skimmed.

KUHN, Isobel

Stones of Fire, 1961

In the Arena, reissued

Green Leaf in Drought, reissued

Ascent to the Tribes, reissued

China Inland Mission

These books provide a helpful insight into the Lisu who have been largely converted to Christianity. Ascent to the Tribes is based in Burma.

b. Kweichow Area and Related Groups

Miao, Puyi or Chungchia, Yao, Tungchia, and Chuang. Some selection has been made in favor of more recent material and useable material.

AGNEW, R. Gordon

"The Music of the Ch'uan Miao." Journal of the West China Border Research Society, Vol. 11, Chaytu, 1939. Limited use.

de BEAUCLAIRE, Inez

1946 "The Keh Lao of Kweichow and Their History" Studice Serica, Vol. V.

1954 "Die Ta-hau Miao der Provinz Kweichow" Gesellschaft f. Natur-und Volkerkunde Ostasiens, Vol. 37, Hamburg.

1956 "Culture Traits of Non-Chinese in Kweichow Province" Sinologica, Vol. V, No. 1, Basel.

1956 "The Representatives of the Lao in Kweichow Province" in Annals of the Academia Simica, Number 3, Taipei.

1960 "A Miao Tribe of Southwest Kweichow and its Cultural Configuration" in Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academis Sinica, Number 10. The latter publication has a great deal of detailed information about the Miao in general and has been used extensively in the above paper.

BERNATZIK, Hugo

Akha und Meau

Innsbruck, 1947.

CHIU, Chang-king

"Die Kultur der Miao-tse nach Aelteren Chinesischen Guellen."

Mitleichungen aus dem Museum f. Volkerkunde i. Hamburg, Number

XVIII, 1937.

CUISINIER, Jeanne

Les Mu'o'ng

Institut d'Ethnologie. Paris, 1948.

GRAHAM, David C.

1937 "Cermonies of the Ch'uan Miao" in Journal of the West China

Border Research Society, Number 9, Chengtu.

1937 "Customs of the Ch'uan Miao" ibid

1954 "Songs and Stories of the Chuan Miao", Washington.

JAEGER, Fritz

"Neber Chinesische Miaotse Albums"

Ostasiatishe Zeitschrift, Heft 1-4

"Anhang; Zur Geschichte der Kweichow T'ung-tzu" ibid.

KOPPERS, W.

"Tungusen und Miao" Mittelungen der Anthropolog Gesellschaft Wien

No. 60, 1930.

LIN, Yeh-Hwa

"The Miao-Man Peoples of Kweichow." Translation of the Maio-Man Section of Lo Jao-t'ien's Ch'ien-nan-chin-fung-chi-lueh, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies IV.

The translation is annotated in detail and provides a great deal of information on the historical background of current designations of tribes. It also illustrates the essential imprecision involved in dealing with ancient sources.

MICKY, Margaret Portia

The Cowry Shell Miao of Kweichow

Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1947.

This volume is a careful study of a single group of Miao. It does provide some useful material on the Miao in general as well.

SAVINA, F.M.

Histoire des Miao

Hong Kong, 1924.

It should be noted that Mrs. de Beauclaire feels that his observations are only accurate with respect to the Western Miao.

SCHOTTER, Aloys

"Notes Ethnogrophiques sur les Tribes de Kouy-Tshou," in ANTHROPOS, III, (1908), IV, (1909), VI (1911).

STUBEL, Han

"The Yao of the Province of Kwantung," Monumenta Serica, Volume III, 1938. "Ein Dorf der Ta-Hua Miao in Yunnan" Gesellschaft f. Natur-und Volkerkunde Ostasieus Bond XXXVII 1954.

TORII, Ryuzu

"Artistic Designs used by Miao-tze Tribes" in Kokka, No. 186-188, Tokyo, 1905.

RUEY, Yih-fu

"On the Original Type of Kinship Terminology Among the Miao Tribe in the Region on the Sources of the Yungning River, Southern Szechwan," in Bulletin of the Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, National Taiwan University, Taipei, No. 3, May 1945.

"The Magpie Miao of Southern Szechwan" in Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology: 29, Social Structure in Southeast Asia.

In the latter article there are some useful general observations about the Miao although both of these studies deal with the Miao in an area to the north of the area dealt with in the paper.

c. Tribal Groups in Areas Contiguous to China and Related to Chinese Groups

It cannot be judged whether the following list is exhaustive, but it provides enough recent material to give a sound background on the Nosu (Lolo), Miao, Puyi, Yao, and related groups.

ABADIE, Maurice

Les Races du Haut Tonkin

Paris, 1924

BERTRAND, Gabrielle

Le Peuple de la Jungle

Paris, 1952

CONIFACY, Auguste

"Etude sur les Coutumes et la Langue des Lolos et des Lagua du Haut-Tonkin", BEFEO, 8, 1908

BOURBOTTE, D.

"Marriages et Funerailles Chez les Meo Blancs de la Region de Nouy-Het, Tran-Ninh." Institut Indochinois Pour l'Etude de l'Homme, Tome VI, Bulletins et Traveaux, Hanoi 1943.

CREDNER, Wilhelm

Siam, das Land der Tai

Stuttgart, 1935

DEVREUX, George

"The Potential Contribution of the Moi to the Cultural Landscape of Indochina" Far Eastern Quarterly, Volume VI, No. 4.

GIRARD, Henri

Les Tribes Sauvages du Haut Tonkin: Mans et Meos, Paris, 1904.

GROSSIN, Pierre

"Les Coutumes des Meos de la Region Lou He, province Sou La"

Extreme Asie, 1926

IZIKOWITZ, Karl Gustav

Lamet, Hill Peasants in French Indochina, Ethnologiska Studies

Goteborg, 1951

JANSE, Olov R. T.

The Peoples of French Indochina, Smithsonian Institute, War

Background Studies, Washington, 1944. Smithsonian publication

No. 3768. A useful review.

LEVY, Paul

In "La Toile Meo" par C, Cressonet et R. Jeannin, Institut

Indochinois pour l'etude de l'homme, Bulletin et Travaux, 1944.

MASPERO, M. Geroges

L'Indochine,

Les Editions G. Van Oest, Paris, 1929.

This has useful although dated material on the Meo and Yolo in

Indochina. The Man discussed here are the Yao.

MORECHAND, Guy

"Principaux Traits du Chamanisme Meo Blanc en Indochine,"

BEFEO XLVII Fasc 2, 1955. Limited use.

ROUX, Henri

"Quelques Minorites Ethniques du Nord-Indochine" in France-Asie

January-February 1954, Vientiane, This article has been recommended.

ROUX, Henri

Laos, Editors Frank M. Le Bar and Adrienee Suddard

Human Resources Area Files Press, New Haven 1960

This volume contains a simplified view of Meo, Lolo, and Man (Yao) and an ethnic map gives an idea of placement. A similar publication on Thailand is not useful for the purposes of this paper.

SEIDENFADEN, Eric

The Races of Indochina

The Siam Society, Bangkok, 1937. This book does not appear to provide very much useful current information, but it has been recommended by others.

FALL, Bernard B.

Street Without Joy

The Stockpole Co., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1961.

Pages 240 to 250 of this book deal with French guerrilla efforts with the Indochinese tribes during the Indochina War.

YOUNG, O. Gordon

The Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand, The Siam Society, Bangkok, 1962. This is an excellent, concise handbook, dealing with the tribes in Thailand, but much of the material can apply to related tribal groups in Burma, Laos, and China. A valuable research tool.

YOUNG, O. Gordon

"Ethnic Groups of French Indochina, French language booklet published by the Association for Indochinese Studies, Saigon, 1937 with notes by Louis Malleret and an ethnographic map in color by Georges TABOULET. Translated by JPRS No. 12359

IWATA, Keiji

"Ethnic Groups in the Valley of the Nam Song and the Nam Lik" in the Japanese Journal of Ethnology Vol. 23, Nos. 1-2, 1959, translated by the Department of Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles

IWATA, Keiji

"Geographic, Demographic and Ethnic Background on Laos," Laos Project Paper No. 4, Department of Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles.

4. The Hakka

The bibliography of the Hakka is extremely spotty, and little of it is recent.

HSIEH, T'ing-Yu

"The Origin and Migrations of the Hakkas" in the Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Vol. 13, pp. 202-227.

This is a well researched article of some substance, but it was prepared in 1928. There is a useful map of the location of the Hakka appended to the article.

EITEL, E.J.

"Ethnographic Sketches of the Hakka Chinese" in The China Review, Vol. XX, 1892-1893, Hong Kong. Some useful historical notes are included.

EITEL, E. J.

"Proverbs in Daily Use Among the Hakka" in China Review, Vol. XX, 1892-1893, Hong Kong.

MICHENER, James A.

Hawaii, Random House, 1959.

There is a fairly useful, imaginative account of the beginnings of the Hakka and a useful treatment of the overseas development in this novel. Dr. Michener, who is recognized as a schol[illegible], has told the author of this paper that his research on the Hakka began in Singapore, then Hong Kong, and then proceeded with numerous interviews in Hawaii.

[illegible], Hsiang-tin

General Guide to the Study of the Hakka

Published in Chinese and Japnnese in Hong Kong, 1943. Although the author of the paper cannot read either Japanese or Chinese, he had a long interview with Professor Lo through an interpreter and obtained two useful maps, one on the migrations of the Hakka, the other on the present locations of the Hakka on the mainland. Certainly any current research on the Hakka would require a translation of this book, since Prof. Lo is the generally acknowledged expert on the Hakka in Southeast Asia.

PURCELL, Victor

In The Chinese in Southeast Asia, (see below) there is an appendix on the Hakka language at page 674.

CRESSEY, George B.

In China's Geographic Foundations, (see above under Geography) there

is a special article on the Hakka at p. 344 entitled "The Hakka, an Example of Selection by Migration."

5. Overseas Chinese

PURCELL, Victor

The Chinese in Southeast Asia

Oxford University Press, London, 1951.

This is the basic reference on overseas Chinese and it is fairly definitive to the date of publication. It is necessarily spotty at times because of the different quality of statistics handled.

SKINNER, G. William

"Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia" in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January 1959, Philadelphia.

This is a useful updated summary and points up current problems.

Chinese Society in Thailand

An Analytical History, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1957. A definitive and detailed sociological study.

Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand.

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1958

This volume like the one above is definitive on the subject to the date of publication. It contains an exceedingly detailed charting of Chinese leadership.

6. U. S. China Policy

Only books and articles referred to in the paper.

CLOUGH, Ralph N.

"United States China Policy" in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, January 1959.

An excellent summary to date of the problems.

WEINER, Myron

in American Diplomacy in a New Era, edited by Stephen D. Kertesz, University of Notre Dame Press, 1961, Chapter 6.

BARNETT, A. Doak

Communist China and Asia

Harper and Brothers, 1960, The Council on Foreign Relations

Although this book gives a thorough thrashing-over of the problems of U. S. po[illegible]ward China, there are a number of weaknesses in the reasoning which do not make it entirely acceptable.

7. Communist Problems

This item is meant to supplement the historical section above in adding a few highly selective items which were found useful in the study.

CHIU, S. M.

Chinese Communist Revolutionary Strategy, Extracts from Volume IV of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1961.