

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 76MOSCOW000333

175

E
BIA9

AOP000
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00333 091829Z

62
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 10-11 ISO-00 BIB-01 CIAE-00 000E-00
PM-04 H-02 ENR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SAM-01 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 ARA-06 /090 W
036369

R-091559Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8562
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
USMISSION USUN

*C*O*N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 333

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, UR, AD
SUBJECT: SOVIETS MIXING THEIR SIGNALS ON ANGOLA

1. SUMMARY. SOVIETS IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN GIVING AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS ON INTERVENTION ISSUE IN RECENT DAYS, BUT THEY APPEAR TO BE PREPARING A POSITION WHICH WILL ALLOW THEM TO REDUCE THEIR OWN COMMITMENT IN RESPONSE TO DAU SUMMIT DECISION. END SUMMARY.

2. IN JAN 8 CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] USA INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR ZHURKIN ARTICULATED DEFENSE OF SOVIET ROLE IN ANGOLA DESPITE POTENTIAL EFFECT ON DETENTE, STRESSING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA (SEPTEL). HOWEVER, ZHURKIN CONCLUDED ON SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTIC
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00333 091829Z

NOTE. STATING THAT WHOLE ANGOLAN PROBLEM MIGHT BE FINISHED WITHIN DAYS BY DAU SUMMIT IN ADDIS ABABA ZHURKIN SAID, "IF THE CUBAN TROOPS LEFT AND IT WAS SEEN THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD SECURED NO BASES OR ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES IN ANGOLA, U.S. PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT

PAGE NO. 1

100

RHw

9/13/90

X

()

100

X

()

100

(-)(1)

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

BIA9

SOON FORGET THE MATTER. INDEED, WEST MIGHT DRAW THE LESSON THAT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD WERE MORE BENIGN THAN SOME THOUGHT AT PRESENT."

3. DURING COURSE OF S/1: CONVERSATION, ZHURKIN ALSO HAD CLAIMED THAT SOVIETS HAD NO TROOPS OR MILITARY ADVISORS IN ANGOLA, SOUGHT NO BASES OR ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES, AND WOULD NOT SEEK TO IMPOSE A PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT. EVENTUAL GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONSIST OF MPLA ALONE OR BE A COALITION, HE ADDED. THE DECISION ON ANGOLA WOULD BE FOR THE OAU, ZHURKIN SAID. EVERYONE INCLUDING THE USSR, WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT IT.

4. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACHE SAME DAY, TASS CHIEF OF FOREIGN INFORMATION YURI KORNILOV TOOK SOMEWHAT HARDER LINE, BUT ALSO ENDED ON AMBIGUOUS NOTE RE FOREIGN INTERVENTION. KORNILOV CLAIMED JAN 3 PRAVDA ARTICLE REPRESENTED NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION AND WAS IN LINE WITH PREVIOUS STATEMENTS AND JAN 6 IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL. ANGOLA WAS "IDEOLOGICAL" QUESTION, A MATTER OF "PRINCIPLE" FOR USSR, SAID KORNILOV, AND THEREFORE SOVIET POLICY COULD NOT CHANGE. LIKE ZHURKIN, KORNILOV CLAIMED SOVIET'S HAVE NO MATERIAL OR MILITARY INTERESTS IN ANGOLA, BUT, WHEN PRESSED, HE AGREED THAT DEGREE OF SOVIET AND ESPECIALLY CUBAN SUPPORT PLACE ANGOLA SITUATION "IN A DIFFERENT CATERGORY", AND HE OPINED THAT WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES (WHICH HE THOUGHT HAD ALREADY BEEN ANNOUNCED) COULD BE KEY TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF CONFLICT.

5. ON PUBLIC SIDE, PRAVDA JAN 9 USES REPORT BY ITS CORRESPONDENT KOROVIKOV FROM ADDIS ABABA TO CITE SOUTH AFRICAN "SUNDAY TIMES" TO EFFECT THAT "RACIST GOVERNORS HAVE ALLEGEDLY AGREED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM ANGOLA ON THE CONDITION THAT THE SECURITY OF SAR INTERESTS IN NAMIBIA AND QUIET ON ITS FRONTIERS WILL BE GUARANTEED." THRUST OF SURROUNDING TEXT IS THAT SOUTH AFRICANS PRIMARILY MOTIVATED BY DESIRE TO KEEP HOLD ON NAMIBIA, BUT THERE IS NO EXPLICIT COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY OF SAR WITHDRAWAL.

6. FINALLY, JAN 9 CENTRAL PRESS CARRIES TEXT OF AUTHORIZED TASS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00333 091829Z

STATEMENT DENYING PRESENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY VESSELS OR EXISTENCE OF "SPECIAL" MOVEMENTS "NEAR" ANGOLA COAST. DENIAL DOES NOT OF COURSE TREAT NON-MILITARY VESSELS OR MILITARY VESSELS AND MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT SPECIAL OR NEAR COAST BY SOVIET DEFINITION, BUT IT DEMONSTRATES SENSITIVITY ON INTERVENTION ISSUE AND SHOULD MAKE IT MARGINALLY HARDER FOR SOVIETS TO PUT PRESSURE ON ANGOLA FROM THE SEA.

7. COMMENT: NONE OF THESE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS COMMIT SOVIETS TO ANY SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION, BUT ALL SUGGEST THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THEIR IMAGE ON EVE OF OAU SUMMIT. IN ANY CASE, AT THIS POINT THEY APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE BY ADOPTING MORE REASONABLE PUBLIC POSTURE.

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 76MOSCOW000333

175

MATLOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

SECRET

SECRET