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NATO-RUSSIA:**OBJECTIVES, OBSTACLES AND WORK PLAN**

- **Goal:** The U.S., in close coordination with key Allies (Quad) and NATO SYG, will develop a framework for the NATO-Russia relationship, to be defined, agreed and put into effect approximately in parallel with the process of Alliance expansion.
- **Our key parameters/red lines:** U.S. and Allies will make best effort to work out a NATO-Russia relationship that induces Russia to adjust cooperatively to expansion; Allies will seek to answer Russia's concerns on what we deem to be its legitimate security concerns and to find ways of accommodating Russia's desire for inclusion and active participation in new/enhanced European security structures, insofar as such arrangements support our overall security and political interests.

For its part, Russia will have to work toward understandings within certain bounds:

- ⇒ No veto
- ⇒ No second-class membership
- ⇒ No subordination of NATO to other bodies
- ⇒ No dilution of/interference in NATO command structure
- ⇒ No condominium (no appearance of secret deals over the heads of Allies)
- ⇒ No Yalta (no appearance of secret deals behind the back of the CEEs)

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- **Russian coming-in objectives:**

Track I: stop or at least slow down expansion;

Track II:

- 1) prohibit NATO military “infrastructure” on territory of new members;
- 2) obtain Russian leadership position in political superstructure of new Europe;
- 3) rule out Baltic and Ukrainian membership in NATO;
- 4) link/condition expansion to satisfaction of its own self-defined security and political needs.

- **Strategy: Persuade Russians**

- a) that enlargement is a fact and that blocking or splitting tactics will not work;
- b) that NATO is committed to POTUS’s goal of undivided Europe, with Russia as a key player;
- c) that it will take Russian cooperation and realism to achieve that goal;
- d) that realism means abandoning or significantly modifying their coming-in goals;
- e) if Russia wants to maximize its participation in and benefit from the larger evolutionary/integrative process underway in Europe, it should solve the problem of NATO+, not fight it.

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- **Principal obstacles/difficulties:** Russia remains to be persuaded on all counts — and may, in time frame we envision, be incapable of accepting our bottom lines.

Key Allies, especially Germany and France, have doubts about U.S.-preferred pace of expansion and may be susceptible to Russian splitting/delaying/blocking tactics.

- **Timetable:** Try to attain sufficient degree and scope of U.S.-Russian understanding (1+1) on framework by mid-fall to permit formal 16+1 discussions to begin — and be announced — approximately at the time of the December NAC; then, a 16+1 framework agreement to be unveiled at '97 Summit, along with NATO+ invitations and a PFP-enhancement initiative.
- **Next steps:** Pursuant to Christopher-Primakov agreement in Jakarta, a confidential, exploratory discussion with the Russians, via Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSG — Talbott-Mamedov channel), starting in second half of August; maintain throughout close consultative ties with 3+1 (other Quad plus Solana), making maximum attempt to incorporate Allied desiderata/concerns in our approach; selectively brief others (CEE, Baltics, Ukraine).
- **Agenda for SSG:**
 1. Nukes
 2. Infrastructure
 3. New Euro structures
 4. Enhanced existing structures
 5. Adaptation

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6. Russian eligibility
7. Others' eligibility (Ukraine, Baltics)
8. Diplomatic/juridical status of agreement(s)
9. Sequencing
10. Beyond-Europe U.S.-Russian cooperative/consultative mechanisms

- **Priority questions/trouble-spots:**

- A) Nukes — NAC decision on future deployments: how to elaborate and apply?

Not just a Russian concern; also the only caveat the Ukrainians have put on their own overall endorsement of our approach.

Russians want to reopen FBS issue on tacnukes; possible linkages to START II.

- B) Infrastructure.

The biggest problem. How, if at all, to use CFE modernization?

- C) Structural innovations.

Russian preference: Quint.

German preference: "Sext" — Quint + NATO SYG.

Solana: "NATO-Russia Steering Committee."

Other: OSCE SC or Advisory Committee.

- D) Russian eligibility.

Russia may apply. Our response? Talk 'em out of it?

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Germany and France want to rule out Russian eligibility.

Reasons: decoupling, Germany's no-nuke policy, implications for EU expansion.

E) Others' eligibility

Roll-out Baltic strategy!

Accelerate similar Ukraine strategy!

F) Adaptation

CJTF etc., what's in it for Russia?