

M-2017-11926

RELEASE IN FULL


Tuesday, July 16, 1996

Chris:

I'm providing here only the Primakov memcon, from our session Monday morning in his office (Jim Collins was notetaker). I've had several long sessions with Mamedov, both before and after Primakov, as well as some discussion with Primakov himself at dinner Monday evening — mostly on NATO-Russia. I'll include more on all that in a memo I'll write for you on the plane home Thursday.

I am dashing to get this written and ready for hand-off to Jim Timbie, who's returning with the VP's party and will get it to you, in one copy only, early Wednesday. I'm also giving an eyes-only copy to Steve Pifer for him to take to Chip Blacker.

Regards,



-0-

ST: The Secretary sends his greetings. He looks forward to seeing you in Jakarta. Like the President, he was very gratified at the results of the Russian elections. He admires your powers of prophesy. When you saw him in Lyon, you more or less predicted the outcome.

YMP: We appreciate the American role and support, although now I see the Americans are trying to claim they created the victory.

ST: You can't believe everything you read in Time Magazine.

In any event, from President Clinton on down — including what the Vice President said on arrival here — we've given

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare,
Senior Reviewer

credit to the Russian people and the Russian President for the victory.

Is there anything you can tell us about the postponement of the meeting today? Everyone wishes President Yeltsin the very best and wants him to be well. We also want to be certain that the postponement of the meeting today is handled so as to create no problems.

YMP: There is nothing I can add. I saw President Yeltsin Monday July 8, and he was in good shape. I reported to him on my trip to Ashkhabad and Bishkek. He is now on vacation, and I understand the meeting Tuesday will be restricted to the Vice President only on the U.S. side. However, I want you to know that there is nothing extraordinary. He had not wanted to go on vacation until after the inauguration; however, others have insisted.

I tried and failed to get Primakov to help get permission for Leon Fuerth to accompany the Vice President.

Primakov said he would not involve himself in the issue.

He advised that the Russian side would be Yeltsin,

Chernomyrdin, Ryurikov and an interpreter. In the end, fortunately, Leon was able to accompany the VP.

ST: It would be best if the Russian side announces that there will be a meeting tomorrow. That will minimize speculation.

YMP: I believe that is already being done. I also have another problem. I have the Egyptian Foreign Minister here Tuesday and the Italian on Wednesday. They are my guests, but had hoped to see President Yeltsin.

ST: I'm sure Ambassador Frowick will make no such demands when he comes here later in the week.

YMP: Very funny. I also wanted to say a word about Lebed. The Americans should not make him into a controlling force that is a threat of some kind. He will not be the decision maker on everything. For example, on foreign policy we have a good understanding. Lebed is intelligent. He and I had a twenty-minute talk. He quickly got the points I made. He understood right away, for example, the problem he had in identifying only Christianity, Islam and Buddhism as official religions.

ST: He's apologized to the Jews [in a *New York Times* interview]; now let's see if he can apologize to the Mormons as well.

YMP: Don't sell him short. He's not like most military men who see things only in black and white and only see one direction in which to go. He sees different sides to an issue and is honest. He will help the President.

ST: I'll pass along what you say. We do, of course, know who is in charge of Russian foreign policy: it's President Yeltsin. But we also know who is his principal adviser on that subject, and that's you. We have listened carefully to what we've heard about the role Mr. Lebed will play in addressing the issue of crime and corruption and the relationship that effort has to the creation of a positive investment climate. Although I have to tell you that the Number One issues for investors is taxes and having a fair and predictable tax regime. Nevertheless crime as an issue is a close second and very important.

Secretary Perry is also interested in Lebed's role, of course, since we've heard that Lebed will have some responsibilities with regard to the Russian armed forces. He is interested in who will be the new MOD as well. We believe it will be important for Secretary Perry to have good relations with the MOD because they can do a lot of important work that will affect our efforts to deal with the NATO issue.

YMP: I'm not involved in the selection of the MOD. When they ask my advice I give it. I know the candidates. Rodionov is very intelligent, and the others are also fine. We do not have any problem of Napoleons or with Bonapartism. In this regard everything is all right.

Primakov recounted at length Rodionov's role in the Tblisi confrontation between Gamsakhurdia supporters and the military which resulted in significant loss of life in the late Gorbachev period. His account painted a picture of Rodionov having got a raw deal at the time and since — i.e., it's not fair to characterize him as "the butcher of Tblisi." He noted that there was a fairly thorough examination underway of the "archives" — suggesting that Rodionov's proponents (along with his opponents, no doubt) take his candidacy very seriously.

Let me now turn to NATO. First I want you to understand that this is a critical issue for us. I have been looking at the material in our archives from 1990 and 1991. At that time the key objective of the U.S. and NATO was getting Soviet troops out of the GDR. In the talks that took place at that time, Baker, Major, Kohl and Mitterrand all told Gorbachev that not one country leaving the Warsaw Pact would enter NATO — that

NATO wouldn't move one inch closer to Russia.

Unfortunately, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were indifferent to this issue. Then the West changed its view. We know that the Central Europeans started pressing you. But, I have to tell you, there is one thing that will not change here — one thing that constitutes a real red line for us: if the infrastructure of NATO moves toward Russia, that will be unacceptable — it will not be accepted. Therefore we need to find a way out of this issue.

We see two processes as linked: the development of NATO-Russia relations and the expansion of NATO. They have to be tied; they have to run in parallel; they have to unfold together. We cannot have one confined to talk while the other takes the form of concrete steps. This is imperative.

ST: If we work hard and are smart, I think we can get through this problem. On our side we are going to make it a cornerstone of our approach that we are not talking just about enlargement — we're discussing a larger issue: issue of European security as a whole, and Russia is a central element in that. We hope Russia will have a role through the development of NATO-Russia relations within the broader context I have described. This is not just an effort to sugar-coat an otherwise bitter pill.

Let me begin with a few words about process. Mamedov and I have discussed this cluster of issues both in Washington and here. We've done so informally, on an exploratory basis, ad ref to you and Chris. On the basis of these talks and my discussion with you today, I will make a recommendation to Chris about your meeting with him in Jakarta. Perhaps you and he can reach, not an agreement per se, but a meeting of the minds on a

framework — an overall workplan that outlines the objectives and parameters within which we will discuss this matter further. If this can be achieved in Jakarta, it will become the basis for a serious one-plus-one dialogue. This dialogue in turn will have to lead fairly soon to a 16-plus-one format.

YMP: This is fine. Could you give me an idea of what you have in mind with respect to a framework.

I then reviewed with him the 8-point concept paper.

YMP: Your list of topics is interesting. I think it's constructive.

[On nukes and infrastructure] If we were to activate all the agreements that exist and the statements that have been made regarding tactical nuclear weapons and other matters, we could agree that there will be neither nuclear weapons nor forces in any of the countries about which we are concerned. But we need to have an agreement also about NATO "infrastructure" in these states. The problem with statements is that they say only that Russia does not want to do something and U.S. statements say that the U.S. doesn't want to do something. What we will need to do is to put such statements into an agreement regarding these countries, an agreement that says NATO will not expand its infrastructure to these states.

ST: Your remarks make Russia's desiderata clear. You also need to understand our positions. There can only be one class of membership in NATO. We're not going to discriminate against new members or undermine the fundamentals of the Alliance. At the same time, we see NATO within the context I described earlier — that of an undivided Europe.

YMP: I know there are problems. But you need to think about other elements as you consider the idea that there can only be one class of membership. You know that we do not want to see the U.S. leave Europe. We think your presence is in our interest. But we also have the new element of ESDI. At the same time, we are witnessing a transformation of NATO's mission. Let's think how all these factors can help us resolve the issue. For example, peace-keeping as a mission for NATO is entirely acceptable — indeed, welcome — to us. What's not acceptable to us is having Poland in the same category as England. The fact is there are already different classes of members of NATO. Countries have different limits to which they are subject. With respect to nuclear weapons, for example, Germany has one set of limits. Norway has another.

ST: You're outlining your concerns, which is fine; we've got some of our own. Part of the purpose of these preliminary discussions ought to be to make clear to each other our red lines. I've told you several of ours. Another concern: You are defining infrastructure very comprehensively. You seem to include command and control, airspace management, etc. You run the risk of defining infrastructure in such a comprehensive way as to make it impossible to find a basis for talks.

YMP: I agree that we should draw red lines, but there are both vertical and horizontal red lines with respect to NATO. The vertical ones include such items as infrastructure. The horizontal ones include such issues as the Baltics and Ukraine.

ST: If by "red line" you mean that you're not prepared to accept the Baltic states' and Ukraine's eligibility for NATO

membership in the future, then we've got a collision of red

lines, yours and ours. We'll be at an impasse if not in a train wreck. In other words, one of our red lines is now and will continue to be that no country is going to be ruled out of eligibility, certainly not by some other country.

YMP: Well, as I say, I think your overall approach makes sense, and that's what Chris and I should talk about in Jakarta. Then we might ask you and Mamedov to form teams. If you need military opinions you can ask for them. My idea is that you try to get the teams to come to a common view. When you are confident that the ideas will gain acceptance then we should go to 16-plus-one. Meanwhile, we will talk to European states in an effort to bring them along and condition them. Our idea will be to prepare all of them so that we can have a successful 16 plus one. The same is true regarding Solana. For us the important thing is to do the one plus one now.

ST: Here's how I see it. It's perfectly appropriate for us to have a bilateral dialogue about the future of Europe. But we are also going to be conducting on-going deliberations and consultations with our Allies. We're not going to be cooking deals behind their backs with you or anyone else. I'm sure you understand that. To the greatest extent possible, we need to keep this whole process transparent. Transparency and discretion or confidentiality may not go together automatically, but let's at least try to walk and chew gum at the same time.

YMP: Yes, as long as you understand that we'll be talking to the Europeans as well — on the same basis, not to play games against you or try to divide them from you, but so that they understand our views directly from us.

We need to look at the evolution of NATO. Why not think in a way that takes account of the fact that the Yugoslav crisis is not foreseen in the charter? Why not change the charter to say that NATO can act to keep the peace outside its area? Why not change it to say that NATO can give security guarantees — i.e., that NATO can give guarantees without membership? Could this be a direction for NATO's evolution, i.e. not taking in new members and expanding NATO's infrastructure but rather giving security guarantees to states?

ST: That's not a very promising line for us to pursue if you see what you're proposing as a substitute for expanding the membership of NATO. If what you're talking about is supplementary to NATO's accepting new members, then it might be explored.

YMP: I see what I'm proposing as compensation for NATO's agreement not to move its infrastructure eastward, toward us.

ST: I think I've made clear that what we're doing at this point is sketching out basic positions. You keep repeating that you don't want to see what you call infrastructure move east, but I hope you hear me saying, just as clearly and just as repetitively that we're not going to accept any agreements or arrangements that set up discriminatory distinctions within NATO.

YMP: With respect to [Russian eligibility for NATO membership], I'm certain that if raised the answer would be no. The Europeans won't have it.

ST: I don't think that's necessarily true. President Yeltsin and President Clinton discussed this issue in September 1994. The background was a statement by the German Defense Minister

Ruhe, who said that Russia could never belong to NATO, and another statement by Secretary Perry, who said that wasn't necessarily so. President Clinton told Yeltsin that as long as he had a say in the matter, no emerging democracy would be excluded from eligibility for membership. If Russia wants to discuss eligibility for membership and asks to do so, our answer should be yes, we are ready to discuss it. At the same time, however, if you do ask, you should be clear that this will not affect the entry of others. Those who have approached the door first may pass you as you stand at the threshold. Also, there should be no expectation or suggestion on your part that by applying for membership or by beginning the process, you would succeed in holding up the process for others. In fact, if you use your application as a blocking or a stalling device, it could have exactly the opposite effect.

YMP: If you were to change the name of NATO, I'd move to join right away. But the very name NATO is a problem. It's kind of a four-letter word for us. Imagine if you were in a position of having to join the Warsaw Pact. If there were a different name, it would be a different problem, easier to solve.

ST: Well, maybe after Poland comes in we could rename NATO the Warsaw Pact, and there would be no more problem for you.

YMP: [after good-natured laughter] The point is, we face a psychological barrier. We face the same thing on the issue of Ukraine and the Baltic states.

ST: As I said, you cannot expect us to exclude membership for the Baltics and Ukraine any more than we are prepared to do for Russia.

YMP: This is a special and emotional problem. In reality it is not acceptable to us that NATO is open to everyone. What if Chechnya were to apply? The problem for us today is that everything is going quite well [between Russia and the West]. But we are facing an issue that could disrupt or destroy everything. So we must be very, very careful.

Let me try to sum up what we have discussed. First, we will have the meeting in Jakarta. We will agree there on U.S.-Russia talks on the issues we have outlined. When we can come to a point of consensus, that can be the basis for 16-plus-one negotiations. Meanwhile, the one-plus-one will remain confidential. At the same time, each of us will talk bilaterally to the Europeans. But, I promise you that this will not be to work against what we are doing in one-plus-one.

ST: That sounds generally okay, as long as it's clear that we're going to be talking to our Allies at the same time that we're talking to you, and that includes talking to our Allies about ideas we're exploring with you. Anyway, I'll report to Chris. I think you and he will have a good discussion, and I'll be prepared to follow up with Yuri, depending on what instructions come out of Jakarta.

YMP: On Bosnia, I understand you don't want to see the collapse of Dayton. If asked today, I would say that Dayton is not wholly realistic. Nevertheless, I agree that we need to fulfil its provisions, and I know that key to this are the September 14

elections. I accept this even though the idea that they will produce a unified government in Bosnia is not realistic. Still, we agree that we have to work together for the elections to take place on time and to be as successful as possible.

To hold the elections, of course, means that we have to have all parties participate. We also know that Karadzic has to be out of office. Milosevic has worked on this. He is more against Karadzic than anyone. Speaking of four-letter words, "Karadzic" is the ugliest sort of four-letter word in Milosevic's vocabulary. But why must we have such preoccupation with him?

We have two possible scenarios. We can use force to get Karadzic to The Hague. If we follow that line, I believe we will not have elections in Srbska. Even the other members of the Contact Group don't support this idea. Only the U.S. and the Germans are for this. If you follow this course, you will have a collapse of the elections just before the American elections, and Dole will use this collapse against you.

We also do not understand why you are sending Holbrooke to twist Milosevic's arm. Milosevic would already have got rid of Karadzic if he could do it. I understand Holbrooke will say to Milosevic, "Get Karadzic out or we'll impose sanctions on Serbia!" All of this will lead to the collapse of elections. I only want to say if this happens and the approach you are taking does not work, don't say Russia did not do its part. We did. We have already got Karadzic out of office and we have told him to stay out.

In our view, the task now is to find a *modus vivendi* with Karadzic's party in order to have elections take place. What we need to do is work to marginalize Karadzic. We need to get the party itself to challenge him. Perhaps it's possible to set up an alternative party center. It's not possible to deal with the issue in the Krushchev manner, by taking off your shoe and pounding it on the table.

I have sent a letter to Milosevic urging him to help. I sent it today. It says that we see the Bosnia situation at a critical moment, a dangerous moment. I'm telling Milosevic that much depends on him and that he needs to deal with Karadzic.

ST: I want you to understand that Bosnia for President Clinton is in a class by itself. There are many important issues on our agenda: START II, CTBT, etc. They involve key interests, and we need to work very hard on them. But Bosnia is especially acute. I think that was clear from Yuri's visit to the Oval Office the other day, and it's clear from the presidential letter that Al Gore brought with him to Moscow. The Vice President is mentioning Bosnia to the Prime Minister and will do so when he sees President Yeltsin as well. And don't make the mistake of thinking this is just an issue of U.S. domestic politics; it's also an issue of U.S.-Russian relations. If Bosnia goes well, it will help us with what we are trying to do broadly together in Europe. If it goes badly, it will be a destructive force.

Our logic on Bosnia is straightforward. If Karadzic stays in Bosnia — basically running the show as he is today — either there will not be elections or they will be a farce. The Bosniaks will boycott the election if Karadzic remains *de facto* in control of Srbska, not to mention *de jure* in charge of the SDS, which is

what you seem willing to settle for. Every single day, Karadzic is doing something to disrupt and undermine the implementation of Dayton. If he remains head of his party, he will continue to run the show. He made a fool of Bildt. To go for this supposedly face-saving arrangement that leaves him running the SDS would be to repeat Bildt's mistake. We'd be saving more than his face; we'd be saving his power base.

YMP: What do you want to accomplish?

ST: Best of all, to get Karadzic out of Bosnia and to The Hague. He's an indicted war criminal, after all, and that's where he belongs in the dock, in The Hague. Next best, get him out of Bosnia, somewhere, as a way station on the way to his ultimate destination in The Hague. What won't do is to leave him in place. If he remains in charge of the party he will continue to run things, and we will not have elections.

Dick Holbrooke is going to Milosevic to try to make progress. His message will be that Milosevic should pull out all the stops and take measures to get Karadzic out of Bosnia.

YMP: The problem is how can he do so. I know Milosevic's options. He can use intelligence channels, but their effectiveness is limited. This is a subject on which I'm very, very knowledgeable. He can't take military action. If he tries to threaten Karadzic, it ends the conversation. Only if Karadzic wants to go — perhaps to Montenegro — will he go. If you insist on The Hague, it will end the elections.

ST: Our view is that Milosevic has the ability to deal with the problem, but so far he has not had the political will.

Holbrooke's instructions authorize him to use all his impressive

powers to get Milosevic to muster the necessary political will. With regard to the reimposition of sanctions on Serbia, two points: we haven't decided to reimpose, but we haven't taken that option off the table either. It may come to that. As for military action, we're well aware of the difficulties and dangers and risks of any such course. But you should be just as aware of the difficulties and dangers and risks associated with letting the current situation drag on and fester, with Karadzic making a mockery, at least in Srbska, out of an Accord and an implementation effort of which Russia is very much a part.

To sum up, I will tell the Secretary that you agree on the need to implement Dayton; that you wish Dick Holbrooke success; that you have written Milosevic...

Primakov interrupted to stress that Holbrooke not mention the letter or his knowledge of it to Milosevic and the importance of keeping the fact that he discussed it with us confidential.

Finally I urge that you receive Ambassador Frowick, who wants to come to Moscow to discuss the elections and his thinking.

YMP: No problem. He can come.

I had had it out with Mamedov on this the night before. Mamedov's original position had been that Russia so vehemently opposed Bob's announced intention to decertify the SDS that he was not welcome in Moscow; then that Frowick must come prepared to discuss alternatives; I said I was sure Bob would come not only prepared to explain his views but to listen to others.

When I called Bob later, he said he's already heard from his Russian deputy that he'd be welcome in Moscow later in the week.

ST: Before we conclude, I would like to raise Nagorno-Karabakh and hear your views.

YMP: I think that it is not worthwhile to do much before September. The Armenians will not do anything until their elections are over. I recently wrote the parties with my philosophical approach to a settlement. I described this approach as maintaining Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh within one state while providing *de facto* independence for Nagorno-Karabakh. Generally, I find the Armenians to be the most constructive, Nagorno-Karabakh [i.e., its "president," Robert Kocharian] to be the biggest problem, and Aliyev to fall somewhere between the two. My own thinking is that we should work to do something for the Lisbon summit.

Finally let me tell you that at Jakarta I will have with me Panov, Makaryan and Karasin [who has been named to replace Panov as the Win Lord-equivalent in the Ministry; Panov is going to Tokyo as Ambassador]. I have proposed that we meet for dinner to give Secretary Christopher and me time to go over our agenda.

ST: In that connection, let me note that we have a paper for you on the subject of ABM/TMD demarcation. We hope that you and the Secretary will be able to agree on a framework we can use to address this issue by October.

Jim Collins handed over the paper prepared for the Russian side on ABM/TMD demarcation. As you know,

this issue went seriously south on us after the meeting, when Primakov saw the Washington Times article reprinting much of his letter to you and reporting extensively on Administration reaction.

The Secretary will also want to discuss CTBT.

YMP: Yes. Your original position was a problem. However, we have received your new ideas and they seem positive. We will discuss this in Jakarta.