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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

I. HISTORIC AGREEMENT

- o INF is first agreement in history actually to reduce, not simply limit build-up of, nuclear weapons.
- o By perseverance, we achieved goal you set in 1981 -- elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons.
- o Credit to NATO unity and steadfastness; U.S. deployments proceeded despite Soviet threats, 1983 walk-out from talks. (INF basing countries: UK, FRG, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands.)
- o INF has most stringent verification regime in history.

II. WHAT IS BEING ELIMINATED

- o All U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles and launchers of intermediate-and shorter-range (from 500-5500 km).
- o For Soviets: SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 intermediate-range missile systems, and SS-12 and SS-23 shorter-range missile systems; those now deployed are capable of carrying over 1500 nuclear warheads.
- o For U.S.: Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs); those now deployed are capable of carrying over 400 nuclear warheads. (U.S. has no shorter-range INF deployed.)
- o Both sides are also destroying hundreds more non-deployed missiles and launchers.

III. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

- o Elimination of Soviet SS-20, a mobile triple-warhead nuclear missile, which presented new threat to Europe.
- o Success for NATO's 1979 "dual-track" -- deploying U.S. INF in Europe while pursuing negotiations with Soviets to restore INF balance at lowest possible level.
- o Have met the standards you established in 1983:
 - U.S.-Soviet equality;
 - U.S. and Soviet systems only;
 - Global limits (i.e., no transfer of threat to Asia);
 - No weakening of NATO's conventional capability (i.e., no dual-capable systems included); and
 - Effective verification. (see separate paper).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)
TREATY VERIFICATION

I. VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES

- o Enhance confidence in Treaty;
- o Deter violations by increasing risk of getting caught;
- o Quick detection of violations if they occur.

II. VERIFICATION REGIME CALLS FOR:

- o Locations for treaty-limited items to be specified until they are eliminated;
- o Exchange of comprehensive data on treaty-limited systems;
- o Updates of data throughout reduction period;
- o Specific procedures to verify elimination of treaty-limited systems;
- o Provisions for on-site inspection (OSI);
- o Provisions for verification by National Technical Means (NTM).

III. VERIFICATION PROCESS

- o Provisions have been made for routine exchange of data and to respond to compliance concerns.
- o In 11/87, sides began data exchange -- on missiles, launchers, bases. After Treaty is ratified and enters into force, initial "baseline" on-site inspection will check number of missiles and launchers.
- o There will be on-site inspection of missile/launcher destruction during three-year reduction period.
- o Sides are allowed to conduct short-notice on-site inspections of certain declared sites suspected of illegal activity during three-year reductions and for ten years afterward.

IV. INF VERIFICATION IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

- o U.S. will seek verification measures that build and improve on INF experience for START agreement.
- o Intrusiveness of INF verification regime sets a positive precedent for other regimes.

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