TELCON
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Secretary Kissinger
3/5/74  9:06 a.m.

S:  . . . . question of what we do about it is really the difference between being relaxed and letting it fall of its own weight or actively working against it. I never doubt it after what Home said that the British weren't going to stop it and then they were too weak to stop it anyway, I don't know what Sheel said to you in Bonn but I think to keep the French happy and to just show a movement, it was pretty inevitable that they should do it and getting together some people right now to do a paper for you, but I don't really--

K:  I am determined not to accept it; it is not a question of whether the decision in itself can harm us, it is when the Secretary of State is in Brussels to brief NATO to be summoned to the EC and then to be informed of a decision that they have already taken and that it is already in the newspapers

S:  Yeh, of course, I couldn't tell what Scheel might have said to you in Bonn on the thing

K:  He lied--you know, he obviously said we would do a few minor things but we will never go to the Foreign Minister's meeting

S:  There is some talk this was a surprising development, but I can't believe it--that these things happen out of no where.

K:  And to take the decision with Britain absent and Italy having no government is inexcusable

S:  I think obviously that puts you in a very awkward position and it is a stupid thing to do in this fashion and undoubtedly it was done as a means of repairing a relationship with the French. I don't think everybody has a hell of a lot of confidence that it amounts to a great deal and it does come down in the end to how much capital you want to spend to work against something like this.

K:  I don't want to work against it, I want to use it as an excuse to show that this procedure will never be accepted again.

S:  I think that on the most immediately related issue--the energy conference, the Europeans still seem to be under some general impression that they did us a favor in the way they conducted themselves in the conference, and I think that is where our tactics are going to have to be adjusted to more passive position.
K: I want us to be on a more passive course on the energy one; I do not want you to go over to that EC drafting next week, just tell them we are reassessing it, but above all, Wilson is seeing Annenberg at 5:00 today, should Annenberg mention this or should we let it go.

S: I really don't think Annenberg should mention it; I would like to discuss with you what we do with the British government, because I do think we have to pick up contact with him pretty quickly, actually it is a good thing have Callahan in the foreign office--he is less volatile than ---

K: There is one thing they cannot do is to support the Common Market within the first three months of being in office against us.

S: I think --

K: They can do a lot, but that they cannot do.

S: I don't know what they were going to be able to do at all, other than try to settle the miners' strike, I don't see how they can go on for more than three months at most

K: I would like you to draft a letter to the Heads of the nine which is focused primarily on procedure

S: Okay, well we are going to meet at 12:00

K: I know, I want that letter drafted

S: Presidential letter

K: Yes.
    Good, I will see you then.