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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82AMMAN 005604

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *CCM*

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 1/27/91

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MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

PAGE 01
ACTION SS-25

AMMAN 05604 301417Z
EXCISE Non-Responsive Info
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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SS0-00 /026 W

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7910
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 05604

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 - 6/30/02 (VIETS. RICHARD N.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IS, US, LE, XF
SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR HABIB
REF: (A) STATE 181096, (B) STATE 180100

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I SAW KING HUSSEIN BRIEFLY THIS AFTERNOON (JUNE 30)
TO APPRISE HIM OF THE NINE POINT FRAMWORK THE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS CONVEYED TO THE PLG (REFTELS).

3. THE KING'S PRINCIPAL REACTIONS WERE:

EXCISE

1 B1, A5

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5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ESSENCE OF MESSAGE TO
BEIRUT.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR DAMASCUS. VIETS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date. 11/27/91

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUT004371

ADP841
SECRETPAGE 01 BEIRUT 04371 01 OF 02 292032Z
ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 NSCE-00 SS0-00 /026 W
-----154541 292106Z /61O 291906Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7115
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4371

EXDIS

DECAPTIONEDE.O/ 12065: RDS-1, 3, 4 6/29/32 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, PINT, XF, IS, LE, SY, PLO, UNSC
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: PRESENTING THE U S POSITION, JUNE 29

REF: EAGLEBURGER/HABIB SECURE TELCON

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. JOINED BY DILLON, DRAPER AND BARRETT, I MET WITH PRIMIN WAZZAN FOR 45 MINUTES BEGINNING AT 6:45 PM, TUESDAY NIGHT, JUNE 29. SARKIS COULD NOT BE THERE BECAUSE HE IS ILL, BUT BUTRUS, ABDO AND THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL AIDE, HADDAD, WERE THERE. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON AS REGARDS THE US POSITION TOWARDS THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM IN PARTICULAR. THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN PREPARED FOLLOWING A REVIEW OF THE CONCEPTS AND PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY THE PRIMIN TO ME YESTERDAY.

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3. WAZZAN'S FIRST QUESTION TO ME AFTER THE PAPER WAS READ WAS WHETHER PAPER HAD BEEN DRAWN UP AFTER OUR LATEST DISCUSSION. I SAID IT HAD AND THAT IN PARTICULAR, I SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PLO MILITARY PRESENCE REMAINING IN LEBANON. WAZZAN PRESSED ON BY ASKING WHETHER WHAT HAD BEEN PROPOSED ABOUT A SYMBOLIC PLO MILITARY PRESENCE WAS THEREBY NONACCEPTABLE. I SAID HE WAS CORRECT, THIS

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AMERICAN POSITION DID NOT ACCEPT HIS PROPOSAL. BUTRUS FOLLOWED UP BY ASKING IF OUR POSITION WAS NEGOTIABLE AND IF IT EXCLUDED A SYMBOLIC PLO MILITARY PRESENCE. I REPLIED THAT WHILE THE US HAD TRIED FORMULATE ITS OWN POSITION,

THE INSTRUCTIONS I HAD RECEIVED EXCLUDED A PLO MILITARY PRESENCE OF ANY KIND, SYMBOLIC OR OTHERWISE.

4. WAZZAN THEN ANALYZED THE PAPER, SAYING IT SEEMED TO HIM TO DEAL WITH TWO SUBJECTS SEQUENTIALLY. (A) THE PRESENCE OF THE PLO IN BEIRUT WHICH WAS TO END AND, B) TERMINATION OF ALL FOREIGN ARMED PRESENCES IN LEBANON. I AGREED.

5. WAZZAN THEN WONDERED ALOUD IRONICALLY IF THERE WAS ANY DIFFERENCE WITH WHAT THE ISRAELI POSITION MIGHT BE. I TOLD HIM THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THE GOI'S SUNDAY COMMUNIQUE AND THAT THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENCES WITH THE POSITION I HAD JUST GIVEN HIM ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON. I TOLD WAZZAN HE WAS FREE TO DISCUSS THE PAPER I HAD GIVEN TO HIM WITH THE PLO OR WITH ME. HE THEN REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT DISCUSS IT WITH ME AS I HAD JUST TAKEN HIS IDEAS AND BURIED THEM. I

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ASKED HIM WHAT THE GOL POSITION WAS. WAZZAN SAID BEFORE HE COULD GIVE ME AN ANSWER ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER, HE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND PROBABLY WITH THE CABINET. HE WOULD ALSO TRY TO CONTACT THE PLO. I STRESSED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION.

6. BUTRUS THEN IDENTIFIED OTHER SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN POSITION, NOTING THAT IT SEPARATED THE TREATMENT OF BEIRUT FROM THE TREATMENT OF THE REST OF THE COUNTRY AND THAT IT DELAYED THE "ADJUSTMENT" OF ISRAELI POSITIONS. I POINTED OUT THAT PARAGRAPH 9 COVERED THE PLO AND OTHERS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. HE ENDED HIS ANALYSIS BY AGREEING THAT THE PM HAD TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE IN THIS RESPECT THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS SICK. I REMARKED THAT NEVERTHELESS I PRESUMED THEY COULD GET TO THE PRESIDENT AND THEY AGREED.

7. BUTRUS THEN GAVE ME A COPY OF A TEXT WHICH TUENI HAD GIVEN TO USUN IN NEW YORK ON AN INFORMAL PERSONAL BASIS. BUTRUS POINTED OUT THAT THE GOL HAD NOT ENDORSED TUENI'S POSITION BUT THE GOL DOES BELIEVE IT MUST SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE UN TO PREEMPT OTHERS FROM DOING SO. AFTER TAKING A QUICK LOOK AT THIS PAPER, I TOLD THEM IT WAS NOT WORTH THE TROUBLE TO COMMENT UPON AND THAT I WOULD LEAVE IT UP TO MY COLLEAGUES IN WASHINGTON

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AND NEW YORK. BUTRUS MERELY ASKED THAT I INFORM THE
STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE PAPER WERE
TUENI'S AND WERE INFORMAL AND PERSONAL. THE GOVERNMENT
HAD NOT YET DECIDED ITS POSITION/

NOTE BY OC/T: DISTRIBUTION COORDINATED WITH S/S-O, MR. B. STRICLAND.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SS0-00 SVC-00 /026 W
-----154330 292107Z /62

O 291950Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7116
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

8. WAZZAN THEN MADE SOME REMARKS IN ARABIC WHICH BUTRUS TRANSLATED. THE PRIMIN WAS (#) WHETHER IN THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PLO WITHDRAWAL IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE PLO FIGHTERS FROM OUTSIDE BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI FOR EXAMPLE, MOVE TO THE BIQ'A VALLEY. I REPLIED THAT THE PAPER DID SEEM TO PERMIT THIS DURING THE FIRST STAGE BUT THAT I WOULD NEED CLARIFICATION FROM WASHINGTON ON THAT POINT. (COMMENT: THE PRIMIN OBVIOUSLY WAS THINKING OF FORMING "THE SYMBOLIC PLO PRESENCE" TO WHICH HE IS ATTACHED, BY USING PLO COMBATANTS FROM OUTSIDE OF BEIRUT, EVEN IF ONLY ON A TEMPORARY BASIS.)

10. WAZZAN ASKED ONE MORE QUESTION, WHETHER THE U S POSITION RULED OUT INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN BEIRUT. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT KNOW, THAT I WOULD ASK.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04371


427

12. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS PREPARED TO MEET WITH HIM AT
ANY TIME, DAY OR NIGHT, AND AGAIN STRESSED THE
URGENCY OF THE SITUATION.
DILLON

NOTE BY DC/T: (#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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June 29, 1982 - Part II

Habib reopened discussion with Wazzan of the PLO/GOL proposals of yesterday. He said two points of concern are prominent. One, are the proposals truly valid? Are the Palestinians prepared to accept these in fact? Two, time is vitally important. We cannot let this drag on. If there is not a resolution or at least the start of a resolution quickly then there will be great trouble. The IDF is poised around Beirut in great strength. A way out is available and it can be peaceful if that way is chosen. If not, fighting of a great magnitude could be just ahead. I reminded Wazzan that I told him yesterday that he not to be strung along by the PLO and I would not be strung along. I am impatiently waiting for the GOL package plan.

I said you must complete the plan this afternoon so that we can discuss it before the day is over. There is no possibility it is acceptable if the PLO strings us along or seeks to get out of this. Wazzan said that the points he gave to us yesterday came directly to him by the PLO and have been the same points discussed by the military commanders - GOL to PLO-and they are the same points being discussed by the PLO with Salam. At the same time he understood my concern over the validity of the proposals and about the time. Wazzan wanted to go back now to the PLO with a technical plan dealing with the moderates. He raised again the question of IDF adjustments. I said that I had spoken about

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this but insisted that they are not preconditions. They had to be part of the total package. I had to know what would happen before I could recommend to Washington anything about adjustments on the line.

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EXCISE

-- The Habib Mission has reached a critical point. The next 24 hours could well determine whether there will be a peaceful way out or whether the Israelis will destroy the PLO militarily.

-- We are not promoting Israel's cause in this negotiating effort. Our position is quite different from Israel's as stated in their Cabinet communique Sunday.

-- We are forwarding the interests of the Government of Lebanon. There is no doubt whatsoever of what the Lebanese seek.

- o The PLO in Beirut must lay down their arms so that the Lebanese Armed Forces can take control of West Beirut.
- o The PLO leadership and the vast majority of the PLO fighters must leave Lebanon under guarantees of safe passage.
- o The Israelis must make some adjustments in their present military lines.

-- I want to speak in full candor. There are many people, and governments, who are not involved in these highly sensitive or unwittingly--undermining the chances for a peaceful outcome.

-- Not a day goes by without some renewed effort to promote an outcome far short of what the Government of Lebanon wants--and must have--if Lebanon as an independent nation is to survive.

-- It is frankly pernicious for others to be suggesting solutions--

--that lead the Palestinians to hope that they can remain in Beirut and Lebanon much as before. The same holds true for current attempts to seek a Security Council Resolution at this point.

-- Such misguided efforts can only encourage the PLO to try to drag these talks on at length. And I must tell you that

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RDS-3, 6/29/02

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should this be attempted it will stimulate the very kind of Israeli military assault that we are working so seriously and urgently to prevent.

-- Anyone who wants a peaceful and positive outcome for both the Lebanese and the PLO should either support the Habib Mission or stand back and refrain from mettlesome irresponsible and dangerous attempts to interfere.

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EXCISE

THEY WERE AS FOLLOWS:

--A) TOKEN FORCE: WE WOULD ACCEPT A REGROUPING OF FIGHTERS DRAWN FROM OUTSIDE THE BEIRUT AREA INTO CAMPS OR CASERNES LOCATED IN NON-URBAN AREAS SUCH AS THE BIQ'A AS A TOKEN "SYMBOLIC" PRESENCE PENDING THE EVENTUAL DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY ELEMENTS IN LEBANON, AS SPECIFIED IN POINT NINE. THIS WAS ON CONDITION THAT THIS TOKEN FORCE WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE LAF.

--WAZZAN ACCEPTED THIS CLARIFICATION. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW HE COULD REJECT SUCH A TOKEN PRESENCE IF THE PLO LEFT IT UP TO THE GOL TO DETERMINE WHERE AND HOW MANY. (THIS PART OF THE TALK WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH 500-1000 MEN HAD BEEN MENTIONED AS A MAXIMUM FIGURE.) WAZZAN SAID THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR LEBANESE-ARAB RELATIONS AND ARAB SOLIDARITY. HE DID NOT WANT LEBANON TO BE ACCUSED OF CHASING OUT ALL OF THE PLO.

--B) INTERNATIONAL FORCE: WE ACCEPTED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL OR MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT--FOR MONITORING AND OTHER PURPOSES--TO IMPLEMENT ANY AGREEMENT RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING IN COOPERATION WITH THE LAF TAKEOVER.

--C) TAMED FIGHTERS: WE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT SOME PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS AND ALLIED LEBANESE COULD

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DISARM AND THEN REMAIN IN LEBANON TO TAKE UP LAWFUL PURSUITS, THEIR NUMBERS AND IDENTITIES TO BE LEFT UP TO THE GOL. THE TOTAL NUMBER, HOWEVER, HAD TO BE "REASONABLE". LEADERS, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE INCLUDED.

--D) "OTHER ARMED ELEMENTS": AS FOR THE FIRST SENTENCE OF POINT EIGHT, THE DISARMING OF "OTHER ARMED ELEMENTS" IN WEST BEIRUT, WE AGREED THAT THIS WAS NA ISSUE TO BE LEFT UP TO THE GOL. WAZZAN WELCOMED THIS CLARIFICATION, SAYING THAT THERE WAS DISEQUILIBRIUM IN OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION, BECAUSE WE HAD FAILED TO MENTION DISARMING ARMED ELEMENTS IN EAST BEIRUT.

4. DEPARTURE OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP: _____

..... I MADE IT
EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE PLO LEADERS COULD NOT STAY. AS OUR EXCHANGES CONTINUED, WAZZAN APPEARED TO AGREE THAT THE PLO LEADERS WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT THEY HAD TO LEAVE AND THAT THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSING HOW THEY MIGHT GO AND WHERE THEY WOULD TO. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE ASKED WHETHER THE LEADERS MIGHT GO

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IN STAGES INSTEAD OF ALL AT ONCE AT THE BEGINNING OF
THE PROCESS. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE
AND THAT I WOULD ASK WASHINGTON FOR ITS COMMENTS/

NOTE BY OC/T: 4 GARBLES IN SUBJECT LINE. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7133

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

5. HEAVY WEAPONS

WAZZAN SOUNDED ME OUT AS TO WHETHER THE PLO FIGHTERS MIGHT TAKE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM AS WELL AS THEIR INDIVIDUAL LIGHT WEAPONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE LAF DID NOT USE SOVIET WEAPONRY AND THAT THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS IN ABSORBING AND CONTROLLING THESE STOCKS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PREFERRED CHOICE WAS FOR THE LAF TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE HEAVY WEAPONS. THE LAF COULD THROW THE STOCKS INTO THE SEA, IF NECESSARY. MOREOVER, THE COUNTRY TO WHICH THE FIGHTERS MIGHT GO POSSIBLY WOULD NOT WANT THEM TO BRING THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM. WAZZAN WAS LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT LAF CONTROL WAS THE BEST ANSWER BUT I SAID THAT, IF HEAVY WEAPONS WENT ELSEWHERE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO STUDY THE ISSUE FURTHER.

6. ARAB DETERRENT FORCE: WE ALL AGREED THAT THIS

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SUBJECT MUST BE LOOKED AT MORE THOROUGHLY IN ITS TWO ASPECTS, THE DEPARTURE OF THE ADF AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED FORCES FROM BEIRUT IN THE FIRST STAGE, AND THEIR EVENTUAL DEPARTURE FROM THE WHOLE COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH POINT 9. WAZZAN SAID THAT THE US MUST HELP THE GOL IN THIS AND I SAID THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS IT WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, BUT WE NEEDED A US-GOL UNDERSTANDING FIRST. WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT SARKIS COULD ORDER A LIMITED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE ADF TO

GET IT OUT OF BEIRUT. WE DISCUSSED WHETHER THE ADF MANDATE WHICH WAZZAN SAID HAD AN "ARAB" AS WELL AS A "LEBANESE" ASPECT, MIGHT NOT BE RENEWED IN JULY AS A WAY OF GETTING ALL THE ADF OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

7. IMPORTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE:

WAZZAN EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WERE 600 THOUSAND PEOPLE LEFT IN WEST BEIRUT, DESPITE THE EXODUS. MANY OF THOSE WHO HAD LEFT WERE REFUGEES OR DISPLACED PEOPLE, PRIMARILY FROM THE SOUTH; OTHERS HAD OTHER HOMES AND EXTENDED FAMILIES ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. THE HARD CORE OF 600 THOUSAND, HOWEVER, WOULD REMAIN. WAZZAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT AN ABSOLUTE PRECONDITION FOR CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS OBSERVATION OF A CONTINUED CEASE-FIRE. I SAID THIS WAS ALSO MY MAIN PREOCCUPATION. I WOULD DO MY BEST TO WORK FOR PROLONGATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. WE MIGHT BE IN A BETTER POSITION AFTER THIS MORNING'S TALK TO PROMOTE AND STRENGTHEN THE CEASE-FIRE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I NOTED, THE ISRAELIS WERE HOLDING AN EXTRAORDINARY CABINET MEETING AT THAT VERY MOMENT, AND THEY WERE IMPATIENT. I THEREFORE URGED THAT THE GOL PUSH HARD FOR AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PLO ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS.

8. DESTINATION OF PLO FIGHTERS:

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WE AGREED THAT THE "PRINCIPLE" OF DEPARTURE OF THE PLO LEADERS AND FIGHTERS HAD TO BE ACCEPTED BUT I ALSO AGREED WITH WAZZAN THAT WE MUST THINK MORE ACTIVELY ABOUT THEIR DESTINATION, IN ORDER TO PERMIT ACCEPTANCE OF THE "PRINCIPLE." WAZZAN SAID THE GOL COULD NOT EXPLORE THE IDEA WITH OTHER STATES. I SAID THAT WE WOULD EXPLORE THE "HOWS AND WHEREAS," BUT VERY DISCREETELY. BUTRUS MENTIONED THAT ALGERIA AS WELL AS EGYPT MIGHT OFFER ASYLUM. I SAID PERHAPS THE TRAVELERS COULD BE APPORTIONED AMONG MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY.

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10. NEXT STEPS

THE MEETING ENDED AT THIS POINT WITH AGREEMENT THAT:
A) WAZZAN WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH SARKIS, HIS LEBANESE POLITICAL SUPPORTERS, AND THE PLO TO PURSUE THE 9-POINT INTERPRETATION AND THE TYPE OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PLO WE HAD DISCUSSED; AND B) JOHNNY ABDU WOULD COMPLETE HIS MILITARY-TECHNICAL-LOGISTICAL PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, FOR REVIEW THIS

AFTERNOON BY WAZZAN AND I HOPE, FOR PRESENTATION TO ME IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. I URGED THAT WE START PUTTING TOGETHER A DETAILED MODEL SCENARIO, WITH D-DAY, H-HOUR FOR EACH OF THE STEPS, ETC., MEANWHILE, I SAID, I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON--AND THROUGH WASHINGTON WITH THE ISRAELIS--TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING. OUR UNDERSTANDING TODAY WAS AD REFERENDUM TO BOTH SIDES. I NEEDED FURTHER ANSWERS FROM WASHINGTON TO SOME QUESTIONS. WE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ONE ANOTHER AGAIN AS SOON AS EITHER HAD SOMETHING TO REPORT.

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I TOLD THE PM THAT I WAS MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE WITH WHICH HE HAD COME TO THIS MEETING AFTER OUR DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS LAST NIGHT.
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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04389

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04389 301756Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7136
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 4389

EXDIS **DECAPTIONED**

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/30/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS/ XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, PLO, UNSC, MOPS, PINT
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TALKS WITH BOUTROS AND SALAM: STEPPING UP
PRESSURES

REF: TEL AVIV 9897

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DRAWING ON THE CONCLUSIONS IN REFTEL, I STRESSED IN
STRONG TERMS THIS AFTERNOON AND EVENING TO BOUTROS AND
FROM PRIMIN SALAM THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE BECOMING
EXTREMELY IMPATIENT. THERE WAS A GROWING SENSE OF URGENCY
IN ISRAEL. THERE WAS A LIMIT TO HOW LONG BARGAINING COULD
BE CONTINUED. HARD DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE. I BELIEVE THAT
BOUTROS IN PARTICULAR WAS IMPRESSED, BUT

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I ADVISED BOTH MEN TO GET THE WORD AROUND TO WHERE
IT WOULD DO THE MOST GOOD.

4. NEW SUBJECT: FUTURE SC ACTIONS ON THE BASIS OF
MY DISCUSSIONS WITH BOUTROS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS. I
FEEL IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH
LEBANESE UN PERMREP TUEINI

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82CAIRO 016209

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 16203 031152Z
ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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CORRECTED COPY CORRECTING PARA TWO LINES
SIX AND SEVEN

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/30/02 (ATHERTON, ALFRED L., JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR EG US IS LE
SUBJECT: HABIB'S INSTRUCTIONS

REF: A. BEIRUT 4380, B. CAIRO 16203

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UPON RECEIPT OF REFTEL A, WHICH I DID NOT SEE
UNTIL AFTER MY MEETING THIS MORNING, JUNE 30, WITH
MUBARAK (REFTEL B), I CONTACTED OSAMA EL-BAZ TO MAKE
CLEAR THAT THE NINE POINTS I HAD DESCRIBED IN THAT
MEETING HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN TO THE PLO BY PRIME MINISTER
WAZZAN. I ALSO RE-EMPHASIZED THAT THESE WERE "GUIDE-
LINES" FOR HABIB WHO RETAINED CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY
ABOUT HOW AND WHEN TO USE THEM. FINALLY, I STRESSED
AGAIN THAT THE NINE POINTS HAD BEEN SHARED WITH
MUBARAK SOLELY FOR THE GOE'S INFORMATION AND WERE NOT
FOR DISCUSSION WITH ANY THIRD PARTY. OSAMA SAID THAT
ALL OF THE FOREGOING WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD.

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Date

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MR Cases Only:

(X) RELEASE

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EO Citations

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82CAIRO 016209

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4. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO BEIRUT AND OTHER ADDRESSEES
AS DESIRED. ATHERTON

NOTE BY DC/T: CORRECTED COPY RECEIVED FROM EMBASSY.
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EXCISE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SUBJECT: Lebanon Crisis: Status Report as of Mid-day
 June 30

As of June 29 Phil Habib was faced with a situation that was beginning to slip out of his control due primarily to conflicting signals being sent by a variety of parties which encouraged the PLO to believe that they could both avoid an Israeli assault on Beirut and preserve their military capability in Lebanon. In this highly dangerous situation and in response to Habib's request for some firmer instructions on the basis of which he might regain control of the situation, I provided him with nine points, as follows:

- (1) Cease-fire in place.
- (2) All PLO leaders to leave Lebanon under assurances of safe passage.
- (3) All PLO fighters in Beirut are to leave Lebanon under assurances of safe passage without heavy weapons (individual weapons will be permitted).
- (4) There will be no redeployment of any armed PLO fighters from Beirut to other locations in Lebanon.
- (5) A PLO political presence in Lebanon is acceptable, but preferably not in Beirut.
- (6) A readjustment of IDF lines will take place after an agreement is reached and as implementation is well underway.
- (7) The LAF take control of all Beirut.
- (8) Other armed elements in West Beirut will turn over their arms to the LAF. The Syrian ADF force and associated units will return to Syria.
- (9) Related to the above, but not linked to the West Beirut issue, it is a matter of policy that in the final arrangements there will be no foreign military presence in Lebanon: PLO, Syrian or Israeli.

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In using these points, Habib made clear that they did not represent a U.S. plan, but rather our appreciation of the best possible outcome from the current situation for Lebanon. He was to make clear that these points would allow the PLO to preserve its existence as a political organization and to depart Lebanon safely and with the honor of its leadership intact.

I have been in touch this morning with Habib, who worked magnificently through the night in order to calm the fears of the Lebanese negotiators about confronting the PLO with the nine points. As a result of Habib's efforts, the Lebanese are now completely with us and realize that the nine points represent the only realistic course to follow if we are to reach a satisfactory conclusion.

Habib's efforts are now moving into a much more "Lebanese" mode, characterized by a great deal of talking and with perhaps no clearly evident progress at any particular point. Indeed, I do not envisage a formal agreement signed by parties, since it is doubtful that the tenuous relationships among the Lebanese leaders and between them and the PLO will allow anything formal. All concerned will have to be allowed to preserve their dignity if we are to be successful. In such a context, it is necessary that Habib have free rein to deal with what is becoming a very nuanced and rapidly moving situation. Over the next 2-3 days, however, we should see an evolution toward a meeting of the minds. We will be staying in very close touch with the Israelis to help them better understand the evolutionary nature of the process at this stage and to counsel them to be patient as it proceeds.

We are also keeping a close eye on the inclination of some states to move again to the Security Council, since a heated debate in New York at this time would undermine everything Habib has accomplished.

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we are at the same time looking into the practical aspects of chartering ships to transport the PLO fighters out of Lebanon. In this connection, the PLO leadership has expressed great concern for their safety and that of their followers while they are enroute and are looking to us for protection. I will be in touch with Cap regarding the provision of an air and sea escort capability from U.S. Navy resources.

It is absolutely vital at this point to let Phil Habib take the lead in devising his own tactics and methods of operation. We do not believe it would be helpful to second guess him as he deals with what remains a highly volatile and dangerous situation.

At your press conference this afternoon, I recommend that you take the following line on questions regarding the Lebanon situation:

We continue to support a strong and stable central government in Lebanon and the departure of all foreign troops. This is a delicate moment in the discussions underway in Lebanon. The risk remains that if the various parties cannot come to terms fighting will be resumed. In these circumstances, it would not be productive for me to comment further.

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Date: 11/27/91

THE PROPOSALS COMMUNICATED BY BANDAR. THIS TIME I WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS. WE WELCOME SAUDI IDEAS AND CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION IN THE ONGOING PROCESS RE WEST BEIRUT. WE PUT THE HIGHEST VALUE ON SAUDI CREATIVITY AND IMAGINATION IN DEVELOPING AND ADVANCING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS TOWARDS AN EARLY SOLUTION IN WEST BEIRUT AND WE INTEND REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH. WE HAD CONVEYED TO BANDAR JUNE 29 OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN THAT IF THE PLO FEELS IT CAN PICK AND CHOOSE BETWEEN WHAT MIGHT APPEAR TO BE DIFFERING SAUDI AND AMERICAN PROPOSALS THIS COULD DELAY THE PLO'S TAKING THE NECESSARY TOUGH DECISION AND ENHANCE THE DANGER OF RENEWED CONFLICT.

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8. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MURPHY

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82JIDDA 005036

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04394

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04394 01 OF 02 011251Z

ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

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USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4394

EXDIS

DECAPTION

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065; RDS-1, 3, 4 7/1/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION CONVERSATION WITH

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY:

SAYS THE

PLO IS CLOSE TO AGREEING TO A SETTLEMENT BUT THAT A) PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THEIR LIGHT AND HEAVY WEAPONS OUT WITH THEM, B) THERE MUST BE SOMETHING MORE THAN A PLO POLITICAL OFFICE IN BEIRUT AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE COMBATANTS AND C) THE PALESTINIANS AND MANY LEBANESE WANT SOME GUARANTEES AGAINST PHALANGE REPRISALS FOLLOWING PLO DISARMAMENT. AS INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO WORK WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE THE BEST WAY TO PROVIDE THESE GUARANTEES. END SUMMARY.

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4. THE PLO IS CLOSE TO AGREEING TO A SETTLEMENT WHICH SHOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO US. THE WORDING AND MODALITIES OF THE SETTLEMENT ARE IMPORTANT. FOR INSTANCE, WAZZAN HAD OBTAINED PLO AGREEMENT TO LEAVE BEIRUT NOT BY DEMANDING IT BUT BY POSING QUESTIONS SUCH AS "HOW CAN YOU STAY HERE WITHOUT YOUR OWN ARMED FORCES? IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE A PLO DECISION TO LEAVE, SOME LEBANESE GROUPS HAS TOLD THE PLO THAT THEY ALSO WERE THINKING OF LEAVING BEIRUT. THE NET RESULT WAS THAT THE PLO HAD NOW ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT IT WOULD LEAVE THE CITY. THE FATAH COMMAND HAS OFFICIALLY AGREED ON THIS AND IS NOW TRYING TO GET THE AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER PALESTINIAN CONTINGENTS.

5. THREE MAIN PROBLEMS REMAINING CONCERNING A SETTLEMENT:
-- A) WEAPONS. THINKS THE PLO COMBATANTS SHOULD TAKE ALL THEIR WEAPONS WITH THEM, LIGHT AND HEAVY. HE DOUBTS THAT THESE CAN BE EFFECTIVELY TURNED OVER TO THE LAF AND BELIEVES THEY WILL FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS OR BE CACHED AWAY SOMEWHERE AND REMAIN A SOURCE OF DANGER. THE WEAPONS CAN BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THE PLO FIGHTERS WHEN THEY ARRIVE AT THEIR COUNTRY OF REFUGE. CONVERSELY, IF THEY WERE TO ARRIVE THERE WITHOUT ARMS, ANY ARAB RECEIVING

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COUNTRY COULD, IF IT WISHED, QUICKLY RE-ARM THEM.
--B) POLITICAL. SAID THAT THE PLO MUST CONTINUE TO BE RECOGNIZED BY THE GOL AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND THAT IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE A MERE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE "LIKE IN KARIS". THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIAL OFFICIAL AND DIPLOMATIC STATUS FOR THIS OFFICE. RAISED THE QUESTION OF IDENTIFYING THE MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP WHO WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE BEIRUT, EXPRESSING THE FEAR THAT MANY MEMBERS OF THE PALESTINIAN INTELLIGENTIA WOULD BE FORCED TO LEAVE.

--C) GUARANTEES. THE PLO AND MANY LEBANESE FEEL THEY NEED GUARANTEES AGAINST REPRISALS BY THE PHALANGE AFTER THE DISARMAMENT OF THE PLO. THEIR CONCERN IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN HEIGHTENED BY PHALANGE ACTIONS AND FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS. SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE LAF, WHICH HAS NOT MORAL AUTHORITY OR PRESTIGE IN THE WAKE OF ITS INACTIVITY AGAINST THE ISRELI ATTACK. PHALANGE CHECKPOINTS FOR INSTANCE, WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AND WOULD LEAD TO CLASHES, PARTICULARLY IF PLO WEAPONS HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN BEIRUT INSTEAD OF TAKEN OUT BY THE PLO FIGHTERS. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BEIRUT;

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04394

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ALL WEAPONS MUST DISAPPEAR AND AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE
INSTALLED.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04394 02 OF 02 011216Z
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EXDIS

6. I ACKNOWLEDGED ALL OF ^{POINTS} AND SAID THAT
WE DID NOT HAVE A CLOSED MIND ON THE SUBJECTS HE HAD
RAISED AND HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL
FORCE IS NOT EXCLUDED. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT THE EXACT
STATUS OF THE PLO OFFICE TO REMAIN IN BEIRUT AND THE
IDENTITY OF THE PLO LEADERS WHO WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE
WERE MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH AND DECIDED BY THE
GOL. I DID NOT WANT TO GO ANY FURTHER WITH HIM,
MAKING IT CLEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE BY AND THROUGH
THE PRIME MINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT.
THE WAZZAN-PLO DISCUSSIONS WERE CONTINUING AND
I WOULD BE HEARING FROM THE PRIME MINISTER LATER TODAY
ON THE PLO POSITION.

7. SEVERAL QUESTIONS TO WHICH
LANTED ANSWERS. THESE CONCERNED THE
POLITICAL FUTURE OF LEBANON, THE POSSIBILITY OF PHALANGE
HEGEMONY, PARTITION OR A GIVE AWAY OF THE BIQ'AT.
I WAS WORRIED ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO NON-MARONITES
AND NON-PHALANGISTS IN THE NEW LEBANON. I REPLIED

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THAT THE FUTURE OF LEBANON WOULD DEPEND UPON A
CONTINUATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, WHICH WE
HOPED WOULD RESUME FOLLOWING THE BEGINNING OF ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL. I TOLD ^{SHOULD}
DISCUSS THESE SUBJECTS WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AND PM
WAZZAN.

IN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTIONS I ASSURED
HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE AN ISRAELI READJUSTMENT

IN THE BEIRUT AREA AFTER THE PLO WITHDRAWAL WAS WELL UNDERWAY, AND THAT BASHIR GEMAYEL SAID HE WAS PULLING BACK HIS FORCES IN THE MOUNTAINS.

8. THOUGHT THAT WHEN THE BEIRUT QUESTION WAS DEFUSED AND THE DRUZE/PHALANGE CONFRONTATION IN THE MOUNTAINS CALMED DOWN, WALID JUMBLATT WOULD BE WILLING TO GET BACK INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. HE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO TRAVEL FROM BEIRUT TO MUKHTARA WITHOUT PRESSURE AFTER A SETTLEMENT IN BEIRUT. OPED WALID JUMBLATT WOULD REJOIN A REACTIVATED NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE AND THAT AS A MEMBER OF THAT BODY HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN FREE CIRCULATION.

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9. MINIMIZE DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4398

EXDI DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/1/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, PLO, MOPS, PINT

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I MET WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS TODAY, THURSDAY, JULY 1 AT 1230, ACCOMPANIED BY DILLON AND BARRETT. THE PRESIDENT WAS ATTENDED BY PRIMIN WAZZAN, FONMIN BOUTROS, JJOHNNY ABDO AND AIDE HADDAD. I TOLD THE GROUP THAT I HAD SENT DRAPER TO JERUSALEM TODAY TO SEE IF HE COULD HELP KEEP THINGS QUIET SO THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO PURSUE OUR WORK.

3. DURING DISCUSSION OF THE ARAB MEETING AT TAIF, I INFORMED THE GROUP OF THE INVITATION BY THE SAUDIS TO BASHIR GEMAYEL AND OF OUR UNDERTAKING TO HELP MAKE TRAVEL

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM.

4. I THEN ASKED THE PRIMIN TO INFORM ME OF THE STATUS OF HIS TALKS WITH THE PLO. WAZZAN REPLIED THAT NN WOULD NOT HAVE A RPLY UNTIL THIS AFTERNOON AND THAT HE HAD INSISTED ON A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY IN WRITING. I TOLD WAZZAN AND SARKIS THAT TIME WAS PRECIOUS AND THAT WE HAD TO DECIDE ON SUCH SPECIFICS AS DAYS AND HOURS OF DEPARTURE.

5. I INFORMED THE GROUP THAT I HAD OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS ON THE POINTS THAT PRIMIN WAZZAN HAD RAISED WITH ME:

--A) LEADERSHIP OF THE PLOOC I TOLD THEM THAT ALL THE PLO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP DID NOT NEED TO LEAVE AT THE OUT-SET OF THE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, AND AGREED WITH THE PRIMIN THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP COULD GO OUT IN STAGES ALONG WITH THE MILITARY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT ARAFAT MIGHT WANT TO GO FIRST.

WAZZAN SAID THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THE PLO LEADERSHIP MIGHT WANT TO GO TO TUNIS TO BE WITH ARAB LEAGUE HEADQUARTERS/

--C) MEANS OF DEPARTURE: I SAID THAT ONE POSSIBILITY WE WERE CONSIDERING WAS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FIGHTERS

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BY SHIPS FLYING A RED CROSS FLAG AND WITH A U S NAVAL ESCORT "FOR PROTECTION."

--D) HEAVY WEAPONS: I SAID WE CONSIDERED IT PREFERABLE FOR THESE TO BE TURNED OVER TO THE LAF, POSSIBLY IN A DEPOT GUARDED BY AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION SUCH AS THE RED CROSS. THEY QUESTIONED WHETHER THE ICRC WOULD HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WEAPONS, AS DO I. I TOLD THEM IF THEY WANTED SOME OTHER KIND OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY MUST SAY SO RIGHT AWAY SO WE COULD GET ON IT. WAZZAN SAID WALID JUMBLATT HAD INSISTED ON SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AND THAT NOW HE (WAZZAN) WAS INSISTING ALSO.; -4(8 -)SO AGREED ON THIS REQUIREMENT. THERE WAS FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF PLO HEAVY WEAPONS WITH ALL THE LEBANESE AGREEING THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE THEM TAKEN OUT. WAZZAN WAS AFRAID THAT IF NOT TAKEN OUT THEY WOULD FALL INTO THE HANDS OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT GROUPS.

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE SIZE OF THE REMAINING PLO MILITARY "SYMBOLIC PRESENCE" IN LEBANON. I SAID THAT I HAD TOLD BASHIR GEMAYEL TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF SUCH A FORCE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD WHEN HE WENT TO TAIF. JOHNNY ABDO SAID THAT BASHIR WOULD LEAVE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORCE UP TO THE GOL. PRESIDENT SARKIS SAID HE PREFERRED THAT BASHIR ACCEPT THIS AS WELL, AS HE DID NOT WANT THE GOL TO CARRY THE WHOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCEPTING THIS ASPECT OF A

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04398

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SETTLEMENT.

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, HOPPER.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04398 02 OF 02 011457Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7146
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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USLO RIHADH IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4398
EXDIS
FROM HABIB

7. WE DISCUSSED HOW MANY PLO POLITICAL LEADERS WOULD BE LEAVING LEBANON AND WHO WOULD DESIGNATE THEM. WAZZAN THOUGHT 50, ABDO THOUGHT 30, AND SARKIS SAID IT WAS UP TO THE GOL TO DESIGNATE THEM. I SUGGESTED THAT THE DESIGNATION BE DONE BY FUNCTION AND THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT AT THE END OF OUR DISCUSSION THAT ABOUT ONE HUNDRED (100) PLO LEADERS WAS THE FIGURE TO USE. MILITARY LEADERS WOULD BE PART OF THE MILITARY DEPARTURE.

8. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE STATUS OF OTHER MILITIAS IN BEIRUT. ALL THE LEBANESE WERE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM TO LEAVE UP TO THE GOL, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT BE ASKING FOR U S HELP AT SOME TIME.

9. ON THE QUESTION OF IDF "ADJUSTMENTS," JOHNNY ABDO SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THIS SHOULD OCCUR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO FORCES AND BEFORE THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. WE GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE AREAS

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AROUND BAABDA AND THE AIRPORT SHOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST CLEARED BY THE ISRAELIS AND I ADDED THAT I WANTED THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS OPENED AS WELL.

10. WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WHAT KIND OF OFFICE THE PLO WOULD NEED TO RETAIN IN BEIRUT. I SAID IT SHOULD BE SIMILAR IN FUNCTION AND ORGANIZATION TO WHAT WAS IN ARAB LEAGUE STATES. WAZZAN SAID IT HAD TO BE OF A DIFFERENT NATURE THAN THE OFFICES MAINTAINED IN OTHER ARAB LEAGUE COUNTRIES BECAUSE

OF THE IMPORTANCE ON THE PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS IN LEBANON, GIVEN THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID THEY WOULD WORK IT OUT ON A "COMMUNITY" BASIS. I SAID THAT WHATEVER WAS DONE, IT HAD TO BE CLEAR THAT ALL PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON WERE UNDER GOL AUTHORITY.

11. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, WE DISCUSSED THE SIZE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE NEEDED TO MONITOR THE PLO WITHDRAWAL, IDF ADJUSTMENTS FOR THE TURNOVER OF THE PLO, AND WEAPONS. BOUTROS THOUGHT ONE THOUSAND (1000) WOULD BE A CORRECT FIGURE, AND JOHNNY ABDU SAID EIGHTEEN HUNDRED (1800).

12. WE PARTED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT I WAS AWAITING RESULTS OF THE GOL-PLO MEETING LATER TODAY WHICH COULD INVOLVE A WRITTEN, SPECIFIC REPLY FROM THE PLO THROUGH PRIMIN WAZZAN. MEANWHILE, I WOULD GET THE USG AUTHORITIES WORKING ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN BEIRUT, AND THE OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED AT THE MEETING TODAY. IN ADDITION, THE "PLAN" FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "PACKAGE" WHICH HAS BEEN PREPARED BY COL ABDU WILL BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT, BEFORE TURNING IT OVER TO ME. (I HAVE, OF COURSE, MADE SURE THAT ABDU UNDERSTANDS WHAT WE WANT IN THE PLAN, AND WILL SCRUTINIZE

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IT CAREFULLY.)
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Radio Transmission - Habib to Hill - 0800 - July 1, 1982

Habib reported as follows:

I have just come from a meeting with Sarkis and Wazzan. They will have a critical meeting with the PLO this afternoon when they will start to put a package together as a whole. They will exchange papers then something in the form of Memcons. These will set out the principles from which they will work out the details. I gave them some views drawn from the detailed scenario papers you cabled to me. There are some questions in my mind, and theirs about some points. They are not so sure that the ICRC would want to do this kind of thing -- like taking surrendered weapons. They definitely want an international force of 500-1,000, perhaps drawn from UNIFIL, to monitor the arrangements and just be present to help out. The idea of a symbolic PLO force in Lebanon is not clear. Bashir is likely to come on board for this concept after his meetings in Taif. On the question of the other militias, the Lebanese have their own plan. They intend to try to embrace these elements into the LAF. But this is their business and not ours to determine for them. The Lebanese really want the PLO to take their heavy weapons with them. Otherwise they fear the weapons will fall into the hands of others in Beirut. I told them they ought to take the weapons themselves and then dump them in the sea. They said no, it won't work that way. The weapons would just slip into the community at large. Finally, the question of where the PLO will go remains uppermost in their minds. Somebody mentioned the leaders going to Tunis. This is a priority issue that you will have to work on. I leave it to you.

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[redacted] On the question of
departure from Lebanon they (the Lebanese and the PLO) like the
idea of a USN escort; they were very happy about that. My report
on this will follow by cable but I wanted you to have this advanced
information.

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ENCLOSURE

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EXDIS DECAPTION

FOLLOWING AMMAN 5604 DTD 30 JUN SENT ACTION STATE
 INFO CAIRO DAMASCUS JERUSALEM JIDDA PARIS RIYADH TEL
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QUOTE
S E C R E T AMMAN 05604

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 - 6/30/02 (VIETS, RICHARD N.)OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IS, US, LE, XF
SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR HABIB
REF: (A) STATE 181096, (B) STATE 180100

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I SAW KING HUSSEIN BRIEFLY THIS AFTERNOON (JUNE 30) TO APPRISE HIM OF THE NINE POINT FRAMWORK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS CONVEYED TO THE PLO (REFTELS).
3. THE KING'S PRINCIPAL REACTIONS WERE:

5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ESSENCE OF MESSAGE TO
BEIRUT.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR DAMASCUS. VIETS UNQUOTE
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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82STATE 182736 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date.

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S E C R E T STATE 182736

EXDIS **DECAPTIONED**

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TEL AVIV
JERUSALEM JIDDA RIYADH CAIRO DAMASCUS AMMAN JUNE 30
QUOTE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4389

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1.3 6/30/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS/ XF, LE, *S, SY, SA, PLO, UNSC, MOPS, PINT

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TALKS WITH BOUTROS AND SALAM: STEPPING UP
PRESSURES

REF: TEL AVIV 9897

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DRAWING ON THE CONCLUSIONS IN REFTEL, I STRESSED IN
STRONG TERMS THIS AFTERNOON AND EVENING TO BOUTROS AND
FORMER PRIMIN SALAM THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE BECOMING
EXTREMELY IMPATIENT. THERE WAS A GROWING SENSE OF URGENCY
IN ISRAEL. THERE WAS A LIMIT TO HOW LONG BARGAINING COULD
BE CONTINUED. HARD DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE. I BELIEVE THAT
BOUTROS IN PARTICULAR WAS IMPRESSED, BUT

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7 ADVISED BOTH MEN TO GET THE WORD AROUND TO WHERE
IT WOULD DO THE MOST GOOD.

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EXCISE

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82STATE 182736

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4. NEW SUBJECT: FUTURE SC ACTIONS ON THE BASIS OF
MY DISCUSSIONS WITH BOUTROS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS. I
FEEL IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH
IFRANESE UN PERMREP TUEINI.

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PAGE 03 STATE 182736

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82STATE 182736

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S E C R E T STATE 182851 TOSEC 100007

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TEL AVIV
JERUSALEM JIDDA RIYADH CAIRO DAMASCUS AMMAN JULY 1

QUOTE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4398

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/1/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, PLO, MOPS, PINT

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I MET WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS TODAY, THURSDAY, JULY 1 AT
1230, ACCOMPANIED BY DILLON AND BARRETT. THE PRESIDENT WAS
ATTENDED BY PRIMIN WAZZAN, FONMIN BOUTROS, JOHNNY ABDO AND

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PAGE 02

STATE 182851 TOSEC 100007

AIDE HADDAD. I TOLD THE GROUP THAT I HAD SENT DRAPER TO
JERUSALEM TODAY TO SEE IF HE COULD HELP KEEP THINGS QUIET
SO THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO PURSUE OUR WORK.

3. DURING DISCUSSION OF THE ARAB MEETING AT TAIF, I
INFORMED THE GROUP OF THE INVITATION BY THE SAUDIS TO
BASHIR GEMAYEL AND OF OUR UNDERTAKING TO HELP MAKE TRAVEL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM.

4. I THEN ASKED THE PRIMIN TO INFORM ME OF THE STATUS OF HIS TALKS WITH THE PLO. WAZZAN REPLIED THAT NN WOULD NOT HAVE A RPLY UNTIL THIS AFTERNOON AND THAT HE HAD INSISTED ON A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY IN WRITING. I TOLD WAZZAN AND SARKIS THAT TIME WAS PRECIOUS AND THAT WE HAD TO DECIDE ON SUCH SPECIFICS AS DAYS AND HOURS OF DEPARTURE.

5. I INFORMED THE GROUP THAT I HAD OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS ON THE POINTS THAT PRIMIN WAZZAN HAD RAISED WITH ME:

--A) LEADERSHIP OF THE PLOOC I TOLD THEM THAT ALL THE PLO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP DID NOT NEED TO LEAVE AT THE OUTSET OF THE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, AND AGREED WITH THE PRIMIN THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP COULD GO OUT IN STAGES ALONG WITH THE MILITARY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT ARAFAT MIGHT WANT TO GO FIRST.

--B) DESTINATION OF PLO FIGHTERS: [

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STATE 182851 TOSEC 100007

WAZZAN SAID THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THE PLO LEADERSHIP MIGHT WANT TO GO TO TUNIS TO BE WITH ARAB LEAGUE HEADQUARTERS/

--C) MEANS OF DEPARTURE: I SAID THAT ONE POSSIBILITY WE WERE CONSIDERING WAS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FIGHTERS BY SHIPS FLYING A RED CROSS FLAG AND WITH A U S NAVAL ESCORT "FOR PROTECTION."

--D) HEAVY WEAPONS: I SAID WE CONSIDERED IT PREFERABLE FOR THESE TO BE TURNED OVER TO THE LAF, POSSIBLY IN A DEPOT GUARDED BY AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION SUCH AS THE RED CROSS. THEY QUESTIONED WHETHER THE ICRC WOULD HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WEAPONS, AS DO I. I TOLD THEM IF THEY WANTED SOME OTHER KIND OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY MUST SAY SO RIGHT AWAY SO WE COULD GET ON IT. WAZZAN SAID WALID JUMBLATT HAD INSISTED ON SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AND THAT NOW HE (WAZZAN) WAS INSISTING ALSO.;

-4(B -)SO AGREED ON THIS REQUIREMENT. THERE WAS FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF PLO HEAVY WEAPONS QUTH ALL THE LEBANESE AGREEING THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE THEM TAKEN OUT. WAZZAN WAS AFRAID THAT IF NOT TAKEN OUT THEY WOULD FALL INTO THE HANDS OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT GROUPS.

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE SIZE OF THE REMAINING PLO MILITARY "SYMBOLIC PRESENCE" IN LEBANON. I SAID THAT I HAD TOLD BASHIR GEMAYEL TO ACCEPT THE PRSENCE OF SUCH A FORCE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD WHEN HE WENT TO TAIF. JOHNNY ABDO SAID THAT BASHIR WOULD LEAVE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORCE UP TO THE

GOL. PRESIDENT SARKIS SAID HE PREFERRED THAT BASHIR ACCEPT THIS AS WELL, AS HE DID NOT WANT THE GOL TO CARRY THE WHOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCEPTING THIS ASPECT OF A SETTLEMENT.

7. WE DISCUSSED HOW MANY PLO POLITICAL LEADERS WOULD BE LEAVING LEBANON AND WHO WOULD DESIGNATE THEM. WAZZAN THOUGHT 50, ABDU THOUGHT 30, AND SARKIS SAID IT WAS UP TO THE GOL TO DESIGNATE THEM. I SUGGESTED THAT THE DESIGNATION BE DONE BY FUNCTION AND THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT

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AT THE END OF OUR DISCUSSION THAT ABOUT ONE HUNDRED (100) PLO LEADERS WAS THE FIGURE TO USE. MILITARY LEADERS WOULD BE PART OF THE MILITARY DEPARTURE.

8. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE STATUS OF OTHER MILITIAS IN BEIRUT. ALL THE LEBANESE WERE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM TO LEAVE UP TO THE GOL, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT BE ASKING FOR U S HELP AT SOME TIME.

9. ON THE QUESTION OF IDF "ADJUSTMENTS," JOHNNY ABDU SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THIS SHOULD OCCUR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO FORCES AND BEFORE THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. WE GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE AREAS AROUND BAABDA AND THE AIRPORT SHOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST CLEARED BY THE ISRAELIS AND I ADDED THAT I WANTED THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS OPENED AS WELL.

10. WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WHAT KIND OF OFFICE THE PLO WOULD NEED TO RETAIN IN BEIRUT. I SAID IT SHOULD BE SIMILAR IN FUNCTION AND ORGANIZATION TO WHAT WAS IN ARAB LEAGUE STATES. WAZZAN SAID IT HAD TO BE OF A DIFFERENT NATURE THAN THE OFFICES MAINTAINED IN OTHER ARAB LEAGUE COUNTRIES BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE ON THE PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS IN LEBANON, GIVEN THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID THEY WOULD WORK IT OUT ON A "COMMUNITY" BASIS. I SAID THAT WHATEVER WAS DONE, IT HAD TO BE CLEAR THAT ALL PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON WERE UNDER GOL AUTHORITY.

11. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, WE DISCUSSED THE SIZE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE NEEDED TO MONITOR THE PLO WITHDRAWAL, IDF ADJUSTMENTS FOR THE TURNOVER OF THE PLO, AND WEAPONS. BOUTROS THOUGHT ONE THOUSAND (1000) WOULD BE A CORRECT FIGURE, AND JOHNNY ABDU SAID EIGHTEEN HUNDRED (1800).

12. WE PARTED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT I WAS AWAITING RESULTS OF THE GOL-PLO MEETING LATER TODAY WHICH COULD INVOLVE A WRITTEN, SPECIFIC REPLY FROM THE PLO THROUGH

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PRIMIN WAZZAN. MEANWHILE, I WOULD GET THE USG AUTHORITIES WORKING ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PRESENCE

IN BEIRUT, AND THE OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED AT THE MEETING TODAY. IN ADDITION, THE "PLAN" FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "PACKAGE" WHICH HAS BEEN PREPARED BY COL ABDU WILL BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT, BEFORE TURNING IT OVER TO ME. (I HAVE, OF COURSE, MADE SURE THAT ABDU UNDERSTANDS WHAT WE WANT IN THE PLAN, AND WILL SCRUTINIZE IT CAREFULLY.)
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EXCISE

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82TEL AV010014

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 10014 01 OF 04 012217Z
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 SSD-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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O 012157Z JUL 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6348
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 10014

EXDIS **DECEPTION**

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3, 4 7/1/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, MILI, PEPR, IS, LE, US, SA, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: JULY 1 DRAPER MEETINGS WITH
- SHAMIR AND BEGIN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DRAPER BOUGHT US SOME EXTRA TIME --
BUT NOT MUCH. GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE OF HABIB'S
EFFORTS, THE ISRAELIS REMAIN HIGHLY SKEPTICAL THAT
AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE NINE-POINT GUIDELINES CAN BE SPEEDILY
ACHIEVED WITHOUT IMMEDIATE ADDITIONAL HEAVY
PRESSURE ON THE PLO. THEY CURRENTLY ARE EXAMINING
A RANGE OF OPTIONS SHORT OF THOSE WHICH THEY RECKON
WOULD ABORT MUSLIM LEBANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND RISK A SHARP DECLINE IN

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 10014 01 OF 04 012217Z

U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS. BUT THE HEAT IS ON AND
BEGIN WANTS SOME POSITIVE NEWS BEFORE THE JULY 4
CABINET MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DCM BROWN, DAS
DRAPER MET FOR AN HOUR ON JULY 1 WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SHAMIR AND SEVERAL OF HIS ASSOCIATES AT THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ANOTHER HOUR WITH
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, SHAMIR, SHARON, DMI SAGI,

GENERAL TAMIR AND OTHERS. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO MET SEPARATELY WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON AND HAD A WORKING LUNCH WITH THESE TWO PLUS DMI SAGI AND GENERAL TAMIR.

--
4. IN ALL OF HIS MEETINGS, DRAPER STRESSED VERY HEAVILY THAT HABIB'S BASIC MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELIS IS THAT WITH LUCK, HARD WORK AND FOREBEARANCE BY BASHIR GEMAYEL AND THE ISRAELIS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION FROM WHICH WOULD EMERGE A CONFEDERATION GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON -- PROBABLY HEADED EVENTUALLY BY BASHIR -- WHICH WILL SERVE NOT ONLY LEBANESE BUT ALSO ISRAELI INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE MAINTAINED AND SUFFICIENT TIME GIVEN TO HABIB TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. USING DRAMATIC EXAMPLES TO IMPRESS UPON THE ISRAELIS THE DEPTH OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THESE OBJECTIVES, DRAPER SAID THAT IN EIGHT YEARS OF CLOSE WORKING ASSOCIATION HE HAD NEVER SEEN HABIB SO COMPLETELY COMMITTED TO A CAUSE. HABIB WAS LEANING VERY HARD ON ALL HIS LEBANESE INTERLOCUTORS (AND IN THAT EFFORT USING ANIMATED ISRAELI EDITORIALS, CABINET MEETINGS AND SO FORTH TO MAINTAIN THE RIGHT KIND OF PRESSURE) TO IMPRESS UPON THEM THAT THEY MUST

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 10014 01 OF 04 012217Z

MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION OR FACE THE VERY REAL POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT. ALREADY A BROAD CONSENSUS EXISTS AMONG LEBANESE THAT THE PLO IS FINISHED IN LEBANON AND THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP MUST LEAVE BEIRUT AND LEBANON. COMBATING THE LEVANTINE/ARAB TENDENCY TO BARGAIN AND NIT-PICK OVER EVERY POINT, HABIB IS FORCING THE GOL LEADERSHIP TO FOCUS ON THE NINE POINT GUIDELINES IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH THE PLO, AND TO COME UP WITH CONCRETE DETAILED PLANS FOR SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION BASED ON THOSE NINE POINTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY FUZZY AREAS, HABIB FEELS THAT THE PLO LEADERS RECOGNIZE THAT THEY HAVE TO VACATE LEBANON ALONG WITH SOME 5,000 FRONTLINE FIGHTERS (CONSISTING OF (A) PALESTINIANS ATTACHED TO THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ARMY, (B) PAID LEBANESE MERCENARIES OF FATAH WHO WILL LOOK TOWARD A GOLDEN HANDSHAKE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO REINTEGRATE INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY, AND (C) SOME 4,500 FATAH REGULARS). IT HAS TO BE UNDERSTOOD, SAID DRAPER, THAT THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PARTIES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT CONCLUDE A FORMAL AGREEMENT, WHICH FOR THE LEBANESE CARRIES THE DANGER OF AGAIN INSTITUTIONALIZING A FORM OF RECOGNITION FOR THE PLO. RATHER, THE ARRANGEMENT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED BY INTERNAL DIRECTIVES CARRIED

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82TEL AVO10014

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OUT STAGE BY STAGE WITH OVERALL PLO AGREEMENT. THERE
ARE A HOST OF EXTREMELY COMPLEX ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS.
E.G. WHAT TO DO WITH THE ENORMOUS STOCK OF
PALESTINIAN HEAVY WEAPONS IN BEIRUT, BUT JOHNNY
ABDU AND A TEAM OF LAF OFFICERS ARE BEGINNING TO

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6349
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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USLG RIYADH IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 TEL AVIV 10014

EXDIS

DRAW UP THE NECESSARY PLANS. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO PREDICT THE FINAL DESTINATIONS OF THOSE PLO LEADERS AND FIGHTERS WHO ARE TO BE EVACUATED FROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON. PLO LEADERS DO NOT WANT TO GO TO SYRIA BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE SUBJUGATED BY ASSAD. NOR DO THEY WISH TO RESETTLE IN A DISTANT ARAB COUNTRY. IF WE COULD GET A POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL FROM EGYPT, THAT MIGHT BE AN ACCEPTABLE DESTINATION. WE ARE WELL AWARE, DRAPER NOTED, THAT BASHIR CONTINUES TO FAVOR A MILITARY SOLUTION, BUT THAT WOULD DEAL A DEATH BLOW TO THE EMERGENCE OF A MULTI-CONFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT TO WHICH BASHIR PAYS LIP SERVICE. IT WOULD ALSO, AS AMBASSADOR LEWIS HAD PREVIOUSLY EMPHASIZED, HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

5. DRAPER'S AUDIENCES WERE DISTINCTLY SKEPTICAL. THEY CITED AND GENERALLY ENDORSED BASHIR'S CONVICTION THAT

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THE PLO IS MERELY PLAYING FOR TIME, EXPLOITING MUSLIM LEBANESE FEARS OF EVENTUAL RETALIATION, AND PASSING VAGUELY POSITIVE SIGNALS IN PRIVATE WHICH THE PLO THEN DENIES IN PUBLIC. I

7. IN RESPONSE TO CLOSE QUESTIONING BY KIMCHE, DRAPER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE CHANCES OF BASHIR BEING ELECTED ON JULY 23 OR SOON THEREAFTER WERE VERY GOOD PROVIDED THAT BASHIR DID NOT MAKE A SERIOUS MISTAKE, E.G., HARRASS THE DRUSE AS UNFORTUNATLEY WAS THE RECENT CASE, OR BE SEEN AS OVERTLY COLLUDING WITH THE ISRAELIS.

8. AFTER GOING OVER THE SAME GROUND IN HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN, DRAPER STRESSED THAT YESTERDAY A HITHERTO RELUCTANT WAZZAN HAD AGREED TO USE THE NINE POINT GUIDELINES AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION AS TO HOW MANY MUSLIMS REMAINED IN WEST BEIRUT WITH DRAPER CITING THE FIGURE OF 500,000-600,000 OF WHOM 400,000 WERE LEBANESE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6350
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82TEL AVO10014

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82TEL AV010014

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6351
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 TEL AVIV 10014

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16. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82TEL AVO10014

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04412

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/27/95

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7155
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4412

EXDIS **DECAPTIONED**
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/2/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, SA, XF, PLON UNSC
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL, JULY 2

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BASHIR GEMAYEL CAME TO THE RESIDENCE THIS MORNING,
JULY 2, TO BRIEF ME ON THE RESULTS OF HIS MEETINGS
YESTERDAY IN TAIF. (HE THANKED US FOR OUR HELP.) HE
MET WITH PRINCE SAUD, THE DEPUTY KUWIATI FOREIGN MINISTER
(NAME UNKNOWN), AND ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL CLIBI, (BUT
NOT THE PLOUS FAROUK KAODUMI OR SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
KHADDAM, WHO WERE THERE). ON BALANCE, BASHIR FELT THAT
HE HAD ESTABLISHED GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS ALTHOUGH THE
TALKS THEMSELVES WERE INCONCLUSIVE.

EXCISE

THE 1969 CAIRO AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. HE SAID
HE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE:

- A) ALL PLO FIGHTERS LEAVE NOW
- B) BASHIR AND THE GOL WILL SPEND THE NEXT 3-6 MONTHS
STRENGTHENING SECURITY FORCES AND THE ARMY
- C) WHEN THESE FORCES ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO PROVIDE
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER PALESTINIANS, A SMALL FORCE

6. AFTER HIS SESSION WITH SAUD AND THE OTHERS, BASHIR
SAID THE ENTIRE COMMITTEE MET FOR THREE HOURS (BASHIR
WAS NOT PRESENT). SAUD LATER TOLD HIM THAT NO
RESOLUTIONS WERE PASSED OR DECISIONS TAKEN. CONSIDERATION
WAS GIVEN TO SENDING A DELEGATION TO BEIRUT FOR TALKS
WITH SARKIS, AND A RECONVENING OF THE NATIONAL SALVATION
COMMITTEE WAS SUGGESTED (THIS LATTER IDEA, ACCORDING
TO BASHIR, WILL BE PROPOSED BY MINISTER OF STATE
JOSEPH ABU KHATIR WHO HAD GONE EARLIER TO SAUDI ARABIA
AS THE GOL DELEGATE TO THE CONFERENCE AT THE BEHEST
OF SARKIS).

7. BASHIR CONCLUDED HIS REVIEW OF THE TAIF MEETING BY
SAYING THAT THE ARABS CANNOT OR WILL NOT DECIDE ON
ANYTHING AND SAID THAT HE HAD THE FIRM IMPRESSION THAT
THEY DO NOT CARE WHAT HAPPENS TO THE PALESTINIANS AS LONG
AS THEY DO NOT HAVE TO DO THE DIRTY WORK. HE WENT ON
TO REITERATE HIS PESSIMISM OVER A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUT004412

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TO THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS AND PALESTINIAN PRESENCE
IN LEBANON. ACCORDING TO BASHIR, ARAFAT IS INCREASINGLY
CERTAIN THAT AN ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT WILL NOT COME
AND IS GOING THROUGH A VARIETY OF MANEUVERS TO GAIN
TIME .

BASHIR THEREFORE BELIEVES IT IS
UNLIKELY A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WILL EVER BE REACHED.
LET ALONE EXECUTED.

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7156
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

8. I TOLD BASHIR THAT REGARDLESS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME, THE TAIF MEETING HAS HAD A VERY IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE IMPACT ON HIS POSITION IN LEBANON. AS A RESULT OF HIS TALKS WITH SAUD AND OTHERS, HE HAS ESTABLISHED LEGITIMCY WITH LEBANESE MUSLIMS THAT WAS CRITICAL TO EFFORTS AT FORGING SOME FORM OF NATIONAL UNITY. I BLUNTLY WARNED HIM THAT HE SHOULD NOT UNDERCUT THIS IMPORTANT GAIN BY GETTING INTO FIGHTS WITH THE DRUZE OR CUTTING OFF WATER AND ELECTRICITY TO WEST BEIRUT (CONCERNING THE FORMER, BASHIR SAID TWO OF HIS PEOPLE WERE KILLED YESTERDAY BY DRUZE AT BAYT-AD-DIN, BUT HE HAD ORDERED THAT FIRE NOT BE RETURNED. ON THE LATTER, HE MAINTAINED THAT THE ISRAELIS, NOT THE PHALANGE, HAD CUT SERVICES. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT REGARDLESS OF WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE, WE CONSIDER SUCH BEHAVIOR INHUMANE, UNACCEPTABLE, AND DANGEROUS).

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9. DEPARTMENT AND TEL AVIV: CONFIRMING SECURE PHONE TALK WITH WASHINGTON, I URGE THAT WE GET BACK TO ISRAELIS AND INSIST THEY RESTORE WATER AND POWER.

10. ON THE BROADER QUESTION OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS AND THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE.

I EMPHASIZED THAT THE PALESTINIANS KNOW THEY HAVE TO LEAVE AND THAT WAZZAN IS COMMITTED TO GETTING PLO ACCEPTANCE OF THE LEBANESE "PHASED PLAN" BASED ON OUR NINE POINTS DRAWN UP BY JOHNNY ABDO. I STRESSED THAT WE ARE ALSO KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON AND WAZZAN KNOWS THAT WE MUST HAVE AN AGREEMENT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, NOT WEEKS. A MILITARY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE DISASTROUS NOT ONLY FOR LEBANON BUT BASHIR AS WELL. I REALLY SPOKE STRONGLY AND AT LENGTH ON THIS ISSUE. I SAID WE WILL NOT GO ALONG WITH A MILITARY SOLUTION TO WEST BEIRUT. ONCE AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED THERE ARE A VARIETY OF WAYS, INCLUDING POSSIBLY RPT POSSIBLY SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT AS LONG AS IT CAN BE DONE WITHOUT COMPLICATING UNDERSTANDINGS HERE, TO ASSIST IN MOBILIZING WORLD OPINION FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. RETURNING TO BASHIR'S POINT ON A SMALL PALESTINIAN ARMED PRESENCE UNDER GOL CONTROL, I SAID THAT IF THE ABSOLUTELY LAST THING IN THE WAY OF AN OTHERWISE SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WAS THE QUESTION OF 300 PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN B'ALABAKK, THEN I BELIEVED THEY SHOULD STAY. BASHIR SAID THAT HE COULD RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO THIS IF IT WAS ONLY A TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT. BASHIR INCIDENTALLY SAID HE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN HEAVY ARMS. HE KNEW THE

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GOL (WAZZAN) WAS WORRIED THAT THE LAF COULD NOT HANDLE ANY TURNOVER. BASHIR FELT THAT CERTAIN LEBANESE OR ARAB TRAITS WOULD EMERGE, AND HIDDEN ARMS -INCLUDING HEAVY WEAPONS- WOULD BE BOUGHT AT CHEAP PRICES AS TIME PASSED. HE CLEARLY WANTS THE GOL (LAF) TO TAKE CONTROL OF ALL WEAPONS THAT CAN BE COLLECTED. HE DOES NOT WANT THE PLO TO TAKE HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM.

12. MINIMIZE DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.
DILLON

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SS0-00 /026 W
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 4415

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/2/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, PINT, XF, LE, IS, SA, SY, PLO, UNSC
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GOL LEADERS, JULY 2

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN TOLD ME TODAY, FRIDAY, JULY 2, THAT THE PLO HAS BASICALLY ACCEPTED THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CLARIFIED NINE POINTS, BUT WITH IMPLEMENTATION CONDITIONAL ON THE PRESENCE IN BEIRUT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD CONSULT WITH WASHINGTON ABOUT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CREATION OF SUCH A FORCE (TO STAY HERE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD). I STRONGLY URGED THAT A GOL COMMISSION FIX AND DETERMINE DATES, STAGES, H-HOURS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AGREED

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UPON. THE GOL MUST NOW TAKE ON ITS FULL RESPONSIBILITY. WAZZAN WAS SOMEWHAT HESITANT IN ALL HIS STATEMENTS. I FEEL WE MUST MOVE QUICKLY IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE GOL STAYS FIRM AND THAT THE PLO WILL STICK TO ITS CONDITIONAL "DECISION IN PRINCIPLE". END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY DILLON, DRAPER AND BARRETT, I CALLED ON PRESIDE.5 -4(8 '7)6 2 AT 1235. HE WAS ATTENDED BY PRIMIN WAZZAN, FONMIN BUYRUS, JOHNNY ABDO

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Date. 11/27/95

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

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EXCISE

AND AIDE KHALIL HADDAD.

4. WE BEGAN THE MEETING WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE CONFERENCE AT TAIF. SARKIS AND BUTRUS THOUGHT THAT THE RESULTS WERE GENERALLY DISCOURAGING--THE ARAB LEAGUE WAS WITH LEBANON IN PRINCIPLE BUT WOULD DO NOTHING. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED WOULD HAVE BEEN SUITABLE FOR A PERIOD PRIOR TO THE ISRAELI INVASION BUT WAS INAPPROPRIATE NOW. SARKIS NOTED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD A FAVORABLE POSITION TOWARD LEBANON BUT THE REST OF THE LEAGUE WAS NEGATIVE.

5. I SAID THAT, WHILE I WAS DISAPPOINTED, WE SHOULD INTERPRET THE RESULTS OF THE TAIF CONFERENCE POSITIVELY, AS SUPPORT FOR GOL EFFORTS TO BEING AN END TO THE PRESENT SITUATION AND TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THAT GOAL. IF THE TAIF MEETING WERE LESS THAN POSITIVE, THE GOL'S RESPONSIBILITY REMAINED AND THEY SHOULD ACT POSITIVELY AND URGENTLY.

6. WAZZAN THEN SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH ARAFAT, HANI AL-HASSAN, ABU IYAD, AND NAIF HAWATMAH LAST NIGHT BUT THAT THE MEETING HAD ENDED PREMATURELY BECAUSE OF ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS AND FLARE DROPPING, WHICH THE PLO THOUGHT

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MIGHT PRESAGE AN AIR RAID. WAZZAN SAID THE GATHERING HAD THEREFORE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FINISH ITS WORK BUT HAD GOTTEN SOME THINGS DONE. THE MAIN QUESTION RAISED BY THE PLO AT THIS MEETING WAS GUARANTEES FOR THE PALESTINIANS WHO REMAINED IN LEBANON AFTER A SETTLEMENT. THEY JUSTIFIED THEIR DEMANDS FOR GUARANTEES ON THE BASIS OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED RECENTLY IN THE LEBANESE MOUNTAINS BETWEEN PHALANGE AND DRUZE MILITIAS. WAZZAN SAID THAT HE HAD REPLIED TO THE PLO LEADERS THAT HE COULD GIVE THE PALESTINIANS ONLY THE SAME LEVEL OF GUARANTEES AS HE COULD TO THE LEBANESE, AND THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO ASK FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO OPERATE WITH THE LAF. WAZZAN ALSO SAID THAT ABU IYAD HAD ASKED THAT I BE INFORMED THAT ALTHOUGH HE, ABU IYAD, WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION OF THE PLO, HE PERSONALLY HAD NOT AGREED WITH IT AND DOES NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ME (HABIB).

7. I TOLD WAZZAN TO TELL ABU IYAD THAT MY CONFIDENCE IN HIM IS ALSO LIMITED BUT THAT I HAVE CERTAIN OBJECTIVES WHICH REQUIRED THE COOPERATION OF MANY PEOPLE. I TOLD WAZZAN THAT HE COULD AGAIN ASSURE THE PLO LEADERS THAT THE USG WOULD NOT BE PARTY TO BAD TREATMENT OF CHILDREN, WOMEN AND UNARMED MEN. WAZZAN REPLIED THAT THERE IS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE LAF'S ABILITY TO TAKE UP ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. I RESPONDED THAT, IF THE PLO

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FEARS THE PHALANGE FORCES, THEY SHOULD TALK DIRECTLY TO BASHIR GEMAYEL. WAZZAN COULD NOT TELL ME WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN SUCH DISCUSSIONS. I TOLD WAZZAN THAT WASHINGTON HAD ALREADY BEEN INFORMED OF THE PLO AND GOL INTEREST IN AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO OVERSEE THE DISARMAMENT AND DEPARTURE OF THE PLO RIGHT FROM THE START.

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

8. I THEN ASKED WAZZAN WHETHER SPECIFIC DATES AND MODALITIES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PLO. WAZZAN SAID, NO. THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS TIME FOR THE GOL TO CREATE A COMMISSION TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES WITH THE PLO. HE, WAZZAN, HAD TOO MUCH TO DO TO GO INTO DETAILS. I SAID HE SHOULD FORM IT IMMEDIATELY. WHEN I ASKED HIM ON WHAT DATE THE PLO DEPARTURE COULD START, SARKIS INTERVENED TO SAY, "WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS THERE."

9. WAZZAN WAS VAGUE IN REPLYING TO MY FURTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SUBJECTS AGREED UPON BY THE PLO AT LAST NIGHT'S MEETING. HE DID NOT THINK THEY HAD REJECTED ANY OF THE CLARIFIED NINE POINTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF WHERE THE PLO LEADERS WOULD GO, BUT HE THOUGHT SOME WANTED TO GO TO DAMASCUS AND OTHERS ELSEWHERE. WHEN I

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ASKED WAZZAN WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER MEETING HE WOULD HAVE WITH THE PLO, HE REPEATED THAT IT WAS TIME FOR A GOL COMMISSION TO TAKE OVER.

10. WE THEN TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE DISPOSITION OF PLO ARMS. WAZZAN SAID THAT THE GOL WAS AWAITING A U S SIGNAL ON THIS SCORE. I REPLIED THAT WE THOUGHT IT BETTER FOR THE PLO TO GIVE UP ITS HEAVY WEAPONS TO THE GOL (LAF2 UNDER THE SURVEILLANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY. I SAID

I UNDERSTOOD WAZZAN'S PREFERENCE FOR THE PLO FIGHTERS TO TAKE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM. THIS THEORETICALLY MIGHT BE ALLOWED AS A LAST MINUTE FALLBACK POSITION, BUT I EMPHASIZED THAT IT PROBABLY WAS NOT WORKABLE, THAT I WASN'T MAKING ANY MORE CONCESSION AT THIS TIME, AND 5#-5 8 COULDN'T STICK AROUND FOR JUL. THE SAKE OF BARGAINING. IF I WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT DESIRED BY THE PLO AND GOL, I DID NOT WANT TO BE FACED WITH NEW DEMANDS AS A CONSEQUENCE. I SAID THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE ON ME AND THERE WERE EVEN SOME WHO HOPED THAT I WOULD NOT SUCCEED.

11. WAZZAN THEN EXPLAINED AT LENGTH THAT I MUST UNDERSTAND THE PEOPLE HE WAS DEALING WITH. THEY ARE NOT A GOVERNMENT, THEY ARE JUST A GROUP AND DECISIONS ARE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO MAKE. WAZZAN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY IMPATIENCE AND THAT HE HAD BECOME IMPATIENT TOO BUT HE THOUGHT WE WERE NEARLY AT A CONCLUDING POINT. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION OF EXACTLY WHO WAS ABOARD FOR THE PLO AGREEMENT, SPECIFICALLY GEORGE HABBASH, HE REPLIED THAT NO HABBASH REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN AT THE MEETING BUT THAT ARAFAT HAD ASSURED HIM THE PLO WAS AGREED; THERE WERE SOME AGAINST THE DECISION BUT THE MAJORITY HAD CARRIED THE DAY AND THOSE OPPOSED WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION. HOWEVER, THIS WAS CONDITIONAL ON THE

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ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND NO AGREEMENT COULD BE ANNOUNCED PENDING THAT DEVELOPMENT. IF THERE WERE TO BE A LEAKED ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PLO HAD AGREED TO LEAVE, THEY WOULD DENY IT.

12. I TOLD WAZZAN I TOOK HIS POINT BUT THAT IF WE GOT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN PLACE, WE AND THE GOL WOULD DECIDE HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE NECESSARY AND FROM WHERE THEY SHOULD COME. I DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THIS FROM THE PLO AND I DID NOT WANT FURTHER CONDITIONS IMPOSED. I TOLD HIM I WOULD CONSULT WASHINGTON AND TRY FOR A COMMITMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN TWO OR THREE DAYS, BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. WAZZAN SAID HE WOULD USE THOSE TWO OR THREE DAYS TO GET THE GOL COMMISSION STARTED ON MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION.

13. I ASKED SARKIS IF HE WAS GOING TO CONVENE THE NSC. HE SAID HE WOULD IF IT WERE POSSIBLE BUT THAT HE DID NOT THINK WALID JUMBLATT WOULD COME. I SAID THE NSC WOULD BE USEFUL IN GIVING NATIONAL ENDORSEMENT TO A GOL-PLO AGREEMENT AND THAT WALID MIGHT BE PREVAILED UPON TO SHOW UP. I TURNED BACK TO WAZZAN TO ASK HIM WHETHER THE TOKEN "SYMBOLIC" PLO FORCE REMAINING IN LEBANON WAS STILL AN IMPORTANT ISSUE. HE SAID IT WAS, FOR BOTH THE PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON'S "ARAB BROTHERS." I AGAIN SUGGESTED THE NUMBER OF 300, IN BARRACKS IN NON-URBAN AREAS, UNDER FULL GOL AUTHORITY, WITH

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MEN COMING FROM OTHER THAN THE BEIRUT AREA, AND HE INDICATED AGREEMENT. WAZZAN ALSO SAID HE THOUGHT HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY WERE STILL WITH HIM BUT HE WOULD USE THE NEXT TWO DAYS TO NAIL DOWN THEIR AGREEMENT.

14. WE THEN TOOK UP THE SUBJECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE AGAIN AND DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT FRENCH FORCES MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN FROM UNIFIL COMMAND IN ORDER TO MAKE UP THE FORCE. WAZZAN THOUGHT AT LEAST 2000 MEN WOULD BE NEEDED. I PROPOSED 1000 AND ABDO SAID 1600 ((TWO BATTALIONS)

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WERE NEEDED. I BELIEVE 1600 MEN WOULD BE SATISFACTORY.

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDAIMMEDIATE 23
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

15. SARKIS THEN RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE DEPARTURE OF THE SYRIANS AND THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ARMY (PLA). I SUGGESTED THAT IF HE TOLD THEM TO LEAVE BEIRUT THEY WOULD GO, AND THAT I HAD HEARD THAT EVERYBODY IN TAIF WAS AGREED TO THIS.

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16. WE THEN DISCUSSED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REST OF LEBANON AND I ASSURED THE GOL LEADERS PRESENT THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY THAT WE WOULD CONCUR IN GIVING AWAY PART OF THE BEQ'A TO SYRIA, WHICH WAS A CURRENT RUMOR. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO UPHOLD THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, AND POINT NINE OF THE U S PROPOSALS SPECIFIES THAT ALL FOREIGN ARMED FORCES WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAVE LEBANON. SARKIS AND WAZZAN BOTH MADE THE POINT THAT THE SYRIANS

COULD NOT LEAVE BEFORE THE ISRAELIS DID, AND I AGREED
THEY HOULD ALL LEAVE TOGETHER, AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE
UNDER POINT NINE.

17. I THEN SAID THAT WE BOTH HAD TO GO OUR SEPARATE WAYS
AND DO THE SERIOUS JOBS THAT WERE AT HAND AND THAT TIME
WAS PRESSING. ANSWERING A QUESTION FROM BOUTROS TO
DRAPER, I SAID THAT DRAPER'S IMPRESSION FROM HIS TRIP TO
ISRAEL YESTERDAY WAS THAT "IF WE DON'T HURRY, I (HABIB)
HAD BETTER LEAVE."
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CLASSIFICATION: ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED
EXEMPTION: ☒ EXEMPT ☐ NON-EXEMPT
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S E C R E T STATE 183276 TOSEC 100014

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENTACTION SECSTATE BEIRUT INFO
AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS JERUSALEM JIDDA RIYADH JUL 1

QUOTE

S E C R E T **DECAPIED**

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3, 4 7/1/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, MILI, PEPR, IS, LE, US, SA, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: JULY 1 DRAPER MEETINGS WITH
- SHAMIR AND BEGIN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DRAPER BOUGHT US SOME EXTRA TIME --
BUT NOT MUCH. GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE OF HABIB'S
EFFORTS, THE ISRAELIS REMAIN HIGHLY SKEPTICAL THAT
AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE

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WITH THE NINE-POINT GUIDELINES CAN BE SPEEDILY
ACHIEVED WITHOUT IMMEDIATE ADDITIONAL HEAVY
PRESSURE ON THE PLO. THEY CURRENTLY ARE EXAMINING
A RANGE OF OPTIONS SHORT OF THOSE WHICH THEY RECKON
WOULD ABORT MUSLIM LEBANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND RISK A SHARP DECLINE IN
U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS. BUT THE HEAT IS ON AND
BEGIN WANTS SOME POSITIVE NEWS BEFORE THE JULY 4
CABINET MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DCM BROWN, DAS DRAPER MET FOR AN HOUR ON JULY 1 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND SEVERAL OF HIS ASSOCIATES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ANOTHER HOUR WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, SHAMIR, SHARON, DMI SAGI, GENERAL TAMIR AND OTHERS. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO MET SEPARATELY WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON AND HAD A WORKING LUNCH WITH THESE TWO PLUS DMI SAGI AND GENERAL TAMIR.

4. IN ALL OF HIS MEETINGS, DRAPER STRESSED VERY HEAVILY THAT HABIB'S BASIC MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELIS IS THAT WITH LUCK, HARD WORK AND FOREBEARANCE BY BASHIR GEMAYEL AND THE ISRAELIS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION FROM WHICH BOTH EMERGENCY-CONFESSORIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON -- PROBABLY HEADED EVENTUALLY BY BASHIR -- WHICH WILL SERVE NOT ONLY LEBANESE BUT ALSO ISRAELI INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE MAINTAINED AND SUFFICIENT TIME GIVEN TO HABIB TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. USING DRAMATIC EXAMPLES TO IMPRESS UPON THE ISRAELIS THE DEPTH OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THESE OBJECTIVES, DRAPER SAID THAT IN EIGHT YEARS OF CLOSE

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WORKING ASSOCIATION HE HAD NEVER SEEN HABIB SO COMPLETELY COMMITTED TO A CAUSE. HABIB WAS LEANING VERY HARD ON ALL HIS LEBANESE INTERLOCUTORS (AND IN THAT EFFORT USING ONIMOUS ISRAELI EDITORIALS, CABINET MEETINGS AND SO FORTH TO MAINTAIN THE RIGHT KIND OF PRESSURE) TO IMPRESS UPON THEM THAT THEY MUST MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION OR FACE THE VERY REAL POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT. ALREADY A BROAD CONSENSUS EXISTS AMONG LEBANESE THAT THE PLO IS FINISHED IN LEBANON AND THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP MUST LEAVE BEIRUT AND LEBANON. COMBATTING THE LEVANTINE/ARAB TENDENCY TO BARGAIN AND NIT-PICK OVER EVERY POINT, HABIB IS FORCING THE GOL LEADERSHIP TO FOCUS ON THE NINE POINT GUIDELINES IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH THE PLO, AND TO COME UP WITH CONCRETE DETAILED PLANS FOR SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION BASED ON THOSE NINE POINTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY FUZZY AREAS, HABIB FEELS THAT THE PLO LEADERS RECOGNIZE THAT THEY HAVE TO VACATE LEBANON ALONG WITH SOME 5,000 FRONTLINE FIGHTERS (CONSISTING OF (A) PALESTINIANS ATTACHED TO THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ARMY, (B) PAID LEBANESE MERCENARIES OF FATAH WHO WILL LOOK TOWARD A GOLDEN HANDSHAKE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO REINTEGRATE INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY, AND (C) SOME 4,500 FATAH REGULARS). IT HAS TO BE UNDERSTOOD, SAID DRAPER, THAT THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PARTIES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT CONCLUDE A FORMAL

AGREEMENT, WHICH FOR THE LEBANESE CARRIES THE DANGER OF AGAIN INSTITUTIONALIZING A FORM OF RECOGNITION FOR THE PLO. RATHER, THE ARRANGEMENT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED BY INTERNAL DIRECTIVES CARRIED OUT STAGE BY STAGE WITH OVERALL PLO AGREEMENT. THERE ARE A HOST OF EXTREMELY COMPLEX ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS, E.G. WHAT TO DO WITH THE ENORMOUS STOCK OF PALESTINIAN HEAVY WEAPONS IN BEIRUT, BUT JOHNNY

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ABDU AND A TEAM OF LAF OFFICERS ARE BEGINNING TO DRAW UP THE NECESSARY PLANS. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO PREDICT THE FINAL DESTINATIONS OF THOSE PLO LEADERS AND FIGHTERS WHO ARE TO BE EVACUATED FROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON. PLO LEADERS DO NOT WANT TO GO TO SYRIA BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE SUBJUGATED BY ASSAD. NOR DO THEY WISH TO RESETTLE IN A DISTANT ARAB COUNTRY. IF WE COULD GET A POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL FROM EGYPT, THAT MIGHT BE AN ACCEPTABLE DESTINATION. WE ARE WELL AWARE, DRAPER NOTED, THAT BASHIR CONTINUES TO FAVOR A MILITARY SOLUTION, BUT THAT WOULD DEAL A DEATH BLOW TO THE EMERGENCE OF A MULTI-CONFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT TO WHICH BASHIR PAYS LIP SERVICE. IT WOULD ALSO, AS AMBASSADOR LEWIS HAD PREVIOUSLY EMPHASIZED, HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

5. DRAPER'S AUDIENCES WERE DISTINCTLY SKEPTICAL. THEY CITED AND GENERALLY ENDORSED BASHIR'S CONVICTION THAT THE PLO IS MERELY PLAYING FOR TIME, EXPLOITING MUSLIM LEBANESE FEARS OF EVENTUAL RETALIATION, AND PASSING VAGUELY POSITIVE SIGNALS IN PRIVATE WHICH THE PLO THEN DENIES IN PUBLIC.

7. IN RESPONSE TO CLOSE QUESTIONING BY KIMCHE, DRAPER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE CHANCES OF BASHIR BEING ELECTED ON JULY 23 OR SOON THEREAFTER WERE VERY GOOD PROVIDED THAT BASHIR DID NOT MAKE A SERIOUS MISTAKE, E.G., HARRASS THE DRUSE AS UNFORTUNATLEY WAS THE RECENT CASE, OR BE SEEN AS OVERTLY COLLUDING WITH THE ISRAELIS.

8. AFTER GOING OVER THE SAME GROUND IN HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN, DRAPER STRESSED THAT YESTERDAY A HITHERTO RELUCTANT WAZZAN HAD AGREED TO USE THE NINE POINT GUIDELINES AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION AS TO HOW MANY MUSLIMS REMAINED IN WEST BEIRUT WITH

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DRAPER CITING THE FIGURE OF 500,000-600,000 OF WHOM 400,000 WERE LEBANESE.

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have been withheld in their entirety.

Exemption(s) invoked: b1

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WELL UNDERWAY). HE STARTED BY STATING THAT
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DEPARTURE FOR BEIRUT.

16. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

UNQUOTE STOESSEL

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUT004426

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7171
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4426

EXD15 **DECAPTIONED**

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065; RDS-1, 3 7/3/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, US, FR, PLO, UNSC
SUBJECT:HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FRENCH EMISSARY GUTMAN

1 (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2 FRENCH EMISSARY GUTMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PAUL
MARK HENRY AND TWO STAFFERS CAME TO THE RESIDENCE TO SEE M
THIS MORNING. JULY 3. PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL AT THE RESIDENCE,

3. TO PUT THINGS INTO PROPER PERSPECTIVE, I DESCRIBED
THE BASIC U.S. OBJECTIVES UNDER WHICH I WAS OPERATING:
--A) DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG GOL WHICH COULD ASSERT
ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
--B) ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES WILL HAVE TO LEAVE,
BE THEY PALESTINIAN, ISRAELI, OR SYRIAN.

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EXCISE

--C) NO PLO MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN LEBANON (WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF A TOKEN FORCE FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD).

--D) THE TRANSFER OUT OF LEBANON OF PLO HEADQUARTERS, AND THE RETENTION OF ANY POLITICAL PRESENCE ONLY UNDER THE MOST STRINGENT OF CONDITIONS

--E) NO EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY FOR THE PALESTINIANS RESIDING IN LEBANON, WHO WOULD HAVE TO COMPLY WITH GOL AUTHORITY.

4. I THEN BRIEFED GUTMAN IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE NINE POINTS U.E. APPROACH AND REVIEWED THE STATUS OF SPECIFIC ISSUES SUCH AS A 300-500 MAN TOKEN "SYMBOLIC" PLO FORCE, A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT TO ENSURE SECURITY OF PALESTINIANS AND OTHERS DURING THE PLO-PLA-SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, THE PREFERRED COUNTRY OF ASYLUM FOR THE PLO LEADERS AND FIGHTERS (EGYPT), AND CONTINUED PLO POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN LEBANON. I NOTED THAT FATAH HAD ALLEGEDLY AGREED TO A PACKAGE AND, IN RESPONSE TO GUTMAN'S QUESTION ON WHETHER ARAFAT COULD DELIVER THE PLO, I SAID THAT HAWATMAH (DFLP) HAD REPORTEDLY CONCURRED AND HABBASH WOULD BE MADE TO GO ALONG, ALTHOUGH RELUCTANTLY. EVEN ABU IYAD HAD AGREED, I WAS TOLD.

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5. WE DISCUSSED THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. I SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE ONE BATTALION (APPROXIMATELY 800 MEN) TO A JOINT U.S.-FRENCH FORCE OF ABOUT 1600 MEN. WE SAW NO NEED FOR OTHER CONTRIBUTORS. GUTMAN INDICATED THE FRENCH POSITION WAS THE SAME AS OURS: AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ASSUMING THERE WAS A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE GOL AND THE ACQUIESCENCE OF OTHER PARTIES (E.G., PLO, ISRAEL, AND PERHAPS SYRIA). GUTMAN ASKED TWO QUESTIONS:

A) WOULD THE U.S.-FRENCH FORCE COME UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL SUPERVISION AND B) WOULD IT REMAIN INDEFINITELY, THEREBY LEADING TO ACCUSATIONS OF "COLONIZATION". I RESPONDED STRONGLY IN THE NEGATIVE TO BOTH, AND STRESSED THAT THE MAXIMUM PERIOD THE U.S. WOULD PERMIT ANY FORCES TO REMAIN WOULD BE ONE MONTH. I EMPHASIZED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MOVE THIS FORCE VERY QUICKLY AND THAT IN MY ESTIMATION THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE LEBANESE TO BEGIN STAFF WORK. THE MOD SHOULD BE THE POINT OF CONTACT, AND SUCH QUESTIONS AS DEPLOYMENT AND QUARTERING OF TROOPS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED NOW IN RESPONSE TO GUTMAN'S QUESTION ON THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF A JOINT U.S.-FRENCH FORCE. I POINTED OUT THAT OUR FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE WAS TO ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE FORCES SHOULD PREFERABLY BE UNDER SOME FORM OF GOL

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OR LAF AUTHORITY. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT
GUTMAN AGREED (SEE SEPTTEL FOR SUBSEQUENT TALK WITH
SARKIS ONTHIS SUBJECT).)

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ADP793
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 NSCE-00 SS0-00 /026 W
-----342146 031443Z /40 S

O 031246Z JUL 82 ZFF
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7172
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE EY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIA IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4426

EXDIS

FROM HABTR

11. RECOMMEND THAT DEPARTMENT REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO
AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, RIYADH AND PARIS.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04426

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ADP847
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04427 01 OF 02 031448Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----342335 031550Z /45-S

O 031300Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7173
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AIVI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4427

EXDIS **DECAPTIONED**
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/3/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, MOPS, PINT
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: SARKIS' REACTION TO OFFER OF
AMERICAN BATTALION

1M KS-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. I INFORMED PRESIDENT SARKIS THIS MORNING OF U.S.
READINESS TO PROVIDE A BATTALION FOR A FRANCO-AMERICAN OULIT-
NATIONAL FORCE (MNF) FOR 30 DAYS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT OF PLO COMBATANTS. I TOLD HIM THAT
EXPEDITION OF THIS FORCE WAS CONDITIONAL ON A FORMAL GOL
REQUEST AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE PACKAGE DEAL WITH THE
PALESTINIANAS. SARKIS AND INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDO HAD
MANY QUESTIONS BUT AT THE END SARKIS SAID HE WOULD CONSULT
WITH THE GOL AND WITH A RE-INFORMED NATIONAL SALVATION COUNCIL
TO GAIN THE WIDEST SUPPORT FOR THE PACKAGE DEAL WITH THE PLO.
HE SAID FURTHER THAT WHEN A PACKAGE DEAL WAS DEFINITELY IN HAND,
HE WOULD CALL FOR THE ONF AND AN AMERICAN CONTINGENT TO
COME IN, GIVING US AT LEAST 48 HOURS TO GET IT IN PLACE.
END SUMMARY.

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3. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT SARKIS AT 1120 THIS MORNING,
SATURDAY, JULY 3, ACCOMPANIED BY DRAPER AND BARRETT. THE
PRESIDENT WAS ATTENDED BY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDO
AND AID KHALIL HADDAD

4. I OADE KNOWN TO THE PRESIDENT THAT I RESPONSE TO OUR
TALK WITH PRIMIN WAZZAN YSTERDAY, I HAD OBTAINED PRESI-
DENTIAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USG TO SUPPLY A U.S. ARMY

PAGE NO. 1

EXCISE

BATTALION OF ABOUT 800 MEN, TO FORM HALF OF A MNF THE OTHER HALF TO CONSIST OF A FRENCH BATTALION. I SAID THAT THIS MNF AND THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT WOULD HAVE TO BE FORMALLY REQUESTED AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY THAT OTHER PARTIES ON THE GROUND ACQUIESCE. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE OTHER ELEMENTS IN LEBANON WERE NOT OPPOSED THAT WE WOULD TAKE CARE OF ISRAELI APPROVAL, AND THAT SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE COULD BE EXPECTED I TOLD SARKIS

THAT IN ADDITION TO MAKING A FORMAL REQUEST, HIS MILITARY FORCES WOULD HAVE TO START PLANNING.

5. THE DISCUSSION THEN DEALT WITH IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS OF OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE MNF. THE FIRST QUESTION ASKED WAS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE PALESTINIANS REFUSED TO GO. I SAID THAT WE NEEDED A PACKAGE DEAL BEFORE COMING IN AND THAT IF THE PALESTINIANS RENEGGED AFTERWARD THE MNF WOULD LEAVE IN FIVE MINUTES LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN TO THE ISRAELIS. IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUESTIONS, I SAID THAT THE ENTRY OF THE MNF WOULD NOT AFFECT THE DISARMING OF AN IDF "READJUSTMENT." WE CONTINUED TO THINK IT WAS DESIRABLE TO GET THE ISRAELIS AWAY FROM BAABDA PALACE, OUT OF THE AIRPORT, AND FARTHER FROM SOUTH BEIRUT. -4(8 SAID HE PREFERRED NOT TO HAVE TH

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MNF UNDER GOL COMMAND AS HE HAD HAD AN UNFORTUNATE EXPERIENCE OF "GOL COMMAND" OF SYRIAN ADF. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD NEED CLOSE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT WITH THE GOL AND REPEATED THAT IF THE PALESTINIANS RENEGGED ON ANY PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL THE MNF WOULD BE ORDERED OUT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE MNF WOULD PRESUMABLY COME ON A SPECIFIED DATE WHICH WOULD BE THE BEGINNING DAY OF DEPARTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS OR SOON THEREAFTER, AND THAT THE MNF WOULD BE HERE TO HELP THE LAF IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION OF A PACKAGE DEAL. WE LEFT IT THAT THE MNF WOULD TAKE UP POSITIONS WHEN THE GOL ASKS THEM TO.

6 WE AGAIN DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT, WHICH WAS TOUCHED ON YESTERDAY, OF WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD TAKE OR LEAVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS BEHIND. SARKIS AND ABU ARGUED STRENUOUSLY THAT THE PLO TAKE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM. I SAID I WOULD LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITY, BUT THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND UPON WHERE THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS WERE GOING, WHICH WAS THE MAIN PROBLEM LEFT UNDECIDED. I MENTIONED THAT WE WERE APPROACHING THE EGYPTIANS IN THIS REGARD. JOHNNY ABU RAISED ANOTHER SUBJECT SAYING THAT IF THE DEPARTING PLO FIGHTERS WERE "FUXED" WITH THE PLA, WHICH IS PART OF THE ADF, I WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REQUEST THE PLO TO LEAVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS IF THE PLA AND ADF WERE TAKING THEIRS WITH THEM.

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NOTE BY OCT: NSCE ADDED PER MR. FEATHERSTONE, S/S-O.

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496

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----342353 031559Z /45-S

O 031300Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7174
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
RUEHJMXAMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 38

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4427

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(b)(1)
(a)(5)

I EMPHASIZED THAT I
DID NOT CARE ABOUT SIGNATURES SO MUCH BUT THAT WE NEEDED
TO NAIL THINGS DOWN FAST AND GET DATES FOR THE BEGINNING
OF THE DEPARTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARRIVAL OF
THE MNF. I REPEATED THAT WE WOULD LOOK INTO THE QUESTION

OF HEAVY WEAPONS.

9. SARKIS SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS SURE THAT HE HAD PACKAGE THAT THE PLO WULD EXECUTE, HE WOULD ASK FOR THE MNF, GIVING US AT LEAST 48 HOURS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO CONSULT THE NATIONAL SALVATION COUNCIL AD GET ITS APPROVAL. HE THOUGHT THE CHRISTIAN WOULD BE AGAINST THE PACKAGE DEAL BECAUSE OF THE SYMBOLIC PLO PRESENCE, AND EVEN FONMIN BOUTROS MIGHT OPPOSE IT. HE SAID THAT HE, SARKIS, REFUSED TO SPEAK FOR THE CHRISTIANS ON THIS ISSUE AND WOULD NEED THEIR SECIFIC APPROVAL. HE ADDED THAT HABIB COULD HELP OBTAIN APPROVAL OF THE CHRISTANS, I.E. BASHIR GEMAYEL

10. I STESSED AGAIN THAT I WAS INA HURRY TOSOLVE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS FACING US. I DID NOT WANT ANY NEW CONDITIONS REESTED OF I WANTEND TO KNOW WHEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT COULD START.

1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE SEEM TO BE MAKING PROGRESS, I WANT TO CAUTION EVERONE NOT TO ASSURE THAT THE JOB IS ALOMOST DONE. I AM HOPEFUL AND BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSILE TO NAIL TOGETHER A PACKAGE DEAL WITIN A FEW DAYS BUT IT WILL REQUIRE FURTHER GOOD LUCK, HARD WORK, AND PERSUASION

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HERE, ALONG WITH THE SAME COMBINATION IN OTHER CAPITALS.

12. RECOMMAND THAT DEPT REPEAT TO JIDDA, RIYADH CAIRO, N AMMAN DAMASCUS, PARIS AND WHITEHOUSE.
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NOTE BY OCT: NSCE ADDED PER MR. FEATHERSTONE, S/S-O.

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE *mm* REF ID: A66000 Date *11/27/95*
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**TAPED PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN HABIB AND
Charles Hill/Adm. Howe**

12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982



HABIB *

...final agreement, I keep talking about alleged agreement, suspicion whether or not these things will really be carried out I am still uncertain about where we are going to come out that the remaining critical issues are the question of the heavy weapons. He doesn't like them taking the heavy weapons with them so we are going to get static on that. David talked about less limited numbers and terrorism and that sort of thing and I said "Look, () said he would probably be back around () said that didn't sound like a bad idea () are you getting me, over ()

One point which I stress very hard () if it meant that we had to have a few hundred men here that would be sufficient to take on a () Anyway whatsoever is a threat to Israel. I have mentioned it to David, I told them we would not bring the men until we () I told them as far as the heavy weapons are concerned we would see what we can do but () the officer in charge of the war () they don't want them to stay, they of the token force the symbolic force, that was not too much trouble () the question of timing, and I said to him that I was willing () arms in place that in other words, it was a package deal () a place to put them that much depended on our ability to get the place to put them () he said he didn't like the idea of them going to Libya () because we were not going to put the King in that kind of spot. () not at all ah, now () you better make sure we can follow through on that I will get to Sam who is going to be off to see the Prime Minister very shortly and get him to make a very strong point about the importance of cutting it out, especially tonight, but keep the place quiet because it is getting too sensitive now.

HILL: Let me tell you () they would right away make a common cause with his domestic opposition and he just can't stand that kind of a problem now. He did not say "no" finally. He is going to put it to his adviser and give us

*N.B. This tape starts after the conversation started and contains numerous blank spots--as indicated throughout the text by spaces.

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a formal answer tonight but we are () as the answer and trying to come up with something else.

HABIB: Well we can't dump [redacted] into the sea and there is no way we can put that many of them into Syria. They will be back here inside of a week or they will be in Jordan. I just don't know why the hell we can't use, well I presume you are trying your best, I don't know. If you can't get them there, how about taking half of them there and half of them in Saudi Arabia, or Oman or, I don't know, Christ I am not saying I'm kidding Oman. Somehow or another you have got to get them out of here. Otherwise, this whole thing falls apart because the whole thing is based on getting them out of here. I mean if we don't get them out of here, we don't have anything going for us. What are you thinking of? () Get Mubarak to take them for 30 days and parcel them out after that. We'll work on it for 30 days and we'll let them go to hell or something. I don't know. Somehow or another you have got to get them out of here.

il
as

HILL: Yeah, we are very aware of that and that is now our first focus but only other thing we have working at this moment is the French told us that they would approach the Libyans about this but they have not done so yet so the French Ambassador is coming into to talk to Larry in a few minutes so we may get more then. But now it looks very, very bleak.

HABIB: Well, you know, that is just going to throw the whole thing about. You got to work on Mubarak, even if it is temporary. Would he rather have them in Libya? Christ, they would be sitting on his border next and then what will the Libyans do with them, then it'll really become a center of terrorism. And then what the hell are you going to do, the Israelis bombing Libya? It's ridiculous.

BIAJ

He can control them. These guys have been whipped. Okay, you go to work Charlie, I've given you all you need now. Make sure Sam goes over the whole thing. You can't go any less than what we went with Kimche.

DRAPER: Let's go over the four points.

HABIB: What four points? I told you already the four points that he () Morrie is sitting here. Do you understand where the sensitive points are or don't you?

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HILL: I have three sensitive points. One, the PLO political office, the second is the heavy weapons and the third is the token force. What is the fourth?

HABIB: The fourth is the timing. When all this kicks off. I told them we could get, technically we should not see any problem in getting them out within ten days to two weeks after the beginning of D day and I want D day to be as soon as possible, as soon as we have them nailed down and we had a place to send them, that was D day and that in terms of their readjustment was after their withdrawal began. In terms of the MNF coming in, that was after they started to pull down and we didn't want to get sucked in and having our force as a hostage.

HILL: Okay, Phil, Admiral Howe is here and he has been working on this morning with a team on the details of this situation. He would like to talk to you now and ask a few questions. Just a minute.

HABIB: Okay, but Charlie you go on down and get onto Sam. Morris is just what I told you awhile ago. We want a PLO declaration. This is very important. That starts the process and that could be D day or the day before D day. That's the way we are thinking in the way of timing. Once we get things nailed down, we want to move right away.

HILL: Roger, we've got that Phil.

HABIB: Okay, who's coming on now? Charlie, you can go and leave us. Anybody coming on, come on.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, John Howe on the line and he got your last message. In working the mechanics of this and I'm going to go off to a White House meeting shortly that involves OSD and others and some of the the congressional and public affairs aspects, and military aspects, the thing we need to know the most is just what your concept is for the use of U.S. forces. I can tell you what they have in mind which is as limited as possible. But we need to know what you need to have the Marines do when they are in there and how expensive it is?

HABIB: Well, what we have counted on is a total force of two battalions, about 1,600 men, half French, half American. Our concept is that they should come in a few days or after the beginning of the departure of the PLO and position themselves as, in effect, a sanitary belt, that would be somewhere between the Israelis and the Lebanese army force. My thought is that

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they would go down mostly toward the airport area and so we can start using the airport. Get the airport in good hands, in friendly hands, or non-combative hands. Also we would undoubtedly have to have some kind of liaison set up with the Lebanese and the French and our thought there was that they would be up in the Ministry of Defense which is right above here. What I would really like to do is to think in terms of those numbers with a 48 hour trigger on it. In other words, 48 hours after the Lebanese tell us they want us to come in, they will come. So you would have to position them about 48 hours off the coast. It would by that time things would be in fairly good order for them to come in. After they come in and at the time they come in, the presumption would be we would get some readjustment from the Israeli lines about that time. Now what I suggest is that you get a couple liaison officers, staff men, to come early when I give you signal. Once we get this thing when it looks like it's in its final stages, we could give you a signal. Send me a couple of staff guys, we'll put them, hopefully we'll get the French to come in at the same time. I want French speakers. At least those staff guys have to be French speakers. As many French-speaking officers as we can put the better off we are. Now we wanted, when the PLO starts moving out to the ships, our guys ought to be around as part of the guarantee that nobody is going to try and kill them, either Israeli or Phalange. So really the deal has to start, if we call D day the day the PLO announce they have accepted the agreement and everything is going to happen and we have it all in hand, then presumably about, if we have a place to go. Hold on. If we have a place for them to go, we start moving. If we don't have a place for them to go, we ain't going to do a God damned thing. We just going to sit on our ass. But if we have a place for them to go, we then have the commercial ships off-shore, we start moving them and we think we ought to be able to move them within ten days, shorter if possible, maybe only three days for all I know, but certainly within ten days. Remember, they have to be assembled, they have to be basically, basically we will have to settle the arms problem by then as to what they take with them. At this point we have just got small arms but there is now a lot of debate around here as to whether they are going to take heavy arms with them too. We haven't settled that finally but the boys in Washington are giving me some ideas. At that point, our boys get in position, we'll probably want them, them and the French, in, as I said, in that area around the airport and coming up this way toward Baabda maybe and the Ministry of Defense. The Lebanese army is going to put about 4,000 men in the same operation with them so that you are going to have 1600 American

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and Frenchmen, 4,000 Lebanese troops and then, presumably, the process just continues until it is cleared out and the Lebanese troops take over. I told them we are counting on a less than 30 day operation as far as we are concerned. Maximum, 30 days for our forces. I am not so sure the French are that limited although the French don't want to stay here forever either. So that they may not be limited to the 30 days that I've set. Now it may be that the MNF might have to monitor the inventory of heavy weapons and spare arms, and the transfers whether we put them on ships or put them in depots. In that case I would hope to use the French with some American presence. I want to maximize the use of the French if I can on the internal stuff. Keep our guys out on the fringes because it is easier to deal with the Israelis at that stage.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, that all tracks pretty well with the thinking that is going here which from the Pentagon standpoint is minimize direct U.S. contact. One specific question. They have a preference here for working with the airport as a priority way of getting out. What they have in mind because of the geography and closeness of the camp, is to have the U.S. presence primarily in the airport area to charter commercial aircraft even though that seems to be impractical to some of us and to try to get these guys out commercially that way with the U.S. being around the airport and the Israelis back a little bit and some French involvement there as well. If that's not politically 'doable', we need to know because the port or even an over the beach thing is also feasible and we either need to rule that out or say that's okay and you can start planning along those lines. With regard to liaison they have already started to identify some people that will be able to fly in as soon as you say 'go'. We will also get sorted out that EUCOM can, at least, start talking to the French military to start out what units and how they might work together. Secretary Haig has the thought that the U.S. should do as much as the French and the U.S. should not simply be transporters, communicators, but should be there in some force. And if you kind of concur in that, we'll kind of beat down the Pentagon who would like not to have such a substantial force although I think it makes sense that they keep their units together basically and either do the airport or do the seaport and provide some security there and help in the checking out. The other issue is if our forces, if we should want to bring in a few more. Does that make sense to you? The Marines have 1,200 off shore right now, within 24 hours. When their other ships get linked up, they'll have about 1800 other fully capable marines.

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HABIB: In terms of the numbers, if you want to bring in a few more, nobody is going to object. In my opinion, as I said, it should be 50/50 French and American. I don't want our troops cannot be just the communicators and the water carriers and the transporters. We have got to have our troops, Al is absolutely right. We have got to do our share. There is no way we can just dump the load on the French. On the other hand, I think the way the thing is going to work out. They are not going to use the airport to transport 5,000, 6/7,000 PLO out of here. I don't know how many we are going to end up with. We don't really know. It may be up to 10,000. Remember, some of them are going to have their families. We may run up to 15,000-20,2000 people. We ain't going to take them out in a god damned airplane. We'll take them out by boat. The port area is easy to get at. You can dock right in there. Obviously, we'll have to control the port area while we are doing this. If you are going to go over the beach in a landing craft you might be able to use the Banmilitair area, our people know where that is, but don't worry about things like that. It seems to me, for one thing, we've got to get our planning synchronized with the Lebanese. Remember, we are going to be depending alot on 4,000 Lebanese troops to be in the confrontation areas. They are going to be doing the street to street stuff.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, that makes good sense and that's what everybody wants here. But if we have this argument about the airport and certainly topically in terms of numbers, what you say makes sense to me and the port makes alot more sense, but politically do you think the PLO would even agree to go out by air or by perhaps the combined operation of going out by air and out by port. Over.

HABIB: Well, it is possible you could use air. But remember it is going to take three or four days after this thing starts and after you are on the ground before the airport is going to be in shape to take 747s or 707s or something like that. Now there may be, you may be able to do something with the air but I'm more interested, the important thing is they've got to start moving before our guys even come. I'm going to get them started simultaneously so it is not like, you know, we want them assembled and ready to go and our guys come in and monitor it and see that they don't get hurt. Now the reason for that is very simple. Let me explain it to you but it'll scare some of your guys. I don't want our guys in position between the Israelis and them and then the guys decide not to go. Then

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what'll we do? Then if we pull out, we say, what are we doing, opening the door for the Israelis to come in, that is why it has got to be very carefully synchronized and it has got to be very carefully timed. That's is why I want to get some staff back here working with the people who are on the ground. This is not going to be an easy operation but it should not involved any of our guys getting into trouble. I can't see that. But, you know, there is always the risk that something is going to go wrong. Every kid over the age of 14 in this god damned country has got an automatic rifle.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, and that, of course, is one of their other concerns that the Pentagon is laying on us is what kind of insurances we are gong to have from the various factions. That they are under control and that the risk is minimized. Do you have any comments on that? Over.

HABIB: By the time they start getting here, the factions will be under control. The Phalange is not going to go after our guys. We can take care of it. The Israelis are not going to go after our guys. I doubt whether the PLO is going to go after them because the PLO wants them there. If the PLO agrees to their coming, it is because they want them. For one of the reasons they are worried about what is going to happen to them and to the people they leave behind if they don't have some protection after they take off. So I think the Lebanese army is going to take care of the factions, the remaining factions. Obviously, all of this depends upon a certain degree of agreement and it's got to be getting underway when our guys get here. So, what you guys ought to think of when I give the signal, when I know that we have got enough that we are really going to start moving, then I'll signal you to send some staff guys, not too many. In the first place there is no place to put these people. Second place is we don't want them all over the god damned place. The minimum amount of staff, responsible guys who can give an order and have it carried out, who know what the hell they are doing. Then we'll bring them, talk it over, put them in touch, get a wheels and command group formed. It is not going to be anything of joint command or anything like that. The Lebanese don't want to command them in any way whatsoever. They are not going to be under Lebanese command. I doubt whether the French will put you under their command, take you under your command or vice versa. So it would seem to me we would have to have proper liaison and coordination. That is the important thing. Now we can handle two or three liaison officers but I don't them to come until I know that we have something. That may be tomorrow, it may be the next day. So have them ready to come. Over.

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HOWE: Okay, Phil, the other question concerns this commercial shipping and if you envision the commercial shipping being there, we will need your advice on what the timing is in regard to contacting them and whether you want us to do it here or you want the ICRC to start talking to shipping companies and going through the problems that that might raise. They have identified some U.S. shipping that's in the area but it may take some heavy persuasion and also the question of arms looms up again. These guys can't be armed when they go aboard ships. Over.

HABIB: I think it would be better to get something like a Greek ship, very frankly, because you think () ground before they go on board, you are not dealing with reality. We told them they could take their individual arms and they are going to take them. Now it seems to me I told the boys earlier in the department they got to start working on the question of ships and I would expect that we'll know two or three days ahead of time when we should start thinking of getting the ships in. I don't think we'll get more notice than that very frankly. We could have longer notice if we need it. It is just that I don't want to wait that long. Once we get agreement, I want to start moving because otherwise these things have a tendency to move away from you. Next thing you know there are six more conditions that we've got from the Israelis and the Lebanese, the PLO, everybody and his brother has another condition out here that they want them to negotiate for them and I told them I ain't negotiating any more conditions. Over.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, well we will have to stay in sync in terms of timing and public awareness, but you are probably right, earlier rather than later, we need to get off the dime and move out on that. Larry is here and he has a couple of things he wants to pass on so I'm going to pass him over to you now.

HABIB: Hold on, John, one further thing, when I said I take it you have French-speaking people with these units. Hell, these guys have been in the area. Someone suggested former army attaches. I don't think that's the answer. I want them from the units so that the liaison is proper. Do you have french-speaking officers who speak french with the units that are on board ships or who are in the headquarters that are associated with them? Over.

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HOWE: We still have to determine that, Phil. I'm sure that in EUCOM who will want to send some of the people, they have a good french speaker. Whether they have got a Marine, Navy french speaker there, I don't know but we'll try to address that problem and take care of it for you and keep the presence small with () END OF SIDE A.

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7/3/82

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 7/3/02 {HILL, CHARLES}

TAGS: PEPR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: PLO WEAPONS

REF: BEIRUT 4398

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WITH REGARD TO THE HEAVY WEAPONS PROBLEM, IT SEEMS, REALISTICALLY, THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION IS FOR THE MNF TO RECEIVE THEM AT AN AGREED COLLECTION POINT AND IMMEDIATELY DESTROY THEM, PERHAPS IN FRONT OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL CONCERNED PARTIES. THIS SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY WAY TO ASSURE ALL PARTIES THAT HEAVY WEAPONS WILL NOT END UP IN, OR REMAIN IN, UNFRIENDLY HANDS. WE WOULD DEFER TO MILITARY MEN ON THE SPOT, BUT IT OCCURS TO US THAT THE HIPPODROME MIGHT SERVE AS AN ASSEMBLY AREA TO WHICH THE PLO COULD DELIVER THE WEAPONS.

3. DESTRUCTION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY USING ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING METHODS:

A) LARGER CALIBER ARTILLERY PIECES AND MORTARS: CLOSE THE BREACH AND DROP A THERMITE GRENADE DOWN THE BARREL. AT A MINIMUM, THE BREACH WILL BE WELDED SHUT AND THE TEMPER OF THE STEEL DESTROYED, RENDERING THE WEAPON UNREPAIRABLE.

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B} VEHICLES, APCs AND EVEN TANKS (IF THERE ARE ANY IN WEST BEIRUT}: INTRODUCE JELLIED GASOLINE OR SIMILAR SUBSTANCE INTO THE INTERIORS AND IGNITE. THEY WILL BURN BEYOND REPAIR.

C} HEAVY MACHINE GUNS, LIGHT MORTARS, HAND-HELD ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND THE LIKE: FLY, SAY, 20 MILES OUT TO SEA - IN ANY ROTARY OR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF OPENING A DOOR IN FLIGHT THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO THE MNF - AND DUMP. ALTERNATIVELY, TAKE THEM OUT TO SEA BY BOAT AND DUMP. COULD ALSO BE PILED AND BURNED BEYOND REPAIR AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

D} AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES, PLASTIQUE, DETONATORS AND THE LIKE WHICH TURN UP IN THE COLLECTION PROCESS OR OTHERWISE ACCUMULATED CAN BE BLOWN BY SAPPERS WITH FIXED CHARGES.

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/30/02 (MURPHY, RICHARD W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, SA, IS, US, XF, PLO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION GUIDELINES AND FAHD MESSAGE FOR BASHIR

REF:BEIRUT 4380; JIDDA 5019; JIDDA 5020

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. I HAVE RECONTACTED KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY AND
DEPFONMIN MANSURI TO ADVISE THAT THE NINE POINTS I
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PAGE 02 STATE 184637

CONVEYED TO THEM SEVERAL HOURS AGO HAVE NOT, AS SUCH, BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE PLO. ADDED THAT WE WILL REMAIN FLEXIBLE CONCERNING THESE POINTS, ADJUSTING THEIR PRESENTATION AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. I SAID THAT THE POINTS MUST NOT BE REPEATED NOT BE SHARED WITH ANY OTHER PARTY. THEY HAD BEEN FURNISHED IN TOTAL CONFIDENCE BY US TO KING AND SAUD BECAUSE OF OUR LONG AND INTIMATE COOPERATION OVER LEBANON.

PAGE NO.

4. I TOOK OCCASION OF PRIVATE SECRETARY'S CALL TO ASK HIM TO ADVISE FAHD THAT I HAD SPOKEN ON PERSONAL BASIS IMMEDIATELY ON HEARING KING'S REACTION TO OUR VIEW OF THE PROPOSALS COMMUNICATED BY BANDAR. THIS TIME I WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS. WE WE SAUDI IDEAS AND CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION IN THE ONGOING PROCESS RE WEST BEIRUT. WE PUT THE HIGHEST VALUE ON SAUDI CREATIVITY AND IMAGINATION IN DEVELOPING AND ADVANCING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS TOWARDS AN EARLY SOLUTION IN WEST BEIRUT AND WE INTEND REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH. WE HAD CONVEYED TO BANDAR JUNE 29 OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN THAT IF THE PLO FEELS IT CAN PICK AND CHOOSE BETWEEN WHAT MIGHT APPEAR TO BE DIFFERING SAUDI AND AMERICAN PROPOSALS THIS COULD DELAY THE PLO'S TAKING THE NECESSARY TOUGH DECISION AND ENHANCE THE DANGER OF RENEWED CONFLICT.

8. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MURPHY
UNQUOTE STOESSEL

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82STATE 184637

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S E C R E T STATE 185208 TOSEC 100052

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FOLLOWING BEIRUT 4427 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TEL AVIV JERUSALEM
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QUOTE: S E C R E T BEIRUT 4427

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/3/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO,US,MOPS, PINT
SUBJECT:HABIB MISSION:SARKIS' REACTION TO OFFER OF
AMERICAN BATTALION

1M KS-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. I INFORMED PRESIDENT SARKIS THIS MORNING OF U.S.
READINESS TO PROVIDE A BATTALION FOR A FRANCO-AMERICAN OULIT-
NATIONAL FORCE (MNF) FOR 30 DAYS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT OF PLO COMBATANTS. I TOLD HIM THAT
EXPEDITION OF THIS FORCE WAS CONDITIONAL ON A FORMAL GOL

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PAGE 02 STATE 185208 TOSEC 100052

REQUEST AND THE CONSLUSION OF THE PACKAGE DEAL WITH THE
PALESTINIANAS. SARKIS AND INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDO HAD
MANY QUESTIONS BUT AT THE NO SARKIS SAID HE WOULD CONSULT
WITH THE GOL AND WITH A RE-INFORMED NATIKONAL SALVATION COUNCIL
TO GAIN THE WIDEST SUPPORT FOR THE PACKAGE DEAL WITH THE PLO.
HE SIAD FURTHER THATN WHEN A PACKAGE DEAL WAS DEFINITELY IN HAND,
HE WOULD CALL FOR THE ONF AND AN AMERICAN CONTINGENT TO
COME IN, GIVING US AT LEAST 48 HOURS TO GET IT IN PLACE.
END SUMMARY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

MR Cases Only:

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3. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT SARKIS AT 1120 THIS MORNING, SATURDAY, JULY 3, ACCOMPANIED BY DRAPER AND BARRETT. THE PRESIDENT WAS ATTENDED BY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDO AND AID KHALIL HADDAD

4. I MADE KNOWN TO THE PRESIDENT THAT I RESPONSE TO OUR TALK WITH PRIMO WAZZAN YESTERDAY, I HAD OBTAINED PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USG TO SUPPLY A U.S. ARMY BATTALION OF ABOUT 800 MEN, TO FORM HALF OF A MNF THE OTHER HALF TO CONSIST OF A FRENCH BATTALION. I SAID THAT THIS MNF AND THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT WOULD HAVE TO BE FORMALLY REQUESTED AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY THAT OTHER PARTIES ON THE GROUND ACQUIESCE. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE OTHER ELEMENTS IN LEBANON WERE NOT OPPOSED THAT WE WOULD TAKE CARE OF ISRAELI APPROVAL, AND THAT SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE COULD BE EXPECTED I TOLD SARKIS

THAT IN ADDITION TO MAKING A FORMAL REQUEST, HIS MILITARY FORCES WOULD HAVE TO START PLANNING.

5. THE DISCUSSION THEN DEALT WITH IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS OF OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE MNF. THE FIRST QUESTION ASKED WAS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE PALESTINIANS

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PAGE 03 STATE 185208 TOSEC 100052

REFUSED TO GO. I SAID THAT WE NEEDED A PACKAGE DEAL BEFORE COMING IN AND THAT IF THE PALESTINIANS RENEGGED AFTERWARD THE MNF WOULD LEAVE IN FIVE MINUTES LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN TO THE ISRAELIS. IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUESTIONS, I SAID THAT THE ENTRY OF THE MNF WOULD NOT AFFECT THE DISARMING OF AN IDF "READJUSTMENT." WE CONTINUED TO THINK IT WAS DESIRABLE TO GET THE ISRAELIS AWAY FROM BAABDA PALACE, OUT OF THE AIRPORT, AND FARTHER FROM SOUTH BEIRUT. -48 SAID HE PREFERRED NOT TO HAVE THE MNF UNDER GOL COMMAND AS HE HAD HAD AN UNFORTUNATE EXPERIENCE OF "GOL COMMAND" OF SYRIAN ADF. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD NEED CLOSE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT WITH THE GOL AND REPEATED THAT IF THE PALESTINIANS RENEGGED ON ANY PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL THE MNF WOULD BE ORDERED OUT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE MNF WOULD PRESUMABLY COME ON A SPECIFIED DATE WHICH WOULD BE THE BEGINNING DAY OF DEPARTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS OR SOON THEREAFTER, AND THAT THE MNF WOULD BE HERE TO HELP THE LAF IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION OF A PACKAGE DEAL. WE LEFT IT THAT THE MNF WOULD TAKE UP POSITIONS WHEN THE GOL ASKS THEM TO.

6 WE AGAIN DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT, WHICH WAS TOUCHED ON YESTERDAY, OF WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD TAKE OR LEAVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS BEHIND. SARKIS AND ABDO ARGUED STRENUOUSLY THAT THE PLO TAKE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM. I SAID I WOULD LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITY, BUT THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND UPON WHERE THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS WERE GOING, WHICH WAS THE MAIN PROBLEM LEFT UNDECIDED.

I MENTIONED THAT WE WERE APPROACHING THE EGYPTIANS I
THIS REGARD. JOHNNY ABDO RAISED ANEW SUBJECT SAYING HAT
IF THE DEPARTING PLO FIGHTERS WERE "FUXED" WITHE PLA,
WHICH IS PART OF THE ADF, I WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REQUEST
THE PLO TO LEAVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS IF THE PLA ND ADF
WERE TAKING THIGBTWITH YHR WITH THEM.

I EMPHASIZED THAT I
DID NOT CARE ABOUT SIGNATURES SO MUCH BUT THAT WE NEEDED
TO NAIL THINGS DOWN FAST AND GET DATES FOR THE BEGINNING
OF THE DEPARTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARRIVAL OF
THE MNF. I REPEATED THAT WE WOULD LOOK INTO THE QUESTION
OF HEAVY WEAPONS.

9. SARKIS SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS SURE THAT HE HAD PACKAGE
THAT THE PLO WULD EXECUTE, HE WOULD ASK FOR THE MNF, GIVING
US AT LEAST 48 HOURS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE
TO CONSULT THE NATIONAL SALVATION COUNCIL AD GET ITSAP-

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PAGE 05 STATE 185208 T0SEC 100C52

PROVAL. HE THOUGHT THE CHRISTIAN WOULD BE AGAINST THE
PACKAGE DEAL BECAUSE OF THE SYMBOLIC PLO PRESENCE. AND EVEN
FONMIN BOUTROS MIGHT OPPOSE IT. HE SAID THAT HE, SARKIS,
REFUSED TO SPEAK FOR THE CHRISTIANS ON THIS ISSUE AND

WOULD NEED THEIR SECIFIC APPROVAL.HE ADDED THAT HABIB
COULD HELP OBTAIN APPROVAL OF THE CHRISTANS, I.E. BASHIR
GEMAYEL

10. I STESSED AGAIN THAT I WAS INA HURRY TOSOLVE THE
IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS FACING US. I DID NOT WANT ANY NEW
CONDITIONS REESTED OF I WANTEND TO KNOW WHEN
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT COULD START.

1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE SEEM TO BE MAKING PROGRESS,
I WANT TO CAUTION EVERONE NOT TO ASSURE THAT THE JOB IS
ALOMOST DONE. I AM HOPEFUL AND BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSILE
TO NAIL TOGETHER A PACKAGE DEAL WITIN A FEW DAYS BUT IT
WILL REQUIRE FURTHER GOOD LUCK,HARD WORK, AND PERSUASION
HERE, ALONG WITH THE SAME COMBINATION IN OTHER CAPITALS.

12. RECOMMAND THAT DEPT REPEAT TO JIDDA, RIYADH CAIRO,N
AMMAN DAMASCUS, PARIS AND WHITEHOUSE.
DILBON UNQUOTE STOESSEL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MR Cases Only:
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S E C R E T STATE 185520

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/3/02(EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE)
TAGS: MILI, MARR, MOPS, LE, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: RELOCATION OF PLO

REF: DRAPER/VELIOTES TELECON 7/,/82

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

THE ARAB STATES' RELUCTANCE
TO RECEIVE THE PLO MAY BRING ON THE DISASTER WE ARE TRYING
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PAGE 02 STATE 185520

TO AVOID. WE ARE AT THE MOMENT WHEN WE SHOULD PUT IT TO THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS IN THESE TERMS, AND WE SEEK YOUR VIEWS. ON WITH WHOM AND HOW BEST TO DO IT.

1 PFLP IS MAKING PLANS TO GO INITIALLY OK AT LEAST FIND ITS WAY LATER TO SOUTH YEMEN. IS IT POSSIBLE OTHER GROUPS ARE MAKING SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS? IF SO, COULD GOL EXPLORE THIS WITH PLO. PERHAPS DESTINATION PROBLEM IS NOT OF AS BROAD A SCOPE AS WE NOW ASSUME.

PAGE NO. 1

3. OUR THINKING AT THE MOMENT IS THAT IT WOULD BE FASTER, SAFER AND EASIER IF ALL PLO LEADERSHIP AND CADRE WENT TO SAME INITIAL DESTINATION AND FROM THERE INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS COULD MAKE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES WILLING TO RECEIVE THEM.

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PAGE 03 STATE 185520

4. WITH SUCH A TWO STAGE MOVE, COULD WE LEAVE FAMILIES IN LEBANON UNTIL FINAL DESTINATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS ARE KNOWN? KEY OF COURSE IS THEIR SAFETY FROM CHRISTIAN MILITIAS AND OTHER ANTI-PALESTINIAN LEBANESE. PERHAPS A TIME LIMIT OF A FEW MONTHS AT MOST WOULD REASSURE LEBANESE THAT THESE PEOPLE WOULD INDEED LEAVE.

5. WE NOTE ABDO'S COMMENT IN PARA. 6 OF BEIRUT 4427 IN WHICH HE SUGGESTS MELDING PLO INTO PLA UNITS. PRESUMABLY HE MEANS THAT PLO UNITS WOULD FORM PART OF PLA AND ADF UNITS AND MARCH OUT OF LEBANON WITH THEM, PRESUMABLY TO SYRIA AT LEAST AT FIRST. IS THIS FEASIBLE IN YOUR JUDGMENT?

6. NEED YOUR VIEWS ON FOREGOING ASAP, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER IDEAS YOU MAY HAVE. STOESEL

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4448

EXDIS **DEC** 11/27/95

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/4/88 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: XF, LE, IS, PLOOILI, PINT
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: ARAFAT COMMITMENT TO WAZZAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. JULY 4, THE ARABIC TEXT OF THE PLO COMMITMENT TO LEAVE LEBANON, WHICH TAKES THE FORM OF A BRIEF LETTER FROM ARAFAT TO WAZZAN. FOLLOWING IS A ROUGH EMBASSY TRANSLATION:
BEGIN TEXT: BEIRUT, 7/3/82. WITH REFERENCE TO THE SESSION WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE DELEGATION, UNDER YOUR CHAIRMANSHIP, AND THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IN BEIRUT ON JULY 1, 1982, I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING DECISION: THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04448 041848Z

LEADERS OF THE PLO DO NOT WISH TO REMAIN IN LEBANON. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IN SPITE OF THE DESIRE OF THE LEADERS TO LEAVE LEBANON, THEY CANNOT DEPART UNTIL AFTER THE PERIOD NECESSARY FOR THE APPLICATION AND EXECUTION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED UPON. THIS DECISION, WHICH STEMS FROM OUR DESIRE TO PREVENT BLOODSHED OF THE INNOCENT CITIZENS IN BEIRUT, COMES WITH A REMINDER TO YOUR EXCELLENCY OF OUR INSISTENCE IN OBTAINING GUARANTEES FOR THE PROTECTION OF OUR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *0111* IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 11/27/95

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUT004448

514

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THEIR CAMPS DURING AND AFTER
THE DISENGAGEMENT OPERATION. IN ADDITION TO WHAT WE
RECEIVED FROM YOUR EXCELLENCY CONCERNING GUARANTEES,
WE REQUEST THAT AN INTERNATIONAL-ARAB OR INTERNATIONAL
FORCE PARTICIPATE IN THESE GUARANTEES WITH THE
LEBANESE ARMY.

WITH WARMEST GREETINGS AND REVOLUTION UNTIL VICTORY.
YASIR ARAFAT, CHAIRMAN OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.
END TEXT

DILLON

NOTE BY OCT: NSCE ADDED PER MR. CAGLIONI,S/S-O.
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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04448 041848Z

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUTO04448

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CONFIDENTIAL

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for 12/8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *Cum* IS/FPO/CDR *11/27/95* **SECRET** *EI*
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY MR CDR ONLY
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FOIA Exemptions ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C OADR
PA Exemptions ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C OADR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William P. Clark
From : The Acting Secretary
Subject : Lebanon Withdrawal Plan

Despite our efforts over the past ten weeks, we have been unable to initiate direct Israel-Lebanon talks concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Lebanon has initiated talks with Syria and the PLO but those talks have not made progress in the absence of Israel-Lebanon talks.

In order to overcome this impasse, we have concluded that we should force the pace by drawing up a comprehensive plan for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and seeking its prompt acceptance by all the involved players. This is the same strategy we used -- successfully -- to obtain the evacuation of forces from Beirut.

If you approve, Ambassadors Habib and Draper would return to the Middle East next week in order to present the plan to Lebanon and Israel. Habib and Draper would then begin an intensive shuttle effort to achieve Israeli and Lebanese acceptance of the plan; meanwhile, the Lebanese, with U.S. and Saudi support, would be working on the PLO and Syria.

The attached draft comprehensive plan has the following elements:

-- A schedule for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The PLO would begin the withdrawal. Israeli and Syrian withdrawals will be parallel, but not linked. The withdrawal would take about thirty days.

-- Security arrangements between Israel and Lebanon. We have incorporated as much of the Israeli suggestions as we believe the Lebanese can accept, including a security zone in the southern 40 kilometers of Lebanon; confirmation of a termination of belligerency between Israel and Lebanon; some elements of normalization; and a framework for the progressive development of relations.

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DECL: OADR

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- 2 -

-- Retention of UNIFIL in part of southern Lebanon to assist the Government of Lebanon in preventing the reinfiltration of the PLO and others potentially hostile forces.

-- A Multinational Force of approximately double its present number comprised of U.S., French, Italian and, hopefully, Belgium personnel to occupy key strategic terrain in Lebanon and to assist the GOL in the assertion of its authority. (The exact nature of the U.S. role will be defined through a U.S.-Lebanon agreement).

Habib and Draper should be able to ascertain within a very few days whether the plan has any chance of being accepted by the parties involved, and primarily Israel. Ambassador Lewis feels this approach could have a chance with Israel. We expect no problem with Lebanon. Nevertheless, we need to prepare for the eventuality that the plan will be accepted in principle by all of the parties, except Israel, in which case U.S. credibility will again be at stake at about the time King Hussein is arriving in Washington.

Therefore, the President could consider whether he should exercise his statutory authority to restrict -- in a carefully applied way -- the supply and financing of certain military equipment and services to Israel as long as Israel remains in military occupation or continues to insist on getting more than our "plan" foresees. Such steps could be taken strictly on policy grounds or on the ground that Israel need not remain in military occupation for reasons of "self-defense," which is the basis for U.S.-Israeli agreements on military assistance.

To make such steps domestically supportable, however, it will be essential that Lebanon (and, indirectly, the U.S. as well) be seen as making major efforts with the PLO and Syria to get their forces out.

Attachment:

Lebanon Withdrawal Plan

DL	OF STATE	DATE	11/21/75
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR. C. J. GARY	
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EIA

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Departure Plan and Security Arrangements

1. Basic Concept. All unauthorized external forces will withdraw from Lebanon in accordance with the attached schedule of departure. This is consistent with the objective of the Government of Lebanon that all external military forces withdraw from Lebanon.

2. Cease-fire. A cease-fire in place will be scrupulously observed by all in Lebanon prior to and during the withdrawal of forces.

3. Liaison and Coordination. The Lebanese Armed Forces will be the primary point of contact for all external forces and will provide necessary information concerning the withdrawal. The Lebanese Armed Forces will keep all concerned currently informed regarding the implementation of the plan, including any revisions to the departure schedule as may be necessary because of logistical requirements.

4. Security Arrangements for Lebanon and Israel. A state of war does not exist between Lebanon and Israel. Belligerency has been terminated, and a state of non-belligerency exists. To preclude any hostile acts between them, Israel and Lebanon shall implement the following security arrangements.

a. General Security Commitments. Israel and Lebanon agree to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other, whether by land, sea or air, including by non-regular forces.

Israel and Lebanon agree that no hostile act shall be conducted from the territory of one against the other. Each shall prohibit the unauthorized entry from its territory into the territory of the other of armed individuals or military equipment. Neither will assist, or acquiesce in, any armed activities within its territory directed against the other.

Neither will permit the stationing of foreign forces on its territory which are hostile to the other. In the event that there is a disagreement between Israel and Lebanon as to whether a particular force is "hostile", the judgement of the United States shall be accepted by Israel and Lebanon.

Israel and Lebanon shall refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the other. Taking into account the free press in both countries, each government will refrain from officially-inspired hostile propaganda against the other.

Israeli naval patrols shall be conducted outside the territorial waters of Lebanon, and shall not interfere with freedom of navigation. High altitude reconnaise flights over Lebanon shall not be considered by Lebanon to constitute a material breach of this plan.

b. Security Zone. A security zone shall be created in the area indicated in the attached map (approximately a 40 km. line from the Israeli border). No rockets or surface-to-air or surface-to-surface missiles shall be permitted in this zone, and no new fortifications shall be established in it. No artillery or heavy mortars other than those in the possession

of the Lebanese Army, the MNF or UNIFIL, shall be permitted in the zone.

The Government of Lebanon shall exercise its sovereignty fully throughout the security zone. Local militia currently operating in the zone shall be incorporated in authorized official Lebanese organizations, or disbanded. It is understood that the forces currently under the command of Major Haddad will be given the opportunity to be re-integrated in the LAF, or to join an about-to-be-created Border Police force.

c. Movement of People and Goods. People and goods shall move across the Israel/Lebanon border in accordance with the national legislation of each country. Practical measures in this regard will be the subject of continuing consultations.

d. Framework of Future Relations. Security is best promoted through normal relations. This agreement constitutes a step toward that goal. Appropriate representatives of Israel and Lebanon shall meet at least once a month following Israeli withdrawal to discuss and carry out ways to facilitate the achievement of normal, peaceful relations. Offices with staffs not to exceed _____ people in number will be established in Lebanon and Israel to support such meetings and consultations, whose members will enjoy necessary immunities from local law.

e. Verification of the Security Zone. The Government of Lebanon shall be responsible for the implementation of arrangements in the security zone. The following arrangements will assist in this regard:

(i) It is understood that UNTSO will continue its responsibilities within its current area of operations.

(ii) The Government of Lebanon will request the United Nations Security Council to authorize UNIFIL to assist the LAF in preventing the infiltration of unauthorized armed elements, concentrating primarily in the northernmost ten kilometers of the security zone, but not to exclude their deployment throughout the zone.

(iii) In addition to the offices described above, Israeli and Lebanese military liaison offices will be established, in order to coordinate matters related to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and to the implementation of the security arrangements. The Lebanese office shall be established at (in Lebanon); the Israeli office shall be established at (in Israel). There shall be direct telephonic links between the offices. Meetings of the liaison offices shall be held at least once a month, or at the request of either party, and shall alternate between the liaison offices. The first meeting shall be held at on .

[If needed: (iv) The Government of Lebanon shall request the United States to conduct regular, periodic aerial surveillance to verify compliance with the security arrangements and to provide its findings to the military liaison offices.]

(v) Violations shall be rectified immediately.

5: Arrangements between the PLO and Lebanon. Law-abiding Palestinian combatants in Lebanon, including the families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. This supercedes the understandings in the Cairo and Melkart Accords which granted certain extra-territorial rights to the PLO. The Government of Lebanon will ensure the physical safety of Palestinians in Lebanon. (Optional: The Government of Lebanon will request that the MNF and UNIFIL by their presence continue to assist the LAF in providing for the security of Palestinian population concentrations.)

6. Arrangements between Lebanon and Syria. The arrangements concerning the withdrawal of Syrian forces have been made at the request of the Government of Lebanon and in light of the arrangements concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

7. MNF. A temporary Multinational Force will assist the Government of Lebanon in the restoration of its sovereignty and authority by serving as an interposition force on key terrain and on certain communication routes during the disengagement of foreign forces and thereafter by undertaking other duties as agreed between the GOL and the contributors to the MNF.

8 U.S. Role. The United States will promote the fulfillment of the undertakings included in this plan. In the event of a violation, the United States will consult with the parties concerned, as appropriate, with respect thereto, and will take such action as it may deem helpful and appropriate to obtain compliance with the agreement.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *CNN* IS, FPO, CDR Date *11/28/95* *EIB*
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Annex to the Plan for Departure
of All Foreign Forces from Lebanon

Schedule for Disengagement and Departure of All Foreign Forces

D-20

Discussion begins between GOL and local militia in southern Lebanon regarding their integration into LAF and or disbanding. Identify MNF units to be deployed to Lebanon.

D-5

POWs, soldiers missing in action and the bodies of fallen soldiers will be exchanged through the ICRC prior to implementation of the plan. Custody of prisoners in Lebanon not having a place to return will be turned over to the government (GOL) under the supervision of the ICRC.

D-4

Expanded MNF elements begin assembly in Beirut in preparation for movement to take positions on Beirut-Damascus highway.

LAF prepares for movement into Tripoli area, along Beirut-Damascus highway, and into southern Lebanon.

D-3

LAF and MNF liaison team moves to Sofar.

LAF begins deployment to north and links up with existing garrisons.

D-2

LAF with MNF contingent begins deployment into southern Lebanon; existing garrisons there and in southern Bekaa establish presence on roads.

Integration of local militias in southern Lebanon proceeds.

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-2-

D-1

LAF with MNF support assumes security for Palestinian refugee camp areas in northern Lebanon.

LAF with MNF support unit deploys to assume security for Palestinian refugee camps in Bekaa Valley.

All Palestinian forces in Lebanon assemble in designated areas for departure by prearranged routes.

Other foreign forces (not party to any arrangements) depart Lebanon.

D-Day

Palestinian forces in the north begin departure by prearranged routes, with LAF and ISF taking over positions vacated by Palestinian forces.

Palestinian forces and all equipment begin departure from Bekaa Valley, with LAF and ISF taking over positions vacated by Palestinian forces.

D+1 to D+3

(Syrian forces disengage from the Sofar area, through the Baydar Pass, and off of the Sannin ridgeline to an area east of Shtawrah. All Syrian forces in the southern Bekaa Valley move to a line immediately south of the Beirut-Damascus highway).*

(Israeli forces disengage from the Beirut-Damascus highway to a line south of the Zahrani River running south of Jazzin to Rashayya in the southern Bekaa Valley. Israel will retain control of the coastal highway to a point immediately south of Sidon.)**

Palestinian forces in northern Lebanon and in Bekaa Valley complete their departure.

*References to Syrian withdrawal will not necessarily appear in Israeli document.

**References to Israeli withdrawal will not necessarily appear in Syrian document.

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-3-

LAF and MNF begin deployment into disengagement zone.

LAF unit deploys to provide security for refugee camps in Sidon area.

D+4

LAF and MNF complete deployment into disengagement zone.

LAF and international force units deploy to the Sidon area to provide security for Palestinian refugee camps.

D+5 to D+25

All foreign forces depart Lebanon with their equipment.

UNIFIL assembles and redeploys to predetermined areas.

D+25 to D+29

Final departure of all foreign forces proceeds.

MNF prepares to deploy from disengagement zone to central Bekaa Valley and to eastern border.

LAF prepares to deploy throughout southern Lebanon and takes over control of all Palestinian camps in the south.

One MNF unit deploys to northern Lebanon in the Tripoli area to supplement LAF security for the Palestinian refugee camps.

D+30

No foreign forces remain in Lebanon.

MNF fully deploys along Beirut-Damascus highway and in central Bekaa.

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11/27/95
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FOIA Exemptions: []
PA Exemptions: []
TS authority to: WASHINGTON
CLASSIFY as [] S or [] C OADR
DOWNGRADE TS to [] S or [] C OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From : The Acting Secretary
Subject : Withdrawal of External Forces from Lebanon

Despite our efforts over the past ten weeks, we have been unable to initiate direct Israel-Lebanon talks concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Lebanon has initiated talks with Syria and the PLO but those talks have not made progress in the absence of Israel-Lebanon talks.

In order to overcome this impasse, we have concluded that we should force the pace for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and seek prompt acceptance of our approach by all the involved players. This is the same strategy we used -- successfully -- to obtain the evacuation of forces from Beirut.

If you approve, Ambassadors Habib and Draper would return to the Middle East next week in order to present our ideas on withdrawal to Lebanon and Israel. Habib and Draper would then begin an intensive shuttle effort to achieve Israeli and Lebanese acceptance of our approach; meanwhile, the Lebanese, with U.S. and Saudi support, would be working on the PLO and Syria.

The attachments have the following elements:

-- A schedule for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The PLO would begin the withdrawal. Israeli and Syrian withdrawals will be parallel, but not linked. The withdrawal would take about thirty days.

-- Security arrangements between Israel and Lebanon. We have incorporated as much of previous Israeli suggestions as we believe the Lebanese can accept, including a security zone in the southern 40 kilometers of Lebanon; confirmation of a termination of belligerency between Israel and Lebanon; some elements of normalization; and a framework for the progressive development of relations.

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DECL: OADR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PA Exemptions

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TS authority to: WASHINGTON

() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR

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From : The Acting Secretary

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DECL: OADR

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-- Retention of UNIFIL in part of southern Lebanon to assist the Government of Lebanon in preventing the reinfiltration of the PLO and other potentially hostile forces.

-- A Multinational Force of approximately double its present number comprised of U.S., French, Italian and, hopefully, Belgian personnel to occupy key strategic terrain in Lebanon and to assist the GOL in the assertion of its authority. (The exact nature of the U.S. role will be defined through a U.S.-Lebanon agreement.)

Habib and Draper should be able to ascertain within a very few days whether this concept has any chance of being accepted by the parties involved, and primarily Israel. Ambassador Lewis feels this approach could have a chance with Israel. We expect no problem with Lebanon. Nevertheless, we need to prepare for the eventuality that the proposals will be accepted in principle by all of the parties, except Israel, in which case U.S. credibility will again be at stake at about the time King Hussein is arriving in Washington.

Therefore, you could consider whether you should exercise your statutory authority to restrict -- in a carefully applied way -- the supply and financing of certain military equipment and services to Israel as long as Israel remains in military occupation or continues to insist on getting more than our approach foresees. Such steps could be taken strictly on policy grounds or on the ground that Israel need not remain in military occupation for reasons of "self-defense," which is the basis for U.S.-Israeli agreements on military assistance.

To make such steps domestically supportable, however, it will be essential that Lebanon (and, indirectly, the U.S. as well) be seen as making major efforts with the PLO and Syria to get their forces out.

Attachment:

Draft Approach to Lebanon Withdrawal.

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1. Basic Concept. All unauthorized external forces will withdraw from Lebanon in accordance with the attached schedule of departure. This is consistent with the objective of the Government of Lebanon that all external military forces withdraw from Lebanon.

2. Cease-fire. A cease-fire in place will be scrupulously observed by all in Lebanon prior to and during the withdrawal of forces.

3. Liaison and Coordination. The Lebanese Armed Forces will be the primary point of contact for all external forces and will provide necessary information concerning the withdrawal. The Lebanese Armed Forces will keep all concerned currently informed regarding the implementation of the plan, including any revisions to the departure schedule as may be necessary because of logistical requirements.

4. Security Arrangements for Lebanon and Israel. A state of war does not exist between Lebanon and Israel. Belligerency has been terminated, and a state of non-belligerency exists. To preclude any hostile acts between them, Israel and Lebanon shall implement the following security arrangements.

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a. General Security Commitments. Israel and Lebanon agree to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other, whether by land, sea or air, including by non-regular forces.

Israel and Lebanon agree that no hostile act shall be conducted from the territory of one against the other. Each shall prohibit the unauthorized entry from its territory into the territory of the other of armed individuals or military equipment. Neither will assist, or acquiesce in, any armed activities within its territory directed against the other.

Neither will permit the stationing of foreign forces on its territory which are hostile to the other. In the event that there is a disagreement between Israel and Lebanon as to whether a particular force is "hostile", the judgement of the United States shall be accepted by Israel and Lebanon.

Israel and Lebanon shall refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the other. Taking into account the free press in both countries, each government will refrain from officially-inspired hostile propaganda against the other.

Israeli naval patrols shall be conducted outside the territorial waters of Lebanon, and shall not interfere with freedom of navigation. High altitude reconnaissance flights over Lebanon shall not be considered by Lebanon to constitute a material breach of this plan.

b. Security Zone. A security zone shall be created in the area indicated in the attached map [approximately a 40 km. line from the Israeli border]. No rockets or surface-to-air or surface-to-surface missiles shall be permitted in this zone, and no new fortifications shall be established in it. No artillery or heavy mortars other than those in the possession of the Lebanese Army, the MNF or UNIFIL, shall be permitted in the zone.

The Government of Lebanon shall exercise its sovereignty fully throughout the security zone. Local militia currently operating in the zone shall be incorporated into authorized official Lebanese organizations, or disbanded. It is understood that the forces currently under the command of Major Haddad will be given the opportunity to be re-integrated in the LAF, or to join an about-to-be-created Border Police force.

c. Movement of People and Goods. People and goods shall move across the Israel/Lebanon border in accordance with the national legislation of each country.. Practical measures in this regard will be the subject of continuing consultations.

d. Framework of Future Relations. Security is best promoted through normal relations. This agreement constitutes a step toward that goal. Appropriate representatives of Israel and Lebanon shall meet at least once a month following Israeli withdrawal to discuss and carry out ways to facilitate the achievement of normal, peaceful relations. Offices with staffs not to exceed people in number will be established in Lebanon and Israel to support such meetings and consultations, whose members will enjoy necessary immunities from local law.

e. Verification of the Security Zone. The Government of Lebanon shall be responsible for the implementation of arrangements in the security zone. The following arrangements will assist in this regard:

[i] It is understood that UNTSO will continue its responsibilities within its current area of operations.

[ii] The Government of Lebanon will request the United Nations Security Council to authorize UNIFIL to assist the LAF in preventing the infiltration of unauthorized armed elements, concentrating primarily in the northernmost ten kilometers of the security zone, but not to exclude their deployment throughout the zone.

[iii] In addition to the offices described above, Israeli and Lebanese military liaison offices will be established, in order to coordinate matters related to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and to the implementation of the security arrangements. The Lebanese office shall be established at [in Lebanon]; the Israeli office shall be established at [in Israel]. There shall be direct telephonic links between the offices. Meetings of the liaison offices shall be held at least once a month, or at the request of either party, and shall alternate between the liaison offices. The first meeting shall be held at on .

[If needed: [iv] The Government of Lebanon shall request the United States to conduct regular, periodic aerial surveillance at least once a week to verify compliance with the security arrangements and to provide its findings to the military liaison offices.]

[v] Violations shall be rectified immediately.

5. Arrangements between the PLO and Lebanon. Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants in Lebanon, including the families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. This supercedes the understandings in the Cairo and Melkart Accords which granted certain extra-territorial

rights to the PLO. The Government of Lebanon will ensure the physical safety of Palestinians in Lebanon. [Optional: The Government of Lebanon will request that the MNF and UNIFIL by their presence continue to assist the LAF in providing for the security of Palestinian population concentrations.]

6. Arrangements between Lebanon and Syria. The arrangements concerning the withdrawal of Syrian forces have been made at the request of the Government of Lebanon and in light of the arrangements concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

7. MNF. A temporary Multinational Force will assist the Government of Lebanon in the restoration of its sovereignty and authority by serving as an interposition force on key terrain and on certain communication routes during the disengagement of foreign forces and thereafter by undertaking other duties as agreed between the GOL and the contributors to the MNF.

8. U.S. Role. The United States will promote the fulfillment of the undertakings included in this plan. In the event of a violation, the United States will consult with the parties concerned, as appropriate, with respect thereto, and will take such action as it may deem helpful and appropriate to obtain compliance with this plan.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *mm* IS, FPC, CDR Date. *11/27/91* *E2B*
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY ☐ MR CASE ONLY
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FOIA Exemptions Schedule for Departure () S or () C OADR
PA Exemptions of All External forces from Lebanon () S or () C OADR

D-20

Discussion begins between GOL and local militia in southern Lebanon regarding their integration into LAF and/or disbanding. Identify MNF units to be deployed to Lebanon.

D-5

POWs, soldiers missing-in-action and the bodies of fallen soldiers will be exchanged through the ICRC prior to implementation of the plan. Custody of prisoners in Lebanon not having a place to return will be turned over to the government (GOL) under the auspices of the ICRC.

D-4

Expanded MNF elements begin assembly in Beirut in preparation for movement to take positions on Beirut-Damascus highway.

LAF prepares for movement into Tripoli area, along Beirut-Damascus highway, and into southern Lebanon.

D-3

LAF and MNF liaison team moves to Sofar.

D-2

Integration of local militias in southern Lebanon into LAF proceeds.

D-1

All Palestinian forces in Lebanon assemble in designated areas for departure by prearranged routes.

Other external forces (not party to any arrangements) depart Lebanon.

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-2-

D-Day

Palestinian forces in the north begin departure by prearranged routes, with LAF already in the area taking over positions vacated by Palestinian forces.

Palestinian forces and all equipment begin departure from Bekaa Valley, with LAF already in the area taking over positions vacated by Palestinian force .

D+1 to D+3

Syrian forces disengage from the Sofar area, through the Baydar Pass, and off of the Sannin ridgeline to an area east of Shtawrah. All Syrian forces in the southern Bekaa Valley move to a line immediately south of the Beirut-Damascus highway.*

Israeli forces disengage from the Beirut-Damascus highway to a line south of the Zahrani River running south of Jazzin to Rashayya in the southern Bekaa Valley. Israel will retain control of the coastal highway to a point immediately south of Sidon.**

Palestinian forces in northern Lebanon and in Bekaa Valley complete their departure.

LAF and MNF begin deployment into disengagement zone.

LAF unit deploys to provide security for refugee camps in Sidon area.

D+4

LAF and MNF complete deployment into disengagement zone.

LAF and international force units deploy to the Sidon area to provide security for Palestinian refugee camps.

* References to Syrian withdrawal will not necessarily appear in Israeli document.

** References to Israeli withdrawal will not necessarily appear in Syrian document.

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D+5 to D+25

All external forces depart Lebanon with their equipment.

UNIFIL assembles and deploys to predetermined areas.

LAF with MNF contingent begins deployment to north and links up with existing garrisons.

LAF begins deployment into southern Lebanon; existing garrisons there and in southern Bekaa establish presence on roads.

LAF with MNF support assumes security for Palestinian refugee camp areas in northern Lebanon.

LAF with MNF support unit deploys to assume security for Palestinian refugee camps in Bekaa Valley.

D+25 to D+29

Final departure of all external forces proceeds.

MNF prepares to deploy from disengagement zone to central Bekaa Valley and to eastern border.

LAF prepares to deploy throughout southern Lebanon and takes over control of all Palestinian camps in the south.

One MNF unit deploys to northern Lebanon in the Tripoli area to supplement LAF security for the Palestinian refugee camps.

D+30

No external forces remain in Lebanon.

MNF fully deploys along Beirut-Damascus highway and in central Bekaa.

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1. Cease-fire in place.
2. All PLO leaders to leave Lebanon under assurances of safe passage.
3. All PLO fighters in Beirut are to leave Lebanon under assurances of safe passage without heavy weapons (individual weapons will be permitted).
4. There will be no redeployment of any armed PLO fighters from Beirut to other locations in Lebanon.
5. A PLO political presence in Lebanon is acceptable, but preferably not in Beirut.
6. A readjustment of IDF lines will take place after an agreement is reached and as implementation is well under way.
7. The IAF will take control of all Beirut.
8. Other armed elements in West Beirut will turn over their arms to the IAF. The Syrian ADF force and associated units will return to Syria.
9. Related to the above, but not linked to the West Beirut issue, it is a matter of policy that in the final arrangements there will be no foreign military presence in Lebanon: PLO, Syrian, or Israeli.

R (E13)

**CONTINGENT PRESS GUIDANCE FOR U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO MIDDLE EAST
PEACEKEEPING FORCE.**

Press stories report that the U.S. has agreed to send forces to Lebanon. Is that true?

answer: In response to a ^{proposal} request from the government of Lebanon, the President has expressed U.S. willingness in principle to contribute to a multi-national force, if needed for temporary peacekeeping arrangements in Beirut. Such a force would not be part of the previously discussed force which might be deployed in southern Lebanon.

How many U.S. forces will go and when?

answer: Again, at this point the decision expresses no more than an agreement in principle. ~~(No formal request has been received. In and when a request is received)~~ the U.S. contribution would be influenced by those of others and the total overall requirement. A large force is not anticipated.

How large?

answer: This will be determined by the government of Lebanon. We understand the total requirement from all sources is not expected to exceed 1,500-2,000.

How can you assure against terrorist or other attacks against U.S. servicemen?

answer: Again such questions are premature. In the event U.S. forces were ultimately offered, their precise role and appropriate safeguards would be negotiated and these matters carefully attended.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Kenneth Dam, Acting

Subject: Lebanon Negotiations: Next Steps

Where We Stand:

Gaps between Lebanese and Israeli positions remain wide. Indeed, Israeli demands have escalated steadily over the months as their positions have been put forward in greater detail. This could be because Israel now sees delay in Lebanon as a way to avoid the broader peace process and, ultimately, to make your initiative irrelevant. Sharon has said publicly that he sees the Lebanon negotiations as a "test" of Israel's ability to resist U.S. pressure on West Bank issues. Almost all the evidence continues to point to Sharon's desire for a lengthy negotiation and substantive positions which Lebanon could not accept and maintain its internal consensus and its place in the Arab world.

Nevertheless, we have had small hints that Begin, and other members of his Cabinet, might now be more amenable to the approach we suggested during Phil's last trip. We believe we must exploit any possibility for helpful changes in Israeli and, for that matter, in Lebanese positions. We want to be able to show that we and the Lebanese have gone more than halfway with Israel in the event agreement ultimately is not possible.

How to Proceed - The Next Round:

We have had a thorough review with Phil of our positions and approach. We continue to believe that our basic draft offers the best vehicle for a serious discussion with the Israelis, and that Phil should go out and give Israel a chance to reconsider its earlier rejection of this approach. The Israelis have now had two weeks to hear directly from Lebanon that Sharon was wrong in his earlier assertion that Lebanon would agree to Israeli positions. Phil's scenario would go as follows:

-- Meet with Begin next Wednesday to determine if he is now willing to do it our way.

-- Make the point that the gap is wide and even widening further.

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-- Stress that if Begin is now willing to engage with us we will update our draft and engage with him to achieve maximum realistic normalization and security content.

-- If Begin agrees, Phil would remain to seek agreement with the Israelis in about a week's time, and then get Gemayel, and his Muslim colleagues, on board.

-- If Begin is not cooperative, Phil would seek with Gemayel an agreed draft which Lebanon would then table and we would support. Phil would press Gemayel to make his best offer on both normalization and security.

-- In either case, Phil would go to Syria and Saudi Arabia to assure support for whatever Gemayel is about to accept.

Key Issues:

The key issues are: a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces, security arrangements, and normalization arrangements. The key element in withdrawal is to get as firm assurances as possible of Syrian and PLO willingness to withdraw. These will come primarily through Lebanon and, at the right moment, Lebanon must make clear publicly that they have such assurances. This week Arafat gave Gemayel's envoy quite explicit assurances in this regard.

On security arrangements, we will make sure our draft goes as far as possible to meet Israel's security concerns. In this regard, while we still prefer a role for UNIFIL in the south, Israel strongly objects, and as fallback, we should consider offering an MNF with U.S. participation. This would entail a difficult time in Congress and we would need to consult with key leadership before tabling an offer.

There has been signs of give on both sides on normalization and Phil will press Lebanon for the maximum. But, we must realize Israel cannot get all that it wants. Lebanon cannot maintain internal consensus and its place in Arab world, on which its economy depends, if it goes too far on normalization. Israel will have to settle for some steps now, as much as we can get without endangering Gemayel's government, and Lebanese and our assurances of an ongoing mechanism for efforts on normalization after withdrawal.

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During Phil's Mission

Hopefully, Israel will now agree to work with us on what we continue to hope are common goals. However, while Phil is in the field, we will want to begin to consider among ourselves what steps we might take if this is not the case. We will analyze the options in Lebanon itself as well as the relationships between Lebanon and the peace process -- domestically as well as diplomatically -- to assure that we are in the best possible position to achieve your goals in the Middle East.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Kenneth Dam, Acting

Subject: Lebanon Negotiations: Next Steps

Attached is a one-page summary of the issues we face, a suggested scenario for handling them and our judgment of the diplomatic and political implications involved. Phil and I will be prepared to discuss with you on Friday the line of reasoning behind our judgments but, briefly, it is as follows.

Where We Stand

The Israelis would clearly be comfortable with a negotiation lasting a number of months. They seek a peace treaty in everything but name, with a residual Israel military presence on the ground in south Lebanon exerting control over the area for years into the future. Their demands are unattainable and, if pressed over time, would provide the excuse for Syria and PLO not to leave, destroy Lebanon's internal consensus and its place in the Arab world, on which it depends for economic survival, and lead to defacto partition.

The issues go beyond Lebanon and include, particularly, your September 1 initiative. Protracted negotiations over Lebanon make it easier for Israel to avoid the West Bank issues and harder for us to press them. A continued impasse would have a severe negative impact on our ability to move your peace initiative in any meaningful way. Sharon has now publicly described Lebanon as "a test case" for Israel's ability to resist American persuasion on the West Bank issue.

With Phil, we have conducted a thorough review of our current policy and reconfirmed its validity. Only talks based on a U.S. draft are likely to produce results quickly enough to serve our broader policy objectives. Meanwhile, Ambassador Draper has been meeting with the Israeli and Lebanon teams in direct talks, which have allowed firm Lebanese positions to be tabled and, thereby, clearly identified the differences between the parties. We remain confident that neither the Syrians nor the PLO

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will stand in the way of an agreement removing all Israeli forces from Lebanon; conversely, the Syrians have made clear their refusal to withdraw should Israel insist on any residual presence.

How to Proceed

Continued Israeli insistence on its present course will force a confrontation, the outcome of which will impact on your Middle East peace and security policies throughout the wider southwest Asia region in the years just ahead. However, before moving to that stage, if we must, it should be clearer than it now is that Israel -- and Israel alone -- is standing in the way of a rapid resolution. We propose a tactical approach which will both allow Israel to avoid a confrontation by acceding to our approach and set the stage for it more clearly should Israel still refuse.

In brief, Phil will return for one more attempt to convince the Israelis to talk on the basis of our draft, with minimal changes, and to do so with the aim of a very quick result. If they agree, Phil would stay in Israel to complete the draft and then sell it to Gemayel. If the Israelis again reject our draft, or our need for speed, Phil would put the same proposition to the Lebanese and assuming Gemayel agrees, do the necessary fine tuning with the Lebanese, who would then table the draft with our support. Just prior to the actual tabling of a draft, Phil would visit Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria to make sure the Lebanese will not be undercut as they try to meet Israel's minimal needs and to keep the heat under Syrian and PLO withdrawal.

The Implications

Because the issues go well beyond Lebanon, it is unlikely Israel will bend sufficiently to meet our needs. Therefore, once you have decided on our next steps, we will begin the process of preparing our ground with the public and Congress for the possibility of confrontation.

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Objective. To obtain rapid agreement on Lebanon -- as early in this month as we can -- both because Lebanon needs it and because, without it, the chances for the success of your broader peace initiative will quickly begin to disappear.

Issues. Israel is in no hurry and is insisting on Lebanese concessions which Lebanon could not make without destroying its hopes of domestic reconciliation and economic revival. The other Arabs are watching to see if the U.S. can move Israel from an area it says it intends to leave -- Lebanon -- before they engage with us to try to move Israel from areas it does not intend to leave -- the West Bank and Gaza. However, the Lebanon issues themselves are not yet clear enough for us to make the public case -- to "prove" -- that Israel's positions are unreasonable; and we must be able to do this.

The Game Plan. Therefore, we propose one more trip by Phil to give the Israelis a chance to back away from their confrontational course and, if they do not, to give us the time to prepare ourselves for the confrontation which Israeli will be forcing on us. Phil's approach will be to secure Israeli agreement to our draft, with minimal changes, within a week or ten days. If the Israelis do not agree to this course, Phil will instead reach agreement with Gemayel and have Gemayel table the result as a Lebanese draft which has full U.S. support and which the other Arabs would not oppose.

The Implications. If Israel does not give in, we can respond in a number of ways. Among these are sanctions, summoning Begin to Washington, a public statement by you or a combination of these elements. In any event, we must first take two steps:

-- try again through Phil and;

-- meanwhile, position ourselves publicly and in the Congress for the crunch if it is to come.

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A. Obtain agreement between PLO and GOL that such a force is necessary on following functions of this force:

1. under general supervision of LAF (but force ^{commanders} retains command/control)
2. guarantee safety on international force
3. monitor and help LAF in controlling turnover of PLO arms, including disposition (dump at sea or destroy in place ^{for} crew-served weapons)
4. interim guarantor of proper treatment of PLO families and other Palestinians left behind. (NOTE: US forces would only be committed up to 30 days so it must be clearly understood that "guarantees" of welfare would be limited to immediate evacuation period.)
5. assist ICRC/LAF in process^{ing} of embarking PLO fighters onto transport vessels/aircraft.
6. secure port and/or international airport (area of embarkation).
7. (possible) in conjunction with "4," ^{above} assist LAF in securing certain limited points in West Beirut after neutralization (e.g., major crossroads, major embassies, AUB Campus and hospital).
8. understanding of limited role of force not to include functions other than those specified above and to exist not longer than 30 days.

-- Habib to secure agreement (may be need for Murphy to get Saudis to keep PLO from backsliding).

-- timing: immediately.

B. Consultations with Israelis to get Israeli agreement to:

1. functions of international force as spelled out in "A" and to guarantee safety of international force.
2. provide guarantees to physical safety of PLO evacuees and those remaining behind (details of how IDF would

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respond to a provocation from the other side would have to be worked out but the guarantees of PLO safety would have to be fairly tight even in the event of provocation).

3. pull back from areas around airport if evacuation by air
4. continue cease-fire
5. once international force withdrew, not to improve positions or threaten Palestinians remaining in Beirut
6. not to in any way impede transportation of PLO to ultimate destination
7. seek understanding of Christian forces on points 1-6 above.

-- Cable to Sam Lewis to secure agreement of Begin, (should not involve Ambassador Arens at this point) ^{in Israel}

-- timing: as soon as possible after PLO-GOL agree exact timing to depend on Sunday's Cabinet decision); cable should be prepositioned as soon as have feedback from PLO-GOL response.

C. Secure agreement of Syria to:

1. accept international force as spelled out in "A"
2. evacuate Syrian-controlled forces in Beirut (1000 Syrian troops who are remnants of 55th Brigade and the Palestine Liberation Army (Sai'qa)) before the international force is inserted
3. assuming evacuation of all Syrian-controlled forces is not accomplished before the international force arrives, a commitment to maintain the cease-fire (discuss same problems of responding to a "provocation" from the other side)

--Embassy Damascus to secure agreement from Assad (Hold in reserve possibility of Habib or Draper visit if deemed necessary); simultaneous approach by Amb. Murphey to get Saudis to "lean on" Syrians in cooperating

--timing: Cable can be prepositioned after PLO-GOL agreement but approach should not be made until after securing Israeli approval

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D. Approach Lebanese armed factions to obtain their agreement to:

1. functions of international force as spelled out in "A"
2. withdraw from areas in West Beirut, turning over power to LAF
3. guarantee physical safety of international force
4. guarantee physical safety of PLO being evacuated and Palestinians remaining
5. respect cease-fire (discuss "provocation" from other side)

- Habib to Secure agreement from:

- Bashir - Christian Phalange forces

- Walid Jumblatt - Amal, Lebanese Army (note Arafat will be responsible for all PLO forces, including ~~DFLP~~ - see A)
(see list of other factions)

- Habib to secure agreements (may have to examine possibility of going to other governments which have influence on these factions) - *see chart*

- timing: after approach to Syrians

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0350 DRAPER-PETERS SECURE TELCON

DRAPER INDICATED THAT A CABLE [STATE 186121] SENT OUT LAST NIGHT WOULD BE REPLIED TO, BUT IN THE MEANTIME HE WANTED TOM MILLER AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON TO KNOW THAT THIS IDEA [IDF REPAIR OF AIRPORT AND GOL REQUEST TO PLO TO WITHDRAW] WAS "A CRASHINGLY DUMB IDEA." IN FACT, HE WENT ON, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WASHINGTON DID LESS CREATIVE THINKING ABOUT IDEAS WHICH MAKE NO SENSE ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT AND SPENT MORE TIME CONSULTING WITH BEIRUT AND WORKING ON AGREED UPON SCENARIO.

Beirut 4464 is written reply to our outgoing.

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☐ CLASSIFY as☐ DOWNGRADE TS to☐ S or ☐ C OADR☐ S or ☐ C OADRSECRETTALKING POINTS FOR TELEPHONE CALLTO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR

- I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE SOME POSITIVE REPORTS FROM BEIRUT THIS MORNING.
- THE PLO HAS PRODUCED A COUNTER-DRAFT TO PHIL HABIB'S PLAN, WHICH THE LEBANESE PASSED TO THE PLO YESTERDAY.
- THE NEW PLO PAPER IS OF COURSE FAR FROM ACCEPTABLE, BUT IT IS ALSO FAR FROM THEIR ORIGINAL ELEVEN POINTS. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THEY ARE SERIOUSLY ADDRESSING THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE.
- PHIL IS NOW WORKING WITH THE TWO LEBANESE GENERALS ON A FURTHER REFINEMENT OF THE DEPARTURE PLAN WHICH THEY WILL PASS BACK TO THE PLO TONIGHT.
- TO SUM UP, THE SIGNS TODAY INDICATE THAT WE MAY BE IN THE NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WE HAD HOPED FOR. THERE IS MUCH TOUGH AND DETAILED WORK AHEAD, BUT THESE ARE GOOD AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMINTS.
- FROM OUR MEETINGS YESTERDAY I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL IS WILLING TO GIVE THIS EFFORT THE CHANCE IT NEEDS TO TEST THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PLO. WE ARE ENGAGED IN THAT NOW.

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- THEREFORE I THINK IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT ISRAEL MAINTAIN A FIRM CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. THERE ARE REPORTS THIS MORNING OF A LOT OF LOW-LEVEL SHOOTING AROUND THE SOUTHERN FRINGES OF THE CITY. YOUR FORCES ARE NOW RIGHT UP AGAINST THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THIS ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL STIMULATE FIRING FROM THOSE CAMPS. AND THE ANXIETIES OF THE MAIN PLO FORCES IN THE CITY WILL BE HEIGHTENED IN THEIR CONCERN FOR THEIR FAMILIES IN THE CAMPS.
- THUS IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO LET THIS POTENTIALLY CRUCIAL PERIOD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BE DISRUPTED BY A MAJOR OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE. WE HAVE TO HAVE ISRAEL'S COOPERATION IN THIS, AND IN RESTORING THE ESSENTIAL PUBLIC AND HUMANITARIAN SERVICES TO WEST BEIRUT. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WE ARE LOOKING FOR A RESTORATION OF WATER, AS THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY TOLD MORRIS DRAPER WOULD BE DONE.

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-- YOUR MAJESTY, I RECEIVED LAST NIGHT YOUR MESSAGE
 CONVEYED THROUGH PRINCE BANDAR.

-- I DEEPLY SHARE THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESSED, PARTICULARLY
 THE DEEP ANGUISH OVER THE HUMAN SUFFERING IN WEST BEIRUT.

-- UNDER MY DIRECTION AMBASSADOR HABIB AND OTHER SENIOR
 U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE REPEATEDLY AND FORCEFULLY URGED ON THE
 HIGHEST LEVELS OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THE NECESSITY OF ENDING
 THE VIOLENCE IN WEST BEIRUT, BOTH TO FACILITATE AMBASSADOR
 HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS WHICH ARE
 CLEARLY RECOGNIZED IN THE UNITED STATES AND THROUGHOUT THE
 WORLD.

-- THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT IS
 EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND THERE ARE CLEARLY PROVOCATIONS ON BOTH
 SIDES THAT TEND TO ESCALATE THE VIOLENCE AS WE CONTINUE TO
 PRESS HARD ON THE ISRAELIS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THOSE WITH
 INFLUENCE EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP ELEMENTS IN WEST BEIRUT
 FROM TAKING ACTIONS WHICH ENCOURAGE FURTHER BLOODSHED.

-- WE ARE OF COURSE AT AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL POINT IN
 AMBASSADOR HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS. YOU HAVE PLAYED A
 PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING THESE
 NEGOTIATIONS TO A POINT IN WHICH THERE ARE REAL PROSPECTS OF A

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PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND A LONG-TERM CESSATION OF VIOLENCE IN LEBANON.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REDUCE THE PROSPECTS OF FURTHER VIOLENCE AS WE MOVE IN THE CRITICAL HOURS AHEAD TOWARD AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE PLO TO DEPART WEST BEIRUT WITH HONOR AND IN A WAY THAT WILL PRESERVE THE PLO AS A POLITICAL ENTITY.

--IN THE CRITICAL HOURS, WE HAVE A DIFFICULT TASK IN OBTAINING BINDING ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL PERMIT THE PLO'S DEPARTURE, JUST AS WE HAVE A CRITICAL TASK IN MAKING ABSOLUTELY FIRM THE ACCEPTANCE BY SPECIFIC ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF THE PLO. SINCE THE TWO ARE CLOSELY LINKED, WE MUST HAVE THE DETAILS OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT WE CONTINUE UNCEASINGLY TO WORK TOWARD THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE IN WEST BEIRUT AND THE RELIEF OF CIVILIANS THERE. AT THIS CRITICAL POINT, WE MUST DO SO IN THE CONTEXT OF PROPERLY REACHING A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, ONE THAT WILL AVOID EVEN GREATER BLOODSHED AND SUFFERING AND BUILD THE PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACEFUL SOLUTION NOT JUST IN LEBANON BUT THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- AS MY CHIEF AIDES AND I CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THE UTMOST DILIGENCE AND DEDICATION WITH THIS PROBLEM, I FEEL CONFIDENT OF YOUR INVALUABLE CONTINUED SUPPORT.

-- I AM TODAY CONTACTING PRIME MINISTER BEGIN DIRECTLY TO
URGE A TOTAL FIRM CEASEFIRE FOR THREE DAYS TO PERMIT US TO
COMPLETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PLO'S DEPARTURE FROM WEST BEIRUT.

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TALKING POINTS FOR THE SECRETARY
FOR USE WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

--LET ME BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN WEST BEIRUT. IT IS NEVER SAFE TO BE OPTIMISTIC, BUT I CAN SAY THAT THERE IS POSITIVE MOVEMENT UNDERWAY AT PRESENT.

--DESPITE THE DISINFORMATION AND DEFIANT PROPAGANDA THE PLO IS PUTTING OUT, IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD ACCURATELY THE MESSAGE FROM US--THAT THEY MUST LEAVE BEIRUT AND GIVE UP MILITANT STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL.

--JUST IN THE PAST FEW HOURS WE HAVE RECEIVED WORD, THROUGH THE SAUDIS AND THE FRENCH, THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP IS TAKING THE POSITION THAT IT IS READY TO RENOUNCE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN RETURN FOR PERMISSION FOR PALESTINIANS TO LIVE IN LEBANON IN PEACE UNDER LEBANESE AUTHORITY, AND IF THE PLO MAY CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THE STATUS OF A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.

--AT THE SAME TIME THE PLO ARE MAKING CLEAR THEIR READINESS TO FIGHT TO THE DEATH IN WEST BEIRUT SHOULD THAT SITUATION BE FORCED ON THEM.

--JUST WHAT IS MEANT BY THESE PLO CONDITIONS IS NOT CLEAR R SATISFACTORY AT THE MOMENT. WE CERTAINLY EXPECT TO HEAR OUGH TALK AND IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS FROM THE PLO IN THE DAYS HEAD. BUT AT THE MOMENT THERE SEEMS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT ATTITUDE ON THEIR PART.

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° AND THAT, WHEN THE MOMENT COMES, THE IDF WILL BE ORDERED TO TAKE UP POSITIONS (E.G. PULLING BACK OUT OF SIGHT FROM BAABDA, TURNING AIRPORT OVER TO LAF) THAT ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND NOT HUMILIATE THE PLO/SYRIANS AS THEY EXIT BEIRUT.

--AGAIN LET ME STRESS THAT NOTHING HAS YET BEEN SETTLED; NO DEAL HAS BEEN STRUCK. WE ARE, HOWEVER, HARD AT WORK IN A SITUATION THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SHOWS SIGNS OF PROMISE.

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TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH
FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM

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-- Point out that U.S. has done its part. Habib Mission accomplished much. Now Arabs must find place for PLO to go. Until they do, it is Arabs who are delegitimizing the PLO.

-- We understand Arab concerns and believe they are being addressed.

- o Firm U.S. position that Israel must withdraw.
- o You have committed U.S. to international force to arrive during withdrawal.
- o We will work so that Israel and Lebanese factions do not endanger Palestinians who depart as well as those who stay.

-- Time is crucial.

--In view of today's discussion, we agree that Arabs should determine several countries to take PLO.

-- But before PLO leaves Beirut, we must know which countries and when. We only have a matter of days.

-- To stress importance and urgency, you will send Ambassador Habib as soon as tomorrow to Syria and Saudi Arabia to help fix schedule. Also can go to Egypt and Jordan. Of course must stop in Israel as well.

-- Reiterate that there are two phases. We work to end siege of Beirut now through departure of PLO. Next will be cooperative effort to get all foreign forces--Israeli, PLO, Syrian, out of Lebanon.

-- All this can launch intensified effort to solve underlying Palestinian problem. We are prepared to be creative.

SECRET

RDS-3, 7/20/02

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SECRET

TALKING POINTS FOR SAUD

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED OUR MEETINGS OF YESTERDAY WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB WHO CONFIRMS THAT, ON THE BASIS OF HIS MOST RECENT DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WOULD NOT AGREE TO A MOVEMENT OF THE PLO FIGHTERS TO THE BEKAA AS AN INTERIM STEP.

-- REFLECTING ON OUR CONVERSATION, THE CONCERNS OF THE LEBANESE PARALLEL THOSE OF THE SYRIANS WITH RESPECT TO THE MOVEMENT OF THESE PEOPLE OUT OF WEST BEIRUT. PERHAPS THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION IS A DISPERSAL AMONG SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES. WHAT WE NEED QUICKLY IS A COUNTRY OF INITIAL DESTINATION AND SYRIA IS THE MOST LOGICAL CANDIDATE COUPLED WITH PRECISE MOVEMENT AND DATES FOR FOLLOW-ON MOVEMENT TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES CONCERNED.

-- I NOTE THAT YOU TOLD THE PRESS YESTERDAY THAT ALGERIA AND IRAQ WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS EFFORT. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT JORDAN AND EGYPT WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP. HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO FINALIZE THESE ARRANGEMENTS VERY QUICKLY?

-- WE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION SYRIAN AND PLA WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS YESTERDAY. WE ARE ASSUMING THAT THE PLO, SYRIAN AND PLA WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS. DO YOU SEE ANY PROBLEMS WITH OUR NOT HAVING DISCUSSED IT YESTERDAY? WE COULD OF COURSE BE MORE EXPLICIT IN THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

-- WE WELL UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS OF OUR ARAB FRIENDS THAT THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION LEFT BEHIND IN WEST BEIRUT NOT BE SUBJECT TO ATTACK OR HARASSMENT. AS YOU RECALL, A MAJOR REASON BEHIND THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS TO PROVIDE REASSURANCE IN THIS RESPECT AS WELL AS TO MONITOR THE WITHDRAWAL. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED THAT MISTREATMENT OF THESE PEOPLE CANNOT OCCUR. AMONGST OTHER THINGS THIS WOULD IMPLICATE US, SOMETHING WE WOULD NOT TOLERATE.

-- WE CONTEMPLATE ADJUSTMENTS IN ISRAELI LINES IN AND AROUND BEIRUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO, SYRIANS AND PLA FROM WEST BEIRUT. WE WOULD VIEW THIS AS PHASE 1 IN A PROGRAM ULTIMATELY THAT WOULD HAVE ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS WILL NOT BE A TOTALLY SMOOTH ROAD BUT I WISH TO EMPHASIZE OUR DETERMINATION IN THIS RESPECT IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

-- WE HAVE HAD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS THROUGH HABIB WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMED PALESTINIANS IN THE NORTH. THE AGREED OBJECTIVE IS THE END OF THE ARMED PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON ALONG WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. IN SUBSEQUENT PHASES WE ASSUME THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, INCLUDING EVALUATION FROM LEBANON. HOW THIS IS DONE WILL BE DETERMINED PRIMARILY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS, FPC/CDR

Date. 11/27/95

Carried to S/S
10:50 AM 8/13
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FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

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TALKING POINTS

FOR USE WITH

ISRAELI CHARGE NETANYAHU

E29

R-

- Phil Habib reports this morning that "the unaccustomed silence in Beirut is very pleasant". Keeping the ceasefire is absolutely essential to Phil's effort to wrap this up.
- But I was astonished to learn this morning that the Israeli military has taken yet another step that obstructs the conclusion of this process.
- The IDF this morning threw the Lebanese Armed Forces off the Galerie Simaan checkpoint. So we are back exactly where we were 5 or 6 weeks ago when your forces did exactly the same thing. We worked for almost a week then to get your agreement to turn that crossing point over the LAF.
- During that time, as you recall, negotiations did not proceed as the Prime Minister of Lebanon would not cross through an Israeli checkpoint.
- Putting us back in this position at the moment is just not understandable to us. The Secretary and President are not yet aware of this. I urge you to return the checkpoint to LAF control before this issue becomes the next matter of serious dispute between us.

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11/27/81

E30

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FOIA Exemption

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FRENCH/EGYPTIAN "WORKING PAPER"

10 FEB 1982

S or C OADR

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

GUIDED BY THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER;

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 237(1967), 242(1967) AND 338(1973);

RECALLING FURTHER ITS RESOLUTIONS 508(1982), 509(1982), 511(1982) AND 512(1982);

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN PARTICULAR THE EXISTING SITUATION IN LEBANON;

REAFFIRMING THE OBLIGATION OF ALL TO STRICTLY RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ALL COUNTRIES AND THE NATIONAL LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF ALL PEOPLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

REAFFIRMING FURTHER THE OBLIGATION THAT ALL STATES SHALL SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ARE NOT ENDANGERED AND THAT THEY SHALL REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS;

DETERMINED TO INITIATE LASTING RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY FOR ALL STATES AND JUSTICE FOR ALL PEOPLES;

PART (A)

1. DEMANDS THAT ALL THE PARTIES TO THE EXISTING HOSTILITIES IN LEBANON OBSERVE AN IMMEDIATE AND SUSTAINED CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES THROUGHOUT LEBANON.

2. DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES ENGAGED AROUND BEIRUT TO AN AGREED DISTANCE AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF THE PALESTINIAN ARMED FORCES FROM WEST BEIRUT WHICH WILL BE REDEPLOYED WITH THEIR LIGHT ARMAMENTS, AS A FIRST STEP, IN CAMPS TO BE DETERMINED, PREFERABLY OUTSIDE BEIRUT, THROUGH MODALITIES TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES, SO PUTTING AN END TO THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND CALLS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ARMED PALESTINIANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON CONCERNING THE DESTINATION AND DESTINY OF THEIR ARMAMENTS, OTHER THAN THOSE REFERRED TO ABOVE.

3. CALLS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ALL NON-LEBANESE FORCES, EXCEPT THOSE AUTHORIZED BY THE LEGITIMATE AND REPRESENTATIVE AUTHORITIES OF LEBANON.

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4. SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN ITS EFFORTS TO REASSERT ITS EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF ITS CAPITAL AND TO TAKE THAT END TO INSTALL ITS ARMED FORCES WHICH SHALL TAKE UP POSITIONS WITHIN BEIRUT AND INTERPOSE THEMSELVES ON ITS PERIPHERY.

5. FURTHER SUPPORTS ALL EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO ENSURE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY AND THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED FRONTIERS.

PART (B)

1. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS AN IMMEDIATE MEASURE, TO STATION U.N. MILITARY OBSERVERS, BY AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT IN AND AROUND BEIRUT.

2. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, BEARING IN MIND THE PROVISION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 511(1982), TO PREPARE A REPORT ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE INSTALLATION OF A U.N. PEACE KEEPING FORCE WHICH COULD, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS, TAKE UP POSITIONS BESIDE THE LEBANESE INTERPOSITION FORCES, OR FOR THE USE OF THE FORCES AVAILABLE TO THE U.N. IN THE REGION.

PART (C)

1. CONSIDERS THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE INITIATION OF DURABLE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY FOR ALL STATES AND JUSTICE FOR ALL PEOPLES IN ORDER NAMELY TO:

(A) REAFFIRM THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION TO EXISTENCE AND SECURITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH S.C. RESOLUTION 242(1967);

(B) AFFIRM THE LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INCLUDING ITS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITH ALL ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE UNDERSTANDING TO THIS END, THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE SHALL BE REPRESENTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY THE PLO SHALL BE ASSOCIATED;

(C) CALL FOR THE MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE PROPOSALS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONSULTATION WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED INCLUDING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, TO PURSUE BY POLITICAL MEANS THE OBJECTIVES MENTIONED ABOVE WITH THE AIM TO RECOGNIZE AND RESPECT THE EXISTENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL.

PART (D)

1. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON AN URGENT AND SUSTAINED BASIS NOT LATER THAN ON THE STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.
2. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS, FPO, CDR

Date: 11/27/90

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FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

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E33

0835 MESSAGE FROM HABIB FOR VELIOTES

IN ADDITON TO OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION AND RELEVANT TO
YOUR RAISING QUESTION OF ISRAELI FORWARD POSITIONS AND POSSIBLE
WITHDRAWAL I WANT YOU TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

DURING SLINGING MARCH BETWEEN SAAB SALAM AND ARAFAT,
ARAFAT SAID TO SAAB THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD PULL BACK 7 KILOMETERS.
THIS WAS RAISED WITH ME ONCE BEFORE AND I HAD TOLD SAAB IT WAS
NOT POSSIBLE FOR ISRAELIS TO PULL BACK BUT THAT THEY MIGHT
AGREE TO A STANDSTILL WHILE GOL PUT ITS UNITS IN PLACE. SALAN
TOLD ARAFAT THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT POSSIBLE, REPEATING
IT OVER AND OVER. I JUST WANTED YOU TO BE AWARE OF THIS.

OF COURSE, IF ISRAELIS WOULD PULL BACK A FEW KILOMETERS
IT WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION INFINITELY EASIER, BUT I WANT YOU
TO UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE MADE IT VERY CLEAR HERE THAT I REGARD
THAT AS IMPOSSIBLE SOLUTION.

6/26 SAT 4:30

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date.

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SECRET/EXDIS**DECAPTIONED**

L - Lawrence S. Eagleburger

NEA - Ambassador Nicholas A. Velictes

FROM: Ambassador Philip Habib

LOOKING AHEAD

1 - S - Entire text.

2. By separate message, addressees will have read my report of my June 26 talk with Sarkis and Boutrus in which we together discussed where we might go from here. The Lebanese still want our help very much. Despite the disarray within the Lebanese government, the possible need to form a new government, the rising risk of Muslim/Christian polarization, and the setback caused by Israeli over-kill, it should be possible for us to recoup and to pursue new efforts to obtain our basic objectives, in partnership with Lebanon and other countries which can be enjoined to assist.

3. Basic judgements affecting the future situation:

-- (a) In the absence of a complete ceasefire in place - applying not only to the Beirut area but also to the Israeli-Syrian front in Lebanon - we will only face difficulties which will threaten our basic objectives. We must keep the heat on to assure the ceasefire lasts, while keeping an active and promising diplomatic process going.

-- (b) A first stage limited IDF disengagement from the Beirut area is a prerequisite for progress, although such a disengagement must be timed and carried out simultaneously or directly connected with other quid pro quos from other parties, the PLO in particular. We should do this in coordination with the Lebanese government to the greatest extent possible. (At the right moment, we must explore Israeli-Syrian mutual disengagement once again.)

-- (c) Our concentration on neutralizing the Palestinians and the PLO in Beirut must be all encompassing, but we should not neglect the need to extract Syrian forces and the Syrian-controlled Saiqah and Palestinians Liberation Army (PLA) from Beirut in conjunction with moving ahead with the Palestinians (total may be 4500 men). Also in this connection, we must remember that there are substantial Palestinian elements in northern Lebanon still untouched by the Israelis or GOL authorities.

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- 2 -

-- (d) A good understanding with the French will be indispensable, since the French are the only ones who have shown a readiness to provide troops for an international presence in the Beirut area.

-- (e) Bashir Gemayel's identification and association with the Israelis must be kept as hidden as possible. This will be hard. Repeated Israeli efforts to associate the Phalange with the IDF have already backfired, in the sense that they have reduced Bashir's chances to win the presidency through a legitimate political process. If he senses his chances have significantly lessened, Bashir will be tempted to pull off a coup, which would alienate the Muslims completely and produce an almost hopelessly divided country.

-- (f) We should share our forward thinking with the Israelis, underscoring the point that a political solution would meet many of their security and other concerns about the PLO and set the stage for establishment of a strong Lebanese government with which the Israelis will be able to work - a least, indirectly.

-- (g) We will have to encourage broader and more consistent support from the Saudis in particular, but also from Egypt, other moderate Arab states, and the Europeans.

-- (f) Finally, we will have to make it clear we can no longer live with Israeli extremes - either in their military behavior or in some of their positions. They should be informed exactly where we stand.

4. Next steps:

-- In conversation with Sarkis, two tactical options have emerged. They are not mutually exclusive but can be pursued simultaneously and in a complimentary fashion. They can be stated as follows:

(1) Continuation of my own mission promoting GOL/PLO contacts and understanding on the future of Palestinian and the PLO in Lebanon; and (2) developing a new Security Council resolution - melding in the Lebanese views, and whatever is of value of the vetoed French resolution - to produce a document we can work with.

-- In the first instance, we should seek agreement with the GOL on a draft text before other consultation. The GOL is already embarked on its own in this direction but I believe

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- 3 -

they will not move without us. They wish to wait a few days for new results on the General Assembly and the Arab League Foreign Minister's meeting before going further.

-- Rather than demanding that the PLO leadership leave Beirut and Lebanon, we should create conditions whereby they would be encouraged to leave. This needs further thinking, but I believe it can be done through dispersion, disarmament, and GOL limitation on their activities.

-- We should explore further with Wazzan and Sarkis whether the transfer of Palestinian fighters out of the Beirut area - as an interim step - could be managed. This is a doubtful proposition, but it is one way by Wazzan after talking to the PLO and has appeared in some Saudi thinking.

-- Deal with the issue of disarmament of the Palestinians in a more effective, more subtle and less confrontational way, although the ultimate objective must be the same. By proper wording in a UN resolution we can, I believe, arrange for the end of a PLO military presence in Lebanon.

-- Meanwhile, we should encourage Bashir Gemayel to support our strategy and transfer the central government.

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FRG/CDR

Date:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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FOIA Exemptions

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SECRET

FROM:

Alexander M. Haig

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

I. SETTING

Begin will be anxious about the atmosphere of your meeting and will do his best to project an impression of cordial solidarity. As you know, the Prime Minister considers his relationship with you as a major asset for Israel and will clearly want to avoid any appearance of serious differences with you. But he will be absolutely firm that the invasion of Lebanon was entirely justified, and that no withdrawal can take place until Israel's conditions are satisfied.

In my breakfast meeting on Friday, I foreshadowed some of the ground you will be covering in your demarche. You will want to explain particularly the relationship between achieving our objectives in Lebanon and our broader strategic goals in the Middle East. Sam Lewis and I recommend that you deliver your demarche during the expanded meeting. This will assure that your presentation is accurately recorded by both sides. Your one-on-one can be used to deal with one or two key specific issues.

II. OBJECTIVES

1. Make sure Begin understands our objectives in Lebanon and our desire to work with Israel to achieve them.

2. Stress the opportunity we see to create a strong Lebanese government.

3. Confirm our goal of seeing all foreign military forces removed from Lebanon.

4. Review optional peacekeeping arrangements.

5. Convince Begin that achieving our goals in Lebanon will serve our broader common objectives in the region relating to the peace process and regional security.

6. (If Begin raises) Inform Begin that Israeli actions in Lebanon preclude moving ahead now on MOU and defense trade measures.

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III. ISSUES

1. U.S. Objectives in Lebanon

We have the opportunity to accomplish a number of things which are in both our interest and Israel's. Begin will be willing to agree to most of our objectives, broadly stated, but will differ with us either on the details or the tactics required. The key thing we need is confirmation that we share the same general goals for the future of Lebanon: a strengthened central government, peacekeeping arrangements to enhance Israel's security, an end to the PLO "state within a state" in Lebanon, turning the crisis to positive effect on the peace process.

2. Create Strong Lebanese Government

The Lebanese leadership has demonstrated that it is willing to try to form a viable decision-making body which can exert the leadership necessary to begin the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction. This is the key to all other objectives. It is also Phil Habib's first priority and he has done a superb job of getting traditional enemies to see the need to work together in Lebanon's hour of trial. Israel has it within its power to facilitate that process or to undermine it.

3. Removal of all Foreign Military Forces from Lebanon

It is within our sights to rid Lebanon of all foreign military forces, save perhaps a symbolic Syrian presence in the northeastern part of the country. Begin will undoubtedly insist on the removal of all Syrian forces and the demilitarization of PLO elements prior to IDF withdrawal. At the same time, Syrian forces in their ADF role have a certain legitimacy, however thin, because of Arab League support for their presence in Lebanon. A request for Syrian withdrawal, which will have to come from the Lebanese Government, should remove even this figleaf of legitimacy. Disarming the Palestinians, similarly, is a job for the Lebanese authorities.

4. Review Optional Peacekeeping Arrangements

Our choices are basically between a UNIFIL that is expanded in size and strengthened in its mandate or a multinational force such as we now have in the Sinai. Begin has made it clear both publicly and privately that he prefers an MFO-type force, preferably with a U.S. component. He has not completely rejected the UNIFIL option, however, which will undoubtedly be much easier for us to organize.

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5. Lebanon, our Strategic Objectives and the Peace Process

Begin should hear from you a clear statement that our basic policy objectives have not changed--to enhance our regional posture vis-a-vis the Soviets and to pursue peace between Israel and its neighbors. But he must also hear that the invasion of Lebanon has complicated our relationships with our Arab friends. Our handling of the Lebanon crisis can either enhance our prospects for achieving our broader regional objectives or it can set them back considerably.

6. MOU on Strategic Cooperation and Defense Trade

In spite of my effort Friday to preempt the issue, Begin may ask you about moving ahead with implementation of the MOU on Strategic Cooperation and related defense issues to stimulate Israel's defense industry. If so, he will recall my letter of May 9 to him and my May 25 meeting with Sharon, in which I indicated that you intended to implement these decisions during this meeting with Begin. You will want to tell Begin that our position on the MOU and related defense trade measures remains the same as indicated last month but, in view of recent events in Lebanon, it would be premature to proceed.

SECRET

Drafted: NEA/IAI:WKirbyWK

Cleared: NEA - Mr. Hill CH
P - Mr. Eagleburger
NEA - Mr. Veliotos
S/S - Mr. L. P. Bremer, III

BM-S

SECRET

SUN 818
LIX'd to WH

E39

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date:

11/27/95

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ISRAELI HARASS U.S. HELICOPTER
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Three times in the last 24 hours the Israelis harassed our helicopters as they ferried our liaison officers in and out of Beirut for meetings with Phil Habib: one was buzzed by an Israeli plane, passengers and crew were delayed and questioned, and an Israeli patrol boat trained its guns on another helicopter as it was coming in to land.

We have protested these incidents in the strongest terms. Ambassador Lewis took it up in Israel and both State and Defense summoned Israeli Embassy officials here. Their response was to assure us that it was a misunderstanding, that they intended no harm, and that they are checking to see how it happened. We suspect that it stems from Sharon's entirely mistaken suspicion that we were transporting French military personnel as part of a French attempt to enter Beirut before an agreement is reached. We have told the Israelis that this is utter nonsense. We have also insisted on assurances from them that such harassment will not happen again. In the past few hours our helicopters have flown round trips from the carrier without incident.

Drafted:CHill

Cleared:NAVeliot

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DEPARTMENT OF ~~SECRET~~ *U.S. FRODOOR* Date: *11/10/75*
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EVENING READING ITEM

THE HABIB PLAN

Phil has finished his "final package plan" and sent it in to us for review. Cap and I and our staffs will be looking at it overnight and, assuming no problems, will cable it to Ambassador Lewis to present to Begin Monday night. Begin continues to resist the idea that a part of the Multinational Force would enter on the day the PLO starts to withdraw. This has, however, become a practical necessity. If Begin shows no flexibility, Phil may have to go to Jerusalem to talk to him. A letter from you to Begin may be needed as well sometime in the next day or so.

Drafted:CHill

Cleared:NAVelites

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500 R E44

studied your message of June 9 on the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 15/FCPTCDR Date: 11/27/95
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Like the Soviet Union, the United States voted for United Nations Security Council resolutions 508 and 509.

Ambassador Habib, during earlier extensive discussions with Prime Minister Begin, made abundantly clear to the Government of Israel that in the view of the United States:

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But it is also clear, Mr. President, that Israeli is not prepared to accept a restoration of the previous pattern of aggression against its northern territories -- an objective that we fully understand and with which we sympathize.

As you may know, Ambassador Habib is now in Damascus for discussions with Syrian leaders to clarify the situation and urge restraint and the acceptance of my proposal for a ceasefire.

At the same time, Mr. President, I am compelled to point out that your government bears no little responsibility for the current crisis in the Middle East by its failure to support the Camp David Accords and its readiness to furnish a steady supply of weapons to PLO forces in Lebanon. While we use our influence to restrain Israel, we expect your government to exercise its influence over the PLO, Syria and your other friends in the area in the same direction.

E45A

Talking points on Tueni draft for UNSC resolution

--A draft was shown to Amb. Lichtenstein by Amb. Tueni day before yesterday. Tueni said he was not planning to float it or try to convene the council. Yesterday the Lebanese Million confirmed they were not interested in pressing for a new resolution.

--text of that draft is less acceptable to US than earlier amended French version which Lebanese showed to Phil on Saturday and which they tried to get considered on Friday night.

--It contains no language about removing or disarming the armed Palestinian presence and in that respect is no better than French resolution we vetoed.

--We don't think that another resolution in security council would be helpful at this time. It would probably be better we think to wait until Phil has an agreement and then we would go to SC and get it to bless agreement with new resolution.

--There is possibility, of course, of having Council adopt resolution that endorses the position of Lebanese government as a way of supporting the GOL's negotiating position, however, unless the GOL's position is very clear on the points important to us, especially removing the armed Palestinian presence either by getting them out of country or disarming them and unless Lebanese are willing to take the initiative and can get at least 9 votes it's too risky given Friday's experience.

--We would, of course, appreciate Phil's views. The idea of UNTSO observers to observe troop withdrawals is incidentally OK and this could be included in a resolution formalizing an agreement.

gist of above passed to Habib as he was leaving for a meeting at which he expected to hear Lebanese views on this matter.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Israeli/Lebanese Negotiations in Khalde, January 17.

Chris Ross called on the open line to summarize today's negotiating session in Khalde. He said that Morris would send a cable from Jerusalem on his meeting with Gemayel.

Although somewhat constrained by the need to use doubletalk on the open line, Ross conveyed that Gemayel was greatly discouraged by the Arab reaction to the agreed agenda.

In the plenary session discussion continued on the general principles which each side applies to the various agenda items. The Lebanese said that they had nothing to propose except on the "program of withdrawal", and deferred to the Israelis to make initial presentations. The views of the Israeli side followed closely the content of the "working paper" developed in the special channel.

Following the plenary, the two sides met in a working group to discuss "termination of the state of war". The Lebanese tried various formulas to establish the principles that termination would take place when the Israeli withdrawal was completed. The Israelis rejected these ideas. In the end, the Lebanese said they would not be negative about considering an Israeli formula for earlier termination of withdrawal but only when the rest of the package was in place.

The plenary resumed briefly to discuss working groups and other procedures. The Israelis do not want to set up working groups until there is greater mutual understanding on general principles.

At Qirat Shimona on Thursday, there will be further discussion of the principles of the two sides with an aim to setting up more working groups which could meet on the days between plenary sessions.

The atmosphere continues to be very businesslike and cordial. The Lebanese are making some of their positions bluntly clear.

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☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C OADRIssue: How, not if, we seek to resolve Lebanon in the near futureA. Habib Scenario

-- Has the advantage of bringing issues to a head.

-- Has the disadvantages of "structuring" a confrontation with Israel which could render ineffective subsequent personal involvement by the Secretary. How to derive the advantages without the disadvantages of the Habib course of action with the best chance of early success and most productive use of Secretary's time.

B. Alternative Scenario I based on discussions with Secretary today

-- Neither Habib nor the Lebanese table a draft in the negotiations.

-- Habib continues to discuss and press his points with both sides for the next few days.

-- Habib then informs the parties that the Secretary is coming out to engage himself with the aim of overcoming the last obstacles to achieving an agreement.

-- The Secretary would be prepared to leave on Sunday and to stay in the area for approximately two weeks. Early during his discussions and shuttling we will evolve a draft agreement that U.S. will support along the line proposed by Habib.

-- It would be made clear from the beginning, publicly and privately, that the purpose of the Secretary's visit is to focus on Lebanon. In addition to Israel and Lebanon, this could involve a visit to Damascus, but we would not suggest even this.

-- Any other visits would depend upon time available and the results of the Secretary's engagement on Lebanon.

-- At an appropriate time, Secretary could meet with certain Ambassadors to keep them informed and to maintain "contact" with other leaders.

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C. Alternative Scenario II based on discussion with Sam Lewis

-- Habib is quite far down the road in his discussion with Gemayel and it would be counterproductive to try to turn off the draft tabling exercise completely. Sam says the Israelis expect and want the Lebanese to table a draft.

-- Habib to tell Gemayel that the Lebanese should go ahead and table the draft but given the imminence of the Secretary's arrival in the area the US will not support the draft but rather work "sympathetically" in the negotiations to narrow differences.

-- On Monday it is announced that the Secretary will make a trip to focus on Lebanon. The Secretary should arrive in Israel no sooner than Thursday, April 28 in order to give Phil time to work the negotiations route.

-- Since it is clear the Israelis are only going to give the final agreement to the Secretary, such an announcement will not interfere materially with Phil's work.

-- The Secretary should go first to Cairo and hold a one-day Chiefs of Mission meeting. The Cairo stop and the focus on Lebanon could carry a helpful signal to the Saudis and others concerning the Camp David partners. The Chiefs of Mission meeting of course would be useful on its own.

-- Lewis believes that if the Secretary is going to get agreement and there would be a good chance of this, he would achieve it by May 6.

-- As in the previous scenario, in addition to the first stop in Cairo and the Secretary's visits to Israel and Lebanon, we would not suggest any other visits although a short trip to Damascus could be useful depending upon circumstances.

-- Any other visits would depend upon time available and the results of the Secretary's engagement on Lebanon.

D. Risks and Advantages of Secretary's involvement

-- Risks of failure are obvious. At this point, however, we are damned if we do and more damned if we don't.

-- Confrontation with Israel could result.

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-- Success would set the stage for solving Lebanon (Syrian angle).

-- In the process, Secretary would have full opportunity to seek ways and means of putting US-Israel relations on more stable basis.

E. Action

If the decision is to go with the Secretary's trip, Habib and Lewis should know ASAP so the necessary can be done in private with maximum effect before White House press leaks risk dissipating the impact of the trip.

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Lebanon Chronology

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June 5 - UN Security Council Res. 508 adopted; calls for end to hostilities

June 6 - Invasion launched; IDF captures Beaufort Castle; moves against Tyre, Nabatiyah, Hasbayya.

- President Reagan sends message to Begin: urges him to give serious thought to June 5 message which warned against wider conflict *

- UN Security Council adopts Resolution 509: demands Israeli withdrawal to international boundaries and calls for ceasefire

June 7 - Habib meets with Begin to gain Israeli compliance with UNSC Res. 509

- Israel downs 2 Syrian jets, bombards Syrian positions in Hammana and Jazzin areas, and bombs Palestinian targets in and around Beirut; Nabatiyah and Hasbayya captured; IDF reaches outskirts of Tyre

- State Dept. issues statement: "a divided Lebanon must not be the outcome of this present violence," Israelis must withdraw and Palestinians must cease using Lebanon as launching pad for attacks against Israel.

June 8 - Fierce fighting at Sidon, Palestinian camps, and Damur; bombing of Beirut continues.

- Israel informs Syria that it does not seek confrontation; will fire if fired upon; warns Syria to halt advance and PLO elements sheltered in Syrian sector should withdraw behind 40 km line

- Begin tells Knesset that Israel's goal is to push "terrorists" beyond 40 km line

- US vetoes Spanish draft resolution which condemns non-compliance with Res. 508 and 509 and, in event of non-compliance, orders consideration of "practical ways and means" to compel compliance

June 9 - Israel extends penetration beyond 40 km line; establishes beachhead at Khaldah (4 miles south of Beirut); captures Sidon and Damur; destroys 19 Syrian SAMs in Bekaa; shoots down between 20 and 30 Migs.

- Habib arrives in Damascus and delivers President Reagan's letter to Assad calling for ceasefire at 0600 June 10

- Reagan message to Begin: concerned by further IDF advances; fears wider war with Syria; calls for ceasefire at 0600 Jun 10

June 10- Ambassador Lewis conveys message from President urging ceasefire and immediate preparation for Israeli withdrawal; expresses concern about broadening Israeli objectives

- Brezhnev-Reagan correspondence

- Haig turns down invitation to Jerusalem: Israel hasn't shown enough "flexibility"

June 11- Israel bombs targets from Khaldah to Babda including Alayh and Hammana approaches, as well as PLO military HQ in Beirut; takes fire control of Beirut-Damascus road; destroys 9 T-72s; shoots down 18 Syrian planes

- Ceasefire goes into effect between Syria and Israel at noon

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- June 12- Israel declares unilateral ceasefire with "terrorists" effective 0900
- June 13- Israel troops move into Babda and trap PLO fighters inside Beirut
- June 14- National Salvation Council formed
 - Habib arrives Beirut and conveys Israeli settlement proposals: demilitarization of 25 mile security belt, withdrawal of Syrian forces. Sharon says "terrorist" infrastructure must be eliminated; "terrorists" should not enjoy immunity beyond the zone.
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 - UNSC Resolution 511 adopted extending UNIFIL mandate 2 months
- June 19- UNSC adopts Resolution 512 - calls for further humanitarian assistance to Lebanon and calls for all parties to refrain from acts of violence against civilians
- June 20- National Salvation Council meets for first time (without Jumblatt)
 - Syria rejects Sarkis' appeal to remove its troops from Lebanon
 - Begin arrives in Washington
- June 21- Reagan meets with Begin: "blunt talks"
 - Israel bombs Palestinian camps around west Beirut
- June 22- Israel mounts major offensive; bombs west Beirut and Syrian and Palestinian positions along Beirut-Damascus road; exchanges artillery fire with Syria.
 - In response to request from Habib, Israel agrees to ceasefire at 1800
 - Haig and Begin hold talks
- June 23- Israel rejects Habib proposal that Israeli forces withdraw 5 kms from Beirut in advance of PLO surrender of its arms
 - US closes chancery in west Beirut
 - Ceasefire at 1900
- June 24- Israel attacks Syrian positions along Beirut-Damascus road and takes control of road at Babda; bombards west Beirut and suburbs
 - National Salvation Council meets for first time with Jumblatt in attendance
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- Haig makes sharp statement to A~~r~~rens about shelling and bombing of west Beirut
- Haig resigns

- June 26- US vetoes French draft UNSC Resolution (vote is 14-1) which calls for immediate ceasefire, Israeli pullback 10 km from Beirut preliminary to total withdrawal, simultaneous PLO removal of its forces to existing camps, and introduction of UN observers to supervise ceasefire and disengagement. US vetoed because Res. did not eliminate armed Palestinian elements from Beirut and elsewhere
- In emergency special session, UNGA adopts Res. ES-7/5 (vote is 127-2(US and Israel) with 3 abstentions) calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal, ceasefire, and Israeli compliance by 0600 June 27, as well as UNSC consideration of "practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the UN," if Israel fails to comply
 - Israel destroys Syrian SAM battery in Bekaa
- June 27- Israeli Cabinet proposes peace plan: Lebanese army to enter Beirut, PLO to lay down arms and go to Syria
- Israeli planes drop leaflets on west Beirut urging residents to leave
- June 29- Haig draws up 9-point proposal for Habib negotiations
- July 4 - Security Council adopts Resolution 513 calling for respect of rights of civilians and restoration of supply of vital facilities
- Israel bombs Palestinian neighborhoods in Beirut
- July 5 - continued bombing; afternoon ceasefire
- July 6 - Reagan confirms agreement in principle to send US troops
- July 7 - Brezhnev responds in letter
- Reagan oral message to Begin: IDF actions over past 72 hours, i.e. crossing points, ceasefire in place, make negotiations impossible; 24-hour deadline unacceptable; some pressure necessary; recent moves counterproductive. If Israel doesn't cooperate, US will have to consider other ways to talk with relevant parties
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 - McCloskey-Arafat
- July 26- Continued air strikes
- July 27- Continued air strikes
- July 28- Habib returns to Beirut
 - Air strikes continue, heavy bombing
 - ceasefire called
- July 29- UNSC adopts Spanish resolution 515 calling for Israel to lift its blockade; US abstains (lack of time to consider)
 - Arab League Ministerial Committee concludes session, calls for withdrawal of all Israeli and PLO forces (Jidda declaration)
- July 30- Renewed fighting, intensive land, air, and sea bombardment of Beirut
 - Ceasefire called
- July 31- Shultz message to Begin: Arab League declaration constructive; next days could be turning point; firm ceasefire necessary; Israel must respond to violations proportionally
- Aug 1 - Ceasefire collapses; Israeli shelling and widespread bombardment of west Beirut; Israel takes complete control of Beirut International Airport
 - Ambassador Tueni calls for emergency meeting of UNSC; Resolution 516 passed unanimously calling for ceasefire (no blame allotted to either side) and authorizing UN observers if GOL requests
- Aug 2 - Shamir meets with Reagan, Shultz and Weinberger in Washington
 - Brezhnev-Reagan exchange
- Aug 4 - Israel advances into west Beirut; tightens siege of PLO strongholds
 - Reagan holds meeting with top advisors to consider US action
 - UNSC adopts Resolution 517 (US abstains) demanding immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Israeli forces, censure of Israel for failing to comply with Res. 508, 509, 512, 513, 515, 516, and calling for return of Israeli troops to Aug 1 positions. US abstains due to no mention of PLO
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- UNSC adopts unanimously Soviet Resolution 518 demanding lift of restrictions on supplies to Beirut; reporting by UN military observers
- Aug 13 - ceasefire
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Lebanon Chronology

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- Aug 14 - Syria tells Sami Khatib it will respond when GOL asks ADF to redeploy. Habib goes to Israel; PLO insists that French enter Day One.
- Aug 15 - Habib meets twice with Begin, before and after an Israeli Cabinet meeting; in second meeting Begin agrees to introduction of MNF on day one but insists that, as part of settlement, Syrians leave Lebanon entirely, PLO provides list of its members in West Beirut to US, and Israeli pilot and bodies of nine deceased soldiers be handed over to ICRC before evacuation starts.

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Aug 16 - Habib returns to Beirut and meets with Sarkis, Wazzan and others. Wazzan says he believes PLO will release one Israeli prisoner and nine corpses. Wazzan states that in plan for PLO departure, PLO should specify in writing responsibility of GOL to verify that all PLO combatants left Beirut as scheduled.

Aug 17 - Habib again meets with Sarkis, Wazzan and others. Wazzan believes he can get PLO to release Israeli prisoner and nine bodies of deceased if request is made in writing and if U.S. agrees to work, in accordance with international law, for satisfactory disposition of Israeli-held Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners.

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Briefing paper for Ag. Sec. Block trip

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BRIEFING PAPER

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E53

The visit to Washington of Foreign Ministers Shamir and Salem provided us an important opportunity to review the status of the negotiations for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. We listened carefully to the concerns expressed by the two Foreign Ministers, and expressed our own views on the need for rapid progress. After these meetings, Ambassador Philip Habib and Ambassador Draper and his team returned to the area in order to help the parties arrive quickly at an agreed text for an agreement.

In addition to the negotiations with Israel, Lebanon has also initiated contacts with Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon. The U.S. is not a direct participant in these talks. We have noted the recent public statements reflecting Syrian and PLO intentions to withdraw from Lebanon if Israel does. This bears out our previous understanding of their positions and is a welcome development.

U.S. policy in Lebanon has the following objectives:

- 1) The withdrawal of all foreign forces--Israeli, Syrian and PLO. All armed elements remaining in Lebanon must be subject to the control of the central government. This includes the militia forces in the south.
- 2) Arrangements to assure the security of Israel's northern border.
- 3) The restoration of a stable central government in Lebanon.
- 4) The extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory.

While agreement has been reached on many issues during the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, we are now addressing the remaining core issues. It is essential that momentum is not lost and that a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon be worked out as soon as possible. The President is personally committed to the achievement of this important objective.

Once an agreement has been reached for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, it will be clear to what extent an

international presence is needed to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces. The U.S. continues to see an important role for the 6,000 UNIFIL troops currently in Lebanon. We will have to see whether there is a need for a Multinational Force (MNF) as well. If so, its objectives would be to facilitate the withdrawal process and to assist the Lebanese central government in re-establishing its control throughout Lebanon, in the same way the MNF has functioned in the Beirut area in the last few months.

We eventually hope to see full peace and normal relations between Israel and each of her neighbors, including Lebanon. In the context of an overall peace, along the lines outlined by the President on September 1, we believe this is an achievable goal. But for the moment we must deal with what is possible in practical terms in Lebanon, a country riven by eight years of internal strife and occupation from outside its borders. Therefore, the U.S. supports practical arrangements consistent with the peaceful relationship we want to encourage.

The security of Israel's northern border is a hallmark of U.S. policy and will have to be an essential element in any agreement that is reached between Lebanon and Israel. The U.S. will do all that it can to assure that an agreement is reached which will preclude a return to a situation in which Israel is threatened by armed attacks from Lebanon.

A stable, secure and free Lebanon would be an historic achievement for the area, for Lebanon, for Israel, and for the world. A Lebanon beset by strife and living under occupation serves the interest of none of us. While there is no direct linkage between progress in the Lebanon negotiations and progress on the broader peace front, there can be no doubt that progress in achieving withdrawal and stability in Lebanon would serve the interests of those who truly seek a peaceful Middle East.

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7/27

- ° Habib is in Israel now.
- ° Last Friday in Damascus, Habib confirmed Syria's agreement to take PLO leadership and offices (est. 1,000). Assad did not totally reject idea of staging remainder of PLO out of Damascus airport for onward destinations. Syrians have no problem with staging out of West Beirut itself.
- ° Saturday in Saudi Arabia, Habib got assurance of continued Saudi help, but Saudi Arabia itself will not take any of the PLO. The Saudis also did not object to staging from West Beirut itself, and Habib now believes this will be the way it is done.
- ° Sunday in Cairo, Mubarak linked Egypt's agreement to take a portion of the PLO to U.S. agreement to provide some political bonus for the Palestinians as regards future achievement of their aspirations. This is clearly the line that the PLO wants promoted now. Habib argued firmly against this as unrealistic.
- ° In London, Habib found Hussein very helpful. Jordan will take back Palestinian combatants who have connections with Jordan by origin of fighting unit or citizenship. Jordan also has gotten Iraq to agree to accept the Palestinian unit formed there (the ALF). Hussein wants the solution of the Lebanon problem (not the immediate West Beirut problem) linked to a comprehensive peace initiative.
- ° Sudan - President Nimeiri says he will receive the PLO combatants, according to the official Sudanese News Agency. We are checking this out through our Ambassador in Khartoum.
- ° Our chief problem with the international force continues to be UN acquiescence. Basically we will have to rely on momentum. When the PLO are about to leave and the Arabs ready to receive them, and Lebanon is calling for the force, we hope the pressure will mount for the Security Council to go along.
- ° Phil Habib believes that our immediate goal is to get Egypt and the Saudis to drop the PLO idea of a "political bonus." We must put pressure on Hassan Ali when he is in Washington. Ambassador Lewis adds that all this current talk about a political bonus is highly troubling to the Israelis. If they conclude that the PLO are emerging with a political victory, it will tip the scales toward a major Israeli military action.

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Agd give to EUR: JGalsden 2/8
Talking points for EC mid-east working
group mtg in Bonn

LEBANON: FOR BACKGROUND ON U.S. VIEWS ON THE
SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE LEBANON-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS,
EMBASSY MAY DRAW ON POLICY STATEMENT PROVIDED IN STATE
8398. FOLLOWING REMARKS UPDATE THAT POLICY STATEMENT.

E56

-- THE PRESIDENT REMAINS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE A RAPID
CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL
AS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IN NEGOTIATING THE WITHDRAWAL
OF SYRIAN AND REMAINING PLO FORCES. AMBASSADOR HABIB
RETURNED TO THE AREA FEBRUARY 8--AFTER DISCUSSIONS IN
PARIS AND ROME--WITH NEW IDEAS FOR BRIDGING GAPS,
PARTICULARLY IN THE DIFFICULT AREAS OF SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS AND FUTURE RELATIONS. FYI: WE DO NOT
EXPECT THE RESULTS OF THE ISRAELI INQUIRY COMMISSION TO
AFFECT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S CURRENT MISSION. THIS IS AN
INTERNAL ISRAELI MATTER ON WHICH WE WILL HAVE NO
COMMENT. END FYI.

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PACE OF THE
LEBANON-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS IS TOO SLOW, LARGELY BECAUSE
THE ISRAELI SIDE IS ASKING THE LEBANESE FOR MORE THAN IS
POSSIBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME. THERE IS SOME AGREEMENT ON
A FEW ISSUES AND ONE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES HAS BEGUN
DRAFTING ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT, BUT DISAGREEMENT OVER
MAJOR ISSUES REMAINS.

-- THE LEBANESE ARE CONDUCTING SEPARATE TRACK
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO. IT WILL BE
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WHATEVER EITHER HEARS FROM
MEMBERS OF THE EC-10 ACCORDS WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
POSITION. BOTH SYRIA AND THE PLO MUST CONTINUE TO
UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT FULL WITHDRAWALS ARE ESSENTIAL TO
RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.

-- THE ISSUE OF PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS
REMAINING IN LEBANON IS ONE OF CONCERN TO ALL OF US; WE
UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOW BEING DEALT WITH SERIOUSLY BY
THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY IN ITS DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE PLO.

-- THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE STILL NOT REACHED A STAGE AT
WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE OR UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES. WE
ASSUME A UN FORCE WILL HAVE A ROLE RESULTING FROM THE
NEGOTIATIONS; THE MNF MAY ALSO HAVE A ROLE. YYY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Umm IS, FPC/CDR

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Minister Sharon is always welcome in Washington.

We believe, however, that this would not be an opportune moment for such a visit. The President has the fullest confidence in his personal emissary, Ambassador Habib, who will remain in the area, where he can be in instant contact with the parties concerned, to pursue his mission to achieve a negotiated peaceful solution to the problem of West Beirut. Ambassador Habib speaks for American policy in this regard and communicates information and views of the parties involved to the President rapidly and accurately. Therefore, the U.S. continues to take up any matter pertaining to West Beirut through Ambassador Habib. At this particular moment, when time is of the essence, and momentum toward the outcome we seek needs to be maintained and built upon, it would not in our view be wise to try to shift the focus of the negotiations away from Ambassador Habib's effort on the scene. We do not want anything to delay us in these crucial final days. Ambassador Habib now has produced a negotiated package arrangement that is reasonable and capable of being put into effect as early as the end of this week. We hope that Israel will give its cooperation to this package arrangement as quickly as possible. Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Lewis are ready to answer whatever questions Israel may have and to transmit messages as may be desired.

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IS/FPC/CDR Washington, D.C. 20520

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SAID

Mr. Paul A. Schwartz
Schwartz Management Co.
P.O. Box 10363
Des Moines, Iowa 50306

Dear Mr. Schwartz:

Thank you for your telegram of June 11 concerning United States' policy regarding the crisis in Lebanon.

Our immediate aim since the outbreak of hostilities has been to bring about an effective end to the fighting.

As you know, the United States remains fully committed to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Accordingly, our goals in the current crisis have been to create conditions which will make possible the restoration of a stable Lebanese government and the removal of all foreign military forces from Lebanese soil, while at the same time assuring full protection for Israel against attack from Lebanese territory. To this end, Ambassador Philip Habib has engaged in intense negotiations throughout the crisis.

We are deeply concerned by the tragic human and material losses which the hostilities have inflicted upon the civilian population in Lebanon. We are already making \$15 million available for emergency assistance such as food, medicines, medical care, clothing and shelter. We applaud Congressional action in authorizing \$50 million to help meet the critical major relief and rehabilitation needs of individuals affected by the conflict. In this effort we are cooperating with the government of Lebanon and with a variety of international and private voluntary organizations, particularly the United Nations and the International Community of the Red Cross.

We recognize that the tragic situation in Lebanon is part of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict, and that the underlying causes of that conflict must be addressed if there is to be a just and durable Middle East peace. We remain committed to the Camp David Accords as the only existing workable basis for a negotiated solution leading to a resolution of the conflict. The Camp David Accords call for a resolution of the Palestinian problem which recognizes the legitimate rights and just requirements of the Palestinian people and insures the security of Israel. We are involved in a process with

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BY S/S-I

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Egypt and Israel aimed at fulfilling the first stage of the Camp David accords: the establishment of full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

We will be devoting great attention and energy to these and related issues through diplomatic discussions with a number of governments.

I appreciate your taking the time to share your thoughts with us on these important issues.

Sincerely,

/s/ 7/1/82

Christopher W. S. Ross
Public Affairs Adviser
Bureau of Near East and
South Asian Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Evening Reading Item

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SECRETLebanon Negotiations

Phil Habib's private discussions in Israel today went very poorly as the Israelis unveiled a lengthy draft agreement containing expansive proposals for normalization of relations with Lebanon. The document is a peace treaty in everything but name, ^{in some respects} and even goes beyond the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in detailing normalization. The draft did not ~~include an annex~~ dealing with security issues since Sharon, who is out of Israel, was not present. Habib is concerned the security proposals could be equally difficult.

Habib's assessment is that the Israeli proposals are completely unworkable; they would be rejected in Lebanon and be opposed by even the most moderate Arab states. These proposals go far beyond the stated Israeli aims for the June invasion of Lebanon and are also more ambitious than Sharon's secret "working paper" of December.

Habib intends, therefore, to tell the Israelis tomorrow in blunt terms that these proposals are unsuitable as a basis for negotiation. Instead, he will suggest that the U.S. draft, developed pursuant to your instructions, be used as a working text.

Drafted by NEA/ARN:CDWelch *mw*Cleared by NEA/IAI:EAbington *ml*NEA:WAKirby *W*SECRET

DECL: OADR

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Lebanon

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NIGHT READING FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN OVER FUNDING OF PLO EVACUATION

We cabled Ambassador Murphy yesterday asking him to raise with King Fahd on Saturday the Saudi pledge to fund the PLO evacuation from Lebanon. Murphy discussed the matter with Prince Saud today. Saud agreed to impress upon Fahd the need for action this weekend. To date the ICRC has received 4.68 million dollars from us. Murphy will press the King to make an immediate payment of 5 million dollars to the ICRC to cover documented costs. Additionally, Murphy will put forth the possibility of the Saudis placing a further 2 million dollars at the disposal of ICRC to cover all anticipated evacuation costs.

The ICRC would then return to the Office of Refugee Programs (State) the 4.68 million dollars the U.S. has advanced to them or the monies will be used by ICRC for relief efforts we now expect them to undertake in Lebanon. This action should serve to substantiate to Congress our stated intent to use USG funds for humanitarian purposes and to underscore that none of the 10 million dollars set aside will actually be expended for the PLO evacuation.

We intend to reply to letters from Senators Kasten and Hatfield, Chairman Long and others, along lines reflected above.

85 0251 7520

Drafted by: NEA/EX:SJKrys:mev

Cleared: NEA:DTSchneider *[Signature]*
AID:MPMcPherson
RP:JNPurcell
L/NEA:JMichel
PM:LBrown
H:JMontgomery

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Q.: There appears to be a growing perception that the Lebanon withdrawal issue and progress on the peace process are closely linked. What is your view?

A.: While we have been pressing for progress in both areas, it is becoming increasingly clear that movement on the peace process on the basis of the President's initiative is being complicated by the slow pace of the Lebanon withdrawal talks. King Hussein has publicly stated that it will be difficult for him to make a decision to enter peace negotiations with Israel as long as Israeli forces remain on Lebanese soil. Whether we agree or not, our effectiveness in achieving the goal of a pullout of all foreign forces from Lebanon is inevitably seen by the Arabs as a measure of our determination and ability to follow through on the positions set forth by the President on September 1. Our interest in progress on Lebanon, therefore, ties in directly with our parallel interest in moving ahead with the President's initiative.

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Q.: How much time does the President's initiative have?

A.: It is difficult to say. You can't put a stop watch to a peace initiative. At the same time, it must be recognized that we are entering an important phase. King Hussein has talked in terms of an early-March deadline for an Arab decision. In practical terms there may be more time than that. The opening for progress, however, remains narrow, and steps must be taken without delay on both the Arab and Israeli sides before it closes.

Q.: What role can the PLO be expected to play in the peace process?

A.: Hussein is now involved in delicate inter-Arab consultations, including consultations with the PLO. These are aimed at coordinating a position that might permit Jordan, along with appropriate Palestinian representatives, to enter negotiations with Israel. We think the Arabs understand that it is unrealistic to believe Israel would agree to sit down with members of the PLO -- even if that organization accepted Israel's right to exist and UNSC 242. What must be devised is a formula for non-PLO Palestinian representation as part of a Jordanian delegation that would meet the needs of all the parties concerned.

Q.: Is Hussein prepared to accept the Camp David Framework as the basis for negotiations?

A.: Hussein, of course, has publicly rejected Camp David, pointing out that Jordan was not a party to it. At the same time, he has expressed deep interest in our proposals -- which are fully consistent with Camp David. More important, he has made it clear that he is interested both in negotiating arrangements during the transitional period called for in Camp David and then pressing on toward the achievement of full peace. These points must not be lost.

Q.: What would be the reaction of the Begin Government if Hussein were to declare his willingness to join the peace process on the basis of our proposals?

A.: Even though the Begin Government has rejected our proposals, we don't see how it could refuse to negotiate if challenged to do so by a credible Arab partner such as Jordan.

Drafter: NEA/IAI: DGreenlee Cleared: NEA/IAI: EAbington ^{GA}
x23672 WANG#3549 NEA: WAKirby ^{GA}

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TALKING POINTS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

--As of noon June 10 fighting close to southern Beirut in the vicinity of the airport has escalated. Israeli gunboats were reported to have begun shelling southern Beirut in an attempt to land north of the airport. Airstrikes against several Beirut targets were conducted early on June 10, resulting in significant damage to areas near the center of the city. The American Embassy in Beirut has reported the presence of a number of armed groups and individuals in the vicinity of the embassy. Although there has been no sign of hostility towards the mission, security is rapidly deteriorating in the city.

--Syrian forces are digging-in, in an apparent line of defense in the southern Bekaa valley. Intense air battles between Israeli and Syrian fighters have been reported over the region with the IDF claiming that 20 Syrian aircraft have been downed today. This is in addition to 23 planes downed yesterday and 6 in the previous two days. The IDF claims that Israeli Air Forces have destroyed the Syrian SAM umbrella over the Bekaa and has issued a call for the surrender of Syrian forces in the area. Attacks have been launched on two SAM sites inside Syria within the past 24 hours; both are no longer

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operational.

--On the political front, Egyptian President Mubarak has sent an urgent appeal to President Reagan concerning the deteriorating situation in Lebanon and the need to end the fighting and achieve an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces in Lebanon. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud will meet today in Europe with President Reagan, probably to explain Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council views on the conflict. There are also reports that an Algerian delegation headed by a senior Politburo member will travel to Damascus on June 10 to confer on what aid Algeria can offer to Syria. Libyan number two Jallud is also reportedly in Algeria to consult on the two Steadfastness Front countries' policies on Lebanon. Saudi media report that Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd 'Aziz telephoned Syrian President Assad to stress Saudi solidarity with Syria in the Lebanon crisis.

--The Israelis continue to state--publicly and privately--that they have limited aims. These are basically to establish a permanent new buffer zone which would put all artillery or rockets out of range of Israel proper and to destroy the PLO as a military force.

--Despite their heavy air and more limited ground engagements thus far, the Israelis have also made clear, publicly and privately, that they do not wish to engage the Syrians in a major war. The Syrians have declared a

mobilization but do not appear to be eager to engage the Israelis.

--We are very concerned at this point that the fighting may escalate into a more generalized conflict between not only Israel and Syria but also involving Iraqi and other Arab forces.

--Having said this, it still leaves us with major problems in trying to contain the damage to major U.S. interests in the region. We must first stop the fighting and bring about the earliest possible Israeli withdrawal. The Israelis are not likely to do so unless there is a substitute force to control the buffer zone.

--At the President's direction, Phil Habib has met with both Prime Minister Begin and President Assad to try to bring about a cease-fire as early as possible. He is also discussing longer term arrangements for the future of Lebanon.

--The human dimensions of the tragedy in Lebanon are enormous. Aside from the great numbers of casualties to civilians, there is already a substantial number of people converging on Beirut fleeing the fighting. There are huge medical and relief needs. To meet these needs the President has announced he will seek \$25 million in humanitarian relief be made available immediately.

--So far the Soviets have mounted a propaganda barrage blaming the U.S. for being behind Israel, but they have taken

no other significant steps.

--We have drawn down our embassy personnel in Beirut and have contingency plans to evacuate other Americans if necessary from Beirut and other capitals.

--(If asked about the possibly illegal use of U.S. weaponry) We are looking into this question, but, as I said before, we need to retain maximum flexibility at this point.

DRAFTED: NEA/IAI: TMILLER

CLEARED: NEA/IAI: CHILL *each*

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EVENING READING

Ken Dam called in Israeli Ambassador Arens today to respond to Arens' January 25 proposal that the emphasis in the Lebanon negotiations be placed on achieving an interim partial withdrawal of foreign forces. He and Phil Habib made clear that a partial withdrawal would present problems and would not be acceptable to the U.S. and to Lebanon. It would suggest a de facto division of Lebanon and leave the impression that full withdrawal is less urgent than it is. Arens argued that this reasoning is specious and continued to press -- without success -- for full U.S. support for such an approach.

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The Senators will be looking for your comments on the Lebanon situation with an emphasis on the Shamir visit and on the developments of the last few days. You met with Percy, Pell, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday and they may wish to continue from there.

TALKING POINTS

-- WE CONTINUE TO BE HOPEFUL OF BRINGING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT WILL SATISFY THE OBJECTIVES OF ALL OF US. WITH QUIET RESTORED IN BEIRUT, PHIL HABIB WILL BE ABLE TO PRESS FORWARD HIS EFFORTS ON THAT FRONT. AMBASSADOR HABIB IS SATISFIED WITH PLO ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL LEAVE BEIRUT, BUT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE STILL REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

-- THE ISRAELIS DEFINITELY SUPPORT THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THERE ARE A FEW KEY TACTICAL DECISIONS ON WHICH THEY WILL HAVE TO REACH A DECISION SHORTLY. WE SHOULD KNOW SOON WHETHER THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED.

-- WE BELIEVE THE PLO IS PREPARED TO DEPART BEIRUT FOR ADJACENT ARAB COUNTRIES. THEIR CONCERN NOW IS WITH THE MODALITIES OF THAT DEPARTURE -- PRINCIPALLY WITH THEIR BEING PERMITTED TO DEPART WITHOUT TOTAL HUMILIATION AND IN RELATIVE SECURITY.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO CONTRIBUTE U.S. TROOPS TO A MULTINATIONAL (MNF) FORCE FOR BEIRUT REMAINS IN EFFECT. WE WILL NEED THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE TROOPS AND CERTAIN ASSURANCES AS TO THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THIS MNF.

85 0251 7520

Drafted: NEA/IAI: ^{YK}LM Peters
ext. 23672

Clearance: NEA: CHill



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

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S/S *Ann*
 Date: *1/27/95*
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TO : The Deputy Secretary

 FROM : NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
 PA - John Hughes *JH*

 SUBJECT: Background Interview on Massacre in Lebanon with
 ABC Television
ISSUE FOR DECISION

ABC Television News has requested two interviews on the massacres in Lebanon. They seek one interview on background with a follow-up interview on-camera. The interviews would be in connection with an ABC Special Report being done on the Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camp massacres of last September.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

William Sherman of ABC Television is putting together a documentary on the Sabra/Shatila massacres. Of special interest to ABC is the nature of assurances provided to the PLO regarding the civilian population that would remain in Lebanon following the withdrawal of PLO combatants. A second focus would be on the role of the MNF as understood by the participants in the Force and the Israeli and Lebanese Governments as well as the PLO.

Sherman or his associates have already spoken with Ambassador Dillon and other Embassy officers in Beirut, on background (Tabs 1, 2). ABC has also interviewed the French and Italian ambassadors in Beirut, MNF officers and Yasser Arafat, among others. Sherman intends to return to Lebanon soon to complete his filming and will also visit Israel after the commission of inquiry there completes its work. Embassy Tel Aviv has not yet met with ABC and has some reservations about any senior USG official doing so except on a deep background basis for fear that it would inevitably provoke further strain into Israeli-U.S. relations by injecting us into the Israeli investigation and its aftermath.

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NEA recommends against an on-camera interview with ABC for the reasons outlined by Tel Aviv and is not convinced it is necessary to making our points. NEA believes, and Ambassador Habib concurs, that the essential facts should be underscored by a senior U.S. official, probably on deep background, in a manner which will best advance our objectives in Lebanon, and avoid damaging U.S. relations with the key parties.

If you concur, in a background session we would make the following points with Sherman in the context of the plan for the withdrawal of the PLO from West Beirut:

1) We were assured by the Israelis that they would not enter West Beirut following the withdrawal of the PLO combatants; that assurance was not honored following Bashir's assassination.

2) We were assured by Bashir Gemayel that the Phalange would not undertake reprisal attacks against the PLO civilians remaining in Beirut; that assurance was not honored following his death.

3) On the basis of assurances we received, we passed on written assurances to the PLO leadership through the GOL. These assurances included a working paper from Ambassador Habib to the Lebanese, and through them to the PLO, advising that written assurances on the safety of Palestinians remaining in Beirut would be prepared; a letter from Ambassador Dillon to Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan conveying the assurances we had received (Tab 4); and the PLO withdrawal plan itself, which is a public document (Tab 5). ABC tells us they have been shown copies of the Dillon/Wazzan letter by the PLO.

We would make the point that we were satisfied at the time that we had assurances that would be honored. At the same time we recognized that we were not in a position to physically prevent either the Phalange or Israel from acting contrary to their word. We will add that we were greatly distressed when it became clear that following Bashir's assassination the Israelis were moving into West Beirut and subsequently that Phalange elements were undertaking reprisals against civilians in the refugee camps. We also felt a certain moral obligation to the Palestinian civilians remaining. Actions we undertook at the time and subsequent investigations provide evidence of this. We will review the sequence of events leading up to the massacre and our discovery, after the fact, that it had taken place. As to the role of the MNF, we believe any questions ABC may have could be addressed separately, also on deep background (PM or L could undertake this). ABC has hinted that it has conflicting views from MNF participants as to the nature of the role it had undertaken.

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NEA Recommendation:

That Nick Veliotes or Charlie Hill meet with Bill Sherman on deep background and that the request for an on-camera interview be turned down.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

PA Recommendation:

PA disagrees with NEA's position as reflected above and recommends that State produce an expert on-camera for this Special. Phil Habib would be ideal. PA's reasoning is:

1. The show will not be aired until after the Israeli commission has made its findings public.
2. representative as experienced as Phil Habib would be able to make his points without being confrontational with the Israelis.
3. ABC has promised that the questioning of a U.S. spokesman would not be "hostile."
4. ABC already has on film some criticism of the U.S. by the French and Italian Ambassadors in Beirut.
5. If we do not offer an on-camera spokesman the viewing public will be left without any visual explanation of the U.S. position.
6. The U.S. position is an honorable one; it deserves to be articulated; Habib was the man on the spot and is the only man who can say at first hand what the understandings were.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Beirut 8469
Tab 2 - Beirut 8558
Tab 3 - Tel Aviv 17546
Tab 4 - Dillon/Wazzan assurances letter
Tab 5 - PLO-Withdrawal Plan

Drafter: NEA/P: TAHoman

Clearances: NEA: WKirby
L : MMcLeod
PM : RKanter

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

SECRET BEIRUT 5508

EXDIS **DECAPTIONED**

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DNG: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, PLO, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: US ASSURANCES TO GOL FOR THE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF DEPARTING PLO PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FPC/CDR	Date: 11/27/95
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1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED AUGUST 19 WHICH I SIGNED AND DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN TODAY COVERING ASSURANCES WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL AND THE PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE OF PLO LEADERS, OFFICES AND COMBATANTS. THE LETTER WAS ADJUSTED SOMEWHAT TO MAKE IT A LETTER RATHER THAN A FIRST PERSON FORMAL NOTE. THE SUBSTANCE IS THE SAME AS THAT AUTHORIZED.

3. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
WITH REFERENCE TO OUR MANY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE NEED FOR ASSURANCES REGARDING THE SAFE AND SECURE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP, OFFICES AND COMBATANTS FROM BEIRUT, I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS ASSURED THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT THE PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO IS ACCEPTABLE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL NOT PREVENT OR IMPAIR ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

ON THE BASIS OF THESE ASSURANCE, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS CONFIDENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PLAN. FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP, OFFICES AND COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT IN A MANNER WHICH WILL:

- (A) ASSURE THE SAFETY OF SUCH DEPARTING PERSONNEL;
- (B) ASSURE THE SAFETY OF OTHER PERSONS IN THE AREA; AND
- (C) FURTHER THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON OVER THE BEIRUT AREA.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FULLY RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THAT MY GOVERNMENT WILL DO ITS UTMOST TO ENSURE THAT THOSE ASSURANCES ARE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED.

RESPECTFULLY,

PHILIP C. HABIB

EMISSARY OF THE PRESIDENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

END TEXT.

DILLON



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520
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Date: 11/27/90

E85

SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO : S/S - L. Paul Bremer, III
FROM : NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
SUBJECT : Message from Habib: Morning Meeting with Sarkis, June 25.

1. SECRET - Entire Text

2. At 1040 June 25, I met for 35 minutes with President Sarkis, who was attended by Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of Intelligence Johnnie Abdu and Chief Aide Tonio Haddad. Also present were Dillon, Draper and Barrett. Abdu confirmed at the beginning of the meeting that the explosions we were hearing were from the aerial bombing of the airport road area and Burj al-Burajinah.

3. I read out the text of the message to the PLO we had requested Saudia Arabia, Egypt and France to deliver to the PLO: "We advise you in the strongest terms to communicate your agreement at once to the following points:

- (1) All Palestinian fighters in West Beirut and the camp to the south of the city will hand over all arms to the Lebanese Armed Forces and turn these areas over to the control of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Government of Lebanon.
- (2) The leadership of the PLO and such others as may be used to join them will depart Lebanon, under safe conduct, guaranteed, monitored, and assisted as requested by outside observers."

4. I explained that this message had been sent last night (Washington time) because there had been too many misunderstandings, too many people sending conflicting messages, too many voices giving false signals to the PLO.

SECRET

RDS-1,3 06/25/02

(HABIB, Philip C.)

5. I told Sarkis that, if these terms were accepted by the PLO, the problem that we had discussed last night could be solved. This expected the GOL would be supported in its position not only by an agreement with the PLO but also by the two large Arab powers transmitting this message. If the PLO did not accept these recommendations, I said I just did not know what would happen. Sarkis commented that Wazzan was in a difficult position and can use help from friendly third countries such as Saudi Arabia.

6. Referring to the bombardment going on, Wazzan said that he needed badly a real cease-fire in support of his efforts with the PLO. Jumblatt was quitting the NSC in protest over the massacre. Barri would follow and maybe he, Wazzan, would also have to resign. I said I would return to the residence asap to exert maximum effort to attain an immediate cease-fire.

7. Wazzan said the PLO leadership is agreed that there can be no return to the status quo ante. However, they needed to save some appearances and honor. Wazzan felt yesterday that the PLO was ready to abandon this military role in Lebanon but that they want to discuss questions of form. They are concerned with the formulation for their future existence, for maintaining the cause. They are ready to recognize GOL sovereignty in such a way that would imply disarmament, without explicitly using that term. They cannot just lay down their arms.

8. As for departing Lebanon, Wazzan noted that the USG position had apparently hardened regarding the necessity for the PLO leadership to leave Lebanon.

9. Sarkis said that the PLO wanted to stay in camps with their arms while they negotiated. Wazzan said these would not be the camps in South Beirut but others and that this would be a temporary arrangement. Only civilians would remain in the camp in South Beirut, and the arms there would be turned over.

10. At this point, wanting to get into communication with Washington, I asked that Jumblatt be phoned. When he got on, I urged him in the strongest terms not to do anything precipitate, not to resign and to talk to Wazzan, the President or me right away. "You are needed." I told him he did not know everything that was going on. (Jumblatt had planned to resign at 1300 local during a press conference.)

11. At the end of the meeting the President received word of an Israeli announcement that had said that the Phalange had participated south with the IDF in the capture of Jumhur from the Syrians, on the Beirut-Damascus highway. This upset the President who said he was sure that it was not so and that it must be an Israeli trick.

12. We left the meeting saying that I would seek a cease-fire and would stand by until the GOL had more precise information to communicate to us about the latest PLO position.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520
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CONFIDENTIAL

TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

SUBJECT: Recorded Radio Report from Habib
 0730 A.M. June 27, 1982

1. Confidential - Entire text

2. It is impossible to do our job properly in the absence of adequate briefings via the Working Group. What is going on? We have repeatedly requested up to date information - including key news reports, particularly from Israel - which we cannot always monitor here. We are under the mercy of constricted communications, but there is no reason why Washington should have been so unresponsive.

3. We need to be updated regularly with:

(a) Texts of key Departmental instructions and cables from the field, particularly from Tel Aviv but also from Arab capitols and the UN.

(b) INR intelligence summary, RPI traffic and key TVIA reports.

(c) Newest developments broadcasted by radio, we learned from sources here hours after the fact that Israel was broadcasting suggestions to the Lebanese to leave West Beirut.

4. Not all this information needs to be dictated to a secretary. It could be transmitted over the secure line at a normal speaking tempo. Important messages should come at dictation speed. We have wasted an inordinate amount of time trying to fill in. We cannot rely on the three of you to keep us filled in since you are all busy. Please correct this situation immediately.

LWG:SEHampton
 #1303A

Pass to Eagleburger, Veliotis and Hill

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PA Exemptions ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C OADR

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ES Sensitive
SECRET

TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

SUBJECT: Taped TelCon Habib and Charles Hill
(no time recorded), July 3, 1982

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(E89)

ES Sensitive
SECRET

TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos

SUBJECT: Taped telCon Morris Draper and Charlie Hill
(no time recorded), July 3, 1982

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

TAPED TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
Morris Draper and Charlie Hill

July 3, 1982

DRAPER: Would you call Charly Hill on an urgent basis, very urgent. Over.

This is State, Roger. Standby.

DRAPER: Department, Department, come in again, please. Over.

This is the Department. They are calling Mr. Hill's office right now.

DRAPER: Now when he comes up, I'm going to explain things I would like to have the tape recorder turned on and also he should bring a secretary with him not to take a message but to take notes. Do you read me? Over.

DRAPER: Area militarily and it is kind of funny a city fighting. I think we have to be prepared, in other words, I go back to this that with landings or with occupation of areas not just one place and not just one entry way. Naturally when we get the airport open there will be some advantage in using that airport, certainly the French want to have that as long as landings I think are made from the south; it's a north/south runway basically and they don't have to fly over the city and take chances with the Habsh crowd and others who might be wanting to send SA-7s up into our aircraft. Over.

HILL: Okay, Morey, I got to go down to see Stoessel and Eagleburger. Anything else before I take off. Over.

DRAPER: No, good luck. You don't need it. Over

HILL: Over and out.

Yariz, Yariz, this is State Department. This is State Department. Over.

This is Yariz. Over.

Morris, this is Eli Bizic. A little awhile ago I was talking to Bob Dillon about the wireless file and we have since then received an instruction on the telex that Habib would prefer to have the wireless file rather than the FBIS. Now we have sent

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instructions to have the entire wireless file sent to you. It's some 80 pages long and it's going to disrupt the unclassified communications for some time. If you don't want the whole thing, let us know right away. It can be edited but then it would take a long time and probably would not be done until tomorrow. One more thing you should know is that the next wireless file is on Tuesday, here which would arrive on Wednesday there so we are responding to you but we need just a little bit more guidance on how much wireless file you want.

DRAPER: Even though it takes a little bit longer I think you might as well edit it and keep all the other stuff flowing. I don't think that's quite correct what Habib said. Habib needs a feel for the basic temperature of the United States; we all do, you know how it relates to the Middle East and comments and statements and extractions, newspaper editorials, and so forth so I suggest a quick editing job. You know cutting it down from 80 pages to 30 or whatever it might be, but that shouldn't take any time to edit; I mean that should take all of 3 or 4 minutes. Over.

BIZIC: We understand Morris. It's just the question of dealing with the bureaucracy at USICA. We think we can do it and they are being very cooperative and they will do their best. The problem is that there are articles about Hinkley interspersed and when it is on a magnetic tape they don't know exactly what begins where and it takes a little longer to edit it than normally would be expected. But based on your guidance, we'll see what can be done. You may end up with the whole file I just don't know. We appreciate what you need and we understand what you need it's just the mechanical question of how to get it out to you in the best and fastest possible way. If we don't get it out tonight it's probably useless to you tomorrow, but we feel it can be done. Over.

DRAPER: I'm not suggesting we make any fine tuning, I mean of cutting out the Hinkley stuff. Do it by big blocks. Usually every wireless file has one of these god-damn long dull speeches made by somebody that doesn't mean anything. Chop out the whole thing and leave the rest in. I think that would do okay. Over.

BIZIC: Roger, Morris. We see what we can do. Over and out.

DRAPER: Over and out. Thank you. Out.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO: S/S - Paul Bremer

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos

SUBJECT: Telecon between Phil Habib and Charlie Hill,
Saturday, July 10 11:00 a.m.

HABIB: I wish you guys would get Khaddam and Faisal, Saud Faisal, there as quickly as you can. Get somebody to talk to them. I wish the they had been there already. But in any event, it seems to me we got to back onto the Saudis and ask them what is going on. So Murphy has got some work to do. Meanwhile, I told Wazzan and those guys this morning while we... were waiting I said, Look, all that I read into that announcement is the Syrians want the PLO to ask them to come. And then Wazzan will say yes. They didn't think that was necessarily so, but I felt it was. My feeling still, on the basis of Morrie's report, and Haddad's last sentence I still think that's a possibility. I don't give up on the Syrians by any means whatsoever. Besides which we have nowhere else to send them. OVER

HILL: You're sure right there. Is it possible or have you gotten that through the PLO or can you do that today? Is that your intention to try to get Wazzan to tell them to issue a request in some form? OVER

HABIB: No, I told them that that's what I think would be necessary but we want to wait until we got Morrie's report. I told them I would let them know this afternoon. OVER

HILL: Okay, I will ring up Murphy right away and bring him into this and, have him get to Saud. And also in the course of the day try to shape up this Khaddam and Saud visit. I guess, you are going to wait Morrie's arrival and then go back to them. Is that right? OVER

HABIB: Yeah, I want to see his full report. Also, I think that you ought to make sure that the Saudis understand that we expect that they are also keeping in touch with the PLO about these things. I presume that they have already told the PLO what they had told us. Or do we know that? I mean, if they

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don't, they ought to stay in touch with the PLO and make sure the PLO knows what they want. OVER

HILL: Should we ask Saud to convey the idea to the PLO that they ought to make a request to Syria? OVER

HABIB: Let's study that in full then I'll come in with a proper recommendation. Let's not get ahead of ourselves too far. We can afford to wait a few hours. Meanwhile, I am going to be meeting Kimche and Bar-On this afternoon and I am not going to be completely negative with them. They will want to know about Morrie's report. I'll just give them....they'll have read this so-called Syrian announcement in the morning paper so we'll be working something out. I don't want to close out this thing, yet. OVER.

HILL: Okay. Then from this end right now I'll just talk to Dick and have him get in touch. There was alarm in the press here and the evening TV news last night about this statement from Iskander in Syria, so the news was here last night and we just brushed it aside as we do with all these things. But, I'm sure that the Saudis have got this and probably are all upset about it and are in touch already. But I'll check in and see what's going on out there and then report back to you. OVER

HABIB: You mean, you had this thing last night and you didn't tell anybody about it? I mean, what's the matter with you guys? Can't you read? Or nobody brought it to your attention because they didn't think it was important. (laughing) It's not the sort of thing you brush aside, old boy. I hope Morrie knew about it before he got there! But I presume he did, because he asked the question that I would have asked. What about the PLO? Now what you ought to have Murphy do with Saud is -- you don't have to come right out and say ask the PLO. He might say to them, have you been keeping the PLO informed? You notice the statement indicates they haven't received the PLO request. Will the PLO be prepared to give a request? Do it in the form of questions. (Play like an Arab.) They always ask questions when they want to find out what the hell you think. They don't tell you. OVER

HILL: Yeah, okay. When we knew about it we were concerned, of course. This was about 3 a.m. your time. It was about to be played here as the destruction of the whole effort and that is what I mean by brushing it aside. They appear to be panicking in face of these questions. O.k. I will put it in this way to Dick and then go to Saud. OVER

HABIB: Yes, I think it would be well if we get something out of Dick today. We need something today. Meanwhile I will hold the Israelis off with a stiff arm, and I will keep the Lebanese from the depth of despair as I think I did this a.m., as you will see from our report. O.k. that's it, and I hope you can get the spokesman to be a little bit reluctant to discuss things on this basis. Let's just keep an open mind until we know where we stand finally. OVER

HILL: Oh yes, we got them on a very short leash, o.k. I will meet with Nick in a minute and I will go over this with him. Walt will be coming in, but before I talk to him I will probably be onto Murphy, and I will get back to you as soon as I have anything. You can let me know if you have any word from Kimche. OVER AND OUT

HABIB: ONE THING, ONE THING, it's fairly quiet in the city, there have only been a few shells fired this a.m., including some of them close to us. We don't know who is doing the shooting, but in any event Sharon's business about the snipers hitting them --- I did all that with the Lebanese, but let's face it my boy, what they did to West Beirut last night is not the way to respond to snipers. In my opinion, it was just completely and totally and possibly out of proportion. It doesn't do any good to look at it now. This guy did not meet his (A) last night and that's just what happened, it interferes with the whole city. The whole city was aflame last night, and there is nothing I can do about it. Whether they played that game and said we won't (B) while this is going on, I don't know what the score is. All I know is that I did not get anywhere near as far as I thought I would go today. All I have now is that, as a result of that meeting with Hani al-Hassan, they won't go by sea definitely, they want to go by land. All the other questions are unanswered about who goes where when and all the modalities. I have kicked them along today and now they are saying if the Syrians won't take them blah, blah,. I have nothing to say. OVER AND OUT.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veriotes

SUBJECT: Need for a Policy Toward West Beirut

We urgently need a policy toward Israeli activities in and around West Beirut. Today's events at least raise the possibility of an IDF assault on West Beirut which could undermine our broader Lebanese policy as well as our hopes as regards the peace process. Phil Habib has already recommended that we take prompt action to forestall further Israeli moves on the city itself (I am attaching a copy of his latest report).

In addition to the several thousand armed Palestinian fighters in West Beirut, there are several hundred thousand non-combatant residents in the immediate area plus a population of more than a million in the broader area of the city. As the Egyptians made clear yesterday, the future of the Palestinian population in Lebanon, and most immediately their humanitarian needs, is high on the Egyptian agenda. Passivity on our part toward this problem could become a major issue between us.

So far, we and the Israelis have been talking past each other as to what the cease-fire really means. We have also been victim to exceedingly fast-moving events. Now, however, our overall Lebanese policy is clearly hostage to what happens in the next day or so in West Beirut.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we follow Phil's recommendation and tell the Israelis on an urgent basis that we expect no military action to be taken in or against West Beirut.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

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 SECRET

TO: S/S - Paul Bremer
 FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
 SUBJECT: Telecon between Phil Habib and Charlie Hill, 12:30 p.m., July 11, 1982

HABIB: You will be getting a cable flash. I will be sending it to Tel Aviv also, but I think you can move on this basis prior to receiving the proposal. I am trying to get this cease-fire established.

I have been talking to the Prime Minister. The firing is still going on, there are short pauses then we may get ten or fifteen shells a minute then there are short pauses. So it hasn't really diminished very much, it is still unacceptable. We have got to get it stopped completely! The Prime Minister and I have agreed that we will try to get both sides to stop, without question, at 2100 hrs. local. He will work to get the PLO and he said he thinks he will get them to stop firing by that time. We ought to tell the Israelis as we go back to them, as I presume we are going to do that the PLO definitely will not be firing at 2100 hrs. and that they should stop at 2100 hrs. That was the deal I made with Wazzan. Now shortly after Saib Salam, who was with Wazzan said "look Ramadan ends at 1900 (7 o'clock) We will stop at 7 o'clock, hopefully, the Israelis will follow suit if they don't, o.k. 9 o'clock (2100 hrs.) We are going to try and get the PLO to stop at 7 o'clock regardless in the hope that we would get some equivalent response. I said I am not so sure I can get that turn around by seven because its only 25 minutes from now, but I will try and in any event will aim for nine (2100 hrs.). Have you got it? OVER.

HILL: Phil, I have it -- you want us to aim for 2100 and say that it's possible that the PLO will stop at 7 o'clock. If that happens, we will hope the Israelis would reciprocate at 7, but in any event, 2100 hrs. OVER:

HABIB: Yes, I couldn't agree at 7 because it's only 20 minutes from now and I told them I had to have time to get it down there and get the order back up here, and get the order distributed to all the firing batteries. Still there are a number of batteries firing and that's the point. O.k., if that's o.k. with you, go ahead, we will be sending a flash

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cable in on the same subject, but go ahead on that basis. That's understood. OVER:

VELIOTES: On some other issues, you will have seen a conversation Larry and I had with Arens where we raised the issue of overall compatability of goals with the Israelis. I am urging that Larry pick this up again today in his conversation with Arens, which I understand he is supposed to have this afternoon and hit them hard in the context of Tamir's comments to you which you have reported.

We started work a few days ago on the whole question of our relations with the Israelis on Lebanon. With the exception of West Beirut itself, which is getting lots of attention, and everything points to their literally settling in, dictating the next government, bullying, and with guns, trying to create what they consider to be the millenium. I want people to start telling them as we get these indications and I think Arens is the one to do it here --at this point --that this is unacceptable, going back to the President's letter. I just wanted you to know that we had not been ignoring these things, it's just a little difficult to get the focus that you need in the hiatus period OVER

HABIB: Did you read the cable we sent in this morning that has this very specific recommendation that we start dealing with that subject? OVER

VELIOTES: Yes, I did see that cable, and I wanted you to know that I got a first draft on my desk. Once I talk to Larry, I'm going to send it out to you for your comments and then we'll decide what to do with it from there. OVER

HABIB: Yeah, you're absolutely right, Nick, and you don't have to only hinge it on the Tamir thing. If you just look at that latest thing of Sharon's and look at some of the things that Sharon has been saying all along in public as well as private and some of the leaks they have given to the press, you will see it runs throughout the thing. And look, today they are extending the reserve call-up three months so they can keep them if they want them for three months. There's a report they are going to start bringing women soldiers into Lebanon. There's the report that they're putting winter uniforms together. There's all sorts of indication in addition to Tamir's bluntness to me. See, what Tamir was doing, well, he was mad because he was accusing me that once we got the Beirut thing done I was going to want them to start disengaging. That's what got him off, you see. And there's all sorts of evidence to support the opening of an argument with him on

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this, because there is going to be one hell of an argument! There's no question of the way they are letting Bashir run wild. Bashir told me the other day that before the Israeli invasion he controlled 20% of the area and the people in Lebanon. He said he now has the capacity to control 40% of them. I just want to give you a little figure like that that illustrates it. All right, meanwhile you go get Sam going. Morris has one point. Wait a minute. He wants to add it. But, in any event, as soon as Morris gets through you get going and get Sam to get those guys to cut it out by 2100 hours absolutely and earlier, if possible. OVER. Hold on.

DRAPER: Nick, as far as that exchange in notes has been proposed for the participation of the U.S. government in the Sofar(?) agreement, and all that stuff, I think the best we are going to be able to do is a note verbal recording of our understanding. I think that will be adequate. I think we can do it and we will send a draft in. Do you read me? OVER

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TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos
SUBJECT: Habib-Welch Telcon
1320 hours, July 2, 1982

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS, FPC/CDR

Date. 11/27/82

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FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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1320 hours EDT--Habib-Welch Telcon 7/2/82

LWG-Welch called Yarze to pass following message from Eagleburger to Habib/Draper.

Eagleburger called French Ambassador here to ask about Mr. Guttman's travel plans, noting we had report of his intention to go to Saudi Arabia. French Ambassador's reply was:

- He did not know of a planned trip to Saudi Arabia;
- Guttman was on his way to Beirut; and,
- French Ambassador will cable Guttman telling him not to complicate picture by raising different ideas.

Eagleburger suggested Habib meet with Guttman in Beirut.

Habib responded that GOL FonMin Boutros expects Guttman in Beirut tomorrow, July 3. Habib will ask the French Ambassador to Lebanon to set up a meeting with Guttman before the latter has any contacts with GOL officials.

CC: NEA - Mr. C. Hill
P - Ms. R. Raphael

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RDS 1&3, 7/2/02 (Welch, David)

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5/59/17

TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis *NAB*
SUBJECT: TelCon Habib and Beth Jones
11:00 A.M., July 4, 1982

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *CM* IS/FPC/CDR Date: 11/27/91

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TS authority to:

CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR HABIB AND BETH JONES
JULY 4, 1982, 11:00 A.M.

HABIB:...THOSE TROOPS SHOULD WANT TO COME OUT OF UNIFIL OR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS GOING TO COME OUT OF UNIFIL. ARAFAT IN NO WAY SUGGESTED THAT THE FRANCO-AMERICAN MULTINATIONAL FORCE SHOULD BE UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN. YOU GOT THAT? OVER.

JONES: I'VE GOT THAT. THE ONLY UN REFERENCE WAS A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE FRENCH TROOPS WOULD COME FROM UNIFIL. IS THAT CORRECT? OVER.

HABIB: THAT IS CORRECT. WHETHER OR NOT THAT WOULD REQUIRE UN ACQUIESCENCE, BUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE FRANCO-AMERICAN FORCE HE DIDN'T SAY THAT IT HAD TO HAVE UN ACQUIESCENCE OR BE UNDER UN CONTROL. HE JUST ASKED A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IF THE FRENCH TROOPS CAME OUT OF THE UNIFIL THEY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE UN ACQUIESCENCE. I MEAN, YOU PEOPLE GOT THAT STRAIGHT NOW? IT HAS NOTHING TO DO..IF THE FRENCH TROOPS COME FROM FRANCE THEY WOULDN'T EVEN HAVE TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION. IN MY OPINION EVEN IF THE FRENCH TAKE THEM OUT OF UNIFIL THEY OBVIOUSLY WANT TO NOTIFY THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT I DOUBT WHETHER IT REQUIRES THEIR ACQUIESCENCE. OVER.

JONES: OKAY. I'VE GOT IT STRAIGHT. I'LL PASS THAT RIGHT ON TO BARRY. OVER.

HABIB: TELL THEM THAT BOB BARRETT WENT OVER AND TALKED TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND WENT OVER IT VERY CAREFULLY AND THAT'S WHAT HE CAME BACK WITH JUST NOW. OVER AND OUT...

JONES: VERY GOOD. STATE DEPARTMENT OUT.

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I. Basic Premises:

-- The Israeli action has changed the situation irreversibly, the previous status quo can never be restored, even if it were desirable, which it is not.

-- A new status quo should be developed, ideally through a broad-based international approach, which:

-- -- protects and ultimately enhances the central government and the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Lebanon, enabling the Lebanese Government eventually to extend its sovereign control to the international border with Israel.

-- -- significantly, if not totally, reduces the security threat to Israel from Palestinians and other insurgents.

-- We should make a virtue out of necessity and try to establish a new status quo not only in Southern Lebanon but also as regards Lebanon's other problems (e.g., the Syrian presence, the Palestinian problem).

II. A Staged Approach: Analysis

-- A satisfactory international-indigenous force establishing a strategic buffer and permitting Israeli withdrawal.

-- A complementary international approach aimed at dealing with Lebanon's other problems:

-- -- free Presidential elections.

-- -- post-elections improvement of the Lebanese army.

-- -- post elections strengthening of Lebanese institutions.

-- -- removal of ADF at least to the Bakaa.

III. Pros and Cons of Various Kinds of International Forces:

-- An expanded UNIFIL with a new territorial mandate (note June 19 renewal of mandate).

-- An international force not under a UN mandate, but drawing authority through an appeal from the Government of Lebanon.

-- -- Its composition: Arab, European, U.S.

-- -- Elimination of Soviet influence?

-- -- Could the mandate of such a force be drawn so as to include Beirut and much of western Lebanon?

IV. Relationship of International Approach to:

-- On-going peace negotiations and particularly the Camp David autonomy talks.

-- European desire to deal more directly with the Palestinian problem.

-- Arab world desire to deal with the Palestinian problem.

-- US-USSR rivalry.

-- Prospects of encouraging a moderate Arab coalition.

-- Jordan's role as regards the peace process.

-- Other issues including the Iraq-Iran situation.

V. Analyzing the Timing and Tactics of U.S. Approaches:

-- Dramatic appeal by President Reagan vs stated, careful consultations with Lebanese, Europeans, Israelis, and key Arab states.

-- Initiatives from others which could cut across our own efforts.

-- Distractions of SC debates.

-- The spoiler roles of the Syrians and the Soviets.

VI. Consensus Summing Up:

-- Game Plan for Dramatic Approach.

-- Game Plan for More Careful Approach.

- Financial Implications for the U.S.
- Humanitarian Program.
- Relocation of Palestinian Inhabitants of Buffer Zone.
- Legal Analysis of Use of U.S. Forces.

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PLO POSITION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS
By Hasan Rahman
Deputy Permanent Representative of the PLO to the United Nations
(212) 288-8500

In relation to the question of Beirut, the PLO has put forth to the Lebanese Prime Minister a plan for the settlement of the question of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. This includes an immediate cease-fire, disengagement of the forces and deployment of units of the Lebanese army enforced by an international force to supervise the cease-fire pending the constitution of an international force to provide safety and security for the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. When the international force is deployed in and around the refugee camps, a redeployment of Palestinian forces outside of Beirut will take place.

The PLO considers the military dimension of the situation in Lebanon as only one of the elements that should be dealt with, since the PLO is not only a military organization but is in fact a political organization. For many years, it has operated as the authority that is responsible for the 500,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world.

To a great extent, the PLO has operated to provide assistance in the social, economic and educational lives of the Palestinians inside the occupied territories, as well as for the Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. As an example, we have 8,000 Palestinian families in Jordan which receive social security from the PLO on a monthly basis.

As far as the Palestinians in Lebanon are concerned, and with the agreement of the Lebanese authorities in accordance with the Cairo Agreement of 1969 between the PLO and the Lebanese authorities, which was endorsed by the Lebanese

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Parliament, the PLO took charge of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and established the infrastructure for all aspects of civilian life. We feel that any settlement of the question of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon must be linked to an overall settlement of the Palestinian question in all its aspects. Linkage is extremely important, because in its absence the repercussions would be disastrous for the whole region.

Two elements should be stressed:

- 1) The necessity to preserve a cohesive and credible leadership and
- 2) A hope for the Palestinians to be enabled to have a passport of their own and a flag in a state of their own on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In spite of all the destruction and the killing that has resulted from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, we hope that the peace initiative that has been launched by Egypt and France in the Security Council, which contains all the elements of what we view as a just settlement of the Palestinian question which the PLO favors, will go forward. This initiative includes acceptance of U. N. Resolutions 242 and 338, rights of all states in the region to live in security and mutual and simultaneous recognition of all the parties.

On the other hand, the initiative for a peaceful settlement recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on the West Bank and Gaza Strip with all of its implications and a role for the PLO to participate in the negotiations as the representative of the Palestinian people.

This initiative enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of the states of the world, including the ten Western European countries; and we hope the United States will find it acceptable for the sake of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Mideast.

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TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Ambassador Eagleburger

FROM : PM - Jonathan T. Howe

SUBJECT: Military Requirements for an Enlarged
Lebanon Peacekeeping Force

This memorandum is a preliminary assessment of the military requirements for a peacekeeping force covering an area larger than that covered by the UNIFIL force. IO will be providing you with more details on setting-up a PKF. How large a force will be required, how heavily will it have to be equipped and, based on other peacekeeping forces, who has forces that would meet the politico-military requirements.

HOW LARGE?

The size of the force required will be partially determined by two variables: area of operation (AO) and type or role of force.

o Area of Operations (AO)

There appear to be three likely options for an increased AO. See map Tab 1.

I) The current UNIFIL-Haddad-PLO areas south of Litani plus the area up to the Zaharani river (Area I);

II) That area plus eastern Lebanon between the coast and the ridge as far north as Damur (Areas I and II); and

III) The area in 2) plus the southern half of Bekaa Valley
(Areas I, II and III).

Attached maps show how large an area is contemplated and how it compares with the current UNIFIL AO, which has been manned by about 7,000 troops. (Tab 1)

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o Type of Force

One can envision three types of peacekeeping force in the region.

1) Observer units carrying only side arms and manning observation points and conducting reconnaissance and inspection patrols;

2) Light infantry force similar to current UNIFIL forces and typical of other peacekeeping forces; or

3) Fully combat-capable, fully supported mechanized infantry units.

Observer units would probably be ineffective in this area. Combat-capable units might be desirable from a military standpoint if there is a likelihood of conflict with the PLO, but nations are likely to contribute only if there is some kind of agreement, even if only tacit, that PLO elements in the AO will be restrained from harassing peacekeeping units. Thus, this memo examines only the option of forces equipped along the UNIFIL lines i.e., light infantry. It does not envision a PKO that would provide a cordon sanitaire against PLO arms infiltration.

SIZE OF FORCE

Whether the peacekeeping force is an expanded UNIFIL, an extension of the existing MFO, a new MFO-type operation or some combination, the size of the force required will remain the same. Equipment will vary depending upon which nations offer units. Some units from less well equipped armies may require additional vehicles, APCs, helicopters, etc., depending upon the conditions and requirements. Heavier armor, mechanized equipment and artillery would not be anticipated for this force.

There are two ways of looking quickly at size requirements. The first is to extrapolate from the size of the UNIFIL elements now in Lebanon, assuming that additional peacekeeping forces will cover approximately 90 km² per battalion. Assuming that the existing eight battalions now forming UNIFIL remain in their current areas, the following are the additional requirements for the three possible AOs:

I) South of Zahrani: eight additional battalions plus support units;

II) South of Beirut, east of Bekka: 20 additional battalions plus support units;

III) All south of Beirut: 24 additional battalions plus support units.

This estimate assumes that the force would be made up of disparate units of widely varying training, equipment and capabilities operating with the same sort of command and control, tactics, etc. as UNIFIL and other peacekeeping forces typically have.

The second way of sizing is from US military standards and assumes much more centralized command and control and sophisticated, mobile operations than multilateral peacekeeping operations typically have. It results in a smaller force and assumes the sort of force that would exist if the peacekeeping were the close direction of a well-equipped, sophisticated modern army. Such an operation would be unusual for a multilateral peacekeeping force.

US PARTICIPATION

Israelis have already speculated publicly that the US should play a role in a PKO in Lebanon, similar to the role we agreed to play in the MFO. Israel would obviously like us to perform such a role because it would a) further demonstrate the US security guarantee of Israel by placing US troops in buffer zones on Israel's western (MFO) and northern (Lebanon) borders; b) enmesh us in and increase our stake in solving their Lebanon problem; c) possibly exacerbate US-Arab relations.

The Israelis probably have in mind a US role similar to that in the MFO, in which we provide both a field unit and the central logistical/headquarters support. The US came to have such a role in the MFO because:

-- MFO is a non-UN force, thus permitting the US to participate without a balancing Soviet role. It is difficult to believe that the Soviets would allow the US to participate in an expanded UNIFIL or that the Israelis would agree to a UNIFIL that included Soviets to balance the US. Thus, in suggesting a US role, the Israelis are implicitly rejecting a force under UN auspices.

-- US participation was necessary to induce others. It may not be necessary to have a US element to convince other nations to play a role in an expanded UNIFIL or a supplementary force.

-- Both sides wanted the US in MFO. While it is unclear who all of the parties would be to an agreement setting up a new or enlarged force in Lebanon, it is unlikely that all of them will agree to a US role without a balancing Soviet role, even if the force is not UN sanctioned. The Syrians and the PLO will clearly object to a US presence.

DoD is likely to seriously resist a US military presence. They believe that the MFO commitment degrades the capabilities of XVIII Airborne Corps and creates a retention problem, although it does provide some training in desert climates. DoD's major concern is that US forces could become a lightning rod for the PLO, involving them in clashes that would a) damage our relations with the Arab world by identifying the US even more vividly with Israel; b) put the US in a situation in which its forces were potentially shooting Arabs; and c) possibly require additional US or Israeli forces to intervene to assist in major fire-fights.

DoD's objections would probably be much less to a reduced US role of logistical support, in which US military and civilian personnel provided air lift, communications, supply management, and technical headquarters support. As in the case of the MFO's Rome headquarters, the new Lebanon PKO could have an off-shore headquarters (e.g., Cyprus) which could be heavily staffed by US personnel, including seconded military. Anything more than a limited logistical/headquarters role, however, will meet with serious and well-founded DoD concerns.

o Other National Participation

The chart at Tab 2 indicates which countries are contributing to current peacekeeping forces which the US supports. Some may be willing to contribute to an expanded force in Lebanon. Their willingness to contribute to an expanded force in Lebanon. Their willingness to contribute is likely to depend upon a number of factors, including:

- Size of the area the Israelis ultimately take and occupy;
- Whether it is UN sanctioned;
- Size of the proposed AO for the peacekeeping force;
- Extent of Arab and Lebanese willingness to accept a multilateral peacekeeping force;
- Willingness of the PLO to at least tacitly accept the authority of a peacekeeping force;

(
A large AO will discourage participation because of the apparent danger to relatively lightly equipped troops. Similarly, the greater the opposition of the PLO, the Lebanese, and Arab governments to a peacekeeping force, the less willing more nations are likely to be to provide units.

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
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MFO UNIFIL UNDOF UNFICYP Cyprus Chad PKF Namibia PKF

stria Inf. Batt. Inf. Batt.

s/NZ Helos

nada Signal Unit 500 Artillery

lombia Inf. Batt.

rmark Inf. Batt.

ji Inf. Batt. Inf. Batt.

nland Inf. Batt. Inf. Batt.

ance 3 support aircraft Log. Unit & Inf. Batt.

ana Inf. Batt. & HQ

el: Inf. Batt. & HQ

aly Minesweepers Log. Unit

pal Inf. Batt.

therland Provost Marshall Inf. Batt.

geria Inf. Batt. Inf. Batt.

rway Inf. Batt. & Log.

land Log. Unit

negal Inf. Batt. Inf. Batt.

aden Inf. Batt.

ited HQ staff Inf. Batt. & 400 other troops

ingdom

ite Inf. Batt.

at

iguay Relief Inf. Batt.

re Inf. Batt.

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POSSIBLE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES

Introduction

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There are three ~~basic~~ scenarios in which the participation of U.S. armed forces in peacekeeping operations might occur in connection with the current violence in southern Lebanon. First, the U.S. might participate in a ^{expanded UN Truce} ~~UN~~ peacekeeping force. Second, an ad hoc multilateral peacekeeping force analogous to the MFO might be established. ^{to supplement or supplant UN Truce} Finally, the U.S. might provide ~~the entire~~ ^{the entire} a peacekeeping force. This memorandum discusses the requirements of U.S. domestic law ^{for these purposes} relevant to the participation of U.S. Armed Forces in such peacekeeping functions. It does not address the international legal aspects related to the establishment and deployment of a peacekeeping force.

Authority for U.S. Forces to Participate

The President's Constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces would provide a sufficient legal basis for the initial deployment of U.S. Forces to perform peacekeeping duties. However, to the extent that significant additional U.S. funding ^(as would undoubtedly be the case in any major involvement) would be required to support the U.S. involvement, Congressional action would be essential. ~~Moreover, the Congress will expect to~~

^{as well as related policy considerations}
This implies that Congressional authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces is required.

~~play a role in authorizing such a significant new U.S. undertaking,~~
and Congressional involvement would be both necessary and desirable
as a policy matter.

There ~~is~~ only precedent for ^{the participation of} U.S. armed forces participation in
peacekeeping activities following a cessation of hostilities is the
current participation of U.S. forces in the Multinational Force and
Observers in the Sinai. That participation was expressly authorized
in advance of deployment ^{by} statute (PL97-132). Such express statutory
authorization was sought by the Executive Branch in that case
because (a) legislation authorizing ~~appropriations for~~ U.S.
financial contributions to the MFO budget was a practical
prerequisite to the ~~participation of U.S. forces~~ ^{establishment of the peacekeeping} (b) it was
considered essential from a policy standpoint ^{and} that Egypt and Israel
have the assurance ^{of ongoing U.S. participation (which could not be assured)} ~~that the Congress was committed to the principle~~
~~provided a Secret Congressional involvement)~~
~~of participation of U.S. forces, and (c) such express statutory~~
~~authorization avoided raising questions concerning the President's~~
~~authority to unilaterally commit U.S. forces in circumstances where~~
~~no imminent military threat to the U.S. or its allies existed.~~

As a practical matter, similar considerations would appear to
apply to any possible participation of U.S. armed forces in a
peacekeeping force deriving from the current situation in southern
Lebanon. While it is conceivable that the U.S. might be able to

participate initially in a UN Force without seeking additional funds from the Congress, the establishment of any ad hoc multilateral force or unilateral U.S. peacekeeping effort would undoubtedly require, substantial U.S. financial commitments, as would any ~~medium~~ long-term U.N. effort. Moreover, U.S. participation would serve a useful policy purpose only if the parties were assured that it would be ongoing. ~~Assurance which would not be credible in the absence of Congress.~~ In sum, while the President technically has the ~~authority~~ necessary authority to ~~send~~ ^{to place} U.S. forces to the Middle East ^{to} serve in a peacekeeping force, ~~the going medium to long term nature of the commitment~~ ^{the extent for involvement} would in practice necessitate prior Congressional approval for both funding and policy reasons.

The War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution (PL 93-148) establishes certain procedural requirements applicable to ^{the} deployment of U.S. forces overseas, and purports to establish certain substantive limitations on the duration of such deployments as well. ~~The applicability of the various requirements of the War Powers Resolution to the participation of U.S. forces in a peacekeeping force~~ ^{in Lebanon} would depend upon the facts and circumstances involved, and would not be substantially affected by the legal basis for U.S. participation.

Consultation with Congress: The War Powers Resolution requires the President "in every possible instance" to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities or into situations "where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." A judgment as to the likelihood that U.S. forces participating in a peacekeeping force would imminently become involved in hostilities would therefore have to be made ^a based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time of deployment. While presumably there would be no clear indication of imminent involvement in hostilities where a force was being introduced following a cessation of hostilities, ^{Howe} if imminent involvement in hostilities were indicated, ^{by the circumstances in the area} consultations would be required. ^(statutory) While the requirement to consult ^{is} limited by the phrase "in every possible instance," it is doubtful that the timing ~~as~~ or circumstances of ^{in a peacekeeping force} such a deployment would provide a plausible basis for arguing that ^{Prior Consultations} ~~consultations~~ were not possible. Further, the ^{Consultation} ~~casualties~~ requirements are ongoing; if subsequent to the initial deployment, U.S. forces were to be introduced into hostilities or into situations in which imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly indicated, ^{Advance Consultations} ~~casualties~~ would be required in every possible instance. ^{Whether prior consultations were required in a given situation would depend upon the specific facts of the situation involved.}

Reporting Requirements: The War Powers Resolution requires the President to submit a formal report to the Congress within 48 hours

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^{in a document}
(We obviously did not have time to prepare a document in response to Libya's attack upon them in the G. I. S. area)

of (a) the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or ~~in~~ situations where hostilities are imminent, or (b) the introduction into ~~a~~ foreign ^{law, treaty} nation of U.S. forces "equipped for combat." The report must set forth the circumstances necessitating the introduction of U.S. forces, the legal authority therefor, and the estimated scope and duration of involvement. Follow-up reports are required at least every six months thereafter until the U.S. involvement ceases.

The reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution apply irrespective of the legal basis upon which the introduction of U.S. forces ~~in question~~ is undertaken.)

→ Even where a statute expressly authorizes the participation of U.S. forces, the reporting requirements apply. Thus, a War Powers report was filed in connection with the introduction into Egypt of U.S. forces participating in the MFO since they are equipped for combat. (The Administration also assured the Congress that reports would be filed in the event imminent involvement of ~~those~~ U.S. ^{assigned to the MFO} forces/in hostilities were clearly indicated.)

It should be emphasized that the ^{Consideration} ~~casualties~~ and reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution are procedural only. They do not purport to limit or restrict the President's substantive

legal authority to deploy U.S. forces abroad.

Congressional Limitations: The War Powers Resolution does seek to limit the President's authority to maintain the involvement of U.S. forces in hostilities or in situations in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. The Resolution provides that the President must terminate such involvement within 60 days unless Congress ~~has~~ specifically authorized continued involvement. (The President may extend ^{the} the period for up to an additional 30 days if he certifies to the Congress that unavoidable military necessity relating to the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces so requires.)

Further, the Resolution provides for the immediate termination of U.S. involvement if the Congress passes a Concurrent Resolution to that effect. (The Executive Branch has questioned the constitutionality of the ¹⁵¹provision.)

It should be noted, however, that unlike the reporting requirements discussed above, the provisions covering the termination of U.S. involvement would apply only in the event U.S. forces were to be introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly indicated. ~~Do not apply to the initial introduction of U.S. forces or to U.S. forces in peacekeeping operations.~~ They would not be applicable to an initial introduction of U.S. forces in ~~peacekeeping operations~~ in a situation where hostilities had ceased and an imminent recurrence of hostilities was not clearly indicated, although the issue of Congressional authorization would arise were U.S. forces subsequently to be faced with imminent involvement in hostilities.

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E103

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT
ON THE OCCASION OF AGREEMENT
ON PLAN FOR RESOLUTION OF WEST BEIRUT CRISIS
DELIVERED IN THE WHITE HOUSE ROSE GARDEN ON AUG. 20, 1982

Ambassador Habib has informed me that a plan to resolve the West Beirut crisis has been agreed upon by all the parties involved. As part of this plan, the Government of Lebanon has requested, and I have approved, the deployment of United States forces to Beirut as part of a Multinational Force.

The negotiations to develop this plan have been extremely complex and have been conducted in the most arduous circumstances. At times, it was difficult to imagine how agreement could be reached, and yet it has been reached.

The statesmanship and courage of President Sarkis and his colleagues in the Lebanese Government deserve special recognition, as does the magnificent work of Ambassador Habib. Phil never lost hope, and in the end his spirit and determination carried the day. We all owe him a deep debt of gratitude.

The parties who made this plan possible have a special responsibility for ensuring its successful implementation. I expect its terms to be carried out in good faith and in accordance with the agreed timetable. This will require meticulous adherence to the cease-fire. Violations by any party would imperil the plan and bring renewed bloodshed and tragedy to the people of Beirut. Under no circumstances must that be allowed to happen.

As you know, my agreement to include United States forces in a Multinational Force was essential to our success. In the days ahead, they and forces from France and Italy will be playing an important but carefully limited non-combatant role. The parties to the plan have agreed to this role and have provided assurances on the safety of our forces. Our purpose will be to assist the Lebanese armed forces in carrying out their responsibility for ensuring the departures of PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of United States forces also will facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government over the Beirut area. In no case will our troops stay longer than 30 days.

The participation of France and Italy in this effort is further evidence of the sense of responsibility of these good friends of the United States.

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- 2 -

Successful resolution of the West Beirut crisis by responsible implementation of the plan now agreed will set the stage for the urgent international action required to restore Lebanon's full sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, obtain the rapid withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country, and help ensure the security of Northern Israel. We must also move quickly, in the context of Camp David, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, as well as the other unresolved problems in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only when all these steps are accomplished can true and lasting peace and security be achieved in the Middle East.

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file Lebanon press

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PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWING ALI'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY

Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt, Kamal Hassan Ali, met with President Reagan and with Secretary Shultz today. The Deputy Prime Minister presented Egypt's position with regard to the situation in Lebanon and the need to give hope to the Palestinians for a just and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian problem.

We made clear the following:

-- The United States views the situation in Lebanon with grave concern and regrets the continuation of hostilities, the acts of violence, and the great human suffering, which constitute a threat to peace and stability in this vital part of the world. The United States strongly urges that all parties and combatants observe strictly a cease-fire in place and refrain from any future acts of belligerency.

-- The tragic developments of the past few weeks demonstrate the need for us to work vigorously and tirelessly to strengthen the structure of peace and to take further early steps on the road to a just and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem without delay.

-- The United States believes it is urgent and imperative to find a solution to the present problem of Beirut and the presence of the PLO in that city, in order to create conditions that will make it possible to achieve other important goals in the Lebanon situation -- as well as to move towards a just and

durable Middle East peace. In this connection, we welcome the statement of the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference yesterday that the PLO is prepared to remove its forces from Beirut. It is our hope that Egypt and other Arab states will assist in helping bring the Beirut crisis to a close by agreeing to receive those forces. The United States for its part will then move forward rapidly on other elements of the Lebanese problem and towards a just and durable peace.

-- In the context of such a peace, the United States, ~~basing itself on the Camp David Accords~~, recognizes that the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and dimensions must be addressed in conformity with internationally-accepted principles of justice. (The legitimate grievances of the Palestinian people should be redressed and their legitimate rights should be recognized. A just and lasting peace must also assure the security of Israel and ~~all the parties concerned, including Israel~~

-- The Palestinian issue will remain of central importance in U.S. efforts to provide new and early momentum to the peace process. The United States ~~basing itself on the Camp David Accords~~, believes that comprehensive peace can be achieved through negotiations in which all parties to the conflict participate, including representatives of the Palestinian people, and which are based on all the principles and provisions of Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the need to realize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

See 8219018
4/7/99 Service
S/S 8219017

LWG-Welch called Morrie Draper at request of NEA/P. to check press handling of Habib-Sharon meeting of July 5, 1982. Draper conveyed following press guidance:

- 1) Confirm Habib-Sharon meeting; but no details.
- 2) Follow-up guidance can be drafted as follows: "Habib decided to do this because it was urgently necessary that a ceasefire be called. A ceasefire was restored at 1600 local time, July 5. Habib also saw Sharon to urge a restoration of water and power services to West Beirut, and to allow essential food and other supplies to go into West Beirut."

Draper added that "standard ceasefire breakdown guidance" should be used for questions on the latest ceasefire violations. Draper also noted that as of 0900 EDT water and power was still off, so press statements should avoid this issue.

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Drafted by: LWG:DWelch
7/5/82 Ext.26611

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO: H - Mr. Drischler

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

SUBJECT: Lebanon Supplemental

Phil Habib called Senator Percy and Congressman Broomfield this morning to seek their assistance in expediting Congressional approval of the Lebanon supplemental. Percy observed that delay is more likely to come from the House side, but he agreed to call Senator Kasten to urge that there be no obstacles in the Senate appropriations process. Broomfield said he would call Chairmen Long and Zablocki. Broomfield observed that it would be essential for the Secretary to speak to Long. No one else in the Department would do. It would also be desirable for the Secretary to solicit Speaker O'Neill's support.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William P. Clark
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Next Steps in the Middle East

Following up on our conversation today, I have attached an outline of how we might proceed over the next several weeks in furthering our policies in the Middle East.

Attachment:
Outline/Next Steps in the Middle East

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Next Steps in the Middle East

The next few weeks will be highly important for the success of U.S. policies with respect both to Lebanon and to the broader peace process.

Following his meeting with Shamir today, Phil Habib is returning to the U.S. to fulfill some longstanding personal obligations. We should take advantage of Phil's presence for an in-depth review of the progress that has been made in the Lebanon negotiations, as well as King Hussein's current position. On Lebanon, we have come a long way in a short time. Only a few points remain to be resolved before an agreement can be reached. We will be exploring additional ideas on how we might deal with the Haddad problem and Arens' concerns about possible Israeli responses to the potential growth of a terrorist presence.

It would be useful in these circumstances to have our Ambassadors most directly concerned in these issues return from the Middle East to assist us in developing the most effective strategy. They would be able, really for the first time, to meet together and share ideas with senior Administration officials. They would work with me to prepare recommendations for the President on how we can best deal with the period ahead. They, and Phil, would then be able to return to the area with the President's instructions. A Chiefs of Mission Conference would also be seen in the area and at home as a demonstration of the President's continued determination to pursue his policies vigorously.

Building on this foundation, I would plan to visit the Middle East in the April 20-May 3 time frame, largely to help resolve any problems remaining in the path of an agreement in Lebanon. By that time, Hussein may already have announced his intention to join the peace process. If not, I would hope to prepare the ground for appealing to Hussein on the basis of a successful outcome in Lebanon or, perhaps, determining if it might be possible to meld Hussein's decision into our strategy for closing a Lebanon deal.

A trip at the end of April would also provide an opportunity to discuss in depth with Prime Minister Begin the U.S.-Israeli relationship and Begin's oft-postponed visit to Washington. I would also meet with King Fahd and Syrian President Assad. The visit would demonstrate that the U.S. continues to regard the Middle East as a high priority area and would inject a new sense of dynamism into U.S. policies.

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- 2 -

While our objective is to push the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations to a conclusion during this coming period, we must recognize that we are looking fairly far into the future in Middle East terms. We may hit unexpected snags and we will have to reassess continually as we proceed. If a real impasse develops, we may want to review the situation with the President and call on him to help resolve the problem. If such is the case following my return, the time may then be appropriate to consider other alternatives, such as a forcing message from the President to Prime Minister Begin or exploring greater direct U.S. participation in security measures in southern Lebanon.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/3/02 {HOWE, JONATHAN T.}

TAGS: MILI LE IS

SUBJECT: CONDITION OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE CONFLICTING REPORTS REGARDING CONDITION OF BEIRUT AIRPORT. SPECIFICALLY, HOW MUCH DAMAGE HAS BEEN SUSTAINED, HOW QUICKLY COULD THIS DAMAGE BE REPAIRED, AND ONCE REPAIRS ARE MADE, WHAT TYPES OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE ACCOMMODATED? IS IT POSSIBLE THAT SOME REPAIRS COULD BE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE C-130'S?

3. FOR BEIRUT: IN LIGHT OF HABIB'S REPORT THAT AIRPORT CAN NOT BE REPAIRED FOR 3-5 DAYS, DOES THIS PERTAIN TO USE OF RUNWAYS BY 707'S OR C-130'S? WHAT FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE LOCALLY TO REPAIR AIRPORT?

4. FOR TEL AVIV: REQUEST YOU CONTACT IDF FOR ASSESSMENT OF QUESTIONS POSED PARA 2. ALSO, WOULD IDF QUICKLY BE ABLE TO PUT RUNWAYS BACK IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION?

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Transcript of Habib/Veliotes Telcon of June 21 at 0800

Amb. Habib: Have you read the message I sent earlier to be transmitted to you?

Amb. Veliotes: Yes I just received.

Amb. Habib: Let me make it very clear the situation now in my thinking is extremely grave with respect to West Beirut. I have just receive Saab Salan. I talked to President Sarkis on the telephone. And while he was in the room with me Saab Salan talked twice with Arafat.

Amb. Veliotes: I read you.

Amb. Habib: The Israelis are moving into the airport area, indeed have already moved into it if the information is correct. There was a Lebanese army unit there, they were told to get out of the way. As the Israelis move up and over the last twelve hours or so there has been a certain amount of harrassing fire from Israeli artillery going into the camp areas in West Beirut.

Amb. Veliotes: We read continue.

Amb. Habib: There have been a number of women and children and old people being killed or wounded. This driving the Palestinians bananas to say the least. I have never heard the conversation, from which I was only hearing one end coming from Saab Salan. He tells me that Arafat and his men who are in Saab Salan's house in West Beirut, also there is Sohl, Foreign Prime Minister. They are there and Arafat said that it is impossible for them to accept what the Israeli are doing. First of all indiscriminate shelling, secondly moving their troops forward into the airport area on the threshold of the camp areas, or threatening to move to the threshold of the camp area, while at the same time calling for a cease-fire or saying there is a cease-fire. They therefore are intending to, as Saab Salan believes Arafat has said to them that if this does not stop they will immediately go into an all out campaign of fighting Israeli, no matter where or how. That is also typical Arabic squeamish yelling about they'll hit them to the right/hit them

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o the left it doesn't make any difference they're all finished, they are going to die anyway, etc, etc. Saab Salan meanwhile is telling him what I'm telling him "you tell them the solution is here, why don't they work it out with the Lebanese government. Let the Lebanese army move in and then the Israelis will stand still. Now frankly, I am not so sure that when I say the Israelis will stand still, they will stand. I am not so sure we can deliver that anymore. Goddamnit, I thought this was a cease-fire in place around Beirut, not a move into the airport, which is a very sensitive area. Now in my opinion we can in the next few hours either solve this problem the way we have been trying to solve it or its going to fail. I have talked to President Sarkis and I had Salam talk to President Sarkis again to say to him that the original idea which was for the Committee of the Government to talk to Palestinians at 6:00 clock tonight that that had to be advance. It had to go down there as quickly as possible to make the arrangements with the Palestinians to get Lebanese army to begin moving down. Now if we get an understanding in that regard, I hope to God we can get the Israelis to stand still. In fact, I would like the Israelis to get off that Goddamn airfield. They had no business telling the Lebanese army to move aside while they moved into the airfield. They have also brought up fifty tanks in the Carlvie area which the Palestinians are aware of. So that in other words they are positioning themselves. Now I realize that it is important to maintain pressure but this is gone further than I think is necessary. We have now had sufficient pressure that the Lebanese government is finally beginning to act with some degree of unity since last night. I had a long talk with the President this morning to make very clear they do exactly what the PLO would have them do. They are prepared to go put it to the PLO. I have told them that there is no indefinite time to this, but it has to be done now. I have repeated the message to Salam who is going back and I heard him give the same message to Arafat over the phone in my presence. We can hopefully still hold this thing together without the mess that is otherwise inevitable. I don't know whether anybody can get the Israelis to just hold back a little bit. Goddamnit, you would think its worth their while. Otherwise they are going to lose a lot of their boys. They'll win in the end but they'll lose them. Now can't you guys arrange that from Washington.

Amb. Veliotis: Sure, we'll do our best today with (Suparty). I will pass your message immediately to the Secretary. We get to the White House at ten o'clock for a pre-brief and I would like to suggest to the Secretary that he make available this conversation. Your report.

Amb. Habib: I am at a point now where I sense the desperation of the people here and the desperation in the Palestinians can erupt. There is no question that they lost old people, women and children one way or the other last night. And frankly, it just, As I said it'll set them bananas. And they are capable of it as you well know. We are still trying to show them that there is a way out and that it is a way out in which they are protected. Now I have told Saab Salam and I told the President that they could guarantee them that the U.S., this is not just me, that I am under instructions to tell U.S. will see to it that are not just simply killed or taken away or put into an impossible positions of being under the controls of people other than the government of Lebanon. And that they will be given a way out. I hope to God that that guarantee still holds fire and that we will be permitted to see that it happens that way.

Amb. Veliotis: Phil, Larry just came in and although I have taped as you requested your message, perhaps you'd like to talk to him and give him a summary of where you are and what you need and when you need it.

Amb. Habib: OK, but why don't you just let him hear the tape. But in sum Larry, its this: That we think we are now in a situation in the last hours of being able to resolve this thing without the use of further force. We think we can do it, and I see now that there is a real possibility. It is going to take a few hours of talking. We have urged the powers of the Lebanese Government to accelerate the process, and they are doing so. But the situation in terms of Israeli movement, Israeli military action is now complicating the situation, it has not simplified. In fact they are making it increasingly difficult to move to the thing as politically in the manner in which I think is now achievable. But, just listen to the tape, its only five minutes. Hell I can't go over the stuff over and over again. We are sending you some cables as well, but its urgent that the Israeli be convinced that the time is right

this minute that they stop doing what they are doing. Which is not only that they are firing haphazardly into the city. But are what (my) Bob's Military Attache calls harrassment fire in which they are killing some of the Palestinian's elderly, women and children. Numbers of the Wounded and Casualties are mounting among the civilians, because the fire that is going in and has been going for the last fourteen hours is not directed at particular targets. It is harrassment fire, it just goes in here, there and everywhere. Now the Palestinians leadership gathered in the House of the Lebanese (Vasarpy) Former Prime Minister who just came to talk to me, and during that time he was on the phone twice with Arafat. Arafat is going bananas over not only the actions, but the movement of Israeli troops into the Airport area and subsequently the threatening. They made the Lebanese army stand aside and then on moving into the airport area up closer to the Palestinian camps. I consider that to be unreasonable movement in view of the alledge cease-fire.

Now you know, and I know that there never has been a cease-fire. Don't think I just been telling these people that the Israelis have no right to do (this). I don't say that. I simply say that the Palestinians fired last night, that they shot 50 shells in the area where I am. 50 right around us and the Israelis have been replying for 14 hours straight. Now, on the other hand, in addition to they are moving too. One way or another the word has to be gotten. You ought to get the Secretary to talk to (_____), Begin to get word to Brown that we have a chance to get this thing done peaceably. If it goes on the way it is, not only going to be here that there is going to be a lot of trouble, but its going to be elsewhere too. Because the Palestinians know they are completely beaten. They are beginning to talk in sort of - tramping like language. There is no point in my describing the language, its really frightening. You got me.

Amb. Veliotis: Phil, what you need now from us is to get the Israelis to stop shooting. Secondly, once you have a deal, you want to Israelis to start moving back beginning from the airport, but also from so other places presumably from around (Bagdad). Thirdly, you want us to reconfirm that if the view is worked out that your guarantee on behalf of the U.S. Government that there will be no slaughter, there will be no deceit. That the people who want to leave will leave and those

who stay will be under the Lebanese authority. That that is still the position of the U.S. Government and we can deliver the Israelis on this. Is this correct.

Amb. Habib: Everything is correct except this. It is not necessary for the Israelis to be moving back at this point, I do think they are ought to get out of the airport at this point. Which they have moved in to, but I also think the most important thing is that they stand still. Now they shouldn't have moved into the airport, and I think they ought to move out of it. Let the Lebanese army control the airport again the way it was this morning, three, four, five hours ago. Then they can stand still while the deal works. And if the deal works the rest of what you said is correct. You got my point.

Amb. Veliotis: OK, but if its a choice of getting them to stop and stop shooting or getting them to get out of the airport. It will be easier to get the first two than the third. Do you suggest we go for all three? Or do you see some marginal virtue in having them there in a threatening position while the deal is being made?

Amb. Habib: Nick, they are in such a threatening position without being in the airport, that it is unconceivable that they need that airport. They only need that airport if they want to move in on the Goddamn town. They don't need it for any other reason, they are in a total threatening position. I think they ought to get out of the Goddamn airport. They had not business telling the Lebanese army to get out of the way. Secondly, of course its more important to get them to stop firing. If you can't get them to do anything else, at least get that. But you know we are being constantly nibbled to death for this Goddamn thing. Now I think we can produce the kind of solution we can best live with and which also the Lebanese Government can best live. And also I'll tell you this, I think its a solution the Israelis can best live. If its a deal. Cause if it is not a deal then we don't have anything that at least we can work. If its just plan power the way Salam thinks, then that which he said yesterday, then we can't do the things we need to be done afterwards. Now I don't understand why the Hell somebody can't convince them of that. If we're convinced of it they have to follow us. Now if we are not convinced of it tell me. You know the situation is a matter of hours now, it is not a matter of days. People have

to understand that. And they must stop putting more pressure on. The guys inside are getting really crazy and I believe it. Everything I have indicates that that is so. They're going to be prepared to go down with a great deal of violence. They are not being given a way out as of now. I have told them in spade, you've got a solution. You've got to accept it. And I've accelerated the process of trying to get them to accept it. Now it's up to (____). Now I can't go down there and make the deal with Arafat. All I can do is use all the instruments that we have the Government, the Muslims who are in contact with him, the people they are living with. We are doing all of that. Now if we've already used all the pressure we need from outside, it is now a matter of a decision right here on the ground. You've got to get the Israelis to stop. There is no point in our talking anymore until you try that.

Amb. Veliotis; OK, Phil we've got you. We'll move on this. Over and out.

Amb. Habib: Before you go out Nick, with the kind of people that are in Washington now, the Prime Minister and others in communication with Tel Aviv and the instantaneous capability of the Israelis to hold their forces back, I think you could get down to go in as well and get it stopped within the next fifteen minutes. I am not exaggerating, if you really move, it can be done within the next fifteen minutes. Then I will really go to work on this Goddamn solution of the Lebanese moving in with some assurance that I can pull it off. Over and out.

Amb. Veliotis. Over and out.

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-- We have just received word--coming on instructions from the President and Prime Minister of Lebanon, that a possibility has opened up for a solution to the problem of the PLO in West Beirut.

-- The Lebanese Government is prepared to negotiate with the PLO for deployment of the Lebanese Army into West Beirut, and on conditions for bringing the Palestinians under Lebanese Government authority.

-- The aim would be to get the PLO to lay down its arms and to give up the idea of conducting a military struggle in the future. The Lebanese Government will start this effort during the 48 hours beginning at 1200 Lebanon time June 17.

-- What the Lebanese Government needs is an iron clad guarantee from Israel conveyed by the U.S. and backed by the U.S. that you will not launch a military assault on the Palestinians in West Beirut during that 48-hour period.

-- Based on what you have told me about Israel's position on this situation, I am going to give the Lebanese that assurance, and say that the U.S. as well as Israel stands behind it. The details of how the forces act can be worked out on the spot between the IDF and LAF. As you know they are in direct contact.

-- If, during this 48-hour period, the Lebanese Government comes to an understanding along these lines that is acceptable, they will then want from Israel and the U.S. the further guarantee that the IDF will not interfere with or attack the

85 0251 : 7520 Lebanese Army as it moves into West Beirut and negotiates a resolution of the Palestinian presence there.

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-- If the Lebanese do not achieve a negotiated solution in the 48 hours, I want you to understand that does not mean Israel has a green light to attack into West Beirut. We would then simply revert to the situation we are in now -- a cease-fire -- and would have to discuss the situation at that point.

-- I also want you to know that Israel's undertaking during these 48 hours would not, of course, mean that you would not have the right of self-defence. But should any hostile act toward the IDF take place then I hope you would order your forces to act with the utmost restraint.

-- In addition, it has to be agreed that the Christian forces would also be bound by the guarantee during this period; they also would not assault the PLO in West Beirut.

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MEMCON ^{Habib} ~~Draper~~/State June 25 6:59am



For the Secretary

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As I have already made clear on secure phone messages, the Israelis are turning out heavy Beirut bombardments of West-Beirut and populated areas immediately to the south. A large bomb just fell in the heart of a heavily populated Muslim quarter, well north of a Palestinian camp and concentration. This is in addition to heavy artillery bombardment on a heavily populated area of West Beirut yesterday.

This air bombardment must stop immediately. If there is a real cease fire now, I may be able to talk to Walid, Berri and others that are resigning from the NSC and cabinet. I have only minutes.

This as a military onslaught, will make it far more difficult for Saudi Arabia and Egypt to help bring about a political solution here, and force the PLO to agree to the conditions in our message. The fractured Lebanese government may not be able to carry through, even if the PLO accepts our demands.

In short, chances of getting a political solution on the problem of West Beirut and the PLO are diminished by the bombing. I do not see what is going on as useful pressure from any standpoint.

Fifteen minutes after cease fire can hear from Yarze the bombs exploding from aircraft.

In my opinion, no matter what happens, aerial bombardment and indiscriminate artillery bombardment is intolerable in present circumstances.

SECRET
RDS - 1 06-25-02

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date: <i>1/27/50</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE	LC Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> Deny	<input type="checkbox"/> No Report		
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FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> , CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR	
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> , DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *Chen* IS/FPC/CDR Date. *11/27/91*
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FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () OADR
PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () OADR

6/28 3:30 a.m.

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0330 PHONE CONVERSATION WITH MORRIS DRAPER

DRAPER INDICATED THAT EARLIER WATCH OFFICER HAD ADVISED HABIB PARTY THAT WHITE HOUSE PLANNED TO COMMENT ON REUTERS ITEM OF EARLIER THIS EVENING REGARDING SUPPOSED NEW PLO OFFER. DRAPER REQUESTED THAT MESSAGE BE PASSED THAT IT IS STRONG VIEW OF ALL IN BEIRUT THAT NO COMMENTS SHOULD BE MADE ON SUCH PRESS REPORTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT PUBLIC COMMENT BE LIMITED TO "WE HAVE, OF COURSE, SEEN THESE REPORTS BUT HAVE NO COMMENT TO OFFER."

CALLED WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM AND PASSED ABOVE MESSAGE.

FYI: SUBSEQUENT REUTERS AND OTHER PRESS ITEMS HAVE BACKTRACKED FROM THAT STORY ANYWAY AND WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM WAS AWARE OF THAT AS WELL.

CC: SWO, NEA