



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

RELEASE IN FULL

THROUGH: S/S BAR-

FROM: ACDA - William C. Foster
IO - Joseph J. Sisco

W.C.F.
J.J.S.

SUBJECT: Site of NPT Signing

Pursuant to your request, we have set down the two principal alternatives and certain considerations affecting each. As you know, it would be desirable to be able to give Kuznetsov a specific indication at Friday's luncheon in New York.

The two alternatives which appear feasible are:

- 1) an initial signing at Geneva open only to those ENDC members who are prepared to sign at that time, with the treaty then being opened for further signatures at the three capitals of the three depositaries.
- 2) a signing ceremony simultaneously in the three capitals along the lines of the Outer Space Treaty.

As to Geneva, our present estimate is that 14 ENDC members would sign. This would include US, UK, Italy, Canada, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Nigeria, Sweden and Mexico. Romania and Ethiopia are probably signatories. India definitely will not sign and it is very doubtful that Brazil would sign this summer. Burma is uncertain. France, of course, has absented itself from the entire proceedings. We will take a hard nose count in New York this week. Such a ceremonial signing in Geneva would have the effect of increasing pressure on India, Brazil and Burma.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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It would also relieve some of the pressure on the Federal Republic of Germany, which is not an ENDC member, to sign immediately. We would want to precondition our agreement with the Soviets on Geneva as a site on a specific understanding that the East German problem would be avoided. This would of course be automatic if the initial signing ceremony was confined to ENDC members. We could expect good press coverage since there is still heavy attendance of the media people at the Vietnam talks in Paris. An initial signing limited to the ENDC in Geneva could be followed, if desired, by a second brief ceremony in the three capitals opening the treaty to signature by states other than ENDC members.

Closely related to the place of signature is the question of who should sign. While the President could himself go to Geneva, it would not seem desirable to create a summit exercise in connection with the signing, nor does this seem feasible in view of the short time span involved. (If we are to meet the President's desire to submit the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Congress this session, a signing ceremony should be arranged for the earliest possible date after conclusion of UN action). The President might designate a special representative, as was done in the case of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Perhaps it is most feasible and desirable for the signing to be at the Foreign Minister level, with Bill Foster accompanying you. You will recall that the Soviets on several occasions have suggested this, and we both believe this would be the most appropriate way to proceed. This would give you an opportunity for some side talks with Gromyko and a number of other Foreign Ministers. It would give you the added option, if desirable, of discussing the Vietnam developments with Ambassadors Harriman and Vance either in Geneva or in Paris on the way back.

The second alternative would probably also prove feasible.

We would want to be sure that, if the signature is open to all simultaneously in the three capitals, a sufficiently representative group was ready to sign. Otherwise the political

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and psychological benefits from 100 votes in the General Assembly might well be dissipated. Our conservative guess at present is that there would be about 40 to 50 signatures at such a ceremony. The advantage of the second alternative is that it would maximize exposure in Washington and prospect of larger senatorial participation.

We have seen Moscow's 4111 and do not feel it alters considerations set forth above.

We both feel it would be more effective for you to discuss this matter personally with the President than to send him a memorandum. The treaty could be made ready for signature within three weeks after the General Assembly acts.

IO:JJSisco:jmp
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