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THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

VOLUME II

PART II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

- A. INTRODUCTION
- B. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- C. OUTER-SPACE TREATY

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Reviewer

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INTRODUCTION

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During the Johnson Administration, basic American policy on arms control was determined by the President on the advice of the Committee of Principals. This body comprised the Secretary of State (Chairman), the Director, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA Director, the USIA Director, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and White House representatives. The Vice President sometimes joined the group. Nearly all arms-control policy initiatives came from ACDA. They were coordinated at the staff level with other agencies and often discussed by the Deputies - the Under Secretaries or Deputy Directors - before being submitted to the Committee of Principals. If the Principals were unable to agree, the issue could be taken to the President. ACDA maintained close liaison with the leaders of Congress and the members of key Congressional committees. Congressional views sometimes had an important influence in shaping American policy, e.g., on including safeguards provisions in the non-proliferation treaty.

Instructions to American delegations at disarmament conferences were drafted by ACDA or sometimes by the State Department. In either case, they went through the usual State Department clearance process and were communicated to other interested agencies. Position papers, originally submitted to the Committee of Principals, were later usually handled by clearance at the staff level.

The principal forum for international disarmament negotiations was the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), established by bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961.¹ It included five NATO members (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy), five Warsaw Pact members (the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania), and eight nonaligned countries (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, the UAR). France did not participate since President de Gaulle regarded the ENDC as a propaganda exercise, and others did not accept his proposal for direct negotiations among the five nuclear

¹See Robert W. Lambert, "The Origin of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee" (U) (Research Report 68-51), Secret.

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powers. Japan wished to join the ENDC, and we tried to get the Soviets to accept her and several other countries. This question was still under discussion at the end of the period.

The U.S. and Soviet representatives served as Co-Chairmen of the ENDC, with the daily chairmanship rotating among all members. The American delegation was usually led by ACDA Director William C. Foster or ACDA Deputy Director Adrian S. Fisher. Formerly, ACDA also had a resident Ambassador at Geneva. Clare H. Timberlake, the last man to occupy this post, was reassigned in 1966 and not replaced. Thereafter our delegation was headed by ACDA General Counsel George Rynn or ACDA Assistant Director Samuel D. Palma when both Mr. Foster and Mr. Fisher were absent.

Since various efforts to establish working groups failed, all business was conducted in the Co-Chairmen's meetings, in plenary meetings, or in occasional informal meetings. In 1962 the ENDC adopted an agenda for general and complete disarmament discussions,¹ but it was not until 1968 that it worked out an overall agenda including collateral measures.² While any delegation was free to speak on any subject at any time, the questions discussed usually expressed the interests of the Co-Chairmen or resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The ENDC reported to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, usually at the end of each session.

The theoretical basis of negotiations was the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles approved by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961.³ The Joint Statement provided for the continuation of negotiations until general and complete disarmament was achieved and outlined the general character of peacekeeping, balance, and verification. Agreement on verification was incomplete, however, since the Soviets refused to accept verification of levels of retained forces and armaments during the disarmament process. The Joint

¹Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 679-681.

²Ibid., 1968, p. 593.

³See Robert W. Lambert, "Historical Review and Analysis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (U)" (Disarmament Document Series, Memo 198), Secret. For the text of the joint statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442.

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Statement also allowed for "collateral" measures, i.e., measures to reduce international tension and facilitate general and complete disarmament. Although the Soviets showed a tendency at one point to shelve the Joint Statement, because we criticized their proposals for violating the "balance" principle, they did not persist in this.

Disarmament questions were also discussed by two U.N. organs, the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission. In the General Assembly, the principal debate usually took place in the First (Political and Security) Committee. The Disarmament Commission, which comprised all U.N. members, rarely met but was convened at Soviet request in 1965 after the General Assembly had been unable to play its usual role because of a dispute over the financial obligations of its members at the 19th session (1964). The permanent U.S. representatives to the United Nations - Ambassadors Stevenson, Goldberg, Ball, and Wiggins during this period - led the U.S. delegations in the General Assembly. Most of the disarmament work, however, was done by Foster, Fisher, De Palma, and ACDA officers assigned on an ad hoc basis.

Communist China did not belong to the ENDC or the United Nations. The only direct diplomatic contact between the United States and Communist China was maintained through their Ambassadors in Warsaw, who had been holding talks on various issues since 1958. Although these talks were usually polemical, we were able to use this channel for communicating disarmament proposals we had advanced in other forums.

When it became evident that the Chinese were about to enter the rank of the nuclear powers, the nonaligned nations developed great interest in bringing them into the general disarmament negotiations. The Cairo nonaligned conference (1964) called for a world disarmament conference. Shortly after this declaration, the Chinese exploded their first nuclear device and proposed a world summit conference to discuss complete nuclear disarmament and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. This proposal got a mixed reception. The USSR was the only nuclear power to accept it. We made no formal reply, and Secretary Rusk called it a "smokescreen."¹

¹See Robert W. Lambert and Jean Mayer, "Recent Proposals for a World Disarmament Conference" (Disarmament Document Series, Ref 400).

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At the Disarmament Commission (1965), Yugoslavia, with strong support from the UAR and India, sponsored a resolution for a world disarmament conference. We abstained from voting on this resolution, which was approved by a large majority.¹ A similar proposal was later adopted by the General Assembly. Although we doubted that the Chinese had any serious interest in disarmament, we expressed willingness to participate in an exploratory group as a preliminary step and supported the resolution on this basis.² We later informed the Chinese through the Warsaw channel that we would be willing to participate in an exploratory group, but they replied that they would not attend a disarmament conference or joint an exploratory group. They linked their refusal to the Vietnam war.³ They also declared that they would not participate in the ENDC, which they had not been invited to join.⁴

Since Eisenhower, the United States had had general and complete disarmament as its ultimate goal, and the Kennedy Administration introduced an elaborate plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (1962). This plan received its last revisions in 1963. It remained on the table but no longer occupied the center of the stage. American policy was soon almost entirely occupied with partial disarmament proposals, or "collateral" measures. Characteristically, the first major new initiative of the Johnson Administration - a proposal to freeze strategic nuclear delivery vehicles - emerged during discussion of an ACDA attempt to revise the first stage of the U.S. treaty outline on general and complete disarmament.

In his first message to the ENDC (January 21, 1964), President Johnson proposed the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles freeze, a fissionable materials production cutoff,

¹See James S. Bodnar, "Report on the Debate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, April 21-June 16, 1965" (Research Report 65-3), pp. 52-58.

²Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 529-530, 537, 585.

³To Warsaw, tel. 1752, May 23, 1966, Confidential/
Limdis; from Warsaw, agm. A-877, May 30, 1966, Confidential/
Limdis; from Warsaw, tel. 539, Sept. 7, 1966, Confidential/
Limdis; from Warsaw, agm. A-205, Sept. 8, 1966, Confidential.

⁴Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 355-359.

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observation posts to guard against surprise attack, a non-proliferation agreement, and a comprehensive test ban.¹ Except for observation posts, these proposals were to remain basic elements of American disarmament policy during the next four years.

¹Ibid., 1964, pp. 7-9.

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NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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Background¹

The first non-proliferation proposal was part of the Western "package" disarmament plan of August 29, 1957.² In the following years Ireland, Sweden, and other nonaligned countries took an increasing interest in the question. The United States was initially cool toward treating non-proliferation as a separate problem, since a non-proliferation agreement might interfere with Western nuclear defense arrangements or be evaded by the Soviet Union. It was with some reluctance that the United States supported the Irish resolution of 1959, and it did so largely on procedural rather than substantive grounds. The United States and most NATO countries voted against the Irish resolution of 1960, but four allies joined the USSR and the neutrals in supporting it.³ In 1961 the General Assembly unanimously approved still another Irish resolution, which was the starting point for subsequent negotiations. In this resolution the General Assembly called on "all states, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control over such weapons."⁴

Although the United States and the Soviet Union both supported the Irish resolution, they interpreted it differently. The United States believed that it envisaged an agreement banning the transfer of "control" of nuclear weapons and that such an agreement would be compatible with the deployment of American nuclear weapons on allied territory and permit the formation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The

¹Unless otherwise indicated, the "Background" section of this chapter is based on J.J. Kadilis (State/EUR/RPM), A History of Non-Dissemination Negotiations (1965), Secret.

²Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, p. 1547.

³Ibid., 1960, p. 373. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway supported the resolution.

⁴Ibid., 1961, p. 694.

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Soviet Union, however, centered its attention on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); it had long attacked allied nuclear defense arrangements for giving the FRG "access" to nuclear weapons, and it would insist that a non-proliferation agreement must block the MLF.

Bilateral American-Soviet negotiations began in March 1962 at Geneva, where Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko were attending the opening session of the ENDC. During a discussion of the German problem, Secretary Rusk suggested a bilateral declaration in which the United States and the Soviet Union would undertake not to relinquish control over nuclear weapons or to transmit information or material necessary for their manufacture to non-nuclear states and urge non-nuclear states to undertake not to obtain control over nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko found the American formula unsatisfactory because it could permit the nuclear arming of German forces under NATO command. He stressed that nuclear weapons should not be transferred either directly or indirectly or through third parties or military organizations. Secretary Rusk replied that the United States had no intention of giving nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr or any national forces, either directly or indirectly.

The NATO countries were generally favorable to the American efforts. The FRG emphasized that the agreement should not foreclose multilateral ownership arrangements, and it also insisted on Chinese Communist adherence. The Soviets, however, continued their attacks on the MLF. On May 9, 1963, they proposed a ban on transfer into national control or "group international control" and wished to prohibit "permanent or temporary, or even incidental access." Initially vague on the Chinese aspect, Mr. Gromyko informed Rusk and Home in September that an agreement would be worthwhile without French or Chinese participation. By that time the Chinese had made it clear that they would not subscribe to any non-proliferation agreement.

Seventh Session of the ENDC (January 21-April 28, 1964)

On January 7, 1964, Mr. Foster submitted to the Committee of Principals draft instructions to the American delegation to the forthcoming ENDC session. The delegation was to indicate

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that the United States was continuing private discussions with the USSR on a draft declaration based on the Irish resolution. The delegation would avoid public discussion of the terms of the declaration. It should state that the United States would not take any actions inconsistent with the resolution. It should also say that the United States was continuing to work toward the establishment of an MLF, which was consistent with the resolution. At the same time, the delegation should propose a nonacquisition agreement among the non-nuclear powers. The draft instruction also outlined related measures - extension of IAEA safeguards, the fissionable materials production cutoff, nuclear-free zones, and the destruction of bombers.¹ The basic non-proliferation provisions were retained in a revised memorandum of January 14, which took preliminary comments into account.²

The instruction was cleared and sent to the delegation, but the Geneva negotiations proved fruitless. Non-proliferation figured prominently in the President's message of January 21 to the ENDC, and Mr. Foster told the ENDC on February 6 that the United States would have private discussions with the Soviet Union on a non-proliferation declaration based on the Irish resolution. He declared that the United States did not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the resolution. The Soviets also reaffirmed support for non-proliferation but continued to lambast the MLF.³

During this ENDC session, the United States privately explored the possibility of unilateral nonacquisition declarations with its allies. While the British were sympathetic and the Canadians did not think that our draft went far enough, the project foundered on German and Italian objections. Foreign Minister Schroeder had said that the FRG could adhere to a nonacquisition agreement only after the MLF came into being, and the Foreign Ministry at Bonn indicated that the FRG would pursue the same policy on the declarations.⁴

¹Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Jan. 7, 1964, Confidential.

²Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Jan. 14, 1964, Confidential.

³See International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, p. 9.

⁴See J.J. Kadilllis, op. cit., pp. 17-18, Secret.

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New ACDA Approaches

The United States was clearly giving priority to the MLF at this time. On April 10 the President decided that we should continue to work for the MLF and try to conclude the negotiations by the end of 1964.¹

On May 20, Mr. Foster proposed a new approach to the Committee of Principals. The United States would offer the Soviet Union a choice between a revised agreement along the lines of the proposal that had previously been discussed and a new agreement that would deal with the MLF problem by leaving out the non-transfer provision and simply prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear nations. Under either agreement, non-nuclear nations would accept IAEA safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. Chinese accession would not be required in either case; since the Chinese would almost certainly refuse to sign, insistence on their participation would make any non-proliferation agreement impossible.

ACDA pointed out that the danger of proliferation was growing. If India, Israel, or Sweden started to manufacture nuclear weapons, the FRG would feel that it had accepted second-class status by joining the MLF. Since it was unlikely that the Soviets would accept any agreement that could be construed as sanctioning the MLF, the present policy meant that there could be no progress in non-proliferation until the MLF issue was settled. "This would not be a serious disadvantage," ACDA said, "were it not for the possibility that nuclear developments by other states might progress to a point which would not only cause a further break in the non-proliferation dyke, but...make the German relationship to the MLF untenable."²

In a memorandum of June 15 to the Committee of Principals, Mr. Fisher said that "we must face the fact that the Russian

¹See Foster, memorandum to Committee of Principals, "U.S. Position on a Program to Inhibit, and Hopefully Stop, Nuclear Proliferation," Apr. 15, 1965, Secret/Limdis.

²Foster to the Committee of Principals, memorandum, May 20, 1964, Secret, with attached draft paper, "Nuclear Non-proliferation Agreement," May 19, 1964, Secret.

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attitude toward the MLF is a major obstacle to agreement at this time," even though the United States knew that the MLF was not inconsistent with non-proliferation and could not accept the Soviet objections. He warned that relaxation of the non-proliferation effort could "well result in...foreclosing our last chances to close the floodgates to national proliferation" and make the MLF "ineffective and even dangerous." If other nations concluded that the United States was abandoning the non-proliferation effort because of NATO needs, the United States would have given "a green light to states now poised at the point of decision." Conversely, failure of the larger effort would create conditions in which the FRG would not be content with the MLF, even if it evolved into a European force.

Referring to the State Department view that MLF decisions should not be taken in the context of "disarmament policy," he pointed out that inaction would also have consequences and that public discussion of American non-proliferation policy could not be avoided in the disarmament negotiations. He therefore considered it important that the MLF charter contain a public commitment by the non-nuclear members not to acquire a national nuclear capability and that the United States refrain from giving the impression that the "European clause" could lead to an independent nuclear force unless at least one of the existing nuclear powers gave up its nuclear force.

He again recommended against insisting on Chinese adherence to a non-proliferation treaty. He proposed that general non-proliferation negotiations be continued during the MLF negotiations and that the United States should now take a policy decision, "as a matter of highest priority," to initiate an intensified effort to obtain a world-wide non-proliferation agreement when the MLF negotiations were concluded.¹

The other Principals were not prepared to accept the ACDA recommendations. At a Principals meeting of June 16, Secretary of State Rusk noted that the FRG insisted on Chinese adherence to a non-proliferation treaty. He wondered whether

¹Fisher to Rusk, memorandum, June 15, 1964, Secret/Limdis. Copies were also sent to the other Principals.

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the Senate would approve non-proliferation measures without it. Mr. Fisher replied that a non-proliferation treaty would be valuable even without Chinese adherence and that insisting on the participation of China would mean writing off the non-proliferation treaty as a viable measure. He said that most nations were tacitly accepting the fact that China would go nuclear.

Secretary Rusk then asked if there had been any thorough study of the Indian problem. Mr. Fisher knew of none but felt that it would be more desirable to deter nuclear attack on India than for that country to have its own nuclear capability. Secretary Rusk did not prejudge the question but noted that there was no U.S. position on opposing the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations once China obtained them.

Secretary Rusk then suggested that the United States might circulate a draft non-proliferation treaty to other nations and get their comments without commitment. In that way it could find out what nations would be willing to join. Mr. Fisher indicated that ACDA would study this approach. Both Secretary Rusk and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance questioned the ACDA recommendation for declarations by the non-nuclear members of the MLF since such declarations would not be required of other non-nuclear nations.¹

Resolution of the Organization of African Unity,
July 21, 1964

On July 21 a summit conference of the Organization of African Unity issued a declaration recalling the Irish resolution. The African leaders declared that they were ready to subscribe to a nonacquisition agreement, appealed to others to take the same course, asked the nuclear powers to respect the declaration, and proposed an international conference.²

¹Memcon, Meeting of Committee of Principals, June 16, 1964, Secret; Fisher to Foster, ltr., June 19, 1964, Secret/Limdis.

²Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 294-295.

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The OAU declaration and the imminence of the first Chinese test gave ACDA an opportunity to take the non-proliferation question to the Principals again. On August 14, Mr. Foster submitted a new draft position paper in which ACDA pointed out that the Chinese test would place pressure on other states to develop nuclear weapons for reasons of security or prestige. Once the process started, it might be impossible to stop it, and the United States might soon be faced with a world of 10 nuclear powers and later with a world of 20. ACDA recommended an intensified effort to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union and to develop the widest possible consensus in favor of non-proliferation. In dealing with the near-nuclear nations, the United States should "examine on a case-by-case basis the feasibility and desirability of bringing appropriate arguments, pressures and inducements to bear." It should consider the usefulness of "security arrangements or guarantees" where security concerns might cause a country to acquire nuclear weapons. India should be given high priority.

ACDA recommended that the United States (1) consider arrangements among nuclear suppliers to export only to countries with adequate safeguards, (2) try to prevent or delay dissemination of gas-centrifuge or similar technologies, and (3) continue efforts to strengthen the IAEA. In the negotiations with the Soviet Union, the United States should drop the Chinese accession requirement without initially disclosing this to the Soviets. It should provide the Soviet Union, when agreement was reached, with a letter providing reassurance that the European clause of the MLF charter would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities. It should also encourage MLF participants to make a nonacquisition commitment. The United States should advocate IAEA safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear states but accept an agreement without safeguards if the Soviet Union rejected them. ACDA saw promise in the OAU declaration and suggested that the Africans might be persuaded to sponsor a General Assembly resolution.¹

¹Foster to Rusk, memorandum, Aug. 14, 1964, Secret/NoFORN/Limdis.

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State Department officials agreed that the imminence of the Chinese test increased the need for measures to halt proliferation. They also thought that India should be given priority, and they agreed with ACDA on safeguards. While they recognized that the Chinese requirement would have to be dropped, they opposed doing so at once because of possible adverse allied and Indian reactions.

They strongly objected to the ACDA proposal on control of the MLF. Admitting that it was extremely unlikely that the United States would or should give up control, unless the European option became a reality, they argued that a commitment to the Soviet Union "could damage important US interests without increasing the likelihood of early Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement." In their view, it would impair relations with West Germany, strengthen the Gaullists, put the issue into British domestic politics, weaken European supporters of the MLF, and disrupt progress in setting up the MLF. At the same time, they asserted that the ACDA proposal would give the Soviets a club over the MLF without promoting the chances of a non-proliferation agreement, since the Soviets would continue to reject any agreement that did not bar the MLF. As an alternative, they suggested assurances to the Soviet Union after specific MLF arrangements had been worked out.

State opposed the ACDA proposal on the OAU declaration on the grounds that it could cause resentment among the allies and raise problems associated with nuclear-free zones.¹

The JCS did not think that the time was appropriate for expanding non-proliferation efforts, principally because the MLF negotiations were entering a critical stage. They were also concerned with the implication that the United States might negotiate a non-proliferation agreement bilaterally with the Soviet Union, without adequate NATO consultation. They wanted full interagency coordination of U.S. action on the Chinese explosion, and they had "reservations as to whether any non-proliferation agreement would be either fully effective or even acceptable to some nations without the adherence of the Chinese communists." They did not, however, object to the ACDA proposal on the OAU declaration, provided that it did not conflict with the MLF or U.S. transit rights.²

¹Memorandum by Garthoff (State-G/PM), "Comments on the ACDA Paper of Aug. 14 on Non-Proliferation," Aug. 25, 1964, Secret.

²JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (JCSM-726-64), Aug. 24, 1964, Secret.

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Thompson Committee

Instead of convening the Committee of Principals to consider the ACDA paper, Secretary of State Rusk decided to establish a committee to consider what further action should be taken to prevent proliferation. The new committee, chaired by Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, comprised the Deputies to the Principals, the Assistant Secretaries of State for Europe and Near Eastern-South Asian Affairs, and the Chairmen of the Policy Planning Council.¹

On October 14 the Thompson Committee submitted a report on the Indian problem. It considered the following courses of action:

- (1) To assist India to develop a nuclear weapon capability;
- (2) To be prepared to impose economic and other sanctions in an effort to prevent India from going the nuclear weapons route;
- (3) To reinforce India's stated policy of confining its nuclear development to peaceful purposes; and
- (4) To do nothing on a bilateral basis to influence Indian policy on nuclear matters.

Since the committee considered it to be in the U.S. national interest to keep India from going nuclear, it eliminated alternatives 1 and 4. It opposed sanctions because of the importance of preserving the relationship between the United States and India.

In order to keep India in the peaceful nuclear path, the committee recommended high-level consultations with Indian leaders, increased cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities, closer relations in non-proliferation efforts,

¹Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Aug. 24, 1964, Secret.

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consultations with other governments, and assurances. The United States should privately assure the Indians "of our support if they are attacked by Communist China and possibly, indicating we would have no objection to their seeking similar assurances from the Soviet Union." The United States would respond to Indian requests for aid against Chinese aggression, make a prompt response if the Chinese used nuclear weapons against India, and make a public statement regarding its response to Chinese use of nuclear weapons against another Asian state.¹

Policy for the 19th General Assembly

On the day the Thompson Committee submitted its report, the Chinese carried out their first test. President Johnson immediately announced that the United States would continue its non-proliferation efforts and assured nations which did not seek nuclear weapons that they would have American support against nuclear blackmail threats if they needed it. The Indians showed an interest in a guarantee by the nuclear powers against nuclear attack. The nonaligned countries had previously (October 10) issued a declaration in which they endorsed non-dissemination and nonacquisition.²

It appeared therefore that non-proliferation would be widely debated at the 19th General Assembly if the financial dispute which paralyzed that session could be settled.³ The Thompson Committee prepared a draft resolution which Mr. Foster sent the Principals on November 12. He noted three questions:

- (1) Should it include a nonacquisition pledge?

¹Foster to Committee on Principals, memorandum, Oct. 14, 1964, Secret/Limdis, with attached paper, "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action," Secret/Limdis, with Secret/NoFORN attachments.

²See International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 11-13.

³Since the Soviet Union and six other U.N. members had not met certain financial obligations, they were liable to lose their voting rights. As it turned out, the 19th General Assembly refrained from taking any action that required a formal vote.

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(2) Should it call on non-members of the United Nations to undertake the same obligations?

(3) Should it preempt debate on the MLF by including language which would not inhibit the MLF negotiations?¹

The question was discussed by the Principals on November 23. Secretary of State Rusk asked whether the United States should continue to oppose proliferation. Why should it be the United States which would have to use nuclear weapons against Communist China? He suggested that there might be situations where it might be desirable for the Japanese and Indians to have their own nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense McNamara doubted that they would ever have a suitable deterrent, and he proposed a study. He asked whether a non-proliferation policy meant an automatic security guarantee to all countries, and commented that this would be a major policy change.

Mr. Foster observed that the draft resolution would not preclude a different policy that might develop from the proposed studies. Secretary Rusk, though skeptical about the depth of interest in disarmament among many countries, agreed that the non-proliferation policy should continue. AEC Chairman Seaborg saw no alternative, since anything else would involve a loss of U.S. control. The Principals approved the draft resolution but added safeguards to the nonacquisition provision.²

Because of its financial crisis, the 19th General Assembly never got down to business on disarmament. However, Secretary of State Rusk saw Gromyko in New York and emphasized continued American interest in non-proliferation. The Soviet Foreign Minister was still violently opposed to the MLF and brushed aside Rusk's remarks on possible Soviet nuclear aid to China and the Warsaw Pact countries. Secretary Rusk said that there were two aspects of the nuclear question - possession and the position of being target countries like the FRG and

¹Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Nov. 12, 1964, Secret, with attached paper, "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Nov. 9, 1964, Secret.

²Memcon, Committee of Principals, Nov. 23, 1964, Secret.

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Italy. There was no question of giving the Germans or Italians access to nuclear weapons through the MLF. It was not clear to him whether Soviet objections to the MLF were based on non-dissemination or on other factors. If it was the former, we could meet the Soviet concern; arrangements would be built into the MLF to make sure that it did not lead to acquisition.

Mr. Gromyko replied that the USSR opposed the MLF on broad political grounds, because of FRG revisionism. The USSR could not rely on assurances or locks or technical devices for its security because these were subordinate to policy. If the United States had already taken a decision on the MLF, it was assuming a heavy responsibility. Moscow regarded the establishment of the MLF in any form as a "hostile act," and the USSR and its allies would draw appropriate conclusions for their security.¹

Proposed Approach to New Soviet Leaders

On November 24, after the ouster of Khrushchev, Mr. Foster sent the Principals a memorandum in which he outlined a six-point program to take up with the new Soviet leaders. He proposed that the United States indicate willingness to include in a non-proliferation agreement an assurance that "the MLF would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons." Present American policy left open the possibility that the MLF would lead to a European nuclear force not controlled by the present nuclear powers, and the Soviets took the view that this would be an independent entity which could be controlled by the FRG. Through Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns, the United States had informed the Soviets that any such change would imply a European political evolution involving a melding of present national nuclear forces. It had not, however, offered to include such a commitment in a non-proliferation agreement, since this would enable the British to veto future MLF evolution without joining, while they might otherwise feel impelled

¹From New York, tel. SECTO 28, Dec. 5, 1964, Secret.

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to join in order to gain a veto right. "Given the present political situation with respect to the MLF," Mr. Foster observed, "this reason no longer seems controlling." We should, therefore, inform the Soviets that we were willing to include in a non-proliferation agreement "an assurance that the MLF would not be sued to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons."¹

This paper was modified after informal consultations with the Principals, and a revised version was circulated on December 3. ACDA now proposed that we indicate our willingness to include "an assurance that the MLF would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons, or alternatively, an assurance that the U.S. will keep its veto" over the MLF. Since the Soviets would probably not act on non-proliferation until there had been a decision on the MLF, it would probably not be wise to offer either alternative in the interim.²

AEC Chairman Seaborg generally concurred but added that IAEA safeguards should be included in the non-proliferation agreement. Experience with the Soviet Union in IAEA led him to believe that it would be willing to include safeguards.³ CIA Director McCone thought that the whole effort might be premature and proposed postponing a decision.⁴

Speaking for the State Department, Ambassador Thompson preferred to pursue the General Assembly resolution. He did not think that it was desirable to make an approach to the Soviets at this time on the European clause of the MLF and

¹Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Nov. 24, 1964, Secret, with attached paper, "Subjects to be discussed with the U.S.S.R.," Nov. 23, 1964, Secret. For the Luns démarche, see Kadilllis, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

²Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Dec. 3, 1964, Secret, with attached paper, "Subjects to be discussed with the U.S.S.R.," Dec. 3, 1964, Secret/Limdis.

³Seaborg to Foster, ltr., Dec. 10, 1964, Secret.

⁴McCone to Foster, ltr., Dec. 10, 1964, Secret.

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